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GLOSSARY
Bakr-Id
Bigha
Choudhri
Fatwa
See Id,
Unit of land; somewhat smaller than an 
acre •
Traditional leader.
Religious document of the Muslim community; 
usually contains a clarification, 
interpretation, or injunction of Muslim 
law by one or more Muslim divines.
Gurukul
Id
Gal i
Idgah
Karewa
Karkhandars
Khutba
Kotwal 
Lathi
Madrassah
Mohalla
Qarbani
Sanatana
Sanatana 
Dharma
Shariah
Sharif
Swadeshi
Swaraj
Narrow dead-end lane.
Centre for traditional Hindu learning.
Id-ul-Fitr - day on which the fast of 
Ramadan is broken; Id-ul-Zuha - occurs 
one month and ten days after Fitr-Id 
and is celebrated by performing garbani 
(also called Bakr-Id)„ See page l6l, 
note 1 for Muslim 'festival cycle*.
Large mosque in which the Ic3 prayers 
are said.
Widow-marriage«
A social group in the Muslim community 
which includes both the industrial 
labourer and the employer.
Religious sermon delivered in the mosque 
on Fridays after the mid-day prayers.
Police station; head of the police force
Wooden stave which has one end capped 
with brass.
Muslim college.
Area within traditional Indian city with 
its own shops, leaders, etc.; unit of 
urban administration under the Moguls.
Sacrifice of cattle, sheep, or goats on 
Id-ul-Zuha.
Orthodox (Hindu).
Orthodox religion (Hindu).
Corpus of tradition and knowledge from 
which all Muslims derive guidance and 
inspiration.
Well-born (Muslim).
Of one's own country; native; indigenous 
Self-government; independence.
INTRODUCTION
'Delhi, I9II-I9 2 2 1 stems from a discussion with 
Ravinder Kumar in April 1 9 6 6. The investigation which 
arose from that discussion rested on the hypothesis 
that the transfer of the imperial capital from Calcutta 
to Delhi, a transfer which took place on 1 October 1913» 
resulted in significant social and political changes in 
the city. The major drawback to such a study lay in 
the fact that there were no extant local newspapers for 
the period« The major advantage lay in the fact that 
in view of Delhi's special relationship with the 
Government of India, a larger number of communications 
on matters of policy and action passed between the Delhi 
Administration and the Government of India, than was 
the case for many similar administrative areas,,
The material available did not prove conducive to 
substantiating or disproving this hypothesis» What the 
available material does substantiate is the thesis that 
nationalism in Delhi transformed the limited horizons 
of a restricted number of educated persons who 
participated in politics in the city prior to 1911 into 
a movement which drew upon new classes and communities 
and which focussed upon issues of all-India significance. 
The corollary to this thesis is that the growth of 
political consciousness contributed to a heightened 
awareness of parochial issues»
The thesis, then, is most concerned with who 
participated in nationalist politics in the city of 
Delhi between 1911 and 1922 and why they did so. The
ix
work of George Rude on the French Revolution offers 
the greatest methodological insight into the problem 
of assessing mass participation in political movements. 
It will become obvious to the reader, however, that 
nothing like the detailed evidence upon which Rude 
depends is available to the historian of modern India» 
Three devices have been adopted to circumvent this 
difficulty and to add another dimension to such a study. 
The first is to analyse the social structure and social 
values of the various communities in the city; the 
second is to analyse the political state of mind of the 
members of various communities; and the third is to 
analyse collections of people in terms of whether they 
were an audience, a crowd, or a mob. These terms are 
defined in the following manner:
audience - an assembly of listeners that
usually collects for a specific 
purpose (i.e. to hear a speaker 
on a known subject).
crowd - a collection of people that has 
a focus of interest, but usually 
has little cohesion, and has no 
proclivity to violence.
mob - a collection of people that has
a focus of interest, coheres, and 
will follow spontaneous leadership.
It usually proceeds to activities 
of a violent nature.
By analysing social values, states of mind, and the 
manner in which people gathered, it is possible to make 
qualified assertions about who was drawn into political 
activity and why those people responded to the issues 
that were raised.
XSome mention should be made of the use of 
particular terms in this study,. The word “Delhi* 
always denotes the rural and urban portions of the 
Province of Delhi as constituted on 1 October 1912.
Delhi Province refers to the rural areas only and the 
Delhi urban area refers to the Delhi Municipality plus 
Delhi City. Delhi City refers to the new imperial 
area, the New Cantonment, and the Civil Linesc
The words 'provincial*, 'national*, and ’parochial* 
are used frequently and deserve to be noted« The word 
provincial is used to denote an attitude or issue which 
depends upon a restricted geographical context, narrow 
intellectual horizons, and limited participation. The 
word national is used to denote a sentiment or ideal 
which depends upon the widest possible geographical 
context, unlimited intellectual horizons, and mass 
participation« The word parochial is used to denote a 
susceptibility which stems from a rigid adherence to 
group identity, and can depend upon religion, social 
origin, birth, occupation, and so forth.
And finally the words 'Moderate* and ’Extremist' 
call for some comment. These words are taken over 
completely from the official records. The term Moderate 
is used to denote those who accepted a slow pace of 
political change with a goal as some type of responsible 
government. The term Extremist denotes those who wished 
to increase the pace of political change and who sought 
some form of complete self-government. The Extremists 
in turn disagreed upon the pace of political change and 
divided into moderate Extremists and radical Extremists. 
The Moderates believed in a homogeneous political
community of the educated elite while the radical 
Extremists sought to gain support from the illiterate 
and poor. The moderate Extremists were never sure 
which type of community they supported, but their 
élite origins and responsible positions in the society 
usually decided them against the radicals.
The study that follows is divided into two parts: 
society in Delhi and politics in Delhi. The first 
three chapters which make up Part One, describe the 
physical environment, the social structure and the 
social values of the inhabitants of Delhi. These 
three chapters lay the foundation for the five chapters 
which follow and provide the basis for a discussion 
and analysis of political events. The three chapters 
which describe political life in the new imperial 
capital of India between 1911 and 1919 concentrate 
upon political crises which occur in May 1915» October 
1917, and April 1919» These crises reveal the variety 
of response which resulted from the evocation of 
nationalist sentiments and parochial issues. The last 
two chapters concentrate on the first non-co-operation 
movement and its corollary, the civil disobedience 
campaign. The movement witnessed the gradual 
disenchantment with politics by the inhabitants of the 
city, a disenchantment which reinforced the reaction 
to the Rowlatt Satyagraha of April 1919» and which 
heightened parochial attitudes among the citizens of 
Delhi.
xi
PART ONE
DELHI ACQUIRES IMPERIUM 
Society in the New Imperial Capital of India
We are pleased to announce to Our people that...We have 
ecided upon the transfer of the seat of the Government 
f India from Calcutta to the ancient capital of Delhi..,
Announcement of George V 
Imperial Durbar, Delhi,
12 December 1911.
Chapter One
CONDITIONS IN DELHI ON THE BRINK OF IMPERIUM
I
The Milieu 
II
The Administration
III
Education and Literacy
IV
The Economy
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The area between the River Sutlej and the River 
Ganges was the marchland of India. The area was a 
marchland because it marked the southeast boundary of 
the fertile plains of the Indus River system, and it 
also marked the northwest extremity of the expansive 
plains of the Ganges River system.^ This area, which 
acted as a geographic divide, also acted as a divide 
in terms of the population of the respective river 
systems. The population to the northwest of this 
marchland was predominantly Muslim in religion while 
the population on the southeast was predominantly Hindu.
A series of cities arose at the junction of the 
Aravalli Ridge and the River Jumna which lay in the 
heart of the marchland. They were the capital cities 
of successive dynasties which sought to exercise control 
over the north of India, and to protect their territories
1
O.H.K, Spate and A.T.A. Learmonth, India and Pakistans 
A General and Regional Geography (3rd edition; London, 
1 9 6 7), pp. 5 ^ 1 - 2 . ’It is hardly necessary to emphasize 
the larger nodality of Delhi: the gateway between the 
Thar-Aravalli barrier and the Himalaya; the marchland 
position between the northwest, ever accessible to new 
waves of invasion and cultural intrusion, and the shock- 
absorbing Gangetic Plains: the convergence of the routes 
from the ancient Cambay ports and the Deccan by Rajputana 
and Malwa. But not only is the general area thus marked 
out as the great crossroads of the sub-continent: the 
pattern is reproduced in detail by the famous Ridge, the 
worn and arid last spur of the Aravallis, pointing like 
a lean but wiry finger straight to the Yamuna.' Another 
aspect of the marchland has been studied in A.S. Jauhari, 
'Growth and Development of Urban Settlement in the 
Sutlej-Yamuna Divide' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of London, 1 9 6 1).
2from subsequent invasions along the same route,'*' The
Mogul Emperor Shah Jehan (1 6 2 7-I6 5 8) built the most
recent but one of these capitals in 1648. This was the
city of Shahjehanabad which became one of the centres
of resistance during the Mutiny of 1857. Slightly
altered, it was the same city that George V named as
2his new imperial capital on 12 December 19.11«
I
The Delhi Municipality was composed of three 
distinct units in 1911s the Civil Lines, the walled 
city and the suburbs outside the walled city, all of 
which covered 1 6 . 7  square miles. By 1921 the Civil 
Lines area had grown to such an extent that it formed a 
separate notified area, as had two new administrative 
units, the Imperial Area (that is, New Delhi), and the 
New Cantonment which enlarged the Delhi urban area to 
65 square miles. These three notified areas receive 
short shrift in this study since they do not enter into 
the political story.
1
For a description of the various cities that arose 
near Delhi see S.S. Bhatia, 'Historical Geography of 
Delhi', Indian Geographer, I (August 195Ó), 17-^3; H. 
Bullock, Fifteen Cities of Delhi (Delhi, 195l); G. Hearn, 
The Seven Cities of Delhi (2nd edition, Calcutta, 1928).
The city of Delhi is located at 28° 38' north latitude. 
This is approximately the same latitude as that of Cairo 
and Canton. It is between Tampa and Jacksonville,
Florida and between Brownsville and Houston, Texas.
3The Delhi Municipality which our political story 
does concern covered 10 square miles and was composed of 
the four suburbs outside the walled city and the walled 
city itself. The four suburbs outside the walled city 
were Pahargunj, Sadar Bazaar, Sabzimandi and Karol Bagh. 
Pahargunj was located to the southwest of the city. It 
was a slum which had grown up in the proximity of the 
Idgah [large mosque in which the Id festival is held].
The houses of Pahargunj were of kaccha [mud and straw or 
unbaked bricks] construction and the impecunious and 
undernourished inhabitants were predominantly Muslim,
The noticeable lack of sewage drains, adequate streets, 
and water supply led the Deputy Commissioner to agree 
with the Health Officer that the suburb of Pahargunj was 
in a 'very backward state.’^ The population of this 
suburb tended to grow very quickly with the development 
of the new imperial capital. A stone quarry at Jhandewal 
and the railway station for the new capital impinged upon 
its borders. These works attracted labourers who resided 
in temporary bastis [frail tent-like structures of thatch 
or straw] and were responsible for transforming what was 
already a slum into a filthy pest hole.
Sadar Bazaar was situated directly to the west of
the walled city and nestled between the two heights of
the ridge. It was the centre of the wholesale trade.
With the convenience of a railway goods station, the
merchants were able to receive, store, and despatch
2products from the three ports of India. The largest
 ^ RDDA, Education File 265 Part B 1915» 'Annual Report on 
the Working of the Municipal Committee, Delhi'.
2 ,Delhi was 9^0 miles by rail from Karachi, 950 miles
from Calcutta, and 960 miles from Bombay.
ksingle group of wholesalers living there were the 
Panjabian,^ There was a solid air of prosperity about 
Sadar Bazaar, although its merchants displayed little 
of their wealth.
Further west lay the suburb of Sabzimandi on the 
western side of the ridge« The suburb was two miles 
from the Kabul Gate of the city and had its own railway 
station. It began originally as the vegetable market 
for the city, but later major industries developed in 
this area. The employees of the factories lived in very 
cheap sub-standard housing in dirty galis that lacked 
any sewage drains. This coupled with the congestion to 
give the suburb a very unprosperous air.
The fourth suburb was Karol Bagh, which too lay on 
the western side of the ridge, opposite Pahargunj„ This 
area was the centre of the leather tanning industry and 
as such the Khatiks and Chamars were its inhabitants. It 
was small and had the dejected air which hung over any 
outcaste cluster.
The walled city of Delhi was irregularly shaped to 
follow the original course of the Jumna River. The 
river wall measured 2^ - miles. The distance from the 
Water Bastion at the north-east corner to the Mori
3Bastion on the north-west corner was jr- of a mile. The 
distance from the Mori Bastion to the Wellesley Bastion 
which was in the extreme south-east was 2 ~  miles. There 
were four gates on the river wall, the most notable of 
which was the Rajghat Gate. The northern wall contained
1
The Panjabian, a group of Muslim merchants, are 
described below in Chapter III,
5the Kashmiri and the Mori gates. The western and 
southern wall contained the following gates, going from 
north to souths the Kabul, Lahore, Farrashkhanna,
Ajmer, Turkman, and Delhi gates.
There were three categories of thoroughfares in 
Delhi Municipalityj the gali, the street and the bazaar. 
The gali [a narrow, dead-end laneJ was the smallest of 
these. It emptied onto a wider ’street’, which in turn 
emptied onto an even wider avenue called a bazaar, The 
latter constituted the main thoroughfare for each 
moha11a. The wealthiest citizens maintained impressive 
houses on the main bazaars and some of the select streets 
and galis. The wealthier merchants lived on the streets 
and the major bazaars"*“ in houses which included their 
business premises on the ground floor and their living 
quarters on the first and second floors. Merchants 
dealing in similar commodities tended to concentrate in 
the same bazaars or moha11a ; thus the cloth merchants 
lived in Chandni Chauk, the jewellers in Dariba, and the 
grain merchants in Naya Bans. The petty industrialists 
and petty shopkeepers tended to follow the same 
residential pattern as the merchants and lived above 
their shops. They were more than likely located on the 
streets and on the less important bazaars. The more 
important artisans also had their workshops on the ground 
floor and lived in the upper stories. They tended to be 
located primarily on the streets, and less generally on 
the ga 1 i s , but they rarely lived on the bazaars. The
I '
The major bazaars were Chandni Chauk, Dariba, Faiz 
Bazaar, Nai Sarak [Egerton Road], Ballimaran, Lai Kua, 
Sita Ram, Chowri Bazaar, Urdu Bazaar, Naya Bans, Kashmiri 
Gate, and Mori Gate.
petty artisans usually worked at home. They lived almost 
exclusively in the ga 1 is , and turned the lanes into 
workshops during the day. The artisans, large and small, 
who worked at the same handicraft, lived in the same area.
The galis presented a stark appearance to the 
observer, The building ordinances required that the gali 
should remain at least eight feet wide, But the two- and 
three-storied buildings on each side, and the open- 
drained sewers along both edges (or down the middle) made 
the ill-ventilated and ill-lighted buildings almost as 
dark and foul-smelling as the gali itself,^ The petty 
artisans, labourers, minor clerks, and such groups that 
could not afford the larger, lighter, more airy residences 
on the streets and bazaars, lived in the gali. Others 
lived there by inclination because their families had 
always lived there. This meant that the gali was rarely 
homogeneous in terms of caste or sect, or occupation.
But the gali was usually homogeneous in terms of the 
incomes, and the intellectual horizons, of its residents.
The living conditions in the galis in Delhi 
exacerbated all the other causes of the high mortality
1
An observer noted that: ’Most of the lanes [galis1 
are absolutely unfit for human habitation,... Some of 
them are so dark and dingy that artificial light is 
needed even during the day.’ A.N. Agrawal, Economic 
Conditions and Problems of Delhi Province (n.d.,
19**3), p. 59.
7rate in the city.^ The open sewers, the lack of sanitary
2facilities for a large proportion of the population, 
the large number of animals quartered within the city,
1
The mortality rate in the Punjab over the decade was 
36.2 per mille, with the rate for those aged 0-5 at 44.7 
and for those aged 6-60+ at 20.0. Census of India, 1921, 
XV (Punjab and Delhi), Part II (Tab1e s ). The mortality 
rate in Delhi in 1912 was 43.74 per mille, with infant 
mortality at 284 per 1,000 male births, and mortality of 
those aged 1-60+ at 30.4. Government of India Commercial 
Intelligence Department, Statistical Abstract for British 
India from 1911-12 to 1920-21 (Calcutta, 1923)* pp .
375-97» Table 1-A lists the natality rate and mortality 
rates for the decade.
2
When Delhi became the imperial capital of India, the 
Administration launched a large number of improvement 
schemes designed to ameliorate the most noticeable abuses 
of sanitation. One such abuse was the presence in some 
houses of a small two-story tower which permitted the 
passage of night soil from the first floor to the ground 
floor to be cleaned out in the morning by sweepers. These 
were gradually replaced during the decade. It also 
attempted to provide more facilities for garbage, and to 
provide latrines in areas where population was most dense, 
and the facilities most lacking. Land acquisition was a 
slow process, and on at least one occasion the Municipal 
Committee divided on communal lines about the acquisition 
of property on Chandni Chauk. RDDA, Education File 155 
Part B 1913» ’Question of the Acquisition of Land for 
the Erection of Latrines in the Chandni Chauk at Delhi.' 
The process of modernisation caused a great deal of 
turmoil in the city throughout the decade. See 
especially RDDA, Education File 8 Part A 1921,
'Development of the Kadam Sharif Area with Respect to 
the Improvements to Roads and the Locality in and about 
the Vicinity.'
and the lack of ventilation in the galis compounded the
2incidence of cholera, smallpox, typhus, and malaria.
The disease that caused the highest mortality, however,
3was tuberculosis, The lack of ventilation m  the foetid 
galis increased the harm caused by the cow-dung fires, 
the smoke from which hung like a pall over the city.
the prevalence of flies, the shortage of clean water,
1
A very large number of cows inhabited the city. Most 
of these were for milk, but there was also a substantial 
number of devoted Hindus who kept cows for religious 
merit. The cows caused an especially acute problem as 
there was no adequate system of sewage in the city, since 
they drew a large number of flies which was mainly 
responsible for the spread of diarrhoea among infants, 
and since the cows were fed garbage a large proportion 
of which was manure, because it was cheapest. The number 
of cows increased in the city during the decade as more 
land was acquired for the new capital. The Administration 
sought to impose a tax on cattle to drive them out, with 
which the Deputy Commissioner disagreed since it might 
arouse those Hindus who kept cows out of religious 
sentiment, RDDA, Education File 4l Part B 1916, 'Proposed 
Imposition of a Tax on Female Buffaloes Maintained within 
the Delhi Municipal Limits.'
2
The Administration worked very hard to reduce the 
incidence of all these diseases, They sprayed wells and 
the Bela in order to reduce malaria, in which they 
succeeded to a large degree by the end of the decade.
They also carried out a large number of vaccinations 
during the decade, but since the programme was voluntary, 
they still experienced a high incidence of death from 
this disease. Cholera and typhus were much more difficult 
problems, since they prevailed in unsanitary conditions. 
The Administration could guarantee a fairly high standard 
of purity in its water system. But large numbers of 
people still depended upon local wells, the purity of 
which was highly questionable.
3
RDDA, Confidential File 106 (1916), 'Report on 
Tuberculosis in India by A, Lankster.'
9The confinement of women inside the house in purdah and 
the very tight clothing worn by Muslim boys also 
contributed to the high incidence of tuberculosis, In 
such conditions it was no surprise that an influenza 
epidemic wiped out 7,000 people in three months in 
1918,1
A bazaar, together with the streets and the galis
associated with it, formed a moha11a. The mohalla was
the unit of urban administration during Mogul rule, The
moha 1.1a had its own set of shops and amenities, police
and leaders. The British combined several moha11as into
administrative and electoral wards of which there were
2nine within the walled city in 1921,
Ward I north of Queen's Road predominantly housed 
the affluent families and businesses of Delhi. The 
kacheri nestled along the eastern wall and banks and 
churches were scattered throughout, This area had a 
high status value as it was closest to the Civil Lines 
(the European suburb), and because it contained the 
shops of the Europeans. It also had a number of hotels. 
Ward I looked northward rather than southward and was
1
RDDA, Home File 33(a) Part B 1919» 'Report and 
investigations in Connection with the Influenza 
Epidemic,'
2
There were 12 administrative wards within the walled 
city in 1911. These made up the eight electoral wards. 
There were in addition four administrative wards 
outside the walls, the combination of which formed 
three electoral wards. There were thus 15 administrative 
wards and 11 electoral wards. In 1922 the number of 
electoral wards was increased to 1 2, with nine of those 
within the walled city.
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separated from the rest of the city by the railway 
tracks over which there were only two bridges. It was 
largely Hindu in its population.
Although the Queen’s Gardens occupied a large 
portion of Ward II north of Chandni Chauk and Khari 
Baoli, a great number of Hindu merchants were 
concentrated there, The grain market flourished in 
Naya Bans; and the grain merchants along with the cloth 
merchants of Chandni Chauk formed the most prosperous 
class in Delhi. This ward also had a predominantly 
Hindu population.
Chandni Chauk, which formed the boundary of four 
wards, epitomised the gaiety and bustle of the city. It 
was known predominantly for its cloth shops, although 
shops of all sorts were found there, Chandni Chauk had 
churches, banks, cinemas, mosques, a gurdwara, the Town 
Hall, and above all, an over abundance of people. The 
rich and the poor, the lame and the blind thronged its 
footpaths, Beggars, tourists, and businessmen walked 
shoulder to shoulder along its length. E.M. Forster was 
entranced by the Chauk when he came to Delhi in 1913:
We [Forster and the Rajah of Dewas State, Senior 
Branch] drove into the City, and came across his 
brother and various members of the court who had 
been shopping. Much excitement, and we drove on, 
but no sooner had we gone twenty yards than he 
thought it would be fun to have them all with us. 
But they had got into the electric tram to have 
the experience, which was new to them, and we 
followed madly in their wake, blocked by 
buffaloes and camels and goats and cows and 
sweetmeat sellers and pariah dogs. The tram was 
disappearing, but the coachman, at the Rajah’s 
orders, leapt from the box and pursued it on foot, 
shouting, After five minutes he came back,
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leading the whole procession who got in, 
together with their purchases of briar-pipes, 
tobacco, mechanical monkeys for the children, 
writing-paper, ink, paper parcels of every 
size and shape,^
Sidney Low, who toured northern India in 1905* described
Chandni Chauk in the same graphic terms. He saw the main
street of the city 'swarming with eager life.' He noted
the 'laden bullock-carts, the carriages, and the tongas,
pushing their way through the broad crowded street'; and
he heard the buzz of voices that rose from the 'chattering
2multi-coloured throng.'
The Red Fort was at one end of the Chauk and the 
Fatehpuri Mosque at the other. The Town Hall (with the 
Clock Tower immediately in front) and the Northbrooke 
Fountain served as foci for people to gather and talk, 
and for hawkers to peddle their wares.
Ward III (Dariba) had a large number of craftsmen 
and handicraft shops. Jewellery, and ivory and wood 
carving was a speciality. T. L. Pennell, an English
 ^ E.M. Forster, The Hill of Devi (Hammondsworth, 1965), 
p. 27.
2
Sidney Low, A Vision of India (London, 191l), pp. 168-9. 
Another description is not so complimentary: 'The Chandni 
Chauk "Moon Light Square", the principal street of Delhi, 
which was once supposed to be the richest street of its 
time, has fallen from its high estate....Now it is the 
abode of the jewellers, silver smiths, ornament-sellers, 
shoes and general merchants and ivory workers of Delhi, 
but the jewels are seldom valuable and the carving has 
lost much of its old delicacy.' H. Mokkaddas Mirza,
The Delhi Visit (Delhi, [l924?]), pp. iv-v.
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medical doctor who toured India in 1911» described it as 
f‘o H o w s :
Pass on into the old ' dariba’ so famous in the 
days of the Mughals, down picturesque, old- 
fashioned little streets, crowded with a motley 
assembly, jostling one another in the narrow 
ways. Do not be deterred by the unattractive, 
almost squalid, appearance of the shops, but 
enter a few, and you will find arrayed before 
you a wealth of silver ornaments and ivory 
carvings which would be enough to set up a shop 
in Regent Street. There are no tables or chairs, 
but there is a clean white sheet spread over the 
mats on the floor, and a profusion of cushions 
and pillows, and round the walls is a picturesque 
dado of hand-painted cloth, Oriental in design 
and bizarre in execution. The silver and ivory 
work which is perfected in these dark little dens 
cannot be rivalled anywhere. In these same 
streets you hear the musical rhythm of the beating 
out of the gold and silver foil for the 
confectioners, which is done by men beating in 
unison on marble slabs.1
This ward was predominantly Muslim in population, but the 
shopkeepers were mostly Hindu.
Ward IV (Malewara), and Ward V (Gali Qasim Jan), 
were predominantly Hindu and commercial. They were 
fairly prosperous wards with many wealthy men, Hindus 
and Muslims, living there.
Ward VI (Farrashkhanna), Ward VII (Bazar Sita Ram), 
Ward VIII (Churiwalan), and Ward IX (Faiz Bazar) comprised 
the rest of the walled city. These wards contained the 
majority of the poor and labouring classes in the city, 
especially along the walls. The Muslims had a slight
1
T.L. Pennell, Things Seen in Northern India (London,
1912), pp. 158-9-
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numerical majority in the wards but the poorer Rajputs, 
Jats, Chamars, Chuhras, karkhandars  ^ and artisans all 
lived here. Their energies were wholly absorbed in the 
struggle for survival in the petty industries and 
handicraft centres that were located there, The small 
flour mill, iron foundry, and tinsel factory, were 
scattered throughout with iron founders of note living 
on Chaori Bazaar,
Urdu Bazaar rivalled Chandni Chauk as one of the
focal points in the city. The Bazaar surrounded the
Jama Masjid, which formed the boundary for three
electoral wards. It provided the Muslims in Delhi with
a social, cultural, and religious meeting ground in
addition to a thriving market. Huge throngs of people
converged daily on the Bazaar from late afternoon
onwards. Many ate at the restaurants and halwai shops
and then remained 'in the immediate vicinity for hours
together, gossiping with their friends over their tea 
2cups.' The hopeless confusion of traffic and the 
crush of the gathered crowds greatly resembled a fair.
The variety of the shops in Urdu Bazaar matched 
the kaleidoscopic nature of the people they served.
Some traders rented stalls around the massive base of 
the great mosque, Others exhibited their wares on 
handcarts, while still others sold their wares from 
trays hung around their necks or from cloths spread
 ^ The karkhandars are explained below in Chapter Three.
2
Aziz-ur-Rahman, History of Jama Masjid Delhi, And 
Interpretation of Muslim Devotions (2nd edition, Delhi, 
1956), pp. 39-^5. The de scription of Urdu Bazaar is 
based on this pamphlet.
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on the ground. Everything imaginable was sold around 
the four sides of the mosque. Some traders sold one 
type of commodity while others sold an assortment of 
articles at one price, such as five pice and so forth, 
Vendors sold food, clothing, hardware, pigeons, and 
medicines, and their cries added to the general hubub of 
bargaining and gossiping. The jugglers, snake charmers, 
magicians, and popular preachers also competed for space, 
and the attention and money of the gathered multitudes, 
The cows, the beggars, the confusion, the congestion, the 
noise and the smells all contributed to the spice of life 
for the urban dweller of Delhi.
II
Delhi was an independent enclave from 1803 to 1857 
but after its part in the Mutiny of 1857> the city was 
incorporated into Punjab Province.^ The area around
Delhi was made into a district and the city became the
2centre of the Delhi Division. The city remained a quiet 
divisional and district centre from 1857 to 1 9 1 1, during
1
Colonel Lake defeated the Mahrattas at Delhi in 1803. 
The Mogul Emperors resided there with their court and 
governed with the advice of a Resident,
2
Delhi Division consisted of the following seven 
districts: Delhi, Rohtak, Gurgaon, Hissar, Karnal,
Amba 11a, and Simla.
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which time its preeminence in the field of education 
and culture declined, while its importance as a 
commercial centre increased,^
The revenue officials in the District of Delhi in 
1911 had charge of the subidivisons of the District, A 
deputy commissioner who was also the district magistrate 
was in charge of the District. Subordinate to the 
deputy commissioner were three tahsildars in charge of 
the three tahsils of the District: Sonepat in the 
north, Delhi in the middle and Ballabgarh in the south. 
Within each tahsil there were two zails [subordinate 
revenue units] which were under the charge of zaildars, 
and within each zai1 were the numerous villages which
came under the jurisdiction of village headmen or
2lambardars. Distinct from the revenue officials and 
their territorial jurisdictions were the police thanas 
|subordinate units of police administration]. A quasi­
representative body, the District Board, was responsible 
for the disbursement of funds. The members of the Board
1
There were large and impressive Imperial Darbars in 
Delhi in 1877, 1903, and 1911, and there were visits by 
various members of the Royal Family to the city. There 
was, in addition, a very violent communal riot in 1886 
when the Moharram and Ram Lila festivals coincided. And 
there were famines in 1892-3 and 1899-1900. The 
greatest blows to the Islamic culture of the city were 
the death of Ghalib in I869 and the closure of the Delhi 
College in 1877» The commercial importance of the city 
grew as more railways intersected at Delhi. The city 
was the junction for six railways in 1911.
2
The villages also had kanungos, patwaris, and 
chaukidars.
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were either elected on a limited franchise, appointed by 
the deputy commissioner, or nominated from the civil 
service. This entire administrative edifice was wholly 
staffed by Indians with one European civilian, the 
deputy commissioner, in overall charge of the city and 
its associated territories,
The population of the District of Delhi in 1911 was 
657,000, which made it eighteenth in population out of 
the 45 districts and native states in the Punjab 
Province. The District had an area of about 1,300 square 
miles, which gave it a mean density of 510 people per 
square mile. This density was the third highest in the 
Province. The District had a net loss in population 
between 1901 and 1911. The decrease of 32,000 was due 
mainly to the poor state of agriculture in the District 
which depended largely upon an erratic rainfall.“*'
On 1 October 1912 the Province of Delhi officially 
came into existence» The Province included all of the
Delhi Tahsil and the Mahrauli Police Thana from the
2Ballabgarh Tahsil. The rest of the Ballabgarh Tahsil 
went to Gurgaon District and all of the Sonepat Tahsil 
went to Rohtak District, The Province was then 557
1
Census of India, 1911, XIV (Punjab), Part II (Tables),
2
It was originally planned to take the whole of Delhi 
District as the new province, but Sir Louis Dane, the 
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, argued against it on 
the grounds that Washington, D.C. and Canberra had shown 
that an excess of land was more of an encumbrance than 
an asset. RDDA, Home Pile 19 Part A 1913, 'Scheme for 
the Administration of the Province of Delhi.' The 
Government of India Act 1912 (2 & 3 George V, c. 6) 
provided the enabling legislation for the administrative 
changes.
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1915 Delhi Province acquired the Shahdara Police Thana
from the District of Meerut in the United Provinces,^
Delhi Province then encompassed 591 square miles with
a population of approximately 412,000, The Province
included 314 villages, in which approximately 150,000
people lived, and the Delhi urban area of 16 square
miles, in which a population of approximately 260,000 
2resided, The rural areas retained the lambardars 9 
zaildars and tahsildar and the police thanas that had 
existed previously. The new area from the United 
Provinces operated under the law from that Province, 
and the rest of Delhi Province retained the law of the 
Punjab, The Province also retained the government 
prosecutor and the treasurer from the old Delhi District, 
Most of the other functions remained under the Government 
of the Punjab, The inspector of factories and boilers, 
the inspector of schools, the management and staff of 
the Lunatic Asylum and Jail, the judiciary, and the
3civil service cadre all came from the Punjab,
1
The reason for this acquisition was to provide land 
to pasture cattle, and to provide a garden area for the 
city, RDDA, Education File 42 Part B 1916,
2
Table 1-B contains the population statistics for the 
various administrative units.
3
RDDA, Home File 1 Part B 1913 , 'Constitution of 
Delhi Province'; Home File 18 Part A 1913, 'Limitations 
of the Period for which a Chief Commissioner May Hold 
the Same Office'; Home File 29 Part A 1913.
square miles in area with a population of* 391 j 828, In
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Province» There were several reasons for appointing
a chief commissioner the head of the new province, the
most important of which was the fact that a chief
commissioner was an ex official member of the Imperial
Legislative Council, Many of the officials in the
Government of India felt that the Morley-Minto Reforms
had reduced the official majority in the Council too
quickly and too drastically, and the appointment of a
2chief commissioner redressed the balance somewhat,
The first chief commissioner of the Province of Dqlhi
3was William Malcolm Hailey,
The executive, protective, and judicial functions 
in Delhi City remained as they had been when the city
4was a part of Delhi District. The deputy commissioner
A chief commissioner took control of the new
1
It is interesting to note that the Central Provinces 
and Berar had an area of over 100,000 square miles and 
a population of 14,000,000. It too was under the 
direction of a chief commissioner,
2
RDDA, Home file 29 Part A 1913.
3
William Malcolm Hailey, later Lord Hailey, O.M., was 
born in 1872, I.C.S, 1895» Secretary Punjab Government 
1907, Chief Commissioner Delhi 1912-8, Finance Member 
Government of India 1919-22, Home Member 1922-24, 
Governor Punjab 1924-9, Governor United Provinces 1929- 
34, author of An African Survey 1938, member of the 
Permanent Mandates Commission 1935-9» There is a short 
polemic against him in Joachim Alva, Men and Supermen of 
Hindustan (Bombay, 1943), pp» 151-72.
4~
The establishments of the various departments are 
listed in Table 2-A„ The number of people registered 
in the Census as government servants are listed in 
Table 2-B.
still handled the local administrative problems. He was 
also the district magistrate and the ex-officio president 
of the Municipal Committee, The city had a tahsildar 
and a naib-tahsildar and each mohalla had a leader who 
was called a choudhri or a mohalladar. The tahsildar,, 
among other duties, reported to the Municipal Committee 
on the infringements of its bye-laws. The mohalladar, a 
person who had declined in prestige and influence under 
British rule, had virtually no power, but he was 
responsible for reporting births and deaths. Under 
Mogul rule he had been a person of high social status 
and had acted as a vehicle of communication between the 
mohalla residents and the city administration. There is 
no indication why the position declined in prestige and 
power, but it was probably because the British tried to 
use the mohalladar as a reporter for police intelligence. 
By the 1890s they had almost become nonentities.^
The police force in the city of Delhi did not carry
any more prestige than the mohalladars. The inhabitants
of the city thoroughly disliked the men entrusted with
their protection and refused to cooperate with them at
2the best of times. Much of the antipathy which the 
public showed toward the police was the result of the 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the force. These 
characteristics arose as a result of the fact that the
19
1
RDD A , Records of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi 
Division, Number 48, ’Id and Muharram Celebrations 
1890*.
2
RDDA, Home File 181 Part B 1917> ’Annual Police 
Report of Delhi Province for 1916'.
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force was illiterate, understaffed, and underpaid,
The police force always had a European as senior
superintendent, and a European as deputy superintendent in
2charge of the Criminal Investigation Department, These 
officials were faced, however, with a subordinate staff
3that was overwhelmingly illiterate. This was because
I
RDDA, Home File 248 Part B 1913«. ’Annual Police 
Administration Report of the Delhi Province for 1912’;
Home File 223 Part B 19l4, ’Annual Police Administration 
Report of Delhi Province for 1913'; Home File 317 Part B 
1914, ’Annual Criminal Justice Report of Delhi Province 
for the Year 1913’; Home File 297 Part B 1915» ’Annual 
Criminal Justice Report of Delhi Province for 1914’;
Home File 304 Part B 1915? ’Annual Civil Justice Report 
of Delhi Province for the Year 1914’; and Home File 181 
Part B 1917.
2The police in Delhi were divided into three areas; the 
Criminal Investigation Department, traffic and patrol.
The C.I.D. dealt with crimes of a penal and seditious - 
or potentially seditious - nature. They spent a good 
deal of time and energy on translating newspaper articles, 
investigating presses and journals, compiling a weekly 
Police Abstract, and recording speeches at meetings, 
Muslims were usually in charge of the traffic and patrol 
divisions. The police supplied the fire brigade, a 
particularly inefficient and ineffective organisation,
Once a fire was reported it took at least 45 minutes 
for the engine to get up steam. In 1916 there were 42 
fires reported and only l4 attended as the fires were 
out before the engine left the station. It is more than 
probable that many fires were not reported since little 
purpose was served. To rectify this matter the Chief 
Commissioner ordered that steam should be kept up at all 
times to reduce the time lag to five minutes. There was 
no vehicle to transport the policemen accompanying the 
engine, and they had to run alongside the engine with a 
hand cart of coal to feed the engine. After running two 
miles they were in no condition to fight a fire.
3
Table 2-C contains the number of police who were 
literate and illiterate and who were Muslim and Hindu.
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the force drew its recruits from the rural areas 
surrounding the Delhi urban area, the majority of whom 
were illiterate (75 per cent in 1.913)» The problem of 
illiteracy was never solved since the conditions of 
work and the pay were not designed to attract qualified 
and intelligent persons, The result was an impossible 
situation in which a constable on traffic duty was 
unable to record what he witnessed for subsequent 
investigation.
The weakness in numbers of the police force in 
Delhi also contributed to its inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness. There were less inspectors, sergeants, 
and sub-inspectors in Delhi in proportion to the 
subordinate staff than in most other cities in India.
The fact that the C.I.D, utilised a large number of 
the inspectors and sergeants, those members who were 
most literate, exacerbated the problem as it left more 
of the traffic and patrol duties to head constables and 
constables than was usual elsewhere,
The police force in Delhi faced one more problem, 
Delhi was supposed to have a reserve force of up to 20 
per cent to handle unusual demands, such as riots, the 
31 annual processions, and visits to the capital by 
important persons. It was not until 1920 that this 
reserve strength was achieved when the administration 
was able to hire 200 ex-soldiers to assist during the 
non-co-operation movement. Since the force was under­
staffed both in terms of distribution and numbers, those 
who should have been employed in normal activities had 
to be detailed to different duties, which in turn left 
portions of the city unpatrolled, traffic uncontrolled,
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and large numbers of4 the force overworked as increasingly 
unusual demands were made of them.
The low scale of remuneration of the police 
contributed directly to the problems of illiteracy and 
understaffing. A member of the police force received from 
R s . 9 to Rs. 12 per mensem with a R s . 1 City Allowance in 
1912, the same pay as an unskilled coolie. The 
Administration in Delhi had to compete with the Punjab 
Police Force which instituted pay scales of a more 
attractive nature. This accounted to a large degree for 
the 102 resignations in 1914. It also contributed to the 
fall in the number of recruits from 304 in 1912 to 200 in 
1913 and to 145 in 1916,
The judiciary in Delhi did not suffer from the same 
problems with which the police force had to contend. It 
was adequately staffed with a district sessions judge and 
subordinate judges and magistrates. The district judge, 
who was always a European, was under the jurisdiction of 
the Punjab High Court and handled both civil and criminal 
cases. Under the district judge there was a judge of the 
Small Causes Court who was usually an Indian. There was 
also a system of magisterial courts which handled civil 
and criminal cases as stipulated by the Criminal and Civil 
Procedure codes. The deputy commissioner was the chief 
magistrate. An additional commissioner either European 
or Indian (in Delhi usually European) helped relieve him 
of his load and an extra additional commissioner (usually 
Indian) further alleviated the judicial load. Below 
these were the honorary magistrates, second class and 
first class.
2 3
Honorary magistrates (second class) were appointed 
in Delhi under section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
of 1898, They were appointed for a term of three years 
with no restrictions on reappointment. There were l4 
such magistrates within the Municipality5 seven of whom 
were Hindu and seven Muslim, The appointees were men 
who commanded prestige and influence and who supported 
government. They were active in public life; represented 
some substantial interest in the city; and usually had 
no legal experience.
There were two honorary magistrates (first class) 
in Delhi. They could try more important cases and usually 
came from the ranks of the more experienced and more 
successful second-class magistrates. There was normally 
one Hindu and one Muslim first-class magistrate, but in 
1922 two Hindus were appointed which gave rise to a 
certain amount of parochial feeling.^
The above system had to contend with 4,350 criminal 
cases and 6,873 civil cases in 1914. Yet the number of 
people who were tried did not reflect the prevalence of 
crime in the city. Rather, it indicated the perseverance 
and success of the police who sought to improve the 
conditions in the city through a high standard of
sanitation and traffic control consequent to the improved
2status of the city.
^ RD D A , Home File 427 Part B 1913? 'Appointment of Haji 
Abdul Ghani and S. Nathu Ram as Honorary Magistrates 
Delhi'; Foreign File 10 Part B 1919> 'Celebration of Peace 
at Delhi'; Home File 3 (7) Part B 1922, 'Grant of 
Magisterial Powers to Honorary Officials in Delhi Province,'
2 Table 2-D indicates the number of people who encountered 
the judicial system in Delhi in 1913 and 1914.
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The proportion of those convicted to those who were 
brought to trial was always under 50 per cent, a ratio 
which reflected several problems confronted by the 
judiciary, The first problem, which the Deputy 
Commissioner criticised harshly, arose from the 
indiscriminate issue of summons by Indian magistrates,
The Indian magistrates demanded much less evidence to 
issue warrants than European magistrates, with the 
consequence that the former gave ’themselves a lot of 
extra work and the people unnecessary worry.1^
A second problem arose from the fact that people
projected personal disagreements and vendettas into the
legal system, A third problem was the reluctance of the
ordinary citizen to have anything to do with the police.
Their response to appeals from the police ranged from
2reticence to a 'systematic withholding’ of evidence.
The Deputy Commissioner complained bitterly that consider­
ing this factor, ’the courts before daring to convict
expect a standard of evidence which in India is really
3unobtainable,’
The Administration in Delhi recognised a definite 
ranking of a status in the province. Europeans who 
were civilians and Europeans in business and in the 
professions formed two sections of a small 'elite. The
1
RDDA, Home File 317 Part B 1914.
2
RDDA, Home File 248 Part B 1913.
Ibid.; He was referring to European judges.
3
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rest of Indian society was then accorded status in the 
following descending order; darbaris, title-holders, 
honorary magistrates, active Indian civilians and 
retired Indian civilians, municipal commissioners, and 
finally members of the District Board, The Administration 
relied upon this élite as the thin edge of a wedge pointed 
downward into Indian society. They were expected to 
explain and popularise the views of the government to 
groups and individuals with whom they came into contact, 
who would in turn disseminate these views to the wider 
community. The government hoped to communicate with all 
the significant elements in the society in this way. The 
elite were also expected to inform the government of the 
various currents of opinion within the society.
The system worked fairly well as long as the 
government chose people who were representative of the 
various significant sections of society. It began to 
break down when nationalist sentiment crystallised around 
leaders other than those who occupied positions of honour 
conferred by the government. This is one of the major 
themes of the rise of nationalism in India. Its 
significance lies in the fact that the government found 
no alternative means to accomplish the same ends. They 
perpetuated the old system, even though it declined in 
value, and began to rely more upon C.I.D. reports for 
information about public opinion. But this system 
worked only one way since there was no group which could 
effectively communicate the policy of the government to 
the community.
The darbar which existed under Mogul rule as a court 
assemblage was taken over by the British and became the
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apex of* their system of* social patronage, Whenever there 
was an official occasion, or function of state, there 
was a strict order of precedence in the seating 
arrangements. The first Indians to be seated were the 
darbaris, These were classified in the Punjab as either 
provincial or divisional. The provincial darbaris were 
considered people of eminence throughout the province, 
while divisional darbaris were considered important only 
within their division. There were always more divisional 
than provincial darbaris. By the twentieth century the 
position had become inheritable. The wealthiest families 
which supported the government or those which performed 
some outstanding service for the state (for example, 
famine relief, heroic deeds during the Mutiny of 1857» 
or government service in a high rank) were appointed.
When the eldest member of the family died, the new head 
of the family applied for the distinction of his 
predecessor and was very rarely refused.
The system underwent a change in Delhi after 1911»
The provincial and divisional distinctions were retained 
but the numbers in each became equal and were kept at 
eight. This was quite a change from 1906 when there were 
26 divisional darbaris.  ^ Entry became possible only when 
a darbari died without any sons in Delhi, and the position 
lapsed from the family, It also became a usual practice 
to promote divisional darbaris to the position of
1  _
RDDA, Foreign File 6 (b) Part B 1920, 'Recommendation 
of Certain Persons in Delhi for Divisional Darbaris.'
17 of the 26 had either died with no sons or had moved 
out of the District, In either case no new appointments 
were made to the list in their place.
provincial darbari and then promote the most eminent 
title holder to divisional darbari. This meant that 
while there were only three or four darbaris who held 
titles in 1.9119 by 1920 all darbaris were title holders» 
The smaller numbers and the closed system meant that 
fewer people were rewarded; but those who received 
rewards could count on climbing ever slowly toward the 
apex,
There were a large number of Indian title holders 
in Delhi in 1911. The highest distinction conferred 
upon an Indian was Companion of the Indian Empire 
(C.I.E.). Lala Sheo Pershad, a Khatri, was an honorary 
magistrate and banker of Delhi, He received the title 
of rai sahib in 1908 as a leading citizen who was noted 
for his 'generosity and loyalty'. He received a C.I.E, 
in 1.911. for his conspicuous wealth and position in Delhi. 
He was then appointed a provincial darbari for his wealth, 
position, generosity, and titles. There was one other
C.I.E. in Delhi, Rai Bahadur Lala Nanak Chand, a Bania, 
who received his title for service in Indore State,^
Below the title of C.I.E., the names of the titles
were different for Hindus and Muslims. In descending
order the Hindus were rai bahadur, mahamahapadhyaya and
rai sahib. The Muslims were khan bahadur, khan sahib,
2shams-ul-ulema, hazik-ul-mulk and shifa-ul-mulk. The
 ^ R DDA, Foreign File 26 Part B 1913» 'List of Provincial 
and Divisional Darbaris, Kurshi Nashins and Titleholders 
of the Delhi Province.'
The title of kurshi nashin [those who could sit in the 
presence of civil officers] occupied the bottom run of 
the ladder of distinction below the District Board, It 
was strictly limited to 35*
2 7
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names themselves were not important as they just marked' 
the passage of people up the ladder of government esteem 
They were, however, greatly valued and much sought after 
by distinguished citizens of Delhi.
There were 22 Hindus and 15 Muslims who held titles 
in Delhi in 1912. The titles were not heritable, but it 
became the practice to confer a title on the son of a 
title-holder. If the family was very outstanding the 
son might receive the same title which meant he would 
climb higher up the ladder in his life time. If the 
family did not possess large resources of wealth, status 
or power, the son started from lower down the ladder and 
he might or might not exceed his father. The numbers 
were not as static as was the case with the darbaris. 
People looked forward to two times a year, New Year’s 
Day and the King's Birthday, when one or two citizens of 
Delhi would receive a title. Government servants, 
municipal commissioners, honorary magistrates, and very 
wealthy families could all aspire to a title and not be 
d isappointed.
The Municipal Committee was the only elected body 
in the Delhi urban area. The status of its members was 
fairly low since a municipal commissioner ranked only 
above a member of the District Board, but they did 
control a certain amount of power. Very few men of 
the Committee held a title, but continuous membership 
on the Committee usually ensured some type of honorary 
recognition. Membership was generally continuous since 
incumbent commissioners rarely had to contest an 
election.
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The Municipal Committee had 11 members who were 
elected triennially, eight appointed members, and five 
official members.^ This gave the Administration and its 
appointees a majority. The elected seats were usually 
divided between six Muslims and five Hindus. This was 
always counterbalanced by the appointment of one Muslim 
and two Hindus. The appointed members represented 
various interests in the city, most of which were thought 
to be very important politically and which would not be 
represented by an elected member. The most important of 
these were the Punjab Chamber of Commerce, the European 
community, the Shias, the Sikhs and the Jains. The 
president of the Committee was always the Deputy 
Commissioner. The senior vice president was always a
2Hindu and the junior vice president was always a Muslim.
1
The electors had to be male, 21 years of age, and either 
the owner of premises the tax on which was at least R s . 
1/8/- per year, or the renter of a house the tax on which 
was R s . 4/-/-. The candidates had to be male, 21 years 
of age, and either the owner of a house the tax on which 
was Rs 13/5/“ per year, or the payer of not less than 
Rs 35/-/- in income tax. RDDA, Education File 16 Part B 
1914, ’Proceedings of the Meetings of the Delhi Municipal 
Committee.'
2
The Municipal Committee had nine standing sub-committees 
which covered the respective areas of income, expenditure, 
and control:
Sanitation Hackney carriage and veterinary
Municipal Works Building
Octroi Finance
Direct tax and nazul Lighting
Education
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III
There were two systems of education in the city 
of Delhi in 1911. Students attended schools which 
were governmentally operated or they attended private 
institutions. Private institutions, in turn, were of 
three types: schools to which the government 
contributed a grant-in-aid, schools which the government 
recognised but which they did not aid, and schools 
which the Government neither aided nor recognised.^
The unaided and unrecognised private schools, and the 
primary schools of the Municipal Committee and District 
Board were the poorest of the lot. They invariably 
provided untrained teachers, unsuitable physical 
facilities, and impecunious students, the majority of 
whom manifested no ability. Both systems contained a
1
RDDA, Education File 8 Part A 1917» 'Quinquennial 
Report on the Progress of Education in the Delhi 
Province for the Period Ending 31 March 1917'; 
Education File 3 (66) Part B 1922, 'Quinquennial 
Report on Education in Delhi Province for 1917-22'.
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large number of vernacular schools and a small number 
of anglo-vernacular schools.'*"
The schools which the students attended provided 
only the minimum facilities for an education. Of the 
110 primary schools in Delhi in 1916, only 36 had their 
own buildings. The middle schools and high schools 
fared no better. Most of the schools rented quarters 
which were overcrowded, poorly ventilated, and 
inadequately lighted. There were few facilities for 
science courses, few good text books which the students 
could afford, and few trained teachers. Out of the 540 
teachers in 1916, only l4l (26 per cent) were trained, 
the majority of whom taught in the government high 
schools.
1
The relevant figures for education in Delhi are as 
follows:
1912 1916 1921
Students in primary schools 3,687 6,0 64 5,439
Students in secondary schools 2,335 2,935 6,332
Students in tertiary schools 185 538 875
Students in girls schools 988 2 , 003 2, 744
Students in private schools 3,697 2,965 ^,539
(Muslim students in all schools) n . a . (3 ,788 ) (5,795 )
Total students: 10,892 14,505 19,525
Number of primary schools (Male) 69 96 132
(Female) 9 14 21
Number of secondary schools (Male ) 8 12 33
(Female ) 3 8 10
Number of tertiary institutions 2 3 5
Number of private schools 100 87 96
Total number of schools: 191 220 296
[n .B. Totals for 1921 do not include students in national 
schools] RDDA, Education File 8 Part A 1917; Education 
File 3 (66) Part B 1922.
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The number of students who attended school in
proportion to the number of children of school age
[participation rate] was fairly substantial. It was,
1 ihowever, highly imbalanced in favour of males. The 
participation rate tended to fluctuate during the War 
especially in the vernacular middle schools. The parents 
of students in these schools were usually of the lower 
middle class who put some value in education, but who 
were hardest hit when wartime inflation began. The
education of their children was one of their more
2expendable items.
The students themselves did not fare well in the 
educational system in Delhi. Those who came from 
wealthy families, or those who lived in hostels, 
suffered few problems; but the vast majority of students
1
The participation rate for students was as follows:
Total males aged 5-15
1912 
26,838
1921 
34,84l
Total male students 9,904 1 6 , 781
Participation rate 3 6. 4 48 .1
Total females aged 5-15 21,863 27,503
Total female students 988 2 ,744
Participation 4.5 9.9
Total participation rate 22.3 rHC"l
Participation rate Muslim males n . a . 3 7 . 7
Participation rate Muslim females n . a . 3 .0
Participation rate non-Muslim males n . a . 55.5
Participation rate non-Muslim females n . a . 15.3
RDDA, Education File 8 Part A 1917; Education File 3 (66) 
Part B 1922.
RDDA, Education File 8 Part A 1917»
2
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who lived at home suffered educationally and physically. 
The headmasters of the local high schools unanimously 
agreed that:
...the health of school-boys is decidedly inferior 
to that of boys who do not attend school and our 
experience leads us to attribute this inferiority 
to several causes: (l) the confinement of boys 
in class rooms not generally suited to the purpose;
(2) the close application to study in the home 
where rooms are badly lighted and ventilated;
(3 ) the lack of nourishing food either in quality 
or in quantity in the case of the poor who make 
great sacrifices in order to educate their sons; 
and (4) the strain of studying through the medium 
of a foreign language at a time when there is a 
drain on the strength owing to the growth of the 
body.1
Girls faced the additional problem of absenteeism because 
they had to assist in the 'innumerable festivals in their 
house s . '^
1
RDDA, Education File 2 Part A 1918, 'Alleged Deteriora­
tion in the Health of Students Caused by the Present 
System of Examination.' Headmaster, Government School, 
Delhi, to Chief Commissioner, Delhi, 11 January 1918.
The Chief Commissioner agreed with this description when 
he stated: '...the comparative... poorness of the 
physique of students (which is certainly a noticeable 
fact in the case of Delhi)...[is ] deep-seated. The 
whole system of education involves a great strain on 
boys who are, for the most part, strangers to the idea 
that physical culture is almost as important as mental; 
and it must be remembered that many students are, very 
badly nurtured, and work at home in conditions which 
militate against health. They are, moreover, many of 
them subject to the unusual strain involved by an early 
puberty and by the commencement of their married life 
before completing their education.' Chief Commissioner, 
Delhi, to Secretary, Department of Education, Government 
of India, 17 January 1918.
2
RDDA, Education File 3 (66) Part B 1922.
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one or more private aided schools through which they
sought to inculcate religious values and a religious
identity among the young members of the community.^ These
schools maintained fairly high standards and received
2strong financial support from their communities. It was 
rare for a member of one religious community to attend a 
private school which another community supported, except 
for the Christian mission schools which members from all
3the religious communities attended.
Most of the religious communities in Delhi supported
RD D A , Education File 228 Part B 1915> ’Annual Report on 
the State of Education in Delhi Province for 1914-5*’
2 The aided and recognised schools run by the various 
religious groups in Delhi were as follows in 1914:
S .P.G. Mission Baptist Mission
1 College 3 Primary schools for boys
1 High school 3 Primary schools for girls
15 Primary schools for boys
4 Primary schools for girls
Muslims Hindus
1 High school 1 College
12 Primary schools for boys 2 High schools
2 Primary schools for boys 
Bengalis 4 Primary schools for girls
1 High school
RDDA, Education File 228 Part B 1915*
3 All the religious communities felt quite safe in sending 
their children to Christian mission schools for several 
reasons. No student who attended a mission school had 
ever been converted to Christianity, and the higher 
standard of instruction and facilities were attractive to 
many parents who were interested in a good education for 
their children. Some even thought that the moral effect 
of compulsory religious training at the mission schools 
was most desirable as was the insistence on discipline 
and the regularity of conduct at the schools. RDDA, 
Confidential File 105 (1916), ’Introduction of a 
Conscience Clause in Aided Schools.’
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There were two noticeable trends in private 
education in Delhi between 1911 and 1921. The first 
trend was that the unaided denominational schools of 
the Hindus received less and less support. The efforts 
of the Hindu community concentrated instead on fewer 
schools but better schools and most new schools applied 
for a grant-in-aid. The second trend noticeable in 
private education was that the Muslim community took 
increasing pride in its ability to provide sectarian 
education on modern lines for its students. The 
Quinquennial Report for 1917-21 commented upon these 
trend s :
Indigenous and special schools require little 
comment. They are ceasing to exist. Mohammadans 
have accepted the value of modern education.
This does not imply any yielding of their 
appreciation of the predominant claims of 
religion. On the contrary, the combination of 
religious and secular education is producing 
in the Anglo-Arabic High School a communal life, 
with laws on a common ethical basis, that 
approaches the English public school society 
more closely than is possible in the mixed 
community of a government school, and which is 
not attained in other denominational schools.1
The Muslims developed their sectarian educational system
to the extent that the Inspector of Schools could report
in 1920 that the Muslim community had provided a school
2for every moha11a.
Various groups within the Hindu community supported 
the establishment of new schools. Rai Kidar Nath led a
^ RDD A , Education File 3 (66) Part B 1922.
2 RDDA, Education File 149 Part B 1920, 'Pressures for 
Improving Mohammadan Education in Delhi.'
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most important group which was composed of professionals,
well-placed civilians, and wealthy merchants who had all
received a 'liberal* western education, He was a retired
district judge with a substantial amount of personal
wealth. He had supported the Hindu College when it faced
financial difficulties during the War; he helped establish
the Ramjas High School and subsequently supported the
establishment of a second Ramjas High School.'*' He was
also active in the foundation in 1917 of the third college
in Delhi, Ramjas College, an institution which was
designed to cater for 'advanced' Hindus who were neither
sanatani [orthodox] nor Arya Samajist. The sanatanis
followed the lead of Rai Bahadur Amba Pershad, a large
grain contractor, who provided a large part of the funds
for the new building into which the Anglo-Sanskrit High
3School moved in 1920. The Arya Samajists opened two 
high schools in 1919: the Dayanand Anglo-Vernacular High 
School and the Dayanand Residential High School. All of 
these schools received grants-in-aid from the government.
1
RAi Kidar Nath was a rai sahib, and was appointed to 
the Provisional Executive Council of Delhi University in 
1922.
2
RDDA, Education File 100 Part B 1917, 'Question of the 
Affiliation of, and Grant of a Maintenance Grant-in-Aid 
to, the Ram Jas College, Delhi.' The other two colleges 
were St. Stephen's Mission College and the Hindu College. 
There was in addition a commercial college and a college 
which taught Auyurvedic and Unani systems of medicine.
3
RDDA, Education File 3 (66) Part B 1922. Amba Pershad 
was the president of the Kerana Committee discussed 
below.
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The 39 per cent increase in the number of schools 
in Delhi and the increase in the number of high schools 
and colleges had a salubrious effect upon education in 
Delhi. The total number of students increased by 35 
per cent between 1916 and 1921 during which period Muslim 
students increased by 52 per cent and non-Muslim students 
by 28 per cent. The most notable increase among non- 
Muslims was a 40 per cent increase in the number of 
female students as the education of females became a 
pressing concern for the Hindu community.^
The emphasis upon education in both Muslim and Hindu
society had an effect upon the rate of literacy in the
city. The number of Muslims who were literate rose by
3,482 (76 per cent) between 1901 and 1911 and by 6,084
(76 per cent) between 1911 and 1921. The number of
Hindus who were literate in Delhi increased by 4,790
(47 per cent) between 1901 and 1911 and by 5,789 (38 per
cent) between 1911 and 1921. The rate of literacy among
Muslims climbed from 5 per cent in 1901 to 8 per cent in
1911 and to 12 per cent in 1921. The rate of literacy
among Hindus climbed from 9 per cent in 1901 to 12 per
2cent in 1911 and remained unchanged in 1921. It is
"*■ RDDA, Education File 6 Part A 1916, ’Female Education 
in Ind ia . 1
2
Census of India, 1901, XII (Punjab and North-West 
Frontier Provinces), Part II (Tables); Census of India, 
1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, XV, P t . II.
The number of people who were literate were as follows:
Total Hindus Muslims
1901 17,744 10,285 4,564
1911 27,354 15,075 8,046
1921 43,842 20,864 14,130
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quite apparent that the Muslims of Delhi had finally 
awakened to the value of education and literacy and that 
they were implementing this lesson,
IV
Delhi was a city of great commercial and industrial 
importance in northern India. It had been one of the 
outstanding commercial centres of upper India during the 
Mogul era, and during the few decades prior to 1911 it 
began to rival Cawnpore and Amritsar as an industrial 
centre.“*” The central position of the city in relation 
to the three major ports and the fact that six railway 
lines met there, were largely responsible for its complete 
dominance over the south-east Punjab, western United 
Provinces and northern Rajputana, and for its relative 
importance throughout these three provinces. The 
presence of an enterprising and affluent commercial 
class reinforced the advantages provided by geography 
and tradition.
Delhi in 1911 relied more upon its commerce than 
upon its industry for its economic well-being. The 
Personal Assistant to the Chief Commissioner outlined
the position of commerce in the city to the Indian
2Industrial Commission. He stated that when the Province 
was created in 1912, Delhi was well known as a large 
distribution centre for imported goods, among the most 
important of which were cotton piece-goods, cheap glass, 
umbrellas, haberdashery and hardware. The Province was
Punjab District Gazetteers, V (Delhi District), 1912, 
Part A, p. l6l.
2 RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 1916, 'Preliminary Note on 
Industries at Delhi for the Indian Industrial Commission.'
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the centre par excellence in northern India for trade in 
precious stones due to the presence of a number of 
expert jewellers and stone cutters. The Province 
exported some luxury articles which were remnants of 
the Mogul past; these included gold embroidery, ivory 
carving and miniature painting. It also possessed a 
considerable trade in ironware, sugarcane mills, country 
shoes, and Delhi caps, Hides, skins, and cotton were 
the only products of raw material that the Province 
exported. The Province also provided considerable 
financial resources, with the existence of the branches 
of eight banks under European managers, a number of ’so- 
called Indian banks', and an even larger number of firms 
which extended 'financial facilities’.
The value in rupees of commerce to Delhi can be 
seen from the value of exports from the city which 
according to the Secretary of the Punjab Chamber of 
Commerce, was R s . 4,09,30,100.^ The single most important 
commodity was apparel, which included drapery, 
haberdashery, millinery, uniforms, accoutrements, boots, 
and shoes. The five other most important products were
1
R.J. Denning compiled the report for Delhi Province 
for the Indian Industrial Commission. RDDA, Commerce 
File 77 Part B 1916, 'Appointment of an Industrial 
Commission to Enquire about Expansion & Development of 
Indian Manufactures and Industries.' He listed 119 
commodities from which he obtained the value of total 
exports from Delhi. RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 
1916.
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jute, hides, raw cotton, skins, and drugs.'*' These six 
commodities represented 50 pen cent of the total value 
of exports from Delhi.
There were five major organisations representing
2the important commercial activities in the city. These 
associations drew upon western models with a secular 
spirit, but their membership came primarily from the 
Hindu Community which dominated commerce in Delhi. Each 
association had less resources of wealth, status, and 
power than the preceding one; each association had less 
cohesion than the preceding one; and each association 
suffered from a decreasing ability to mobilise its 
res ources.
The Punjab Chamber of Commerce was the most 
influential and most exclusive commercial organisation
1
The imports and exports of the six most important 
redistributive products in 1914 were as follows:
Value of
Imports Exports Exports
(ma und s ) (maund s ) (Rs. )
Apparel 11,696 36,040 89,87,475
Jute bags and cloth 2,08,020 2,25,627 35,35,998
Raw cow hides 76,280 86,998 31,33,287
Raw cotton 79,944 76,947 19,09,247
Raw sheep skins 75,765 51,557 17,50,521
Drugs 25,989 31,477 11,45,960
Total: 2,04,62,488
RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 1916.
2
Table 3-A contains a list of the number of traders in 
the various commodities.
k 1
in Delhi. Its membership included the eight European 
banks, the six railways, most of* the trade and industry 
under European ownership and control, and the largest 
and most important indigenous concerns. Its membership 
totalled almost 50 business enterprises, some of which 
were located in Amritsar and Lahore.^ The Chamber had 
the right to nominate one member for the Punjab 
Legislative Council and one member for the Delhi 
Municipal Committee. The latter perquisite was enlarged 
to two in 1922 to enable the Chamber to nominate one 
European and one Indian from its membership. The 
nominations previous to 1922 were usually European. The 
Chamber always had a European president and a full-time 
European secretary. This secretary also served as the 
secretary of the Delhi Piece Goods Association. The 
Chamber commanded the greatest resources of wealth, 
status, and power of all the organisations in the city 
and its members were unequalled in prestige and influence.
The second most important economic organisation in
Delhi was the Delhi Piece Goods Association. Its members
were the Europeans and Indians who dealt with imported
cloth. It had an estimated 100 members, some of whom
were located in Amritsar and Cawnpore. The Association
computed that the imports with which its members dealt
contributed up to 25 per cent of the tax revenue of the
2Municipal Committee. Some of its members were also 
members of the Punjab Chamber of Commerce. The majority
1
RDDA, Education File k Part A 1922, 'Reconstitution 
of the Delhi Municipal Committee.'
2
Ibid .
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of the members were retailers for the Delhi market and
wholesalers Tor cloth merchants in the small towns and
villages throughout the hinterland. The economic power
of the members over this area was almost absolute."^ The
Association itself and most of its members could not
draw upon as much wealth, status and power as the Punjab
Chamber of Commerce, but it certainly drew upon more
prestige and influence than any of the other associations
2in the city. It received recognition of this fact in
1922 when it achieved the right to nominate one member 
to the Municipal Committee.
The Delhi Piece Goods Association exhibited a 
certain amount of cohesiveness, but it could succumb 
to dissension on occasion. In 1914 a group of Indian 
members petitioned government that the leaders of the
3organisation did not respond to the wishes of the members.
During the Rowlatt Satyagraha in 1919 these merchants 
were accused of using their monopoly to enforce hartals 
in surrounding towns. This charge was proven false, 
but noone questioned the fact that the merchants had the 
ability to bring such pressure to bear. (Many of the 
charges were produced by cloth merchants in the outlying 
towns and villages because of resentment, which is 
indicative of the relations that some members of this 
organisation had with their clients,) RDDA, Confidential 
File 262 (1919)» ’The Disorders Inquiry Committee.’
2
At one point in 1922, the members of the Association 
estimated their inventory at £4 million in piece goods. 
NAI, Home Poll 1922/18. ’Report on the Political 
Situation in India during the Month of July and the 
First Fortnight of August 1922,’ Chief Commissioner, 
Delhi, to S.P. O ’Donnell, 17 July 1922.
3
NAI, Home Poll 4 Deposit, December 1914, 'Petition of 
the Choudhris of the Delhi Piece Goods Market.'
2* 3
And again in 1922 another division occurred. When the 
Municipal Committee was reconstituted the D.P.G,A. was 
allowed to nominate one member. A special committee of 
six met and nominated the Chairman, Mr J,C. Roberts, 
with two of the six members dissenting. The Indian 
members of the Association then petitioned the Chief 
Commissioner to invalidate the nomination and to call 
a general meeting of the entire membership at which an 
Indian member could be nominated.'*" There was friction 
within the Association over whose views were to 
predominate, the minority of European members, or the 
majority of Indian members. The Indian members 
undoubtedly wanted the Europeans as members because 
of the prestige and influence their membership gave 
the organisation, but they did not want the Europeans 
to exercise a decisive voice. The Europeans, on the 
other hand, did not mind contributing their prestige 
and influence to the organisation on the condition that 
they had a decisive influence over its policy. The 
nomination of a European to represent the Association 
on the Municipal Committee indicated which group had 
the most influential voice.
The Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association was 
another significant commercial organisation in Delhi. 
The important difference between it and the D.P.G.A,
1
RDDA, Education File 4 Part A 1922. The petitioners 
were refused. The disagreement did not lead to open 
conflict, however, as one of the outstanding Indian 
members of the Association was elected to the Municipal 
Committee for Ward II (Chandni Chauk) against the 
Congress candidate.
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was that the latter dealt primarily with imported cloth 
while the D.H.M.A, dealt with indigenous products. It 
had an estimated membership of 450, all of whom were 
Indian,^ The resources of wealth, status, and power 
that the D.H.M.A. or its individual members could draw 
upon were more limited than those of the Punjab Chamber 
of Commerce and also more limited than those of the
D.P.G.A. Its petition to nominate a member for the 
Municipal Committee was refused in 1922. The wider 
range of commodities with which its members dealt, the 
large number of members, and the heterogeneity of its 
membership in terms of the diverse social, religious, 
financial, and educational characteristics and achieve­
ments, restricted the cohesiveness of the organisation.
The Kirana Committee in Delhi faced many of the 
problems which plagued the D,H.M.A. The Kirana 
Committee was a loosely organised group of small 
grocers who used the organisation to settle disputes 
among themselves. The Committee computed that its 
members (along with the grain, sugar, and ghee merchants) 
paid 50 per cent of the tax revenue of the Municipal 
Committee, The resources of wealth, status, and power 
that the Committee or any of its members could draw 
upon, however, were quite limited for a number of reasons. 
The Committee found it almost impossible to mobilise its 
members on any issue mainly because of its size and lack 
of cohesion. The range of social, religious, financial, 
and educational characteristics and achievements of the 
members were so diverse that only a minimal amount of
RDDA, Education File 4 Part A 1922.
1
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cohesion was possible and the large membership presented 
a problem of organisation,^ The organisation also faced 
the problem that the members who traded in grain, sugar, 
and ghee had separate panchayats which fulfilled the same 
function as the Kirana Committee, And finally the 
organisation lacked strong leadership, The Committee was 
quite content to follow the lead of Rai Sahib Amba Pershad, 
even though he generally acted in his own individual 
interests. All of these reasons led the Chief Commissioner 
to dismiss with impunity the petition of the Committee 
for a representative on the Municipal Committee.
The Indian Bankers' Association was the fifth most 
important commercial organisation in Delhi. Those money 
lenders who had incorporated themselves as banks and other 
important money lenders belonged to this Association.
Rai Bahadur Sri Kishan Das was the president of the 
Association whose individual members had quite large 
resources of wealth, status and power. The Association 
had little influence, however, because the traditional 
inclinations of the Indian money lenders prevented them 
from participating in an organisation that had more than 
the most tenuous control over its members. The 
Association also suffered for want of influence because 
of the straightened economic circumstances of the Indian
1
The exact membership of the Kirana Committee was not 
stated, but it was confidently estimated as larger than 
the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association. A petition 
to the Municipal Committee contained the signatures of 
167 members. RDDA, Education File 4 Part A 1922. There 
were 2,463 people involved in such trade in 1911 and 
7,601 in 1921. See Table 3-A.
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banker and money lender. The number of people employed 
in this endeavour declined between 1911 and 1921 by 
1,578 or 60 per cent, a decline which came about mainly 
through the banking crash of 1913-14»  ^ The Chief 
Commissioner dismissed the application of the Indian 
Bankers’ Association for representation on the Municipal 
Committee.^
There were, in addition to the foregoing commercial 
organisations, a number of professional organisations in 
the city, the most important of which were the Bar
3Association and the Sub-Assistant Surgeons’ Association. 
They had a small number of European and a large number 
of Indian members. They obviously had less wealth than 
the commercial organisations but their prestige and 
influence were just as important. And even though the 
members came from different religions, communities and 
castes, the homogeneity of their education, income, and 
status resulted in a cohesiveness that was absent in 
most other organisations in the city. These organisations 
had the greatest ability to mobilise their resources, but 
only rarely did so, and certainly never for political 
agitation.
In 1918 two other professional groups organised 
themselves into associations. The accountants formed the 
Indraprasth Karmachari Mandai with a membership of 300.^
^ See Table 3-A.
^ RDDA, Education File 4 Part A 1922.
3 Table 3-B contains a list of the various professions 
in Delhi.
4 / xRDDA, Confidential File 227 (l9l8), ’List of Political,
Quasi-Political and Religious Societies, Sabhas and 
Anjumans in Delhi Province for the Year Ending the 30th 
June 1918.'
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They, like the members of the other two professional 
organisations, had diverse social origins. But they also 
derived a high degree of cohesiveness from similar 
education, income, and status. Their individual and 
collective resources of wealth, status, and power, 
however, were much more limited. They did not mobilise 
their members for political agitation, The other 
professional group which organised itself in 1918 was 
the Indraprasth Vaid Sabha with a membership of 100,^
The members of this organisation were much more 
traditionally oriented and tended to remain most loyal 
to their caste and community. Members of the 
organisation had limited resources of wealth, status, 
and power.
It is possible to conclude that those commercial 
and professional organisations in Delhi, which were 
modelled on Western institutions, had achieved some 
amount of cohesion despite the diverse social origins 
of the members. The Punjab Chamber of Commerce, the 
Delhi Piece Goods Association, the Bar Association, the 
Sub-Assistant Surgeons’ Association, and the Indraprasth 
Karmachari Mandai all displayed a degree of cohesiveness 
due to the nature of their financial and professional 
interests. Those commercial and professional groups 
that formed Western-style organisations, but remained 
essentially traditional in inspiration, were less 
cohesive and appeared to have little ability to 
effectively mobilise the organisations’ more limited 
resources of wealth, status, and power. The members of
Ibid .
1
48
the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association, Kirana 
Committee, Indian Bankers Association, and Indraprasth 
Vaid Sabha were much more traditionally oriented in their 
financial and professional interests and retained their 
primary loyalty to caste and community. Even though many 
individual members had substantial resources of wealth, 
status, and power, they were unwilling to lend them 
fully to the support of the organisation, a factor which 
weakened the prestige and influence of this type of 
organisation.
The organisations in Delhi which were modelled on 
Western institutions and whose members pursued modern 
financial and professional interests, were firm supporters 
of the government. This was unavoidable as a result of 
strong ties with foreign markets and western education.
The ties were reinforced by the fact that the government 
recognised the value of these bonds of loyalty and 
conferred special privileges upon the organisations and 
their members. The members of these organisations 
welcomed their privileges and in turn repaid the 
government by remaining staunchly loyal to it.
The organisations which were modelled on Western 
institutions, but whose members pursued traditional or 
indigenous interests were not tied to the government by 
any special bonds of loyalty. In terms of financial 
affairs, education, and lack of privileges, the members 
of these organisations were keenly aware of the 
indifference, if not contempt, with which the government 
treated them. They were, therefore, more receptive to 
the issues raised by swaraj and swadeshi which drew more 
directly from their traditional world.
2*9
The total value of exports from industry in Delhi
totalled approximately R s ,1 crore,^ The three most
important commodities of manufacture were wheat flour,
2hardware and cotton yarn. These three commodities 
represented 50 per cent of the value of manufactures 
in Delhi, The industries which produced exports for 
Delhi, consisted of two cotton spinning mills, the 
Delhi Biscuit Company, and two flour mills. The rest 
of the petty industry in the Province ’ran on
3unenterprising slothful and traditional lines.’ The
1
Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, pp. 160-1. 
Denning did not separate the value of the exports of 
commerce from those of industry. The estimate of the 
Deputy Commissioner in the Gazetteer has been 
arbitrarily imposed on Denning’s estimates.
2 The imports and exports of the three most important 
manufactured products in 1914 were as follows:
Value of 
Imports Exports Exports 
(maunds) (maunds) (Rs . )
Wheat flour 1,12,600 6,62,333 24,27 ,965
Iron manufactures 63*853 60,647 1 6,56,225
Cotton (twist & yarn) 7,134 32,786 10,33,785
Total: 51,17,975
RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 1916.
3 RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 1916. The census of 1911 
listed 43 factories in Delhi. These factories, each of 
which employed at least 20 operatives and utilised some 
form of power together employed about 4,300. (The 
Gaze11eer listed four cotton mills, two cotton presses 
and three ginning factories, four flour mills, two 
biscuit factories, ’several’ iron workshops, four ice 
factories, an oil and soap mill, and a malt works which 
employed about 2,630,) The census of 1921 listed 38 
factories, each of which employed over 20 operatives and 
utilised some power, and employed altogether 5 ,300.
Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, 
XV, Pt . II; Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, 
pp. 160-1 .
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failure of a large number of swadeshi industries and 
firms in the banking crash of 1913-14 in the Punjab 
dissuaded most financiers with available capital from 
investing in other nascent industries in Delhi.^ 
Shortages of material during the war and competition
from abroad before and after the war also limited the
2opportunities for investment. The erection of the 
new capital did not provide as much industry for Delhi 
as would have been expected, either. A civilian 
observed that:
It is significant that although the building of 
the new capital offers a good many opportunities, 
few of the contracts for building, supply of 
material, fittings, or furniture have been secured 
by men belonging to Delhi.3
1
There were 16 companies that failed in Delhi in 1913-4. 
RDDA, Commerce File 4 Part A 1916. ’Note on the Effect 
of the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907 and of the 
Companies Act of 1913 on Indian Industries.’ For a 
detailed discussion of this crash see H.K. Trevaskis,
The Punjab of Today: An Economic Survey of the Punjab 
in Recent Years, 1890-1925 (Lahore, 1932).
2
There were 31 swade shi industries in Delhi in 1911*
They employed about 2,625 operatives. Only three of 
these were still classified as factories in 1921. The 
other 28 had either liquidated or no longer employed more 
than 20 operatives. In 1921 there were 17 new swadeshi 
industries which employed around 2,000 operatives. Those 
that closed down or no longer employed over 20 were 13 
cotton factories, four iron workshops, four flour mills 
and one each of a cane factory, a lock works, a bakery, 
a biscuit factory, a button factory, a coach building 
factory, and a gold thread factory. Census of India, 
1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt . II.
3
RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 1916.
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Industry, then, served as the poor step-brother to 
commerce in Delhi, In many cases it provided an outlet 
for investment capital. But only rarely did an 
industrial concern wholly take up the energies of any 
of the wealthy families of the city.
The ’industry’ described above concerned highly 
localised and fairly sophisticated establishments. Delhi 
also had a large number of petty industries which 
employed a small number of operatives, used a limited 
amount of machinery, and depended upon a small output.
One example of such a petty industry was the large 
number of concerns which imported paper in order to 
make bahis [a native account book]. The turnover in 
this commodity was estimated at R s . 10 lakhs per year.^ 
The factory type of industry described above employed
4,300 in 1911 and 5,300 in 1921, Petty industry employed
2400 in 1911 and 5,500 in 1921, For the same years 
commerce employed 19,700 and 28,600.
The wage and salary earners in Delhi in 1911 were 
not organised like members of the commercial and the 
liberal professions. There were no trade unions among
^ Pun,jab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, p. 16 3.
2
These figures, as shown in Table 3-0, are based on the 
two censuses after the figures for handicrafts in Table 
3-D have been taken out of the classification ’industry’. 
The figures do not include labourers who worked in the 
construction industry, nor do they include the 
unspecified labourers. Those who were employed in 
services in Table 3-E and those who were employed by 
the government in Table 2-B are also excluded.
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those who worked in factories, nor among those who worked 
in petty industry, The clerical professions also lacked 
any occupational organisation. These circumstances 
changed through the decade following 1 9 1 1, however, when 
the clerical profession formed a trade union and the 
syces formed a union which agitated for higher wages.
There was some attempt to organise the domestic servants, 
and a serious attempt to organise the industrial workers, 
all of which came to a head in 1920 when there were six 
strikes.^
The wages of men employed in industry in Delhi 
varied immensely. An engineer could receive from R s . 65 
to R s . 150 per month. A woman working on a cotton gin 
received around R s . 6 per month. The workers usually 
put in a 72 hour week, but some government industries 
worked 56 hours. Throughout the following decade there 
were several attempts to reduce the long hours. The 
Delhi Administration opposed these attempts on the grounds 
that the labourers were uneducated and would have nothing
3to do if not kept fully employed.
Female 'industrial1 labourers, especially in the 
textile mills, came from the Muslim community, probably
 ^ The strikes of 1920 are discussed below in Chapter 
Seven.
2
RDDA, Commerce File 56 Part B 1914, 'Report on the 
Working of the Indian Factories Act During the Year 
1913'. Table 4-A contains several lists of wages in 
Delhi.
3
RDDA, Commerce File 83 Part B 1919, 'Labour Questions'.
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from the karkhandar group. Most did piece work and came 
and went as they pleased. Their dismally low wage 
constituted a supplement to the family income rather than 
the sole means of support,
Working conditions varied enormously and the 
inspection of factories could guarantee only a certain 
amount of safety for the small number of factories that 
came under the Indian Factories Act. The uninspected 
petty industries probably had worse conditions, but with 
very few operatives it was easy to maintain low wages, 
long hours, and poor conditions through the threat of 
dismissal. As industry expanded and work began on the 
new capital a labour shortage developed, but this 
shortage was counterbalanced by an influx of immigrants.^
A large number of immigrants came into Delhi to 
work as labourers either in the new imperial capital,
1
The Deputy Commissioner observed: 'Owing to the 
growth of factories the labourers have come in large 
numbers from neighbouring districts and other places 
with the result that Teliwara, Sabzimandi and other 
suburbs of Delhi show a large increase in population,' 
Pun.jab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, p. l6l.
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in factories, or petty industry,^ They came from the
same areas from which Delhi traditionally drew its
2immigrants. The immigrants who came into Delhi between 
1911 and 1921 were predominantly Hindu, they were 
illiterate, they were either unmarried, or married but 
unaccompanied by their wives and children, and they were
3mostly between the ages of 20 and 35» They were usually 
brought in by a jobber who was himself not born in Delhi; 
who paid for the immigrants’ transportation to Delhi; who
1
It is difficult to ascertain the number of people who 
immigrated into Delhi Municipality between 1911 and 1921.
An estimate can be derived by calculating how many of the 
non-Delhi born residents of Delhi Municipality in 1 9 H  
would have survived if they had all remained in Delhi until 
1921 and had a survival ratio of 20 per mille. Of the 
8 4 ,160 non-Delhi born residents in Delhi Municipality in 
1911» 68,765 would have been alive in 1921. This number 
of old immigrants can be subtracted from the total number 
of non-Delhi born who were resident in the Delhi urban 
area in 1921 (137>058) which means that 68,293 new 
immigrants entered the Delhi urban area between 1911 and 
1921. (Using the same procedure it was 39,820 for the 
decade 1901-11). Assuming that all the people who were 
enumerated in Delhi City in 1921 were immigrants, since 
very few people lived there before 1911, it is possible 
to subtract the number of residents in Delhi city from 
the total of new immigrants, which leaves 12,132 as new 
immigrants into Delhi Municipality between 1911 and 1921. 
This figure tends to be confirmed by the fact that the 
Hindu community in Delhi Municipality increased by 15,649 
between 1911 and 1921 in absolute numbers, while the 
Muslim community increased by only 476. Census of India, 
1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
2
Table 4-B lists the places from which immigrants came, 
and in what numbers.
3
This is evident from even a superficial glance at 
each of these classifications in the two censal reports. 
Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, 
XV, Pt. II.
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support themselves; and who found them accommodation with
the rest of his gang either at the work site or in the
abundantly cheap housing in the four suburbs without the
walled city.^ They managed to live cheaply enough to
either save money or send it back to their families.
They were quite fortunate in having an outlet for
unemployment as they invariably returned to the place
from which they emigrated. Their living conditions, the
fact that they were either unmarried or unaccompanied,
their illiteracy, and the lack of institutional ties with
the city combined to make them one of the more ’turbulent’
2groups in the city. They did not respond to the issues 
raised by the political agitator in any significant 
numbers, but they did become involved in the industrial 
unrest of 1920.
1
RDDA, Home File 187 Part B 1917» ’Working of the 
Workmen's Breach of Contract Act, 1859> in Delhi Province’; 
Home File 215 Part B 1921, ’Details of the Results of 
Prosecutions under the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act'; 
Home File 40 Part B 1922, 'Administration of the Workmen's 
Breach of Contract Act . '
2
The annual police reports reiterate yearly that the 
increase in the number of criminals in the city is due to 
the ’influx of population of a humble type who have been 
attracted by the demand for work’ which led to ’such a 
large floating population whom the police cannot get to 
know.’ RDDA, Home File 248 Part B 1913. And again in
1916 ’the population is largely a floating one particularly 
in the suburbs’ which led to an increase in crime in those 
areas and a lack of public assistance in the detection of 
crime. RDDA, Home File 181 Part B 1917» The crime was 
usually not serious, just petty thieving and minor 
f ighting.
paid in advance on their wages until they were able to
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The conditions that the salary and wage earners of 
Delhi faced varied a good deal. The Deputy Commissioner 
concluded that the labourer who earned R s . 15 per month 
was much better off materially than the clerks and others 
who had greater expenses because they were in a higher 
social scale.^ He elaborated upon this point in the 
following manners
Probably in no Punjab district will be found 
such a contrast of wealth and poverty as is 
found in Delhi. In the city are many wealthy 
merchants and property owners living in great 
comfkrt and luxury: some keep motor cars and 
all keep horses and carriages of which many are 
of a high grade. The Lalaji1s fast trotter and 
gig are quite a feature of the place. The upper 
middle class consists of professional lawyers or 
shopkeepers who have been successful in business: 
some come of good stock but in this class the 
majority are men who by their own abilities have 
come to the front to an extent which would have 
been well-nigh impossible under oriental rule, A 
middle class clerk whose salary will be anything 
from R s . 50 to R s . 100 lives a somewhat dull life: 
paying a high rent and having to appear in clean 
respectable clothes does not leave any great 
margin for luxuries, after the family have been 
fed and clothed. His sons are probably being 
educated to a higher extent than the father, and 
although the early stages of education are cheap, 
provision has to be made for the high education 
by which alone examinations qualifying for State 
or professional service can be passed. The petty 
tradesmen do no more than eke out a humble 
existence, but a livelihood is certain as they 
deal in such necessaries as always commend a 
sale. Amongst the artisans and depressed classes, 
there is seldom distress: true, their incomes 
are small but then their wants are few: the 
squalor of their surroundings is due far more to 
ignorance, and want of civilisation than to want 
of means.^
^ Punjab District Gazetteer, V, 1912, A, p. l6l.
2 Ibid., p. 138-9.
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The observations of the Deputy Commissioner, Colonel 
Beadon, about the La la j i and the middle class of Delhi 
were quite valid. But below that level his perspicacity 
becomes more questionable. An Indian clerk earning R s . 
100 per month was certainly better off than his European 
counterpart who earned the same amount.’*' The salary of 
R s . 50 per month may have been somewhat low in the face
of a high rent, and a number of dependents who would not
1
3
2work. The people in the lower classes received a much
smaller wage, but more of their dependents worked.
The lower classes did, however, face a serious 
problem of wages and costs. If a basic unit of 
consumption was composed of an adult male, an adult 
female, and an older child, and a younger child, their
1
A European shorthand clerk in the Chief Commissioner's 
office received R s . 100/-/- per month. RDDA, Home File 
211 Part B 1913, 'Transfer of Bishen Das to the Finance 
Department and Appointment of Mr ¥. Bailey as Shorthand 
Writer in the Chief Commissioner's Office Delhi.'
2
The Deputy Commissioner stated that 'quite humble 
tenements are let for R s . 10 per mensem' in the 
Municipality while in the Civil Lines and cantonments 
the rent was R s . 50 to R s . 120 per month. Punjab District 
Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, p. 13^.
3
In a work on C.F. Andrews, the authors commented upon 
the relative well-being of labourers in northern India: 
'The wages of unskilled labour in North India had risen, 
and the men were not likely to be attracted by the promise 
of twelve annas a day in Fiji when they could get as much 
by carrying earth for the foundations of New Delhi.' 
Benarsidas Chaturvedi and Marjorie Sykes, Charles Freer 
Andrews: A Narrative (London, 19^9), p. 113.
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annual consumption of* grain could be l8-§- maunds. This
2would be the same as 2.03 seers per day* Assuming that
the usual proportion was three parts wheat to one part
coarse grain, the cost for this household per day for
3grain would be 3 annas on the prices of 1913- The 
average cost of cooking oil was 5 annas per seer; assuming 
a seer per week this would amount to 20 annas per month. 
The average rent for a kaccha dwelling inside the walled 
city was 32 annas per month. These three basic 
commodities amounted to Rs, 10/12 per month, Added to 
this was the cost of spices, salt, sugar, pulses, 
vegetables, and clothes. But these were only essentials 
and weddings, funerals, festivals, sickness, and times of 
unemployment also counted heavily. It would be legitimate 
to argue, therefore, that even R s . 30/- per month would 
be a tenuous position to confront and maintain. And since
1
An adult male consumed seven maunds per annum, an adult 
female five maunds, an older child four maunds, and a 
younger child 2.\ maunds. RDDA, Revenue File 117 (t>) Part 
B 1914, 'The War in Europe - Proposal to Open Cheap Grain 
Shops.'
2
This would be divided into .77 seers for an adult male 
per day, .55 seers for an adult female, .44 for an older 
child, and .27 seers for a younger child. This estimate 
is confirmed separately in RDDA, Home File 238 Part B 
1921, 'Petitions in Respect of the High Rents Demanded by 
Landlords in Delhi.'
3
Wheat cost 10.25 seers per Rupee and jowar and bajra 
averaged 14.5 seers per Rupee. RDDA, Commerce File 121 
(e) Part B 19l4, 'The War in Europe - Rise in the Price 
of Wheat Ordinary IX of 1914, Wheat Conference.'
4
RDDA, Home File 238 Part B 1921.
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the majority of* the population were in this position it 
would follow that a rise in prices would seriously affect 
them,
Prices rose dramatically from 1914 to 1922, while 
wages tended to remain static or to improve only in 
certain sectors of the economy.'*' It was this gap between 
prices and wages that provided the grounds for discontent 
among the lower income groups in Delhi, The nationalist 
agitators provided the rationale for direct action 
through the issues they raised, but the constraint of 
circumstances provided the major impetus for the release 
of some of the economic discontent that arose during the 
decade.
1
Table 4-C contains three lists of relative prices for 
selected commodities in Delhi.
NATALITY AND MORTALITT RATES FOR DELHI, 1913-21
I913 1914 I9I5 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921
Births per mille Total 44.8 48.9 47-9 49.4 52 .8 47.9 45-8 47-4 40.6
Infant mortality per 1,000 ) Male 283.5 292.O 228.9 2 2 7.2 228.8 327-3 249-4 2 1 7 . 7 2 2 5.6birth« (Age 0—1) ) Female 264.1 281.8 212.4 218.8 220.6 3 0 7.9 245.4 206.2 208.1
Deaths per mille in Delhi ) Total 39.9 37-9 28.9 32.9 32.7 93-5 42.0 35-5 3 1 .2Male 36.9 34.6 26.9 29.9 29-5 80.2 38.1 32.9 27-3
) Fesale 43.9 42.2 31.6 36.7 36.7 110.2 96.9 38.8 35-7
Deaths per aille in Delhi ) Urban 44.2 42.1 34.2 38.9 36.4 73-9 46.4 37.6 35.7
) Rural 35-1 32.5 22.9 25.9 28.1 II7 .4 36.7 33-1 26.3
Source: Government of India, Commercial Intelligence Department, Statistical 
Abstract for British India from 1912-13 to 1921—22 (Calcutta, 192**)
pp. 327- 329. 337-
TABLE 1-B 
POPULATION OF DELHI
Total population Delhi Municipality Total population Delhi City-
Total population 
Delhi Province
I90I 1911 1921 1931 1921 1911 1921
Total 208,575 232,837 248.259 347.539 56.161 [l80,610] 183.768
Hindu 114,417 121,735 137,384 178,737 36.919 151.248
Musli* 88,460 102,476 102,952 158,287 11,752 27.0 54
Jain 3.266 3 .5 3 1 3,856 4,238 6 836
Christian ) 2,164 3,075 3.021 3,008 5.770 4.531
Indigenous < 1.575 2,464 3,021 - 1,000 4.531
European ) 589 611 - - 4,370* -
Sikh 229 1,939 975 3,169 1,694 95
Source: Census of India, 1901» XII, Part II; Census of India 1911» XIV, Part II;
Census of India. 1921, XV, Part II; Census of India 1931, XVI, Part II.
* Does not include hlTJ Eurasians.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION AND THE 
MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, 1913
Delhi Administration (l,844)
Chief Commissioner's Establishment (l4)
1 Chief Commissioner
1 Personal Assistant to the Chief Commissioner
12 Clerical staff
Deputy Commissioner's Establishment (290)
1 Deputy Commissioner
5 Superior staff
113 Urban staff
171 Rural staff
Police Establishment (1223)
7 Gazetted officers 
63 Upper subordinates 
1153 Lower subordinates
District Judge and Munsif Court Establishment (82)
Judge, Small Causes Court Establishment (30)
Public Works Department Establishment (9 )
Medical, Civil Police Hospital, Plague Establishment(12) 
District Jail Establishment (6 5)
Government High School Establishment (3^)
Ecclesiastical Establishment (5 )
Government Gardens Establishment (53)
Encamping Grounds and Historical Buildings 
Establishment (2l)
Veterinary Establishment (6)
Municipal Committee (l,839)
Secretary’s Establishment (3 6 3)
Octroi
128 illiterate peons 
106 other staff 
Genera1
33 illiterate peons 
96 other staff
Health Department Establishment (1,319)
690 sweepers 
629 other staff 
Engineering Establishment (157)
61
TABLE 2-A*
* Sources: RDDA, Home File 29 Part A 1913;
Education File 16 Part B 19l4.
GOVERNMENT SERVANTS, DELHI URBAN AREA, 1911, 1921
Produc t
Total. 
Workers & 
Dependent s
1911
Total
Actual
Workers
1911
Total 
Workers & 
Dependents
1921
Total 
Workers & 
Dependent s 
(Hindu) 
1921
Total 
Workers & 
Dependents 
(Muslim)
1921
Total 
Workers A 
Dependents 
(Sikh) 
1921
Total 
Workers * 
Dependents 
(Jain) 
1921
Total 
Workers & 
Dependents (Christian) 
1921
Total
Actual
Workers
1921
Canals & streams (367} 506 329 82 71 8 16 184Labourers ( ) ( ) 40 40 _ _ 20Roads & bridges 4,662 ) (2,564 ) 73 70 _ 3 _ _ 47Labourers ( ) ( ) 34 32 _ 2 _ _ 22Rail (4,601) (1.691 6,881 5.780 565 63 106 359 3,359Labourers, coolies, porters ( ,) ( 5 4,650 2, 830 1,783 6 28 3 2,866Post office, telegraph, telephone 1,604 556 1,689 943 599 31 27 89 667Army (imperial) 3,836 2,924 6,318 1,179 677 432 45 3. 982 4,313Army (native states) 10 2 201 172 29 — _ _ 86Police 2,122 827 1.795 777 933 32 10 43 1,094Watchmen 41 22 101 51 50 - _ _ 71State service 1,891 722 5.523 3,950 716 39 67 743 3. 080Service (native states) 97 6 16 2 12 2 _ 11Munic ipal 1,010 231 2,226 1,422 637 109 12 46 1.356Other local officials 83 28 559 65 493 1 - 350
Total: 20,324 9,628 30,612 17,642 6,576 790 304 5.281 17.526
*Source: Census of India, 1911» XXV, Part II;
Census of India, 1921, XV, Part II.
TABLE 2—C*
POLICE FORCE IN THE DELHI URBAN AREA
ic
Literate
12
Illiterate
1913
Literate Illiterate
1916
Literate Illiterate
Inspectors 6 _ 7 8Sergeants 15 - 15 _ 6 _Sub-Inspectors 24 1 24 1 26Head Constables 96 31 106 8 U 103
50Constables 304 840 293 415 742
Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims
Inspectors 1 3 1 3 1 4Sub-Inspectors 13 12 13 12 12 14Head Constables 36 86 39 104 50 103Constables 525 603 529 598 549 6 08
Source: RDDA, Home File 248 Part B 1913; Home File 223 Part B 1914;
Home File 181 Part B 1917.
Onî\3
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CIVIL JUSTICE, DELHI
TABLE 2-D
Criminal Justice
1912 1913 1914
No. persons brought to trial n.a . 6,900 5,976
No. witnes ses 7,061 9,088 9,680
No. convicted n. a . 3,323 n. a .
No. d is charged n . a . 1,076 n. a .
No. a cquit ted n. a . 2,501 1,658
Per cent convicted 32 48 n. a .
Civil Justice
No. of original suits for money 
and moveable property 
No. of original suits for title 
and other suits
Value and Cost of Suits for Money 
and Moveable Property
Up to Rs. 500 
500 to 1,000
1.000 to 5,000
5.000 to 10,000
10.000 to 100,000 
over 100,000
Total value of suits
Duration of trials (Days)
contested 
unconte s ted
5,092 5,^72 
756 719
4,686
1 7 2
215
16
3
4,989
229
246
6
2
Rs. 11,90,643 12,68,172
51
22
73
24
Sources: RDDA, Home File 317 Part B 1914;
Home File 297 Part B 1915; 
Home File 304 Part B 1915*
TABLE 3-A
MERCHANTS, DELHI URBAN AREA. 1911. 1921
Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Totalb'orkers & Actual Workers & Workers A Workers dt Workers A Workers ds Workers A ActualProduct Dependents Workers Dependents Dependents 
( Hindu)
Dependents
(Muslin)
Dependents
(Sikh)
Dependents 
(Jain)
Dependents 
(Christian)
Workers
1911 1911 1921 1921 1921 1921 1921 1921 1921
Owners. Manager, theatres, etc. 25 6 52 5 42 2 3 13Bank, insurance, Money lenders, brokers ¿1,682 2,445 4,117 3.786 34 8 264 23 967Coonission agents, warehouse 1,226 888 1.671 1.347 242 _ 82 954Textiles 8 .1 3 2 2,876 12,085 9,820 2,00 1 U2 216 2 5,772Skins, fur, horn 787 268 718 4o6 306 - 6 331Vood (not firewood) 23 3 737 212 508 8 _ 9 326Metals, tools, Machinery ¡*96 159 624 179 438 - 4 3 417Pottery, bricks, tiles 3 3 361 24 337 - _ 217Chemical products 1.699 452 2 ,0 1 5 608 1 . 272 - 151 _ 932Vendors (wines & spirits) 633 212 507 335 165 5 _ 2 275Hotels, cookshops, etc. 128 72 138 — 132 - - 6 82Fish — - 16 — 16 - _ — 5Vegetable oils, salt, condiments 877 241 9.109 5,260 3.279 88 447 35 3,482Milk, butter, ghee, .poultry 1,299 475 2,087 880 1.146 1 60 . 943Sweetmeats, sugar, gur 456 296 1,104 254 174 3 673 _ 628Vegetables, cardomon, betal, fruits 3.903 1 ,4 5 1 5.898 2,986 2.836 6 67 3 2,538Grains and pulses 2, 314 1,0 5 1 1,-648 1,448 99 1 100 803i Tobacco, opium, ganja 3Ô1 61 657 91 566 _ - _ 376Hay, grass, fodder 1,043 440 586 563 12 _ _ 11 173Ready-made clothes, hats, shoes 6,108 2,509 6.842 1,333 5.323 30 156 _ 2.913Furniture, carpets,, bedding 353 50 238 101 137 _ _ _ 154Hardware« cooking, gardening 129 12 989 731 237 _ 21 _ 353Building materials 77 26 2,617 2,252 354 6 _ 1 ,8 5 3Dealers & hirers, animal transport 104 68 629 46 582 1 _ _ 423Dealers & hirers, mechanical transport — — 73 43 17 1 12 _ 36Fuel 488 142 298 75 188 1 28 6 142Jewellery, clocks, optical 2,688 1,128 729 261 171 297 _ 318Bangles, beads, toys 641 54 1.356 172 1.184 _ _ 486Publishers, booksellers, stationers 345 149 - 1,0 5 2 381 506 19 108 38 472Dealers in rags, stable refuse 9 8 21 21 _ _ 19General shopkeepers 10,017 3.385 3.383 2,713 578 11 26 45 1.424Itinerant peddlers & traders 104 23 1.677 1,435 183 - 59 3Other traders, farmers of tolls
unspecified 429 392 92 4o 16 _ 36 _ 52Manufacturers, businessmen 593 386 1,449 686 544 165 31 23 757
Total: 50,082 19.739 65.575 38,294 23.645 398 2,838 215 28,639
Source: Census of India, 1911. XIV Part II;
Census of India, 1921, XV, Part II, o\-p-
Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total TotalWorkers & VActual Workers & Workers & Workers & Workers & Workers & Workers & ActualProduc t Dependent s Workers Dependents Dependents Dependents Dependents Dependent s Dependent s Workers(Hindu) (Muslim) (Sikh) (Jain) (Christian)1911 I9II 1921 1921 1921 1921 1921 1921 1921
TABLE 3-B* PROFESSIONS, DELHI URBAN AREA, 1911, 1921
Priests, ministers U,202 1,659 2,646 731 1,880 _ _ 35 649Religious mendicants Ilk 51 1,189 1,189 - - _ 42Catechists, readers 116 82 47 - 29 6 _ 12 34Temple, burial, burning, circumcisers 502 174 1,862 1,686 152 24 _ _ 1,051Lawyers of all kinds 418 126 569 525 - 33 6 2 134Lawyers clerks, petition writers 667 233 380 323 31 _ 26 _ 193Medical, all kinds 898 255 1,289 540 570 23 19 137 600Midwives, vaccinators 1»92 322 1,358 646 399 40 30 243 695Teachers, all kinds, (1,054 ) (424) 1,644 850 579 3 33 175 678Teachers* clerks ( ) ( ) 986 960 - 5 11 10 307Scribes, stenographers 195 82 143 130 10 _ 2 . 65Architects, surveyors, engineers 378 131 464 243 187 18 7 1 189Authors, artists, photographers 103 42 171 19 123 — 19 7 64Musicians, actors 1,499 836 1,211 785 426 - _ - 606Conjurers, acrobats 225 111 2 _ 2 - - _ 2Cashiers, bookkeepers, clerks 3,233 536 2,245 1,949 176 45 19 47 1, 4l4
Totals 14,096 4,684 16,156 10,576 4,564 197 172 669 6,723
TABLE 3-C* LABOURERS, DELHI URBAN AREA , 1911, 1921
Cotton, ginning, cleaning 382 76 574 192 374 _ 6 266Cotton spinning (3,694) (1,388) 2,613 1, 240 1,372 - 1 _ 681Cotton sizing & weaving ( ) ( ) 4,936 3,634 1,295 - 6 1 2,006Jute spinning, weaving 2 - 137 70 67 - _ - 91Furriers & brush makers — - 567 147 420 _ _ 311Sawyers (2,549) (1,509) 86 12 74 _ _ _ 13Carpenters, joiners ( ) ( ) 3,812 1,889 1,744 174 1 4 1,728Iron forging, rolling 340 - 329 11 - _ 229Arms - - 151 - 142 9 - _ 107Other iron, etc. 1,483 637 4 ,3 7 2 929 3,244 196 3 _ 1,091Other metal 506 158 611 - 611 _ _ _ 339Porcelain & crockery - - 127 - 127 - _ _ 63Brick & tile makers 531 176 2,2 2 7 933 1,280 9 2 3 1.376Other ceramics, alabaster, mosaic - - 10 - 10 - _ 10Matches & explosives - - 107 7 100 - _ _ 64Aerated water & ice 89 - 467 32 430 3 1 264Dyes, print, ink - - 16 9 7 - _ - 13Paper mache, cardboard - - 278 19 259 - - - 131Butter, cheese, ghee — - 100 _ 100 _ _ _ 46Brewers & Distillers - - 238 17 221 _ _ _ 103Tobacco, opium, ganja - - 473 113 356 - - 4 258Upholsterers, tents - - 22 21 - 1 - - 10Stone cutters, dressers (17,266) (3,035) I54 35 119 _ _ _ 97Bricklayers & masons ( ) ( ) 11,543 7,994 3,471 28 39 11 5,120Other builders, painters 1, 807 939 4,866 4,508 356 2 - 2,895Repairing motor vehicles - - 203 23 131 20 - 29 97Ship & boat builders - - 42 - 42 _ _ 24Gas & electric 148 30 1,327 625 569 103 6 24 79**Printers 226 53 712 508 172 _ 2 30 362Labourers, unspecified 4,899 2,180 14,360 12,442 1, 828 73 “ 17 9,478
Total: 23,582 10,181 55,471 35,399 19,250 629 60 130 28,067
C\Ut
* Source: Census of India, 1911, XIV, part XI;
Census of India, 1921, XV, Part U.
I Total Total To tail Total Total Total Total Total TotalVorkers A Actual Vorkers & Vorkers & Vorkers * Vorkers 4 Workers A Workers & ActualProduct Depend ent s Workers Dependents Dependents De lendents Dependents Dependents Dependents Workers(Hindu) Muslim) (Sikh) (Jain) (Christian)
1911 1911 1921 1921 I92I 1921 1921 1921 I92I
TABLE 3-D* ARTISANS, DELHI URBAN AREA I9II, 1921
Rope 156 91 248 100 148 _ _ 111Vool fBlanket) (22) (17) 100 - 100 - - _ 1(Carpet ) ( ) ( ) 88 61 27 - - _ 59Silk i spinners) 850 ) 319 402 - 400 - 2 - 115(weavers ) 1 ) 14 — — — 14 — 1Dyeing, bleaching, printing 92 42 429 9 419 1 - - 286Lace, embroidery 18, 382 5, 242 4 162 561 3 601 - - 1 452■panning 409 • 42 655 557 98 - - - 274Leather articles 1,584 619 1 491 427 1 064 - _ _ 268
Bone* ivory, horn 26 14 245 78 167 - - - 123Basket weavers, thatchers 1,233 658 910 753 157 - - - 638Brass, copper 5,256 1,454 2 541 998 1,543 - - - 1 019Minters, die sinkers 427 186 37 - 37 - - - -! Glass, crystal 88 42 289 - 289 - - - 120Potters 1,676 1 040 2 852 1 898 950 4 - - 83OVegetable oils 681 279 1 508 625 883 - - - 475Soap, per f use 441 243 1 116 33 1 O83 - - - 458Rice pounders, Hillers 2,393 1,760 971 570 363 7 12 19 496Bakers, biscuit Makers 322 144 880 192 607 6 75 - 164Grain parehers 241 77 220 205 15 - - - 93Butchers 731 470 596 22 574 - - - 193Sugar, aolasses, gur 61 — 30 12 18 - - - 8Sweetmeats, jams, condiments 2,566 779 2 229 1 929 292 4 k - 842Hat, cap, turban 920 209 649 28 619 1 1 - 189Tailors, embroidery on linen 3.737 2 084 5 881 1 116 4 595 51 20 99 1 477Shoe, boot, sandals 6 948 2 407 14 835 12 015 1,629 2 - 1,189 5 611Gloves, socks, buttons 347 50 1 338 130 1 184 24 - 519Cabinet Makers, carriage painters 1,354 556 886 247 639 - - - 425Lime burners, ceMent workers 146 18 344 14 330 _ - - 176Cart, carriage» palki 136 109 118 18 90 - - 10 43Saddles, harness 329 102 — - - - - - -Bookbinders, envelope Makers 164 57 565 8 547 - 9 1 213Musical instruMests 148 68 108 17 91 — _ - 75Vatches, optical 504 324 335 42 292 - 1 - 180Precious stones. Metals 12 449 4, 508 7 582 2 102 5 456 - 10 14 2 525Bangles, beads 1, 143 451 966 6 960 - - - 322Toys, kites, taxidermy, fishing tackle 435 230 2 405 105 2 299 - 1 673
Total: 66 387 24 691 58 025 24 cor*00 31 566 96 148 1* 333 20 374
TABLE 3—E* SERVICES. DELHI URBAN AREA I9II, I92I
Vashing, cleaning, dyeing 2 284 1 194 4 230 1 867 2 359 1 3 1 685Barbers 2 058 1 196 2 371 1 155 1 213 - - 3 979Sweepers 3,645 2 081 6 653 6 403 98 16 - 136 3 642Boat owners, bo at Men, towmen 19 11 45 - 45 - - - 18Motor vehicles, owners, drivers — - 160 85 52 k 1 18 94! Other vehicles, owners, drivers 2 242 828 5 378 2 502 2 869 6 - 1 2 316Palki bearers 1.693 875 1 881 1 564 316 — - - 877Animal vehicles, owners, drivers 400 220 1 348 447 901 • 815Porters & messengers 3.675 2 442 1 840 884 945 3 1 7 1,043Cooks, water carriers 12 125 7 080 18 470 11 082 6 430 126 61 746 10 403Private grooms, dog boys 2 163 760 3 037 2 433 326 136 2 l40 2 190Motor drivers — — 99 18 66 k — 11 62Beggars & vagrants J 3 121 1,741) 2 851 1 519 1 278 8 8 38 1 512Prostitutes ( 267 79 188 - - - 162
Total: 33,425 18,428 48,630 30 ,038 17 ,076 304 76 1,100 25 ,798
* Source: Census of India, 1911, XIV, Part II;
Census of India, 1921. XV, Part II.
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TABLE 4 - A*
MONTHLY VACIES FOR SELECTED OCCUPATIONS. DELHI
1912 - 1912 1912 - U 1912 - 4 1919 - 21 1922 - 41 2 3 h 5 6
BANGLES (LAC) - - 7/8 to 15/- _ _
BEARER - 20 _
BHISTI - 9 _ _ _BLACKSMITH 27 - 20 to 28 46/8 4l
BLEACHER _ _ _ 19/8
BOILERMAN _ - l<t to 20 - _
BRICKLAYER . - 20 to 26 - _ _
CARPENTER 30 - 20 to 27 • 58 48
CARVER (WOOD & IVORY) 30 - _ 20 to 50 50 36/8
CHAUKIDAR fGUARDl - 7 7 to 8 - - _CLERKS - 50 to 100 - . _
COOLIE 13/14 9/6 9 to 12 22/12 17COOLIE (WOMEN) 9/8 - - - 15/3 13/14COOLIE (MINOR) 5/12 . - 7/9 5/12DARZI (TAILOR) 20 _ •
DHOBI _ 10 _ _ _
DRAWER - - _ - 2 6/8 20/8
DRIVER (ENGINE) 30 /8 - 18 to 30 _ 47 42/8
DYER _ _ - _ 25ENGINEER _ - 65 to 100 - _
EMBROIDERER 20 - - 9/6 to 13/2 3 0/8 25/8
FIREMEN 20 - - _ 32 27FITTER 35 - 35 to 55 20 to 30 52 46/8FOLDER _ 2 5/8 20
GINNER (WOMAN) - - 6 _ _
JEWELLER (SUPERIOR) - - _ 100 _ _
JEWELLER (MEDIUM) - - _ 25 to 30 _ _
JEWELLER (APPRENTICE) - - - 15 to 20 _ _
KHANSAMAH [COOK 1 - 18 - _ _ _
KHIDMUGAR 1 WAITER 1 12 _ _ _
LABOURER (SKILLED) _ 9/6 to 15 _ _
LABOURER (INDUSTRIAL) _ 15 _ _
MALI [GARDENER] - 9 - - - _
MASON 30 - - . 47 40
MESSENGER - - 9 to 11 - _ _
MILLMAN (FLOUR) _ . 20 _ _ _
MISTRI 45 20 _ - 68 60
MOCHI iSHOEMAKER 1 - - - 7/8 to 18/8 2 5/8 22
MOULDER 21/8 - . - 37/8 33
OILMAN 16 - 12 to 13 - 22 18
PAINTER 16/8 _ 30 . 23 21/8
POTTER - - _ 33/8
PRESS COMPOSITER 25 44 _ 35 26/8
PRESS DISTRIBUTOR 20 - • _ 27 21/8
PRINTER (COTTON) _ - 15 to 18/8 _ _
REELER - - _ _ 22 18
SILVERWARE _ 45 _ _
SIZER - - 40 34/8
SPINNER - - 25 _ 34 29/8
SYCE . 9 _ _ _
SWEEPER _ 8 _
TANNER . . . 11/4 34 30/8
THREAD BALLER • . - 19
TIN WORKER _ . - 30 to 45 _ _
TURNER 20 • _ _ _ _
WAREHOUSEMAN « 20 _ _
WARDER _ _ _ 40/8 36
WEAVER • 26 _ 63 56/8
WEAVER (OOTA) - “ - 2 - -
SOURCESi Columns 1, 5i 6
Column 2
Census of India. 1931. XVI (Delhi) 
Part I (Report)|
Punjab Pistrict 'Gazetteers, V, 1912, 
A, pp. 13^—5I 
RDDA, Commerce File 56 Part 3, 191** I 
RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A, 1916.
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TADLE k - B*
NUMBER OF RESIDENTS IN THE" DELHI URBAN AREA NOT BORN IN DELHI
Total % of Total Population % of Noij-Delhl Born
19OI 1911 1921 1901 1911 1921 19OI 1911 Ì92I
Total Population 208*575
2
232,837
3
304,420 ... V ? .. 6 7 8 9
Total Non-Delhi Born 59,174+ 84,160+ 137,058 28.37 36.15 45.02
Punjab & Punjab N.S. 15,433® 23,913 38 ,1 2 3 7.4o 10.27 12.52 26.08 28.41 27.81
Punjab 1 2 1 ,17 4 34,790 1 9.O9 11.04 1 2 5 .15 25.38
£-p U.P. & U.P.N.S. 27,424 34,817 56,634 13.15 14.95 18.60 46.34 41.37 41.32
•HÖ United Provinces 34,303 55,714 14.73 18 .30 4o .71 40.64
%0
BengaI 1 ,0 52^ 1,102*4 2,59'* 0.51 0.47 0.85 1.78 1.31 1.89
Rajputana Agency 12,316 19,510 31,050 5.95 8.37 10.20 20. 81 23.18 22.65
4)OcdH
United Kingdom 577 569 2,829 0.28 0.24 0.92 0.98 O .67 2.06
Central India Agency 1,105 1,103 276 0.53 O .47 0.01 1.87 1.31 0.20
N.-W.F.P. « 1,044 580 } 0.45 0.02 1 1.24 0.42
Total: 57,907 82,058 132,086 27.82 35.22 43.12 97.86 97. ^ 9 96.35
* Sources: Census of India, 1901, XII - A, Pt. II|
Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. IIj 
Cenaus of India, 1921, Pt. II.
+ The total Non-Delhi born figures were derived from the difference between the total population and the 
persons born in Delhi District. The figures for 1901 and 1911» therefore, are not based upon the same 
land area as the figures for 19 2 1.
( The Non-Delhi born figures for the Punjab for 1901 include: Punjab Province, North-West Frontier 
Province, and the Punjab Native States.
The Non-Delhi born figures for Bengal for 1901 include Bengal and Assam.
+ + The Non-Delhi born figures for Bengal for 1911 include 1 Bengal, Bengal Native States, and Eastern 
Bengal and Assam.
1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923
TABLE 4-c(i)* RELATIVE PRICE INDEX FOR SELECTED COMMODITIES DELHI
Wheat 100 128 110 112 143 176 153 169 164 117Rice 100 100 110 101 119 165 186 165 147 129Jovar 100 120 100 100 193 203 143 216 150 103Ba jra 100 121 98 98 172 221 154 221 154 115Barley 100 113 113 110 134 179 154 179 141 89Gram 100 117 113 110 137 217 193 231 175 103Salt 100 100 122 138 194 155 166 155 150 194Sugar 100 64 98 117 50 I29 147 239 237 156House rent 100 100 100 l4o 140 150 150 150 130 120
Social functions 100 100 120 125 130 I50 150 150 145 140Cotton piece goods 100 80 150 175 200 25O 250 200 175 155Average 100 104 112 120 149 182 167 188 164 130
Source: Census of India, 1931. XVI, Part I•
TABLE 4-C(2)* AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES CURRENT OF FOOD GRAINS, DELHI
Salt (Rs/md.) 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.5 3-5 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.7Rice 1 6.5 6.9 6.9 • 6.7 7.4 6.8 8.0 11.1 12.5 11.1 9-9Wheat " i.5 3.8 4.4 5.0 4.3 4.4 5-6 6.9 6.0 7.6 6.4Jovar (great millet) " 2.8 2.6 3.6 3.6 3.0 3.0 5-8 6.1 4.3 6.5 l*.5Bajra (spiked millet) " 3*2 2.9 3.9 4.0 3.2 3.0 5.7 7.3 5.1 7-3 5 .1Gram " 2.3 2.7 3.7 3.** 3.3 3.2 4.0 6.3 5.6 6.7 5.1Barley " 2.7 3.3 3-3 3-3 3.3 3.2 3-9 5.2 4.4 5.2 4.1
TABLE 4-C(3)* VARIATIONS IN RETAIL PRICES
Rice 1873 = 100 203 216 216 209 231 212 250 347 391 3^7 309Wheat " 67 181 210 238 205 210 267 329 286 362 305Jovar " 187 173 240 240 200 200 387 407 287 433 300Bajra » 178 161 217 222 178 167 317 406 283 406 283Gram " 144 169 23I 212 206 200 250 394 350 419 319Barley " 193 193 236 236 236 229 279 371 314 371 293
Source: Government of India Commercial Intelligence Department,
Statistical Abstract from 1912-13 to 1921-22. PP. 559-579.
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THE MAJORITY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY IN DELHI
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The Hindu community constituted an absolute majority 
in Delhi. Out of a total population of 488,188 in Delhi 
in 1921, Hindus formed 71 per cent with a numerical 
strength of 325»551. The Hindu community constituted 
82 per cent of the rural population and 57 per cent of 
the urban population with 151,248 persons living in Delhi 
Province and 174,303 persons living in the Delhi urban 
area .
The Hindus who resided in the Delhi urban area 
lived either in the new administrative units of Delhi 
City which had formed since 1911 or in the Delhi 
Municipality. Of the 174,303 Hindus who lived in the 
Delhi urban area, 37,000 lived in the New Imperial 
Area, the New Cantonment, and the Civil Lines. The 
overwhelming majority of the Hindus who lived in these 
new areas were immigrants, most of whom were government 
servants and labourers. There was a gross imbalance in 
favour of males who constituted 24,700 as compared with 
12,200 females.
The Hindus who lived in the Delhi Municipality 
totalled 1 2 1 ,7 35 in 1911 which represented 52 per cent 
of the population. Between 1911 and 1921 the Hindu 
population in Delhi Municipality increased by 15,649 
and totalled 137,384 which represented 55 per cent of 
the total population in that unit. It is most likely 
that the increase of Hindus in the Delhi Municipality
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between 1911 and 1921 was due primarily to immigration 
for the 9?600 males and for the 6,000 females.^
The Hindus of Delhi were characterised by a 
heterogeneous social structure and were further divided 
into sectarian religious groups. The loyalties to 
caste and sect illustrate the traditional nature of 
Hindu society and provide the milieu with which the 
political leaders were confronted. As the process of 
politicisation encompassed ever larger numbers of 
individuals and new social groups from 1911 onwards, 
it became apparent that in the cities occupation was 
an equally significant force for fashioning social 
ties and for moulding political attitudes. Those castes 
which exhibited a high degree of occupational diversity 
usually displayed a lower degree of social, economic, 
and political cohesiveness. Those castes which exhibited 
a significant amount of consistency of caste, sect, and 
occupation, displayed a higher degree of cohesion in 
their political attitudes and in their social loyalties.
 ^Between 1901 and 1911 the number of females born in 
Delhi decreased by 4,519» The number of females resident 
in Delhi who were born outside Delhi increased by 9?732. 
This seems to indicate that Delhi-born girls emigrated 
from Delhi while females from surrounding districts 
immigrated into Delhi. The most obvious explanation for 
this movement is that it was the custom of the area for 
men to marry wives from the east. The number of females 
resident in Delhi who were born in the United Provinces 
was twice that of either the Punjab or Rajputana, the 
other two major areas from which immigrants came.
Census of India, 1901, XII (Punjab and North-West 
Frontier Provinces); Census of India, 1911, XIV (Punjab); 
Census of India, 1921, XV (Punjab and Delhi).
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I
The Brahman community in Delhi was the third largest 
after the Jat and Chamar communities.^ It encompassed
Brahman castes from the Punjab, Hariana, United Provinces,
2Maharashtra, Bengal, Tamilnad, and Kerala. The Gaur
Brahmans from Hariana were the most numerous while the
Sarswat Brahmans from the hills of the Punjab were the3second largest caste.
The Gaur Grahmans were described by Ibbetson as 
very strict in their observance of caste rules. They 
were strict vegetarians and looked down upon - and refused 
to eat and smoke with - Brahmans who ate flesh (for 
example, Sarswat Brahmans). They were also reputed to be 
quarrelsome and grasping. The Sarswat Brahmans on the 
other hand were less strict. They ate flesh and would 
eat and smoke with most of the stricter Hindu castes
This Chapter is based upon a very large number of Files 
in the Record Department, Delhi Administration, from 
which only isolated references have been taken.
2
There was also a group of Muslim Brahmans peculiar to 
Delhi District called Huseni Brahmans. There were about 
3,!}00 of these in 1881, and they appeared to administer 
to the spiritual needs of both Hindus and Muslims.
Denzil Ibbetson, Panjab Castes (Lahore, 1916), p. 218.
3 Of the 60,984 Brahmans in Delhi District in 1881, 58,650 
were Gaur Brahmans and 1,250 were Sarswat. The number of 
Brahmans increased to 61,299 in 1891 and to 62,176 in 
1901. Of the 62,176 Brahmans in Delhi District in 1901, 
25,672 were in Delhi Tahsil. The number of Brahmans in 
Delhi in 1921 was 37,l4l. Ibbet son, Panjab Castes, p.
219; Punjab District Gazetteers, V (Delhi District), 1904, 
B, xiv; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II (Tables).
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(for example, Banias, Khatris, Kayasths, and Suds).
They also lacked the quarrelsome and grasping nature 
of the Gaurs.^
All the Brahman castes had panchayats to settle 
social questions of a minor nature. In addition to 
these, three Brahman organisations were created as a 
reaction to reforming movements like the Arya Samaj, 
of which more later. The oldest was the Chaurasia 
Brahman Sabha (or Chaurasia Prem Parkashni Sabha) which 
was founded in 1906 with the object of strengthening 
orthodox sentiment and promoting Sanatana [orthodox] 
religion through the recitation of bhajans [hymns] and 
the Ramayana. It met weekly on Mondays. Its membership 
slowly decreased and it finally fell inactive in 1918.
In 1910 the Gaur Brahmans founded a second organisation 
whose inspiration was social reform. This organisation, 
the Gaur Brahman Zamindari Association, which was 
oriented towards both rural and urban Brahmans, met 
every three months in the Sat Narain Mandar, Dariba 
Kalan, and continued actively through the decade.
There were two other organisations in existence in 
1911 that concerned Brahmans. The oldest was the Khatri 
Updeshak Sabha founded in I889 as an organisation of 
social reform. It depended primarily upon Khatris for 
support but the school it founded in 1895 educated both 
Khatri and Brahman boys. It also supported Sud Brahman 
widows. The other organisation, the Brahman Sabha, was 
founded in 1911 to promote Sanatana Pharma [orthodox 
religion]. It began with 100 members and soon gained an
Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, p. 220.
1
additional 200 within five years, most of whom were 
considered 'influential*. It was located at the Sat 
Narain Mandar in Dariba Kalan, met three times per year, 
and took special pains to perform the upnayana 
[Brahmanic thread] ceremony for poor Brahman boys.
Yet another Brahman organisation came into existence 
after 1911. It was the Brahman Hitkarak Mahamandal Sabha 
which was founded in 1914. It began with 30 members, 
and was located in Jagiwara where it maintained a school 
for the religious education of Brahmans. The two most 
active officers of the organisation (the manager and 
secretary) were both members of other sanatani 
organisations which were anti-Arya Samaj in tone. This 
organisation showed very little life and after abolishing 
its school in 1916, became inactive in 1918 .^
A representative of the Brahman community who spoke 
for traditional feeling and conservative sentiment was 
Pandit Banke Rai. He was born in 1853 and died in 1923» 
His achievements as a Sanskrit scholar by 1906 earned him 
the titles of divisional darbari and mahamahapadayaya, a 
title which included a stipend of Rs. 100 per year from 
the Government. He owned one garden of 18 bighas of land 
in addition to his house in Katra Nil. He was president 
simultaneously of seven bha.ian mandalis, which had a total 
membership of around 5 7 0, the main function of which was 
to promote Sanatana Pharma by the recital of the Ramayana 
and hymns. He took an active part in the education of
1
RPPA, Confidential File 70 (1915): ’List of Political, 
Quasi-Political, and Religious Societies, Sabhas, and 
Anjumans in Pelhi Province for the Year Ending 30 June 
1914. 1
7 4
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Brahman children, but did not participate in Hindu 
organisations which actively opposed the Arya Samajists 
or Muslims. His contributions to the War effort were 
of such an order that the government presented him with 
a Sanad for General War Work. It is interesting to note 
that Deputy Commissioner Bolster of Delhi recommended 
him for the honour of provincial darbari in 1920.
Bolster thought that the recognised head of the Brahman 
community, which was showing a loyal disposition in 
that ’critical’ year, should receive such recognition. 
Chief Commissioner Barron refused on the ground that the 
list should remain small and there was therefore no room 
for his elevation.^ The Pandit had no son and upon his 
death the seat of divisional darbari lapsed from the 
family.
The Brahman community in Delhi contained a high 
degree of occupational diversity. There were 38,000 
Brahmans in Delhi in 1921 of whom 16,900 were actual 
workers. The community included 8,700 who were literate 
and of this number 2, 400 were literate in English.
1
RDDA, Foreign File 6 (a) Part B 1920: ’Recommendation 
of Certain Persons in Delhi for Provincial Darbaris, 1 
Note by Deputy Commissioner dated 2k November 1920.
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Table I lists the numbers of actual workers in the 
various occupations,
TABLE I N­
OCCUPATIONS OF THE BRAHMAN COMMUNITY IN DELHI, 1921
Trade 3»300
Priests 2,000
Government servants 1,550
Contractors, clerks, cashiers 700
Professions 700
Living on incomes and pensions 250
Income from Agricultural lands 120
Transport (owners, managers, officers) 100 8,720
Cultivators of all kinds 3>700
Labourers of all kinds 1,700
Domestic servants 1,400
Artisans and industrial workers 1,200 8,000
16,720
The most important characteristic about this occupational 
structure is that the Brahman community was the only high 
caste community with such a large number of manual 
workers. The second characteristic is that almost all 
the non-manual workers filled occupations for which some 
degree of literacy was necessary. These two facts meant 
that the manual and non-manual division was reinforced 
by the division between those who were literate and those 
who were illiterate. The division between those literate 
in Hindi and those literate in English was not as 
important except where it highlighted the division between 
modernised and traditional Brahmans.
Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
1
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The Brahman community in Delhi, with some exceptions, 
did not have large resources of wealth, status, and 
power. Even though members of the community were involved 
in trade, they did not tend to be the wealthiest or most 
successful merchants. They did excel in the professions 
and government service, and they did own land (eight per 
cent in Delhi District in 1910),^ But few Brahman families 
could match the wealth of the more outstanding Bania,
Khatri, and Kayasth families in Delhi.
The Brahman community of Delhi did have a certain 
amount of status. This came in the first instance from 
its traditional position in the varna structure as the 
guardian and transmitter of the sacred texts of Hinduism. 
This status tended to accrue only to those Brahmans who 
were actually priests and to the few Sanskrit scholars 
in the city. The status which accrued to the Brahman 
community came, in the second instance, from a style of 
life which other sections of Hindu society sought to 
emulate. And the high status of the Brahman community 
came, in the third instance, from the large number of 
positions its members held in the professions and 
government service which in turn stemmed from its 
emphasis upon education.
While the Brahman community in Delhi was not devoid 
of status, it lacked any significant or visible 
manifestations of power. There were no Brahmans on the 
Municipal Committee, there were few Brahmans who were 
title holders, honorary magistrates or darbaris and no 
Brahmans held positions of importance in the mercantile
1
Punjab District Gazetters, V (Delhi District), 1912, A,
62.
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and commercial organisations of the city, But if the 
community lacked political and economic power, it does 
not follow that it did not have social, religious, and 
cultural influence. This influence, which derived 
primarily from the status of the community, was evident 
from the fact that many of the leaders of the Arya Samaj 
and the nationalist movement came from this group, The 
lack of cohesion within the community, however, meant 
that even though it supplied leaders, it did not respond 
as a community to political agitation.
The Bania community was the fourth largest social 
group in Delhi. It encompassed Bania castes such as 
the Aggarwal, the Oswal [Marwari], the Maheshri, the 
Saraogi, the Sahai and so forth.^ Ibbetson described 
Banias as strict Hindus of pure Vaisya descent who wore 
the janeo [sacred thread], who had long periods of 
purification, who would not practice karewa [widow- 
marriage] and who would not eat or drink at the hands 
of lower castes - or higher castes - which ate flesh.
He added that they had great commercial expertise and 
business acumen, and that the dealings of some of the 
great Bania houses of Delhi, Bikaner, and Marwar were 
of the most extensive nature. In the Punjab, Banias 
were found in great numbers only in the Delhi and Hissar 
divisions, and in the central states of the eastern 
plains. This was easily understandable in terms of the 
tradition that the Aggarwals originated at Agraha in
1
The Aggarwals constituted 25,600, the Oswals 400, and 
another 1,000 were unspecified. There were also 3,800 
Jain Aggarwals. Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
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the Hissar District,^ The Aggarwals were almost entirely 
Hindus (except for some Jains and a few Sikhs), and 
invariably Vaishnava»
The Banias of Delhi had only two exclusively Bania 
organisations in 1911. The oldest was the Vesh Young 
Men's Association, Founded in 1892, its object was to 
improve the moral and intellectual stature of the Vesh 
and Bania communities. It had a reading room where 
young men were supposed to discuss moral and social 
questions. It maintained a membership of 40 which met 
at the house of the president, Lala Sri Ram, Bar-at-Law, 
in Imli Mohalla. The members were not necessarily those 
members of the Bania group who had the largest resources 
of wealth, status and power, but they carried some 
prestige and influence. It is significant that this 
organisation became the parent organisation for the 
Indraprasth Sewak Mandli, which was a Hindu volunteer 
association, founded in 1917» to support Home Rule.
The second Bania organisation in Delhi was the 
Rohtgi Dharm Rakhshari Sabha. It was founded in 1911 
with the ostensible purpose of promoting Sanatana Pharma. 
Its real object was to save sanatanis from being 
converted to the Arya Samaj. It had 75 members who 
exercised ’some influence’. This was obviously a 
response to the activities of the Arya Samaj that came 
to a head before the War.
A third organisation came into being in 1914. It 
was the Marwari Association. It began with - and
This was the capital of the Vaisya Raja, Agar Sen. The 
Aggarwals were said to have spread after the capture of 
the city by Shalib-ud-din Ghori in 1115. Ibbetson,
Panjab Castes, pp. 2h2->h,
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maintained - a membership of 15. It supported a library 
and a reading room on Chandni Chauk. Its ostensible 
purpose was social reform, but its real objective was to 
promote the Arya Samaj among Marwaris. The Arya 
Samajists in this organisation did not take active parts 
in other Arya Samaj groups. The Marwari Arya Samajists 
maintained a school called the Marwari Vidayala.^
The Bania community, like the Brahman community, did 
not attempt to establish any western style organisations 
to protect its interests. Also like the Brahman community, 
it relied upon traditional institutions to regulate 
social and religious activities. Unlike the Brahman 
community, however, its outstanding interest in economic 
affairs found ample protection in the western-style 
organisations in the city in which it was predominantly 
represented. It contributed the largest numbers to the 
Punjab Chamber of Commerce, the Delhi Piece-Goods 
Association, and the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile 
Association. It predominated in banking, cloth, and 
grain, the three major commodities of Delhi commerce.
The Bania community’s predominance in the political 
and official affairs of Delhi was as marked as its 
predominance in the economic affairs of the city. The 
Bania community had the most representatives on the 
Municipal Committee, the largest number of title holders, 
darbaris, and honorary magistrates. The Bania community 
in Delhi had a certain amount of status derived from its 
traditional position in Hindu society and more especially 
from its orthodox religious observances. But in the
RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915).
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cities, where occupation was as important as role, the 
community’s large resources of wealth contributed to a 
large extent to its high status and extensive power.
The Bania community in Delhi, then, displayed a high 
degree of consistency of wealth, status, and power.
The career of Lala Mina Mai Somani illustrates the 
way in which a Bania with wealth also achieved status 
and power. He was born in 1880 and, after a vernacular 
education, entered the family firm of Dhuliawala. The 
firm had extensive interests in banking, cotton milling, 
iron forging, and investing. In 1912 he was elected to 
the Municipal Committee from Ward VII (Bazar Sita Ram), 
a minor commercial area with a large population of 
indigent Muslims and low caste Hindus. Between 1912 and 
1919 he obtained the titles of kursi nashin because he 
was a ’wellrto-do banker, house proprietor, and liberal 
subscriber to private charities’, rai sahib and honorary 
magistrate (second class). He subscribed R s . 65,000 to 
the Second Indian War Loan Fund and became a member of 
the Delhi Committee for the Third Indian War Loan Fund.
He capped this career when he became a divisional darbari 
in 1924. He also became the first president and dharma 
alankar of the Indraprasth Sanatan Dharm Mandal in 1916, 
and built dharmasalas and piaos.
From all indications the Bania community had a high 
degree of consistency of wealth, status, and power. There 
was also a high degree of consistency of caste, sect, and 
occupation. The Bania community was overwhelmingly 
orthodox in its social and religious values. It gave 
financial support to traditional educational institutions, 
to the Prin.ja Pol, and to temples. Its members visited
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the sacred shrines of India and attended all the religious 
melas. It contributed lavishly to the Ram Lila and 
Krishna Lila pageants in the city, and regarded caste as 
the bed rock of society. Most Bania concerns were family 
enterprises and kinship played a predominant role in 
their social and commercial activities. This concentration 
on orthodox religion was matched by a concentration on 
commercial occupations.
The Aggarwal caste had 25,600 members in Delhi in 
1921. There were 9,900 actual workers and 8,500 persons 
who were literate, of whom 1,500 were literate in English. 
The occupations of the actual workers of the caste are 
shown in Table II.
TABLE II1
OCCUPATIONS OF THE AGGARWAL CASTE IN DELHI, 1921
Trade 7 ,636
Government servants 197
Contractors, clerks, cashiers 191
Professions 187
Transport (owners, managers, officers) 171
Living on incomes and pensions 167
Income from agricultural lands 2k
Industrial owners, managers 27 8,600
Artisans and industrial workers 612
Labourers of all kinds 33^
Domestic servants 237 
Cultivators of all kinds 91 1,27^
9,874
It is interesting to note both the relative and absolute 
dominance in trade of the Bania community. Banias
1 Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
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comprised about 25 per cent of those involved in trade 
of all kinds (28,6^k). The next closest groups in 
numbers were Brahmans and then Rajputs who together did 
not equal half the Banias. But their relative dominance 
was equally important. Banias controlled many or most 
of the large financial concerns in indigenous banking, 
cloth and grain. Both in numbers and in resources the 
Banias were the merchants par excellence of Delhi.
The Bania community, then, had a high degree of 
literacy, large resources of wealth, status, and power, 
a significant concentration in one type of occupation, 
a predominant influence in the economic organisations 
in the city, and a very traditional attitude towards the 
social and religious values of Hindu society. This 
consistency was matched only by the Jat community and 
like the Jat community, the cohesiveness of the Bania 
dommunity enabled it to respond more as a community to 
various political issues in Delhi from 1917 onwards.
The Khatri and Kayasth castes did not occupy any 
rigorous position in the order of varna nor were they 
related to each other in any formal sense. Yet they 
shared many characteristics. The traditional origins 
of both communities was somewhat ’low’, a state of 
affairs which they both sought to rectify by claiming 
Kshatriya status. They both founded organisations in 
Delhi to further this end. Other characteristics which 
they shared were the same strength in members, a high 
rate of literacy, and a high standard of living, which 
resulted from the pursuit of commerce and the professions 
as occupations. They both emphasised caste mobility and 
they both contributed significant numbers of leaders and
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followers to the Arya Samaj and the nationalist movement. 
They differed in that the Khatris originated in the 
Punjab and the Kayasth originated in Bihar and Bengal, 
and the Khatris had more members in trade while the 
Kayasths had more members in the clerical and liberal 
professions. There is very little information about the 
Kayasths in Delhi, but Ibbetson described the Khatris in 
the following manners
Trade is their main occupation; but in fact they 
have broader and more distinguishing features. 
Besides monopolising the trade of the Panjab and 
the greater part of Afghanistan, and doing a good 
deal beyond those limits, they are in the Panjab 
the chief civil administrators, and have almost all 
literate work in their hands. So far as the Sikhs 
have a priesthood, they are, moreover, the priests 
or gurus of the Sikhs. Both Nanak and Govind were, 
and the Sodis and Bedis of the present day are, 
Khatris. Thus then they are in fact in the Panjab, 
so far as a more energetic race will permit them, 
all that Mahratta Brahmins are in the Mahratta 
country, besides engrossing the trade which the 
Mahratta Brahmins have not. They are not usually 
military in their character, but are quite capable 
of using the sword when necessary. Diwan Sawan Mai, 
Governor of Multan, and his notorious successor 
Mulray, and very many of Ranjit Singh’s chief 
functionaries, were Khatris. Even under Mahomedan 
rulers in the west, they have risen to high 
administrative posts. There is a record of a 
Khatri Dewan of Badakshan or Kunduz; and I believe, 
of a Khatri Governor of Peshawar under the Afghans, 
The Emperor Akbar’s famous minister, Todur Mai, was 
a Khatri; and a relative of that man of undoubted 
energy, the great Commissariat Contractor of Agra, 
Joti Parshad, lately informed me that he also is a 
Khatri. Altogether there can be no doubt that 
these Khatris are one of the most acute, energetic 
and remarkable races in India, though in fact, 
except locally in the Panjab, they are not much 
known to Europeans. The Khatris are staunch Hindus;
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and it is somewhat singular that, while giving a 
religion and priests to the Sikhs, they themselves 
are comparatively seldom Sikhs. The Khatris are a 
very fine, fair, handsome race. And as may be 
gathered from what I have already said, they are 
very generally educated.1
Their toughness and energy, their high rate of literacy, 
and their business acumen gave them moderate resources 
of wealth, status and power.
There were 9,000 Khatris in Delhi in 1921. Of these,
2,250 were actual workers and 2,800 were literate. More
than half were occupied in trade (l,300) with a few in
government service (125) and the professions (l2 5).
There were close to 550 occupied as agriculturalists,
industrial workers and artisans, labourers, and domestic
servants. The Khatris had only one organisation, the
Khatri Updeshak Sabha. It was founded in 1889 with the
object of social reform. It initiated a school in 1895
to educate Khatri and Brahman boys. The organisation also
2supported Sud Brahman and Khatri widows.
1
Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, p. 247. A most remarkable 
description of the Khatri caste in a north Indian city 
can be found in Prakash Tandon, Punjabi Century; 1857- 
19^7 (London, 1961). Various references to the Kayasth 
caste can be found in Charles H. Heimsath, Indian 
Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform (Princeton, 19^4), 
pp. 281-4; John H. Hutton, Caste in India; Its Nature, 
Function, and Origins (fourth edition; London, 19^3)> 
passim; B.B. Misra, The Indian Middle Class: Their 
Growth in Modern Times (London, 1961), passim.
2
Census of India, 1921, XV, P t . II; RDDA, Confidential 
File 70 (1915).
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Lala Gurpershad Kapur was a fitting representative 
of the Khatri community. He was born in 1883 and became 
a cloth merchant of some renown, He was appointed 
municipal commissioner in 1918 and 1921 and was elected 
to the Municipal Committee in 1922 for Ward II (Chandni 
Chauk) against the Congress Party nominee. He received 
a War Loan Sanad for subscribing over R s , 2,000 to the 
Second Indian War Fund and was vice-president of the 
Indraprasth Sanatan Dharm Mandal. He was honorary 
secretary of the Kshatriya Upakaraka Sabha, which sought 
to have the Khatri caste upgraded to Kshatriya status in 
the census of 1921 and he was honorary secretary of the 
Delhi Piece Goods Association.
The Kayasths of Delhi had two organisations. One 
was the Kayasth Self-Advancement Society founded in 1892 
with social reform as its object. It was hardly 
functioning in 1911 and became completely inactive by 
1917* The other organisation began in 1912. The Chatar 
Gupat Sabha began with 125 influential members who lived 
on and around Bazar Sita Ram, Its objects were social 
reform, the education of children, and the extension of 
support to widows and orphans. It held several meetings 
during the year, an annual meeting in March, and maintained 
a library and a widow fund.1
Munshi Rup Narain represented the Kayasth community,
He was a member of the Bar in Delhi and was elected 
municipal commissioner for Ward IV (Malewara) in 1915«
He was an honorary magistrate (first class) and received
1
There were 7»300 Kayasths in Delhi in 1921. Census of 
India, 1921, XV, P t . II; RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915) .
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a War Loan Sanad for subscribing over Rs . 2,000 to the 
Second Indian War Loan Fund. He was also a vice- 
president of the Indraprasth Sanatan Dharm Mandal.
Several interesting points emerge from a comparison 
of the three groups discussed above, The first is that 
the number of persons who were literate in proportion 
to the actual workers of the community was 52 per cent 
for the Brahman community, 86 per cent for the Aggarwal 
caste, and 124 per cent for the Khatri caste. This is 
a direct comment upon the number of manual workers in 
the Brahman community and the high degree of education 
among the dependents in the Khatri caste. It probably 
meant also that even the manual workers among the Khatris 
were literate.
The second point of note is the comparison of 
dependents per actual worker in the three groups. This 
ratio was 1.2 dependents per actual worker for the 
Brahman community; 1.6 for the Aggarwal; and 3»0 for the 
Khatri. These ratios reveal two facts. The first is that 
there were more women who worked in the Brahman community 
than in the Aggarwal and Khatri castes.1 The Brahman 
women who worked came from those sections of the 
community whose occupation was manual, while those 
Khatris who performed manual labour maintained a stricter 
seclusion for their women. This implies that upwardly 
mobile castes emulated traditional values to a greater 
extent than those who were no longer mobile. These
1
In the Brahman community, the proportion of actual
workers who were females was ten per cent. It was five
per cent for the Aggarwal and Khatri castes. Census of
India, 1921, XV, Pt . II.
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figures also reinforce other evidence that of the three 
groups, the standard of living among the members of the 
Khatri and Kayasth castes was sufficiently high for most 
of their children to survive infancy into adulthood,1
There was a noticeable gulf between the higher 
castes - the Brahmans, Banias, Khatris, and Kayasths =* 
and the rest of Hindu society in Delhi, The higher 
castes had large or moderate resources of wealth, status, 
and power; high rates of literacy; and a majority of 
members who pursued non-manual occupations. The rest of 
Hindu society reflected the converse of these 
characteristics. A community which occupied a middle 
position between these two sections of Hindu society, 
however, was the Rajput community,
The Rajput community was divided into sub-units 
called clans, tribes, or castes, The largest clan was 
the Bhatti. The second largest was the Gaura clan, which 
although it practised karewa retained the high status of 
the Rajput community. Members of this group were noisy 
and quarrelsome, and clannish in disposition, The next 
largest group were the Chauhans, who also practised 
karewa, but who were unable to retain their high status 
in the eyes of the rest of the Rajputs, They were 
consigned from the Kshatriya status to the Sudra level 
with the Jats (who also practised karewa). They were the 
best Rajput cultivators in Delhi District and were 
characterised as well behaved and orderly. They 
considered themselves to have a higher status than the
Census of India, 1931» XVI (Delhi), Pt, I (Report),
1
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Jats however,1 The Rajput clans did not form western- 
type organisations. They relied instead upon powerful 
panchayats to regulate clan affairs.
The Rajput community occupied a middle position in 
Delhi because it had a rate of literacy which, though 
lower than the ratio for the top groups, was higher than 
that of any of the remaining groups in Delhi. It also 
had a larger number of non-manual workers than the lower 
groups of the society. There were 20,700 Rajputs in 
Delhi in 1921. There were 9>900 actual workers and 2,300 
who were literate. The diversity of occupation of actual 
workers is shown in Table III,
TABLE III2
OCCUPATIONS OF THE RAJPUT COMMUNITY IN DELHI, 1921
Trade 1,200
Government servants 800
Contractors, clerks, cashiers 200
Professions 130
Income from Agricultural lands 60
Living on incomes and pensions 50 2,440
Cultivators of all kinds 2,600
Artisans and industrial workers 2,800
Labourers of all kinds 1,300 
Domestic servants 600 7«300
9,740
The Rajputs of Delhi possessed limited resources of 
wealth, status, and power, Some Rajputs possessed 
significant amounts of wealth as rural and urban landlords, 
and as traders. But these were few and the community as
1 Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, pp. 132-5
2 Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
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a whole, with its high proportion of manual workers, was 
not wealthy. The community possessed a substantial 
degree of status which stemmed from its traditional 
position in Hindu society. This status was jealously 
guarded and zealously maintained. Yet the community 
was unable to translate its status into power. There 
were no Rajputs on the Municipal Committee, very few 
who were title holders, and none who were darbaris or 
honorary magistrates. The Rajput traders belonged to 
merchant organisations but they did not exercise any 
influence over the direction of such organisations.
The Rajput community in Delhi as a whole displayed 
little consistency of caste, sect, and occupation.
There was no single large clan or caste to give the 
community any great amount of cohesion, while the 
division between the Chauhan and other Rajputs was 
naturally unbridgeable. The Rajputs were undoubtedly 
orthodox with the exception of the Chauhans, whose 
practice of karewa encouraged them to join the Arya 
Samaj. There was probably some consistency of caste, 
sect, and occupation among the Chauhan clan which was 
agriculturalist and among the Bhatti clan which had 
large numbers of artisans and labourers. It is difficult 
to discover, however, how many Chauhans and Bhattis were 
in non-manual occupations, or how many members of the 
Gauras and Kicchis, the other two important clans, were 
literate or worked in manual occupations.
The Jat community was the largest single group in 
Hindu society in Delhi in 1921. This is understandable 
because the Jat community was the largest single
community in the Punjab and in the western United 
Provinces« It belonged to the Sudra varna and had the 
highest status of the communities which practised karewa 0 
According to Ibbetson9 members of the Jat community would 
eat and smoke with the Ahir and Gujjar castes which were 
also Sudra, but they were deadly enemies of the Rajputs,,1
Ibbetson describes the Jat as the farmer and revenue 
payer par excellence in the Punjab. He was honest, 
industrious, sturdy, and independent. He was impatient 
of tribal or communal control, and asserted the freedom 
of the individual. These values and characteristics gave 
him a special propensity to join the Arya Samaj, He was 
peaceably inclined if left to himself, but he was 
turbulent and not easily pacified once aroused,
2There were two major groups in the Jat community,
The Dhe had their ancestral origins in the north and west 
The Hele or Haulania came from the south, more 
specifically from Bharatpur. These two groups came from 
the same area originally but the Dhe migrated across the 
Indus plains and settled in the area between the Indus 
and Ganges river. A large number of those who settled 
between the Indus and the Sutlej were converted to Islam;
r
The Ahirs numbered 11,357 and the Gujjars 13,04l in 
Delhi in 1921, They both practised karewa and were both 
overwhelmingly rural, They had a very low rate of 
literacy and no wealth, status, or power. Ibbetson, 
Panjab Castes, pp, 97=’104, 126-131; Census of India, 19^1 
XV, Pt. II.
2 For a further discussion on the migration of Jats see 
A.B, Mukerji, 'Jats, A Study in Human Geography,’ 
Geographical Review of India (June 195^); and A.B. Mukerj 
’The Migration of the Jats: A Study in Historical 
Geography,’ Indian Geographer, VI (August 1961), 4l-53*
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a large number of those who settled in the modern state 
of Punjab were converted to Sikhism; and a large number 
of those who settled in Mariana and in western United 
Provinces remained Hindu. The Hele also migrated from 
the trans-Indus area, but they went south through 
Rajputana and eventually large numbers concentrated at 
Bharatpur, They then migrated into Hariana and western 
United Provinces. There was little animosity between 
the two groups, but they strictly refrained from 
intermarriage. These two major subgroups were again 
subdivided into tribes. The largest tribes were the 
Dehia, the Khatri, the Dagar, the Dhillon, the Ithwal 
and the Ghatwal.1 The Dhe formed the majority in the 
province.
There were 46,100 Jats in Delhi in 1921. Of these 
15,600 were actual workers and there were 1,600 members 
of the community who were literate. The occupations of 
the actual workers are listed in Table IV.
The Jat community had mixed resources of wealth, 
status, and power. The members of the Jat community 
in the rural areas owned the largest amount of land and 
were the lambardars in the majority of the 3l4 villages
1
Ibbetson is unclear about the Khatri, the Dagar, the 
Dhillon, and the Ithwal tribes in Delhi, He had no 
information on the first two and the second two were 
located primarily in the Sikh tract and the Eastern Sub- 
Montane respectively with an unusually large concentration 
in Delhi District. The Dhe formed the majority and the 
Hele the minority in the District with the Dehia and the 
Ghatwal tribes respectively the major tribes of these two 
sub-groups.
TABLE IV1
OCCUPATIONS OF THE JAT COMMUNITY IN DELHI, 1921
722
223
60
4o
hi 1,086
1 3,78 8
263
259
72 14,382 
15,468
in the Province. This significant form of wealth added 
to their status which was somewhat higher than that 
conferred by tradition. They were also eagerly recruited 
for the army. They made a virtue of manual labour and 
tended to look down upon the non-manual occupations as a 
means of acquiring wealth and status. Their power in the 
rural area was also quite high since their community paid 
the greatest proportion of the land revenue, they 
constituted the lambardars, and they had a significant 
representation on the electoral roll.
1
Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
2
For a description of a Jat village in Delhi Province, 
see Oscar Lewis and Harvant Singh Dhillon, Group Dynamics 
in a North Indian Villages A Study of Factions(New Delhi 
1954); and Os car Lewis, Village Life in Northern India: 
Studies in a Delhi Village^ (Urbana, 1958) ; for a more 
general discussion of Jat villages see A.B. Mukerji, ’Jat 
Settlements and Habitations.' Indian Geographical Journal 
XXXI (1956), 102-15, and XXXII (1957), 13-28.
Government servants 
Trade
Living on incomes and pensions 
Professions
Contractors, clerks, cashiers
Cultivators of all kinds 
Artisans and industrial workers 
Labourers of all kinds 
Domestic servants
9 k
The Jats who lived in the urban area, who were 
literate, and who pursued non-manual occupations, seemed 
to have a somewhat higher status than tradition 
conferred also, and they had a reasonable amount of 
wealth and power. Many of the wealthy urban Jats were 
landlords who preferred to live in the city. Two examples 
of such Jats were Chaudhri Raghnath Singh and Chaudhri 
Risal Singh. Chaudhri Raghnath Singh who was a divisional 
darbari, had received the title rai bahadur in 1892 at the 
age of 3^. He was a Jat who was an ’enlightened 
agriculturist of influence and service to Government* and 
who owned 105 bighas of land. Chaudhri Risal Singh won 
the election for the Municipal Committee for Ward XI (Sadr 
Bazaar)in 1922 against the Congress Party nominee. At 
the age of 50 he was a landlord of some repute.
The urban members of the Jat community did not form 
any western-style organisation to further their interests, 
but they did join other organisations with religious, 
social, political, or economic goals. Representatives 
of the Jat community joined the Arya Samaj in large 
numbers; they subscribed to the Ramjas College Committee; 
and a Jat was elected to the Municipal Committee in 1922. 
They belonged to the economic or professional organisations 
of the city, but their voice was usually not the most 
significant one heard in these organisations. The 
prestige and influence of the urban Jat community was, 
therefore, somewhat less than that of their rural 
brothers, but it would seem to have been slightly higher 
than that of the Rajputs.
The Jat community in Delhi Province, both urban and 
rural, displayed a moderately high degree of consistency
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of wealth, status, and power, This was also true of 
caste, sect, and occupation which made them comparable 
to the Bania community, The majority of the Jats 
belonged to the Dhe group. All Jats practised karewa 
and there was, therefore, no distinction between those 
Jats who joined the Arya Samaj and those who did not, 
while the values and goals of the Samaj were peculiarly 
amenable to the Jat personality. And the majority of 
the Jats pursued agriculture and owned agricultural 
land. The study of politics in Delhi shows that the 
members of only two groups of Hindu society react as 
members of a community. These were the urban Banias and 
the rural Jats. Otherwise people in Delhi participated 
in politics as members of occupational groups or as 
members of a religious community.
The rest of Hindu society in Delhi came from that 
portion of the community referred to variously as 
depressed classes, harijans, outcastes, or panchamas. 
This portion of the community was divided into those 
castes whose traditional occupation did not carry any 
stigma and those whose occupation rendered them 
untouchable. The largest castes of the former were 
the Jhiwar [water carrier], the Julaha [weaver], and 
the Kumhar [potter], The largest castes of the latter 
were the Chamar [leather] and the Chuhra [sweeper].
None of these castes had any resources of wealth, 
status, and power; they were almost entirely illiterate, 
they pursued manual occupations, and in only a few 
instances did they display any consistency in caste,
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sect, and occupation.^ They relied completely upon the 
traditional organisation of the panchayat and they had 
no representation in any of the organisations of the 
city. The pertinent details of these castes are given 
in Table V.
TABLE V2
FIVE SELECTED CASTES OF DELHI, 1921
Total
Persons
Actual Number
Workers Literate
Actual Workers 
in Traditional 
Occupation
Jhiwar 10,983 5,922 288 15.4Julaha 9,342 4,327 62 29. 1Kumhar 9, l4l 3,561 65 43.3Chamar 45,046 2 1,944 182 2 7.6
Chuhra 14,375 7,354 67 81.6
There is a very good discussion of a Chamar caste in 
Agra which has a high degree of consistency of caste, sect, 
occupation, and residence in Owen M. Lynch, ’Rural Cities 
in India: Continuities and Discontinuities,’ in India 
and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity, Philip Mason, ed„ (London, 
1967), pp. 142-58, He” also discusses the impact of 
enfranchisement upon the caste and the growth of literacy. 
There were five other artisan groups in Delhi that showed 
a high consistency of caste, sect, and occupation. They 
were :
Number of 
Actual Workers
in Traditional
Dhobi 1,189 82Lohar 630 63
Nai 2 , 030 75Sunar 501 91Tarkhan 1,193 70
Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
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The Chamars and Chuhras suffered certain disabilities 
They could not draw water from community wells and their 
presence in Hindu or Muslim private schools was prevented 
as was their attempts to acquire land for agricultural 
or residential purposes in certain localities.
The material condition of the majority of the members 
of the depressed classes, was not, however, the worst in 
the Hindu community. There was a steady demand for 
sweepers and both touchables and untouchables could 
easily find work as day labourers. The fact that their 
women and children worked placed them in a fairly 
advantageous position as wage earners. The Chief 
Commissioner summarised their position (and his attitude 
toward them) as follows;
As I have said, neither class suffers from lack 
of employment; they have already fair facilities 
for education, and in many ways are probably in 
less pressing need of special attention than 
some other classes, such as weavers, potters, wire 
workers and followers of similar trades. Where a 
class enjoys a fair amount of material prosperity 
and is not subjected to any actual oppression by 
its neighbours, it seems not unreasonable to leave 
it to work out its future by its own resources and 
by such facilities as private enterprise is 
prepared to extend to it.l
The condition of those members of the depressed classes 
who remained in their traditional occupations, except the 
Chuhras, was much worse than that of the rest of the 
Hindu community. The potters and the weavers were the 
exceptions to the lack of congruence in caste, sect, and 
occupation mentioned above. These two groups displayed
RDDA, Home File 169 Part B 1916: ’Measures for the 
Amelioration of the Moral, Material and Educational 
Condition of the Depressed Classes.’
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a high degree of consistency and their condition of 
economic hardship, exacerbated by the War, was largely 
responsible for their response during the Rowlatt 
Satyagraha of April 1919 discussed in Chapter Six. The 
cohesiveness of the leather workers that emanated from 
the congruence of caste, sect, and occupation was 
actively played upon by missionaries with a parochial 
intent.
The depressed classes received considerable 
attention from the three missionary religious groups 
which were active in Delhi. The Christian missionaries 
were interested primarily in social welfare while the 
Arya Samaj and the Muslim missionaries were more 
interested in proselytization. The Christian missions 
maintained the largest number of schools for them. In 
1916 the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
maintained eight and the Baptist Mission three primary 
schools. The Hindus maintained a primary school for 
Reghar Chamars. It is reported that in Delhi there 
were 831 students from depressed classes who were under 
instruction in 1916. Only 15 of these were untouchables.
The process of proselytization was the more 
important kf the two types of missionary effort. The 
process of amelioration pursued by the Christian 
missionaries did not engender much parochial enmity 
because of the small size of the Christian community 
and because far greater numbers of people benefited from 
an improvement in conditions than were converted. The 
process of proselytization pursued by the Arya Samaj and
RDDA, Home File 169 Part B 1916.
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the Muslim missionaries caused considerable tension in 
the city. The proselytization by Muslim missionaries 
threatened to upset the imbalance in numbers between 
the two major communities and such conversion attacked 
the traditional organisation of Hindu society. The 
Chief Commissioner commented thats
It must be noted that there is also a fairly 
continuous process of conversion of Chumars to 
Mohammadanism, and it is by no means rare to 
find that the first step of a prosperous Chumar 
is to secure his social status by conversion to 
Islam (c.f, Punjab Census Report, 1911, Volume 
I page 173). The extent of the recent conversion 
of both Chuhras and Chumars to Christianity, Arya 
Samajism or Islam is indeed a matter of very 
considerable concern to certain classes of the 
population, The orthodox Hindu resents it on 
religious grounds; while the dweller in the 
villages or town suburbs finds in it a decay in 
the traditional bases by which the village 
community maintains its existence and a positive 
inconvenience so far as it reduces the available 
supply of the lowest menial labour,^
A concerted attempt to mobilise the Chamar leather 
workers against the Muslims which is discussed in 
chapters Four and Five, were two examples of the result 
of the parochial attitude of the missionaries in Delhi,
II
Those Hindus who held to the orthodox beliefs of 
Hinduism were called sanatanis a The diverse path that 
they followed was called the Sanatana Pharma. In Delhi 
the sanatanis constituted the overwhelming majority of 
the Hindu population and were predominantly Vaishnava»
1 Ibid.
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The sanatanis of Delhi were undergoing a process of 
change. This change resulted from numerous threats to 
their orthodox way of life. Most sanatanis had 
accommodated to the process of urbanisation and were 
able to maintain a rigid attitude toward marriage, caste, 
and religious practices. Untouchables no longer 
announced their passage, but they still lived in 
demarcated areas and still performed many of their 
traditional functiohs, such as sweeping, for the higher 
castes. But the process of urbanisation had forced many 
compromises upon the orthodox Hindu. The observances 
that rural Hindus maintained toward commensality and 
drinking water were impossible in a thriving city.
However, these and many other compromises had been made 
and accepted.
The compromises demanded by modernisation were of 
a much different order. Modern systems of transportation, 
changes in education, and increased emphasis upon merit 
and occupation to the detriment of role and traditional 
status, a bureaucracy that was an active agent for change, 
new political institutions, and so forth, demanded 
compromises of a much more serious nature than the process 
of urbanisation. These compromises, again, were made and 
accepted with the strong reservation that marriage, caste, 
and religious practices remain inviolate. It was in just 
these three areas, however, that the reformers began to 
work in the firm belief that traditional or orthodox 
practices were an impediment to the process of 
modernisation. The first of these reform movements, the 
Brahmo Samaj, had found little sympathy and engendered 
little support. Its challenge was contemptuously ignored.
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The Arya Samaj, on the other hand, with its subtle 
combination of the traditional and the modern was a 
challenge which the sanatanis found hard to ignore,
And, in fact, the sanatanis of Delhi did not ignore 
the challenge.
The sanatanis of Delhi responded to the process 
of modernisation by establishing 23 formal organisations 
before 1911» The oldest of these organisations were 
the bha.jan mandalis, which were composed of a group of 
lay Hindus led by a preacher who was well versed in 
sacredotal lore and who recited the epics and sacred 
hymns in the belief that such recitation provided for 
the moral and spiritual welfare of the participants,1 
There were 12 bhajan mandalis in Delhi of which seven 
met annually, three met monthly and one met weekly. 
Although the membership of these mandalis varied, the 
president and secretary were the same for the majority 
of them, namely, Pandit Banke Rai and Pandit Joti 
Pershad, The festival of Ram Naumi was the occasion 
for most of the annual congregations. Ten of these 
organisations were founded before the conflict between 
the Arya Samaj and the sanatanis began in earnest, and 
it is presumed that they carried on passively the 
bhakti tradition of orthodox Hinduism after the conflict 
began.
The second type of organisation was composed of 
sanatani organisations created in direct response to 
the challenge of the Arya Samaj. The first such
1 ~
For a detailed description of the bhajan mandali see 
Milton Singer, ed,, Krishna: Myths, Rites, and Attitudes 
(Honolulu, 1966), pp. 90-138.
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organisation was founded in June 1904. Another five 
followed between 1908 and 1911» The anti-Samaj 
activities usually took the form of inviting renowned 
sadhus and sanyases from Benares or Hardwar to give 
public lectures in order to refute Arya Samaj teachings, 
The Parsons Hindu Anathalya was the exception to this 
activity. It was an orphanage founded in October 1905 
(it took its name from Colonel Parsons, then deputy 
commissioner of Delhi) whose object was to house 
orphans in order to bring them up as good sanatanis 
rather than let the Arya Samajists, the Christians, or 
the Muslims take them, which the latter three were only 
too willing to do, This organisation had 200 members 
and was ’popular with well-to-do Hindus.’ It housed 22 
orphans in 1914 and 35 in 1918.
The third type of sanatani organisation was devoted 
to the education of women. There were only three schools 
of this type, but this type of activity did show that 
the sanatanis were aware of some need in this regard.
The motivation for their awareness probably came from 
the rapid strides that the Arya Samajists and other 
reformers were making in this field.
The fourth type of sanatani organisation had only 
one example. It was the Gaurakhsha Sabha (or Prinja 
Pol), which was an organisation to provide an asylum 
for old and inform cattle, and to oppose kine-killing.
It was founded in 1894 and had roughly 500 ’influential' 
and 'well-off' members. It collected about Rs. 20,000 
annually to keep the 1,000 cattle it maintained in two 
pastures at Jhansa in Gurgaon District. Its president, 
Lala Sheo Parshad, held the title of C.I.E. 1
1 RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1 915).
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Between 1911 and 1918 ten more sanatani organis­
ations were founded, They had various objectives and 
showed a more positive attitude toward modern conditions. 
One had a membership of 75? but the rest had close to 20, 
Three were founded to promote Sanatana Pharma; two were 
bhajan mandalis; one was formed to prevent kine-killing; 
one was anti-Arya Samaj; and one was a temple managing 
committee. The remaining three were somewhat peculiar 
to sanatani groups as they were founded for ’social 
reform’. This seems a contradiction in terms, since 
sanatanis were per se against reform. But the largest, 
the Saraswati Sabha with a membership of 75» was 
organised to promote ’social reform and the principles of 
sanitation'.1
All sanatani organisations drew their support from 
the higher castes of the Hindu community. The majority 
of the officers of these organisations had large 
resources of wealth, status, and power and were usually 
composed of successful men in business or in the 
professions. Brahmans of high social status also 
figured prominently, The membership of the organisations 
was more diverse, but still came from those castes and 
communities that had resources of wealth, status and 
power, namely, the Brahman, Bania, Rajput and Jat 
communities, and the Khatri and Kayasth castes. The 
Banias, Khatris and Kayasths, however, supplied the more 
significant amounts of monetary support. One measure of 
this support is that only one sanatani organisation fell
1 RPPA, Confidential File 227 (1918): ’List of Political, 
Quasi-Political and Religious Societies, Sabhas and 
Anjumans in the Pelhi Province for the Year Ending the 
30th June 1918.’
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inactive by 1918, in comparison to the large number of 
Arya Samaj organisations which fell inactive over a 
corresponding period.
The Sanatana Pharma lacked any idea of formal 
congregation, as a body of people collected together 
for religious worship, It depended, instead, upon a 
consensus that covered both the social and the 
religious precepts of the community. These precepts 
were inculcated through the religious texts, through 
puja, and through religious festivals. Most Hindu 
children learned about their religion and community 
from the mother, who, with varying degrees of ability 
and accuracy, recited the more popular texts. They 
were also exposed to the oral recitation of religious 
texts at temples. The use of images both in the home 
and in the temples and dharmasalas reinforced the oral 
tradition as did puja where it was practised either in 
the home or in the temple. There was no corporate act, 
however, only the knowledge that other people were 
performing puja in a similar way. It was this knowledge 
that sustained the consensus. The consensus of the 
Hindu community found public expression and was 
reinforced by the religious festivals that occurred 
with remarkable frequency throughout the year. There 
were 12 festivals recognised by the Government through
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the year with the largest crowds attracted by the 
Dusehra or Ram Lila festival.1
The Sanatana Pharma encompassed many practices.
The higher castes practised vegetarianism or ate flesh, 
they kept their women secluded, did not permit widows 
to remarry, and maintained a strict code of personal 
cleanliness. They might also keep cows, feed Brahmans, 
and build dharmasalas and piaos for merit. The lower 
castes tended to eat flesh, allow their women to work, 
and allow widows to remarry. The dieties they 
worshipped were manifold in number with some groups 
worshipping saints and forming sects such as the Kabir 
Panthi (9,400 in Pelhi in 192l), the Rai Pasia (12,700), 
and the Lai Begi (l2,700) . 2
1
Oscar Lewis refers to this as the 'Festival Cycle* 
which began in the month of Cait [March-April] with 
Basora and ended with Holi-Pulhendi in Phagun 
[February-March], He lists and explains 19 
festivals in the Province. Village Life in Northern 
India, pp. 197-246. The Pelhi Administration recognised 
only eight north Indian festivals and four local 
festivals. These were, from January to Pecember 1915:
Basant Panchmi Solono
Sheoratri Janam Ashtami
Holi Pusehra
Purga Ashtami (local) Pewali
Baisakhi Jam Putia (local)
Nirjala Ikadshi (local) Ganga Ashnan (local)
RPPA, Home File 187 Part B 1914; ’Public Holidays to be 
Observed in Pelhi Province.’ There were, however, a 
total of 31 recognised and unrecognised festive occasions 
in Pelhi listed in RPPA, Home File 181 Part B 1917: 
’Annual Police Report of Pelhi Province for 1916.'
2 Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. I (Report). A good 
general outline of the religious sects of the Sanatana 
Pharma can be found in J.N. Farquhar, Modern Religious 
Movements in India (Pelhi, 1967).
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The diversity of Sana tana Pharma, which in turn 
reflected and reinforced the heterogeneity of the 
social structure exercised a profound influence upon 
the members of the community. The visible 
manifestations of the religion could lead the observer 
to look upon Hindu society in Pelhi as fragmentary and 
incohesive. But it was just this fragmentation that 
both divided and united the society. The syncritic 
nature of Hinduism assigned every individual to a group 
on the one hand, and it regulated the role and status 
of each of these groups in relation to the other on the 
other hand. It provided an immense amount of security 
for each individual as a member of some group, and it 
gave each individual's group a definite position in an 
ordered heirarchy. The sense of security, then, emanated 
from a consensus which accepted the precepts of the 
system. Many an astute political leader realised this 
fact and sought to mobilise the community with the cry 
that the basic precepts of the system were being 
questioned. And people responded, not because they felt 
that their caste or sect would suffer, but because they 
thought that their security would be undermined. Caste 
and sect only became important when specific grievances 
and discontents could be tied to larger issues. But 
more often than not, it was a general issue, such as 
cow-killing or regulation of marriages, that engendered 
the greater degree of response.
The most significant Hindu sect in Pelhi outside the 
Sanatana Pharma was the Arya Samaj. It was not 
significant in terms of numbers, since it only had 650 
formal members and several thousand informal converts
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in 1911. (The growth of the sect to 12,000 in 1921 and 
to 50,000 in 1931 meant, however, that it eventually 
did become significant in terms of the numbers of 
followers,) The Arya Samaj was most significant in 
terms of its ethic, the people who joined it, their 
activities, and the effect of all this upon the wider 
community in Delhi,
The Arya Samaj, founded in 1875, was a neo­
traditionalist group which sought to defend Hinduism 
against Christianity and Islam.1 It had a split 
personality which, on the one hand tied it to the 
orthodoxy of the Vedas, and on the other brought it 
into conflict with the sanatanis because of its radical 
views on social questions. The Arya Samaj was 
monotheistic and iconclastic, against child marriages 
and for karewa, against caste and for varna by merit 
rather than birth, against the extremes of the joint 
family and for individualism. It introduced an ethic 
of social service because its founder believed that 
individual happiness or misery depended upon the happy 
or miserable state of the society of which the 
individual was a part. It also introduced the concept 
of a congregation and held weekly services on Sunday 
morning.
The ideas of individualism, merit, social service, 
and congregation were some of the more significant 
values propagated by the Arya Samaj. These ideas gave 
the non-Brahman groups in Hindu society a sense of 
social dynamism and provided them with a social status 
commensurate with their growing wealth and power. They
1 For a good general discussion of the Arya Samaj see C. 
Heimsath, Indian Nationalism, pp. 113-30, 29^-308, and 
the works referred to therein.
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also enabled such groups to absorb Western values, 
education and technology without sacrificing their 
cultural heritage, All of this is vividly illustrated 
by a description of an Arya Samaj meeting in a north 
Indian city in 1912:
The place of meeting is a large oblong hall 
without seats, with a platform at one end and 
a high narrow gallery at the other. In the 
floor, in front of the platform, there is a 
square pit, measuring perhaps two feet each 
way. This is the altar. On one side of the 
hall a small platform for singers and a 
harmonium had been placed. When we entered, 
there was only one man in the hall, and he 
was laying some pieces of wood in order at 
the bottom of the square pit. When that was 
done, he set up a stick of incense on end on 
the floor at each corner of the pit. Some' 
packets of aromatic herbs and several 
sacrificial vessels lay on the floor. Men 
came dropping in, and squatted in front and 
on the two sides of the altar. When there 
were perhaps twenty present, those next the 
altar began to intone some Sanskrit verses, 
amongst which we could distinguish some of 
the verses of Rigveda, X, 129. The fire and 
the incense sticks were then lighted; the 
aromatic leaves were shed on the fire; and 
ghi (melted butter) was rubbed on the outer 
edges of the altar. Other verses were now 
chanted, while the flames rose nearly two feet 
above the level of the floor. This is the 
havana, which Aryas are recommended to perform 
every morning, at the time of their devotions, 
for the purification of the air.
The second part of the service then began.
It consisted of the singing of hymns, the 
repetition of texts (one of them the Gayatri), 
prayer and a sermon, all in Hindi except a few 
texts which were in Sanskrit. It was just like 
a Protestant service, and totally unlike any 
Vedic observance.1
1 J.N. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements, pp. 123-4 
(italics added).
109
The combination of the modern and the traditional 
in the Arya Samaj gave rise to a conflict within the 
movement as to which aspect should receive the greatest 
emphasis. One group supported western education and 
the eating of meat as a rejection of orthodox values»
The other group supported a traditional education in 
the vernacular and demanded a strict vegetarian diet.
The two groups managed to coexist until the Arya Samaj 
founded its first affiliated college at Lahore in 1888. 
The foundation of the college brought the conflict into 
the open and resulted in a formal split of the two 
groups in 1892. Those who supported the Dayanand Anglo- 
Vedic College with its emphasis upon Western science 
and literature along with study of the Vedas , were called 
the ’college* or ’cultured' group.
The dissident group established a traditional 
educational institution at Hardwar, the Gurukula 
Mahavidyalaya, which students entered at age eight and
from which they were not allowed to depart until they 
were 25. Their rigorous, monastic form of instruction 
with Hindi as the sole medium, was designed to instill 
Vedic values, discipline, and vigour. The supporters of 
this group were called the ’vegetarian’ or ’mahatma’ or
* gurukul* group. The practical effect of the rival forms 
of education was for the 'college* group to produce 
significant numbers of graduates who entered commerce, 
the professions, or government service. The Gurukula 
Mahavidyalaya did not produce any graduates until just 
before the War, and they were ill-suited to do anything 
but teach, preach and proselytize. The gurukul, in 
effect, was a seminary for religious training which
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attracted a different type of student altogether from 
the college.
There was an additional difference between the 
supporters (and graduates) of the two groups. The 
'college' group became very active in politics as 
described by a British officer in August 1909s
The samaj, I know, contains many men of forward 
views politically, and this is inevitable. But 
to brand all Aryas as extremists is absurd.
There are hundreds who have joined the body in 
order to obtain freedom from caste and other 
trammels in their private lives. All said and 
done, the Arya Samaj is the direct product of 
British teaching. For years we have preached 
against caste and child marriage and have taught 
patriotism and self-help. It is unreasonable to 
complain when the fruits of our teaching appear. 
There is a national feeling now in India: ideals 
of patriotism are in the air and the young men 
are being stirred. It is idle not to recognise 
and encourage this; and to brand all who are 
answering to the call as disloyal and seditious. 
And this we almost must do if we are hostile to 
the Arya Samaj. It is the only organisation which 
expresses the new ideas, half social and half 
political as they are. The Brahmo Samaj has no 
life. It is a purely philosophic system.1
The 1gurukul' group strictly eschewed politics and
increasingly attacked the 'college' group from 1900
onwards when that group became quite active in the
2provincial branch of the National Congress, The
NAI, Home Poll 154-156 Part A, October 1909: ’Political 
Situation in the Punjab,’ M.W, Fenton to the Secretary, 
Government of India, Home Department, dated Simla, 11 
August 1909.
2 For a good discussion of the politics of the Arya Samaj 
in the Punjab see Norman G. Barrier, ’The Arya Samaj and 
Congress Politics in the Punjab, 1894-1908,’ Journal of 
Asian Studies, XXVI (May 1967), 363-79.
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The deportation of Lala Lajpat Rai, the political 
leader of the Arya Samaj in the Punjab, in 1907 caused 
a large number of the ’college* group to withdraw from 
politics,"*- But Mahatma Munshi Ram, the principal of 
the Gurukula Mahavidyalaya and the leader of the * guruku1’ 
group still felt constrained to argue against any 
political involvement in his The Arya Samaj, A Political 
Body in 1909. It is significant, however, that the anti- 
British tone of the nationalist movement from 1917 
onwards drew several outstanding members of the ’guruku1’ 
group including its leader into politics. This was a 
result of their much more militant stance and the intense 
process of revivalism in which they participated.
There were two types of Arya Samajist who belonged 
to the ’college' group in Delhi. There were those who
1
It is interesting to note that the Arya Samaj was not 
as politically active in the United Provinces as in the 
Punjab. C.J. Stevenson-Moore, the Officiating Director, 
Criminal Intelligence, in a note of 23 December 1909 
commented that; 'In the United Provinces the political 
aspect was never so strong as it was in the Punjab and 
this distinction has been maintained. In the hundreds 
of regular meetings of the Samaj held in the towns of 
the United Provinces in the last two years the speakers 
have generally confined themselves to religious questions, 
and in some cases they have gone out of their way to 
praise the British Government for its religious tolerance, 
In the Punjab members of the Arya Samaj are still the most 
prominent leaders of political agitation,,.,The Society 
is the most advanced body in the [Punjab] Province in 
matters of social, educational, and religious reform, and 
it is not surprising therefore that its members should 
take a somewhat advanced position in regard to political 
matters also,' NAI, Home Poll k Deposit, April 1912:
'Note on the Arya Samaj,'
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enrolled as regular members of organisations and who 
paid a subscription fee. And there were those who 
attended the Sunday services at the Arya Samaj mandir 
but who did not enroll formally in any organisation.
Little is known of the latter group in Delhi.
The formally organised part of the ’college’ group 
of the Arya Samaj in Delhi in 1911 had 15 branches.
The oldest was the Chowri Bazaar branch which had 191 
members who were quite influential.1 It was subordinate 
to the Lahore Arya Pratinidi Sabha [the provincial 
representative body] and acted as the local representative 
of that body in south-east Punjab. It maintained a girls 
school and a library. Its officers in 191^ consisted of 
a deputy collector in the Canal Department, a Bania of 
Mahrauli, a school headmaster, two cloth merchants, a 
contractor, and three pandits. A second branch of the 
Arya Samaj was founded in 189^ - at Sabzimandi with 18 
members. Its officers consisted of a Mali, a Rajput, a 
Khatri, and a pandit,
The 15 Arya Samaj organisations formed between 1882 
and 1911 exhibited several interesting characteristics.
1
Dayanand Saraswati, the founder of the Arya Samaj, 
visited Delhi in 1877 to attend the Imperial Darbar.
He then travelled throughout the Punjab for a period of 
18 months. It was during this period that the first 
branch of the Arya Samaj was formed in Delhi. Farquhar, 
Modern Religious Movements, pp. 101r-29. According to 
Diwan Chand in The Arya Samaj, What It Is and What It 
Stands for (Lahore ■, [ 19^2? ] ) , pT 28", this event occurred 
on 9 October 1879* The oldest branch of the Arya Samaj 
in Delhi in 1911 traced its foundation from 1882. RDDA, 
Confidential File 70 (1915).
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There were four rural branches (and one at Mahrauli), 
three of which fell inactive by 1917» There were ten 
urban organisations, four of which fell inactive and 
two of which became independent of the Arya Pratinidi 
Sabha. Those that remained active received substantial 
support from Banias, Khatris, Kayasths, and Jats, and 
the majority of them were active in education.1
Between 1912 and 1918, the ’college* group of the 
Arya Samaj founded l4 more branches with a combined 
formal membership of 455. Of these five became inactive. 
These newer branches followed the same pattern as those 
of earlier foundation. All four of the rural branches 
fell inactive because they did not have education as an 
object. Only one urban branch fell inactive mainly 
because it did not draw enough support from more well- 
to-do samajists.2
Thus by 1918 there was a total of 14 active 
branches of the ’college’ group with a combined formal 
membership of 625. The overwhelming majority of these 
were involved in education and maintained 12 schools.
In 1919» the ’college’ group founded the Dayanand Anglo- 
Vedic School with lower middle, upper middle, and high 
school branches in Darygunj. Its affiliation with the 
D.A.V. College in Lahore gave the ’college’ group in 
Delhi their own formal, recognised, educational apparatus.
One of the more outstanding Arya Samajists of the 
’college’ group in Delhi was Lala Bulaqi Das. He was an 
Aggarwal Bania who was born in I869. He was the
1
RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1 915).
2 RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918).
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proprietor of the firm of Gulab Singh Bulaqi Das, a
wholesale cloth and lace establishment. He occupied
the position of vice-president of the Chowri Bazaar
branch of the Arya Samaj for over a decade and acted
as president of the new branch of the Samaj which was
founded in Shahdara in 1916. He was a member of the
Board of Trustees of Hindu College, became a member of
the Managing Committee of Ramjas College in 1917 and,
inspired by his intense interest in education, overcame
any feelings he may have had toward the 'gurukul' group
to become president of the Dayanand Residential High
School (of which more later) in 1919* The Lalaji became
interested in political activity also, and in 1917
joined the Hindu Association, an organisation founded to
reinforce the intense parochial sentiment engendered by
the Ram Lila affair.1 He was an active supporter of the
local branch of the National Congress and became their
nominee for Ward IX (Faiz Bazaar) in the election of
2the Municipal Committee in 1922. He was one of the 
rising Banias in Delhi who sought to translate wealth 
into prestige and influence. In this endeavour Lala 
Bulaqi Das was most successful.
Before 1911 there was little activity in Delhi by 
the 'gurukul' group, but after 1911 this group became 
quite active in the city, Between 1911 and 1920 the 
'gurukul' group founded four organisations with a combined
3membership of 8 5. These organisations which were
1 This incident is discussed below in Chapter Five.
2 This election is discussed below in Chapter Eight.
3 RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918).
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formed in 1914, 1916, 1918, and 1919, were all active 
in education of the gurukul variety for both males and 
females, although the branch formed in 1916 fell 
inactive in 1917* The 'gurukul'group succeeded in 1919 
in its attempt to establish the Dayanand Residential 
High School. It petitioned the Government for 
recognition and requested a grant ¡-in-aid, a most unusual 
step for the 'gurukul' group which rejected the 
government system of education altogether.1 The 
successful establishment of this institution guaranteed 
the group’s viability, as it then had a continuous, 
formally recognised educational apparatus.
Two individuals who belonged to the ’gurukul* group 
illustrate the type of person who supported the more 
traditional wing of the Arya Samaj in Delhi. Lala Ram
j
Saran Das was a Lahiry [the Sudra caste of blacksmith] 
who was born in 1862. He became the proprietor of 
Lahiry Brothers and New Employment, a notable firm of 
ironmongers. He received the title of kursi nashin as
a reward for his position as the ’local head of a highly
2respectable family. ’ He became the jointr-secretary of
1 RDDA, Education File 130 Part B 1920: 'Recognition of 
the Dayanand AnglO'-Vedic High School and Dayanand 
Residential High School, Delhi'; Education File l4 Part 
B 1921: 'Withdrawal of Recognition from the Dayanand 
Residential High School, Delhi.' The petition for 
recognition and grant-in-aid was more than likely 
instigated by Lala Bulaqi Das whose 'cultured' values 
revealed no conflict between indigenous education and 
government support. The High School disaffiliated during 
the non-co-operation movement discussed in Chapter Eight.
2 RDDA, Foreign File 26 Part B 1913s 'List of Provincial 
and Divisional Durbaris, Kurshi Nashins and Titleholders 
of the Delhi Province.'
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the Managing Committee of the Dayanand Residential High 
School in 1919- The other individual, Seth Raghu Mai 
Lohia, was also a Lahiry and was also an ironmonger. He 
was a Trustee of the Ramjas College and contributed Rs. 
1,00,000 toward the foundation of the Kanya Gurukula [a 
gurukul institution for females in Delhi] in 1918. He 
was the general secretary and a founding member of the 
Khandaewal Vesh Mahasabha whose object was social reform, 
and, like Bulaqi Das, he overcame any feelings he may 
have had for the other wing of the Arya Samaj, and became 
a member of the Managing Committee of the Dayanand Anglo- 
Vedic High School. Both of these men and several other 
wealthy ironmongers, illustrate the type of wealthy 
merchant who possessed large resources of wealth and who 
sought to translate this into prestige and influence.
The Arya Samaj provided a base for their aspirations which 
was totally denied to them by the more orthodox tone which 
regulated the Sanatana Pharma.
There was little difference in the resources of 
wealth, status, and power between those who supported the 
'college' group and those who supported the 'gurukul' 
group in Pelhi.1 But the latter group was smaller than 
the former. They both drew upon Banias, Khatris, Kayasths
There is no indication that there was any intense 
conflict between the two groups, but there was enough 
feeling for them to form separate organisations. The 
loyalty of the two groups to the general principles of 
the Arya Samaj was strong enough for members of both 
groups to contribute financial support to each others' 
educational institutions which is very well illustrated 
in the respective lists of the boards of trustees.
RPPA, Education File 130 Part B 1920.
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and Jats and they both succeeded in their attempts to 
found their own type of educational institution. And 
they both became involved in politics in 1919«*
There was a significant difference, however, between 
those who supported the Sanatana Pharma and those who 
supported the Arya Samaj. The sanatanis had much 
greater resources of wealth, status, and power than the 
Arya Samajists. The sanatanis formed the greatest 
majority of the municipal commissioners, the titleholders, 
the darbaris, and the honorary magistrates. They also 
formed the officers of - and the most significant Indians 
in - the Punjab Chamber of Commerce, the Pelhi Piece 
Goods Association, the Pelhi Hindustani Mercantile 
Association, the Indian Bankers Association, the Kirana 
Committee, the panchayats of grain, sugar and ghee 
merchants, and the Indraprasth Vaid Sabha. The Arya 
Samajists too had representatives in these organisations, 
but they did not have as much prestige or influence as 
the sanatanis. Those Arya Samajists who belonged to the 
Bar Association, the Sub-Assistant Surgeon’s Association, 
and the Indraprasth Karmachari Sabha [accountants], on 
the other hand, did have as much wealth and status as 
their sanatani colleagues but the overwhelmingly 
conservative political attitudes of these organisations 
restricted the amount of power the Samajists could 
exercise if they had been inclined to do so. But while 
the sanatanis possessed large resources of wealth, 
status, and power, their religious and social tradition
1
The activities of the Arya Samaj during the Rowlatt 
Satyagraha is discussed below in Chapter Six.
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diffused their ability to mobilise these resources to 
support or reject the tide of the nationalist movement. 
The Arya Samajists' values of individualism and social 
mobility reinforced the cohesiveness of the members of 
the sect through the congregation and gave its more 
limited numbers and resources of wealth, status, and 
power a large significance in the ensuing political 
life of the city.
Chapter Three
THE MINORITY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN DELHI
I
Muslim Society
II
Muslim Sects
III
The Jain Community
IV
The Christian Community
V
The European Community
VI
The Sikh Community
119
There were five minority religious communities in 
Delhi in 1911 and throughout the succeeding decade.
The largest of these was the Muslim community, followed 
in turn respectively by the Jain, Christian, European, 
and Sikh communities.1 The Muslim community was by far 
the most important of these communities, representing 
44 per cent of the total population in Delhi Municipality 
in 1911 and 41.5 per cent in 1921. (The Muslim community 
was also the largest minority in Delhi City [20.9 per 
cent in 1921] and in Delhi Province [l4.7 per cent in 
192l]). The most interesting feature of the Muslim 
community in Delhi Municipality was that even though it 
increased by l4,Ol6 between 1901 and 1911, it only 
increased by 476 between 1911 and 1921. There was an 
increase of 11,752 Muslims in Delhi City between 1911 and 
1921, but whether this increase stemmed from migrants 
from Delhi Municipality, or migrants from outside Delhi, 
or permanent residents, it had little effect upon the 
social, religious, economic and political activities of 
the Muslims of Delhi Municipality. These two groups, 
therefore, elicit little consideration in this study 
which focuses upon the social and religious organisation 
of 102,000 Muslims who lived in Delhi Municipality in 
both 1911 and 1921.2
The Hindu community as described in the previous 
chapter was characterised by a heterogeneous social
1
Table 1-B, Chapter One, contains the numbers in each 
community.
2 Census of India, 1921, XV (Punjab and Delhi), Part II 
(Tables).
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structure and a sectarian religious community. The 
fragmentation of society into relatively homogeneous 
units and the lack of any concept of congregation 
militated against the ability of the community to 
mobilise its resources effectively, with the Arya Samaj 
as the major exception. It was observed, however, that 
even though the members of a caste community shared 
certain values, the caste decreased in homogeneity when 
the sub-castes were numerous and strong, and when the 
occupational structure was diversified. It was also 
observed that the Bania and Jat caste communities 
displayed the greatest consistency, on the one hand, of 
wealth, status, and power, and on the other, of caste, 
sect, and occupation. And, with the possible exception 
of these two and a few other low caste groups, it was 
concluded that individuals in the Hindu community were 
as likely to respond to political agitation as members 
of occupational groups or as members of a religious 
community, as they were likely to respond as members of 
a caste or a sect, again with the exception of the Arya 
Samaj.
The Muslim community in Delhi displayed several 
characteristics in common with the Hindu community. It, 
too, was characterised by a heterogeneous social 
structure and a sectarian religious community with 
groups that shared similar values and acted in a similar 
manner. The Muslim community also had a corpus of 
religious knowledge that offered guidelines for the 
social, religious, economic, and political life of the 
individual members. Again like Hindu society, the 
Muslim community faced the problem of modernisation.
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But where Hindu society was founded upon a consensus 
which legitimised the social inequality of the members 
of the community, Muslim society was founded upon a 
community of the faithful (institutionalised through 
the mosque, the ulema, and the congregation), which 
proclaimed a basic equality of all its members, Both 
of the communities responded to the religious idiom of 
political agitation, however, in a bid to preserve the 
identity and the integrity of their members.
I
The only unifying factor among Indian ^
Muslims was a common allegiance to Islam.
The Muslims of Delhi in 1911 had two outstanding 
reminders of their cultural heritage. The first and 
most obvious reminder was the architectural remains of 
the many Muslim rulers who had made Delhi their capital. 
From the Qutb Minar in the south to the Red Fort within 
the walled city, they could trace the rise and splendour
1 M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (London, 19^7), P- 25«
2 There are numerous descriptions of the monumental 
remains of Delhi of which some of the more copious are: 
Stephen Carr, Archaeology and Monumental Remains of Delhi 
(Allahabad, 1967); D .D. Mathur, Hist orical Monuments of 
Delhi and Their Cultural Significance (Delhi, 19^7)» JTa. 
Page, ed., List of Muhammedan and Hindu Monuments, Delhi 
Province, 4 volumes (Calcutta, 1913); and S.N. Sen,
Delhi and Its Monuments (Calcutta, 1948). There are two 
popular books with very good photographs: Gavin Hambly, 
Cities of Mughal India: Delhi, Agra, and Fatehpuri Sikri 
(London, 1968); and Martin Huerlimann, ed., Delhi, Agra, 
Fatehpuri Sikri (London, 1965).
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of Muslim power in India from the twelfth century onwards. 
The monuments were an aesthetic heritage which also 
reminded contemporary Muslims of the splendour and the 
rich culture that had accompanied that power. Other 
monuments, on the other hand, reminded Delhi Muslims of 
the violent eclipse of the last Muslim ruler in India.
The memorials to the British soldiers who fought 
gallantly in the Mutiny of 1857 during the seige of Delhi 
covered the Ridge and Kashmiri Gate area. And the Khuni 
Darwaza emphasised the harsh treatment meted out to the 
Muslims, particularly the imperial house of the Moguls, 
in the city during the tumultuous events of 1857»
The second reminder of the cultural heritage of the 
Muslims of Delhi was the Urdu language. Urdu in Delhi 
achieved its first golden age during the reign of Muhammad 
Shah (1719-1748). After Muhammad Shah’s death the poets 
who wrote in Urdu left Delhi for Lucknow, Aurangabad, 
Hyderabad, and other centres of culture. The second 
golden age of Urdu in Delhi dawned under the last Mogul 
Emperor Bahadur Shah II ( 1837f-1858 ) , who was a considerable 
poet and a patron of the arts. The period was best known 
for the poetry of Ghalib who became a resident in Delhi 
in 1812 and lived there until his death in 1869. Delhi 
was also known for an outstanding educational institution, 
namely, the Delhi College, where Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had 
studied. But this heritage, like the Mutiny memorials, 
was a reminder of the waning golden age of Muslim rule
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in India, epitomised by the last and the greatest poem
Muslim society was not organised into caste groups 
like Hindu society. The census lists groups and calls 
them castes, the most numerically significant of which 
were the Arain, Faqir, Machhi, Meo, Mogul, Pathan, 
Qureshi, Rajput, Sayid, Sheikh, and Teli. But these 
appelations carried a different meaning in Muslim 
society. Some of the names were of castes of Hindus 
who were converted to Islam. Others were the names of 
groups who were immigrants. The major problem for the 
social historian is that there was no exclusiveness of 
name connected with these groups. There was no process 
of legitimisation of caste status like the phenomenon 
of sanskritisation in Hindu society.
In Muslim society a person could call himself 
whatever he liked. He could call himself a Sayid or a 
Qureshi, the two most highly regarded social groups in 
Muslim society, and no one would object. Neither would 
anyone accept it and hence no status accrued to the name 
without the fact. For example, in Delhi, 20 per cent of 
the people who claimed to be Sayid in the Census of 1921 
returned their occupation as trade. A Sayid never
1 A large number of couplets have been woven into a 
novel by Ahmad Ali, Twilight in Delhi (Bombay, 1966).
A useful discussion of Urdu literature can be found in 
T, Grahame Bailey, A History of Urdu Literature (London, 
1932), with more recent comments by Khwaja Ahmad Faruqi 
in Sahitya Akademi, CorJ _ Literature: A
of Bahadur Shah II written in a prison in Rangoon, 1
Symposium (New Delhi,
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indulged in trade since he would lose his social status 
if he did so. This was obviously a case of people, who 
were not really Sayids, who claimed a status that none 
but themselves would accept. (Or they could be Sayids 
of fallen status, which would then negate the idea of 
looking upon caste as a cohesive factor in the society 
as there would be no cohesion between these two parts 
of the same caste.)
The difficulty of using caste as a unit of social 
organisation is especially noticeable in regard to the 
Sheikhs. Everyone who did not call himself something 
else, called himself a Sheikh, This was the largest 
single appelation in the list of castes (both Hindu and 
Muslim) in Delhi.1 But it is absurd to assume that the 
term conveyed even the vaguest meaning to these 
individuals, since some members of all the groups 
discussed below called themselves Sheikhs. It is clear, 
therefore, that caste was by no means the most important 
social grouping in Muslim society.
There were several groups in Muslim society that 
shared certain values and whose members tended to act in 
a similar fashion. The basic and most important division 
in Muslim society in Delhi was between the sharif [the 
’well-born’] and the non-sharif. The distinction of the 
sharif depended upon birth, marriage, and occupation.
There was some social consensus to support the distinction, 
but it was most assiduously maintained by the sharif 
themselves. The consensus which existed in support of 
the system resulted from the fact that there was no 
invidious function or role thrust upon the non-sharif;
1 There were 79,874 Sheikhs in Delhi in 1921. Census of 
India, 1921, XV, Pt. II. .....
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the sharif mixed quite freely with the non-sharif; and 
there were three methods to gain status and recognition 
which the non-sharif could pursue, which are discussed 
below.
The sharif who represented between one-tenth and 
one-eighth of the Muslim population generally displayed 
a high degree of consistency of wealth, status, and 
power,1 Their wealth usually came from inheritance, 
income from pensions or agricultural land, or from 
success in the professions. They could under only one 
circumstance pursue trade as an occupation; that
1
It is possible to derive some idea of the number of 
Muslims who were sharif by assuming that the majority of 
Muslims who were in occupations that the sharif normally 
pursued were in fact sharif. In 1921 the number of 
Muslims who pursued such occupations were as follows:
Government servants 6,576
Professions 4,564
Booksellers 506
Incomes and pensions 1,858
Agricultural rents 1,800
15,304
[N.B. The number for the professions is low because 
there were no lawyers or teachers’ clerks listed in the 
census for the Muslim community. It is most likely that 
these two groups participated in the Non-co-operation 
movement as there were, beyond any doubt, Muslims in both 
these professions.] This figure represents 13.3 per 
cent of the total Muslim population living in the Delhi 
urban area in 1921. Given that some non-sharif may have 
been represented and that the figures for two professions 
are not available, it is highly probable that the sharif 
represented from 10 to 12 per cent of the Muslim 
population. Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
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exception was the profession of bookseller.1 Most of the 
wealth in the hands of the sharif in Delhi was a carry 
over from pre-British days when Delhi was the seat of the 
Mogul Empire. Many of the landowners survived the severe 
dislocation in Muslim fortune caused by the Mutiny in 
1857 and maintained their positions as land owners, or 
accepted pensions from the new government as compensation.
Mirza Suraya Jah was the sharif pensioner par 
excellence in Delhi. His grandfather Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh 
rendered 'valuable service' to the British during the 
Mutiny. For this he was suitably rewarded and was 
recognised as the chief representative of the Moguls.
He and his family received the grant of a hereditary 
pension aggregating to Rs. 22,830 per annum and Rs.
1.21.000 as compensation for loss of property incurred 
during the siege of Delhi. In 1872 he borrowed Rs.
45.000 from the government, more than half of which they 
remitted as an act of favour. The assumption of Queen 
Victoria to the title of Empress in 1877 was the occasion 
for an increment of Rs. 2250 to the pension. Mirza 
Ilahi Bakhsh died in 1878, and his son, Mirza Sulaman
It is significant to note that the sharif were under­
represented in the professions and government service.
The Muslim community constituted 38 per cent of the 
total population in the Delhi urban area, but the sharif 
only constituted 28 per cent of all those in the 
professions and 21 per cent of those in government 
service. The sharif who were professionals and 
government servants also represented a smaller proportion 
of their own community than did the Hindus. Muslim 
professionals and government servants constituted 11 per 
cent of the total Muslim population while those Hindus 
who were in the professions and government service 
represented 17 per cent of the total Hindu population.
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Shah succeeded him, He in turn died in 1890 and his 
son, Mirza Suraya Jah then became the chief representa­
tive of the Moguls in Delhi, The Mirza from that 
point onward until his death in 1913 headed the list 
of divisional darbaris. He was exempt from personal 
appearance in the civil courts, he was also a member 
of the Jama Masjid Committee, the Fatehpuri Mosque 
Committee, and of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee 
of which more later. When the Delhi College ceased 
to exist in 1877, the Mirza attempted to re-establish 
the institution.1 The Government granted the Mirza a
loan in 1910 and received repayment through withdrawals
2of Rs, 8,000 per annum from his pension.
The status of the sharif derived in the first 
instance from who their parents were, who they married, 
and from an observation of the prohibition against 
trade as an occupation. It derived in the second 
instance from a high degree of status crystallisation 
of income, occupation, and education, with all three 
relatively high, especially education. The status of 
the sharif derived in the third instance from the fact 
that they had many representatives who were darbaris and 
title holders; and it derived in the fourth instance 
from their ’style of life’.
The Mirza secured promises of subscriptions totalling 
Rs. 72,000, but his exertions met with little success.
He subsequently founded the Shahzada High School in 
1899» In spite of his generosity in cash and the free 
loan of a building, the school lapsed into a moribund 
state.
2
Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, pp. 71-2.
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The ’style of life’ of the sharif of Delhi could be 
characterised as 'aristocratic'. They perpetuated the 
cultural norms established at the Mogul court (for 
example, of food, dress, retinue, residence, and 
language); they put a very high premium on education 
and invariably sent their children first to the Anglo- 
Arabic School in Delhi, and then to the Muslim Anglo- 
Oriental College at Aligarh or to England. They were 
highly urbanised; they were very cosmopolitan; they were 
liberal with both their time and money; they were 
generally conservative in their political outlook; and 
they tended to be enlightened in their religious 
attitudes.
There were of course, a much larger number of 
sharif who did not have the wealth to maintain an 
’aristocratic’ style of life. They differed from the 
aristocrats in that they did not live up to the cultural 
norms of the Mogul court; they as often as not had to 
send their children to St Stephen’s Mission College in 
Delhi as to the M.A.O. College at Aligarh; and they 
tended not to be so overwhelmingly conservative in their 
political outlook. The gulf between the aristocratic 
and the ordinary sharif was significantly narrower than 
the gulf between the sharif and non-sharif. There was 
a good deal of mobility into and out of the aristocracy 
with the major vehicle for social advancement being the 
purchase of rural land. There was also a good deal of 
downward mobility among the aristocrats as it was very 
difficult to follow their way of life and escape 
impoverishment.
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One downwardly mobile group of the Muslim 
aristocracy in Delhi was the Moguls. In 1920,53 Moguls 
applied for pensions from the government. These were 
in addition to the 125 who already held pensions.1 
Their average age was 32 years, with the youngest 10 and 
the eldest 75. Of the 53, 20 were dependent upon 
relatives for maintenance, 12 lived off the meagre 
income of their needlework, four were tailors, four 
were patwas, two were copyists in the Vernacular Office 
of the District Court, two were butlers, two worked with 
dabkai [tinsel] and two with karchob [wood]. And there 
was one each of the following: miscellaneous labourer, 
postman, peon in a school, shikari [hunting guide], 
chaukidar [guard], and an art painter. Of the 21 
relatives mentioned in the list, there were 15
pensioners, three in the courts, two at needlework, and
2one cloth merchant. All 199 of these Moguls were 
literate.
One of the traits displayed by the sharif in Delhi 
and especially by the aristocracy - was significant for 
the political activity of the Muslim community. They 
found public polemic most distasteful and avoided it at
1 R D D A , Foreign File 4 Part B 1921, ’Charitable Pensions 
Drawn by the Ex-Royal Family of Delhi.’
2 The ex-royal family did suffer from a great deal of 
penury, but they also received some special privileges. 
The Islamia Girls School catered especially for them and 
there was also an Ex-Royal Family Scholarship from the 
government which supported nine girls and two boys in 
1914-5, and 18 girls and four boys in 1917-8. RDDA, 
Education File 153 Part B 1918, ’Education of the 
Dependents of the Ex-Royal Family of Delhi and Oudh.’
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all times. If they disagreed with the point of view of 
a person or a group, they would withdraw until a more 
auspicious climate of opinion dawned. During the pan- 
Islamic movement before the War, and the Khilafat 
movement after the War, if they were asked to speak at 
a political or religious meeting, rather than refuse 
outright, or to attend to express their position, they 
would agree to participate and then just not appear.
Or they would be, as Hakim Ajmal Khan often was, 
unavoidably absent. This characteristic made them a weak 
reed upon which to lean when the government sought their 
intervention to counteract the influence of the nationalist 
leaders and agitators who came from their ranks.
The sharif of Delhi controlled a substantial amount 
of power. This power derived in the first instance 
from the fact that they were regarded as the ’natural’ 
leaders of the Muslim community. They derived a certain 
amount of power from the fact that they were the teachers, 
journalists, doctors, and lawyers of th^ society. And 
finally, they derived their power from the fact that they 
served as members of the Municipal Committee as members 
of the managing committees of the Jama Masjid, the 
Fatehpuri Mosque, and the Anglo-Arabic School, and as 
honorary magistrates.
Two individuals illustrate the characteristics and 
values of the sharif in Delhi. Abdul Ahad was one of the 
more active sharif. He was a municipal commissioner from
1912 to 1915; a member of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee 
throughout the period 1913-1920 and its honorary secretary 
from 1918 until his death in 1920. He also occupied the 
honorary secretaryship of the Anjuman-i-Moiyad-ul-Islam,
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the local Haj Committee, and the Managing Committee of 
the proposed Islamia College, He was a member of the 
Hardinge Library Committee and proprietor of the 
Mujtabai Press, He was a trustee of the M.A.O, College 
at Aligarh and held the successive titles of khan sahib 
and khan bahadur. Upon his death his wife and sons 
sought permission to erect a musafarkhana [rest house 
for travellers] in his memory at Ajmere Gate to the 
value of the R s . 50,000 which he had invested in War 
Bonds,
Pirzada Muhammad Hussain was born in 1859 and after 
securing an M.A. joined government service. He retired 
as a divisional judge and devoted the rest of his life 
to community service. He received the title of khan 
bahadur and was an appointed member to the Municipal 
Committee from 1918 through 1925. He was one of three 
Muslims on the Special Sub-Committee on Local Self- 
Government to which he wrote long and dissenting 
memoranda. He was a member of the Managing Committee 
of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee from 1914 onwards 
and was a member of the special Recruiting Committee 
for Delhi City formed in 1918. He was a member of the 
Managing Committee of the proposed Islamia College and 
a member of the Provisional Executive Council of Delhi 
University founded in 1922. He was a member of the Mela 
Committee for the Prince of Wales’ visit to Delhi in 
1921; a member of the Joint Committee for the Muslim 
cemetery at Fironzshah Kotla; and a member of the 
Anjuman-i-Muhafiz Auqaf.
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The non-sharif Muslims in Delhi were divided into 
merchants, karkhandars, and artisans. Those who depended 
upon trade for a livelihood numbered 23,645 in the Delhi 
urban area in 1921 (or 21 per cent of the total Muslim 
population in the Delhi urban area). The karkhandars 
numbered approximately 20,000 (representing 17 per cent), 
and the artisans numbered approximately 31,5 5 0  
(representing 27.5 per cent of the total Muslim 
population in the urban area of Delhi in 1921).^
The Muslim traders in Delhi occupied the role of a 
middling class between the sharif and the non-sharif, 
and provided mobility within the Muslim community, since 
anyone could gain entry into the merchant community. The 
traders shared with the sharif a contempt for the 
illiterate, ill-washed, ill-fed, ill-housed and poverty- 
stricken masses. They were highly urbanised, they valued 
education, they were philanthropic, and they also shared 
a distaste for public polemic. The traders differed 
from the sharif in that their education was generally 
vernacular and traditional except for those who attended 
the Anglo-Arabic School, and that they displayed a very 
conservative religious attitude in addition to their
*
conservative political outlook. The traders also 
invested in urban property rather than rural land since
1
These figures leave out those Muslims listed in Service 
in Table 3-E, Chapter One. These Muslims were both 
karkhandars and artisans as well as impoverished sharif 
and merchants. There is no way to separate these groups.
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the latter could not increase their status and the 
former could increase their wealth.
The merchant community mediated between the sharif
and the non-sharif because it could amass large resources,
of wealth, status, and power. The merchants amassed
large resources of wealth, of course, from their commercial
enterprises, and in many instances individual merchants
were vastly more wealthy than the members of the sharif.1
Abdul Rahim, a Muslim hide merchant, was reputed to be
2one of the wealthiest men in Delhi.
1
Out of the 3^ categories of trade in the census of 1921, 
listed in Table 3-A of Chapter One, Muslims predominated 
significantly in 15. These were wood, fuel, metals, 
pottery, chemicals, hotels and restaurants, theatres, 
fish, milk and poultry, tobacco and opium, ready-made 
clothing, furniture and bedding, bangles and beads, and 
books and stationery. Taken together, the number of 
Muslims in these 15 commodities constituted 52 per cent 
of those Muslims who were in trade. The largest categories 
of Muslim trade were ready-made clothing, chemicals, 
bangles, and milk and poultry in that order. The Muslims 
also constituted a significant proportion of the traders 
in vegetable oils and condiments, in cardamom and 
vegetables, and in piece-goods in that order. Taken 
together, the number of Muslims in these latter three 
commodities constituted a further 3^ per cent of total 
Muslims in trade. In comparative terms, there were as 
many people dependent upon trade in the Muslim community 
(21 per cent) as there were in the Hindu community (22 
per cent), And they also fared well in terms of total 
population, since Muslim traders represented 36 per cent 
of all people dependent upon trade in the Delhi urban 
area in 1921, while the Muslims represented 38 per cent 
of the total population in the same area. Census of 
India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
2
RDDA, Confidential File 90 (1915)» ’Influx of Baluchis 
to the Nomania School in Delhi and Enquiries in Connection 
therewith.'
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The merchants could attain a high status in Muslim 
society by pursuing traditional practices which gained 
recognition from the rest of Muslim society, both sharif 
and non-sharif. The most important of these was 
philanthropy. The Muslim merchants of Delhi tended to 
contribute large subscriptions to mosques, madrassahs, 
makhtabs [traditional Muslim educational institutions 
usually located in a mosque], and orphanages. They were 
quite rigorous in their observances of the fast of Ramadan 
and the sacrifice of Bakr-Id a And they participated in 
the haj in larger numbers than any other group. Haji and 
hafiz [displaying an ability to memorise the Koran] 
before the name of a merchant was a highly valued 
distinction. The Muslim merchants of Delhi also derived 
status from the fact that they represented a large 
number of the darbaris and title-holders of the community.
The Muslim merchants in Delhi were able to acquire 
power in a commensurate proportion to their wealth and 
status. They served as municipal commissioners and 
honorary magistrates. They were also highly represented 
on the managing committees of the Jama Masjid, the Fatehpuri 
Mosque, and the Anglo-Arabic School.
Haji Shaikh Azizuddin was an example of the affluent 
trader who displayed a high degree of consistency of 
wealth, status, and power. He was a khan sahib and an 
honorary magistrate (second class). He received a War 
Loan Sanad for contributing over R s . 2,000 to the Second 
Indian War Loan Fund and was a member of the Third Indian 
War Loan Fund Committee, He was a Trustee of the proposed 
Islamia College, a member of the Joint Committee for the 
cemetery at Firozshah Kotla, and a member of the Anjuman- 
i-Muhafiz Auqaf.
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The Muslim merchants did not tend to establish 
western-style economic organisations to promote their 
interests. They joined the economic organisations 
already in existence, such as the Delhi Piece Goods 
Association, the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile 
Association, the Kirana Committee and so forth. But 
they tended to rely more upon traditional panchayats 
to regulate their relations with their fellows.
There was one group of especially affluent men,
however, who did establish a special organisation.
They established the Anjuman-i-Vakil-i-Qaum-i-Panjabian
in 1900, in Sardar Bazaar, with 30 members. Its
objectives were the religious and temporal progress of
the Delhiwal Panjabian community. It is interesting to
note that all the officers of the organisation carried
the appelation haji or hafiz. The organisation assisted
widows and orphans and maintained a school on the Qutb
Road where religious and technical subjects were taught.
Haji Abdul Ghani was appointed honorary magistrate in
1913 mainly because he was the outstanding representative
of the community.1 The Panjabians also had a cemetery
2that was used generally to bury their own group.
1
RDDA, Home File 427 Part B 1913» 'Appointment of Haji 
Abdul Ghani and S. Nathu Ram as Honorary Magistrates 
Delhi'; Confidential File 70 (1915)» 'List of Societies 
and Anjumans in Delhi.'
2
RDDA, Revenue File 118 Part B 1916, 'Provision of a 
Muhammadan Cemetery in Karaul Bagh.'
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The karkhandars formed a distinct social group in 
Muslim society.^ The group included the casual labourer, 
the industrial worker, and the factory owner organised 
into a recognised brotherhood with a panchayat. The 
karkhandars, who owned the petty industrial shops which 
this group tended to establish, had moderate resources 
of wealth, but they had no status and no power. The 
karkhandars who were labourers were, by and large, much 
better off economically than the Muslim artisans, since 
their wages tended to be both higher and more regular 
and since the occupations they pursued were expanding 
rapidly while the market for the wares of the artisan was 
continually contracting.
The karkhandars displayed several noticeable 
characteristics. They looked upon education as useless 
and adamantly refused to send their children to schools. 
There was little inclination to equate social with 
economic status since the more wealthy karkhandars were 
only marginally more cultured than the poorer ones. The 
males squandered as much as possible on the entertainment 
of themselves and their friends, which meant that their
1
It is difficult to estimate the number of karkhandars 
in Delhi. It can be hesitantly assumed that those 
Muslims who were classified as 'labourers' were 
karkhandars. The hesitancy arises over (l) the number 
of artisans who became labourers, and (2) the number of 
karkhandars who were in other types of occupations, 
such as services. Assuming that labourers were 
karkhandars, it is possible to derive an estimate of 
19,250 workers and dependents in the Delhi urban area 
in 1921. This was 17 per cent of the total Muslim 
population which supports the impressionistic estimates 
of 20 to 33 per cent by contemporary Muslims. Interview 
Shri M. Mujeeb, September 19 6 7.
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wives had to scheme, manoeuvre and manipulate to get 
what little money they could. Their major concern in 
life seemed to centre on the riotous good times of the 
tamasha, The karkhandars tended to be apolitical and 
were not observed as being particularly rigorous in 
their religious observances. They were, however, 
capable of a high degree of religious frenzy on the 
spur of the moment,
The artisans are the last distinct social group 
in Muslim society which shared certain values and 
acted in a similar fashion.1 Their resources of wealth 
were much smaller than those of the karkhandars, but 
they had a similar low status and a similar lack of 
power, The artisans differed from the karkhandars in 
that they did not constitute one large homogeneous 
group; instead, they formed a number of smaller and 
homogeneous units. These units gained some homogeneity 
from the fact that all artisans who dealt with one 
commodity tended to live in one area, were organised into 
a brotherhood under panchayat which regulated their 
social and professional relationships, married within 
the craft, and attended the same mosque. The artisans
1
It is interesting to note the absolute dominance of 
Muslims in the artisan handicrafts. Muslims represented 
38 per cent of the total population in the Delhi urban 
area, and constituted 54 per cent of all artisans. 
Artisans were also the single largest occupational group 
in the Muslim community, constituting 28 per cent of all 
Muslims. The artisans who were Hindu constituted only 
l4 per cent of the total Hindu community, on the other 
hand. See Table 3-D, Chapter One.
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were similar to the karkhandars in that they lacked any 
serious political consciousness, but they differed 
from the latter in that they tended to have conservative 
religious attitudes. The violent nature and anarchic 
attitudes of the karkhandars found no parallel among 
the artisans who were highly amenable to the dictates of 
their choudhris and the ulema.
The more wealthy artisans usually owned retail 
outlets for their wares and employed the less fortunate 
members of their community. These more wealthy ship­
owners, who were generally the leaders of the community, 
were as often as not literate or semi-literate and 
acted as the vehicles of communication of news from the 
world of the printed word. (Otherwise bazaar gossip 
circulated among the wives and workers who thronged the 
narrow gal is' which became work areas during the day. )
The relationship between the retailer and the 
artisan was not always a relationship between super­
ordinate and subordinate craftsmen. A different 
relationship existed especially when the craftsmen 
belonged to one religion and the retailers to another.
In the sphere of luxury goods, the relationship was 
generally between Hindu merchants and Muslim craftsmen. 
The Muslim artisans in these cases usually worked in 
their houses rather than on the retailers' premises, 
which meant that they had in their possession quantities 
of costly materials. Since he was usually very poor and 
could not afford such a deposit, the artisan had to 
accept a loan from the shopkeeper which was in turn 
taken back as security. The interest on the whole loan
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was the normal rate charged in India and ranged between 
33 per cent and 200 per cent per annum,1
The artisan was never able to pay the interest, let 
alone the principal, and in effect entered into a kind 
of bondage which neither he nor his children were able 
to break. The relationship had certain advantages as 
well as certain disadvantages. It enabled the artisan 
to borrow as long as he could work, since the shopkeeper 
was assured of his income. The disadvantages lay in 
that the artisan received decreasingly smaller returns 
for his work. An object might return a very handsome 
profit for the shopkeeper, but the artisan received only 
a pittance. In the area of conspicuous consumption the 
artisan’s way of life became even more perilous during 
times of depression or inflation since his remuneration 
was the first to drop and the last to rise.
Two examples of artisan brotherhoods illustrate the 
nature of such communities in Delhi. The butchers of 
Delhi were unique among artisan bortherhoods in that they 
established a western-style organisation. The Anjuman-i- 
Muin-ul-Talim was founded in 1910 with the twin objects 
of promoting education and safeguarding communal interests. 
The entire community of butchers (most of whom resided 
at Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazaar) were members of the 
Anjuman, and they all subscribed to the school that was
1
RDDA, Home File 305 Part B 1915* ’Use of the Civil 
Courts as an Agency for the Realisation of Usurious 
Demands of Money-Lenders.'
2
It was founded in response to the communal tension 
evident in Delhi in July 1910. RDDA, Confidential File 70 
( 1 9 1 5 ) .
founded at their mosque,1 It is interesting to note 
that no butchers were officers of the organisation.
The officers were a pleader, a cloth merchant, a skin 
merchant, and a proprietor of a printing press, These 
leaders and other influences discussed later converted 
this group of cohesive apolitical, illiterate,
obstreperous, and fanatic Muslims into a powerful
2political weapon.
The second example of artisan organisation, albeit 
of a more traditional type, was the brotherhood of 
tailors. The tailors lived in Bara Hindu Rao in Sadar 
Bazaar. They all attended the Mosque Bara Hindu Rao 
Darzian and supported the Madrassah Rahimia Islamia 
Arabia which was connected to it. In this case, as in 
most instances, the same sect, occupation, residence, 
maulvi, school, and kinship provided a high degree of 
cohesion.
Those factors which contributed to cohesion within 
the artisan brotherhoods also brought about alienation 
when a person left the craft for new employment, It is 
interesting to note that those occupational categories
i 4 o
1
The total number of butchers and dependents decreased 
from 731 to 596 between 1911 and 1921, but the number 
of actual workers decreased from 470 to 1 9 3? representing 
decreases of 18.5 to 5^.5 per cent respectively. See 
Table 3-D, Chapter One.
2
The Deputy Commissioner described the butchers, who 
were most responsible for violent crime in Delhi in 
1913> as the ’most quarrelsome and turbulent of the 
populace.’ RDDA, Home File 223 Part B 1914, ’Annual 
Police Administration Report of Delhi Province for 1913*'
in which Muslims predominated declined in numbers between 
1911 and 1921 by 42,8 per cent, (The non-Muslim 
categories, on the other hand, increased at the rate of 
49-0 per cent.) The most notable decline took place 
among the textile workers of lace, crepe and embroidery, 
which declined from 18,000 to 4,000; brass and copper 
smiths from 5>000 to 2,000; rice and flour grinders from 
2,000 to 900; cabinet makers from 1,300 to 800; and 
workers in precious metals and stones from 12,000 to 
7,000»1 Since the organisation of the artisan centred 
around the craft, this meant an increasing disintegration 
of social loyalties as new employment usually entailed 
new horizons,
II
Indian Islam is a necklace of racial, cultural and 
political pearls strung on the thread of Islam. ^
The Shariah was to the Muslim community what the 
Sanatana Pharma was to the Hindu community. It was the 
’path* or 'road* from which all Muslims drew inspiration
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1
Census of India, 1911? XIV (Punjab), Part II (Tables); 
Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
2
Percival Spear, ’The Position of the Muslims, Before 
and After Partition,’ India and Ceylons Unity and 
Piversity, Philip Mason, e d . (Londonj 196 7)> P* 31.
and guidance. Through a corpus of written knowledge 
it supplied guidelines for all thought and action of
1
The Shariah was divided into two parts, namely, kalam 
and fiqh. Kalam ['dogmatic and sholastic theology"’”[ 
supplied endless exegeses upon the teachings of Islam, 
and fiqh [jurisprudence] sought to provide a method by 
which it was possible to reconcile teaching with practic
There were four systems of fiqh; the Indian Muslims 
in Delhi followed one of them the Hanafi school. All 
four of the systems of fiqh used the same four ’roots’, 
namely ijma [consensus of Muslim learned opinion], 
qiyas [argument by analogy], hadith [reports of the 
Prophet’s sunna (his course of conduct, doings, and 
sayings)], and the Koran, The Koran was the point of 
the inverted pyramid, that upon which everything rested. 
The hadiths with the greatest amount of validity were 
those reports attributed to the first four Khalifs,
The qiyas with analogues in the Koran were stronger than 
those with analogues in the hadiths, and those with 
analogues in the hadiths of the first four Khalifs were 
stronger than those with analogues in hadiths that were 
attributed to less distinguished observers. In the 
attempt to reconcile teaching with practice the founders 
of the four systems of fiqh used the four ’roots’ to 
advise people how to ascertain what was wajib [required] 
mahzur [forbidden], mandub [recommended], makruh 
[disapproved], or mubah [merely permitted]. See Reuben 
Levy, The Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge, 1962), 
Chapter IV.
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the members of the community. As an ideal, it 
propounded a theory of social equality which encouraged 
a host of responsibilities towards kinsmen and co­
religionists, It stressed the accountability of the
individual to the community and set standards of
2’public behaviour and collective sacrifice,’
The Muslims of Delhi did not rely exclusively upon 
the Shariah to inform their religious, social, and 
political activities, The motivation for many of these
1
A summary of the different aspects of Islam by M„ 
Mujeeb is as follows; ’This allegiance [to Islam] 
created the sentiment of belonging to a community, 
and this sentiment has been the point at which religion 
the instinct for self-preservation, political interest 
and social traditions can be said to meet, This 
sentiment can remain latent or dormant for generations, 
but it can also be roused to fever pitch within an 
incredibly short time. It has brought the joy of 
release from normal social restraints and inhibitions. 
It has supported movements for reform. Under normal 
conditions, its most characteristic expression is the 
emotional response to a stranger introducing himself 
as a Muslim, and the realisation that comes with it of 
all the Muslims of the world being one vast brotherhood 
This sentiment has not generally overcome sectarian 
prejudices or material interests. It has not been a 
generally active political force. But if we have to 
define the Indian Muslims, we can only say that they 
are Indians who call themselves Muslims, who believe in 
the unity and fraternity of the Muslims as a religious 
and social community, and are capable of showing in 
practice that they act in accordance with this belief, 
however they might differ in doctrine and observances.’ 
The Indian Muslims, p. 23.
2
Ali Mazrui, ’Islam, Political Leadership and 
Economic Radicalism in Africa,’ Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, IX (April^ 1967) , 274-91.
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activities sprang from factionalism, sectarianism and 
parochialism as well as from a commitment to values 
derived from the Shariah. For example, there was a 
great deal of factionalism among the Sunnis; to a 
lesser degree, a manifestation of sectarianism among 
Muslims in general; and a spirit of parochialism 
exhibited toward the Hindu and Christian communities. 
And yet despite the factionalism, sectarianism, and 
parochialism (or maybe because of it) much of the 
response of Muslims in Delhi to the process of 
politicisation was informed by the traditional values 
of Islam, such as, the sentiment of pan=Islam or the 
attitude toward the Khilafat.
The Sunnis were Muslims who accepted the sunna 
[conduct, doings, and sayings] of the Prophet, as well 
as the Koran as providing a guide for Muslim precept 
and practice. They were the largest Muslim sect in 
Delhi, representing 90 to 95 per cent of the Muslim 
population.1 The Sunni sect succumbed to heterogeneity 
in its social organisation since it encompassed all the 
social groups discussed above. It also succumbed to 
factionalism.
The presence of factions within the Sunni sect in 
Delhi resulted from differing responses to the process 
of modernisation, a process which gave rise to a 
controversy over the definition of orthodoxy. The 
process presented a serious dilemma to a faction of 
Muslims who were 'traditionalist* since they were
1 Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt . I (Report).
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highly suspicious of change and usually prohibited 
everything that was not specifically permitted in the 
written corpus of the Shariah» This, of course, led to 
serious dilemmas because many of the problems which 
arose from the process of modernisation could not 
possibly have been foreseen in earlier centuries, and 
because there were so many contradictions in the corpus. 
The traditionalists argued that it was better to hold 
onto what was known, however, than to advance uncertainly 
into the unknown. This attitude, which was supported 
by large numbers of merchants and artisans, also led to 
a spirit of intense parochialism when Muslim leaders 
and maulvis, or the Hindu community, or the government, 
questioned tradition on any point.
The faction of Muslims who were the ’liberals’, did 
not encounter the problem which faced the traditionalists, 
or at least to the same extent. They permitted most 
things that were not specifically prohibited in the 
Shariah and in addition tended to ignore some of the 
more anachronistic prohibitions. This attitude, which 
was supported in a large measure by the sharif, some 
merchants and some artisans, reinforced the more 
cosmopolitan values with Muslim society.
The factionalism in the Sunni sect in Delhi tended 
to coalesce around individual maulvis whose attitudes 
and values stemmed to a large degree from where they 
were trained. Most of the maulvis in Delhi came from 
the Dar-al-Ulum at Deoband in the United Provinces, an
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institution which trained traditionalist maulvis« A
smaller number came from the Maj1 is-i-~Nadwah-a 1 °Ulama
at Firangi Mahal in Lucknow, which was slightly less
2 /traditionalist, (It was, however, much more 
traditionalist than the Muslim Anglo-Orienta1 College 
at Aligarh which, as a highly westernised institution, 
did not train maulvis,) A smaller number of maulvis 
were trained in the local madrassahs of Delhi, most of 
which were known to be more traditional than liberal.
The differences within the world of orthodoxy were 
institutionalised in the two dominant mosques in Delhi. 
Both of these, namely, the Jama Masjid and the 
Fatehpuri Mosque, were confiscated as royal property 
after the Mutiny of 1857* The Jama Masjid was reopened 
in 1862 under a Managing Committee that was appointed 
by - and responsible to - the government, with the 
deputy commissioner as ex°officio president. The ten 
members of the Committee were eminent Sunni Muslims 
with large resources of wealth, status, and power. The 
re-establishment of the Jama Masjid aroused some
1
1
M, Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims, p. 409, places the 
Dar-al-Ulum which was founded in 1867, in a theological 
context. The Mazahir-al-Ulum at Saharanpur and the 
Qasim-al-Ulum at Muradabad, both of which were founded 
later, looked to the Dar°a1-Ulum for inspiration and 
guidance. For a longer discussion see Ziya-ul-Hasan 
Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan 
(Bombay, 1963 ) •
2
The Nadwah-al-Ulama was founded in 1892. Abdul Bari 
became one of the most famous teachers there after the 
death of Shibli Nomani. See M. Mujeeb, The Indian 
Muslims, p. 409.
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controversy since the more rigorously traditionalist
group did not want to restore some relics which had
been removed.1 A compromise was reached but the
traditionalist faction did not gain satisfaction until
the Fatehpuri Mosque was reopened in 1877. The
Fatehpuri Mosque also had a Managing Committee of ten
members with large resources of wealth, status, and
power who were appointed by - and responsible to -
the government with the deputy commissioner again as
2ex-officio president. The Fatehpuri Mosque was the 
more conservative of the two institutions.
The factionalism evident in the Sunni sect also 
tended to manifest itself in the types of organisations 
that were established in Delhi. In 1888 the somewhat 
more liberal members of the Jama Masjid, led by Hakim 
Ajmal Khan and Sayed Ahmad (imam of the Jama Masjid) 
founded the Anjuman-i-»Moiyad-ul-Islam. It was designed 
to support and educate destitute children, but by the 
turn of the century it also maintained several old 
mosques and buried all Muslims who had no one to attend 
to them (for which it received R s . 3/12 per burial from 
the Municipal Committee). It had a substantial income 
(larger than either the Jama Masjid or the Fatehpuri 
Mosque) of Rs . 2,150 per year from the rent of houses, 
subscriptions and a donation of R s . 300 per year from
1
The mosque had been purchased by a Hindu who 
proposed to demolish it and erect new buildings on the 
site. The government intervened, compensated the owner, 
and turned the mosque over to the Muslim community as 
a sign of favour during the Imperial Darbar of 1877-
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the Nizam of Hyderabad. The orphanage had 55 boys and 
eight girls in 1914, It had a very good reputation and 
all Muslims appreciated it»1
The leader of the Anjuman°i°Moiyad“’Ul°Islam, Hakim 
Ajmal Khan (1865-1927), was also the leader of a 
liberal group of established Muslims in Delhi, He 
lived in a grand house on the corner of Ballimaran and 
Chandni Chauk, and came from a very wealthy and 
aristocratic family which had accompanied Babur in 1526. 
The family was represented at the court of each 
succeeding Mogul and held jaghirs in two Patna districts 
valued at R s . 3 , 000. They also received eight villages 
in jaghir in Panipat and Sonepat, but these were 
resumed by the Government of India and the family 
granted a pension. Hakim Ajmal Khan's eldest brother 
established the Madrassah Tibbiya which the Hakim 
expanded into a college for Ayurvedic and Unani medicine 
with the addition of a Zenana school for midwifery and 
a pharmacy. The Hakim Sahib became the head of his 
family in 1903 by which time he had established a large 
practice in Delhi in addition to a large princely 
clientele like the Nawab of Rampur who gave him Rs . 600 
per month. He was a hafiz, an outstanding scholar in 
Persian and Arabic and a trustee of the M.A.O. College 
at Aligarh. In 1908 he was granted the title hazik-ul-
mulk for his loyalty and for the influence which he
2exercised in the interest of law and order.
RDDA, Confidential File 70 (l915)*
2 Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, 72-3. Hakim 
Hafiz Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Haziq-ul-Mulk, later became a 
leader of the nationalist movement in Delhi and northern 
India. He was elected the president of the annual 
session of the All-India Moslem League at Amritsar in 
1919» and the president of the annual session of the 
All-India National Congress at Ahmedabad in 1921.
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The more traditionalist Sunnis did not establish 
an organisation until 1906o The parochial tendencies 
of their religious outlook resulted in the foundation 
of the Anjuman-i-Hidayat-ul-Islam„ the object of which 
was the prevention of Muslims from embracing other 
faiths in response to the proselytizing activities of 
the Arya Samaj. It was supported by the Panjabian 
merchant community and by a large number of maulvis,
It had an income of R s „ 350 of which R s . 100 was 
donated by the Begum of Bhopal, which it spent on the
14 schools it supported within and without Delhi, and 
on preachers who were sent to various parts of the 
country to lecture against the Arya Samaj.1
The president of the Anjuman-i-Hidayat-ul-Islam 
was Maulvi Abu Muhammad Abdul Haq Haqqani who was born 
in 1850 and who lived in Kucha Ballimaran, near Hakim
1
RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915)* Two examples of 
preachers of the An juman-i-Hidaya t -ul- Is lam visiting 
other districts occurred on 19 February 1909 and 25 
November 1909. At the former, several maulvis lectured 
at a fair in the Bulandshahr District of the United 
Provinces. They stressed the need for better education 
and distributed a violent anti-Arya Samaj pamphlet 
written by Muhammad Rafat-ullah who was secretary of 
the Society in Delhi. At the second meeting which 
lasted two days, the preachers of the Society and 
especially Maulvi Nizamuddin, sought to persuade the 
Muslim Jats to establish educational institutions and 
exclude the Hindu and Arya Jats. Nothing constructive 
resulted from the meeting, while it did stir up a good 
deal of bad blood between the two groups of Jats in a 
small village in the Meerut District. NAI, Home Poll 
103-110 Part B, April 1909, 'Weekly Reports of the 
Director of Criminal Intelligence,1 for the week ending 
13 March 1909; Home Poll 120-127 Part B, February 1910, 
'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,’ 
for the week ending 18 December 1909.
Ajmal Khan. He owned four houses in Delhi and 500 
bighas of land in Karnal District. He was an author 
of considerable distinction and received the title 
shams^ul-ulema in June 1912 (which carried a pension 
of R s . 100 per annum). He later became president of 
the Anjuman-i-Muhafiz-i-Mazarat which was established 
to protect Muslim cemeteries. In May 1909 he issued 
a fatwa which called upon Muslims to join with the 
Christians to fight against the Hindus in general and 
the Aryas in particular.1
Both the traditionalists and the more liberal
Sunnis did not show any consistency between their
religious outlook and their political attitudes, Many
religious conservatives were willing to press the
government for political reform, and conversely many
religious liberals staunchly supported the government.
Those who were willing to question government motives
and actions, and press for political reform, united in
the local branch of the Muslim League. The branch was
founded in 1909» in time to host the annual sessions of
the Muslim League in both 1909 and January 1910. The
local branch included religious conservatives as well
as religious liberals, both of whom were very Moderate
in their political attitudes. It had 150 members of
2the sharif and merchant sections of the community.
The confusion in religious and political attitudes 
was also illustrated in the newspapers in Delhi. There 
were 22 newspapers in Delhi in 1911, 16 of which were
1 NAI, Home Poll 115-124 Part B, June 1909, 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,’ 
fop the week ending 8 May 1909•
2 RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915).
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in Urdu and six of which were in English, Of the 22 
editors, one was English, one was Eurasion and one was 
a Hindu; the rest were all Muslims. The Urdu weekly 
Curzon Gazette with a circulation of 4,825 was the 
largest single journal. It was edited by Umrao Mirza 
who consistently opposed the Moderates in ’Ajmal 
K h a n ’s party’ and just as consistently supported a 
small clique of religious liberals who were also 
political Extremists. The Curzon Gazette was opposed 
by the Delhi Gazette which had a weekly circulation 
of 700. It was edited by Sajjad Hussain, a religious 
conservative and political Moderate who supported 
’Hakim Ajmal Khan’s party’ until the latter stopped 
its pecuniary aid, after which it fell inactive.1
The traditionalist faction within the Sunni sect 
sheltered yet another sub-group of the most vigorous 
’fundamentalists’. This sub-group relied mostly upon 
the Koran and the hadiths for its inspiration and 
guidance and tended to look upon fiqh as irrelevant. 
These people were called ghair-maqallids [people who 
did not follow any of the four schools of jurisprudence] 
of which there was a goodly number in Delhi. They were 
very ’puritanical’ in their social conduct, very
1
NAI, Home Poll 2-3 Part B, October 1912, ’Report on 
Newspapers Published in the Punjab for the Year 1911.’
parochial in their religious outlook, and fanatically 
dedicated to their way of life.1
A number of ghair-maqallids organised the All-India 
Ahl-i-Hadis Conference in Delhi in 1912. The Conference 
began with 20 members but it soon attracted ever
increasing numbers until it had reached a strength of
2300 by 1918. The faction was not as important in 
numbers, however, as it was in terms of its ethic, and 
also in terms of the sort of person who supported it.
The ethic of the Ahl-i-Hadis was of the greatest 
importance to the individuals and to the group since 
they vigorously guided their lives by it. One Muslim 
scholar described the attitudes of the group in the 
following manner:
1
One example which illustrates vividly the lengths to 
which the fanaticism of the ghair-maqaHid could go, 
occurred during the Khilafat movement in 1921, A 
large group of 'frontier- and trans-border talib-ul- 
i1ms*and a ghair-maqa11id had a religious argument in 
front of the Jama Masjid on a Friday evening, A large 
mob of people quickly gathered in time to witness 
this Kashmiri Muslim run 'amok' with a large knife. 
Before he could be subdued he had killed four people 
(including one of his own friends) and wounded five 
others. The incident was described as 'purely an 
outburst of fanaticism.' NAI, Home Poll 42 Deposit, 
April 1921, 'Fortnightly Reports for the 2nd Half of 
January 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 31 
January 1921.
2
R DD A , Confidential File 70 (1915)
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Piety consists in sincerity, truthfulness, 
and honesty of intent, in following the Qur’an 
and the sunna, in exemplary life which might 
be a beacon to others, in quest of knowledge 
and scholarship (especially in the science of 
hadis ) , in associating with and deference for 
the 'ulama', in impeccable conformity to the 
minutiae of all prescribed ritual, including 
the jihad, and in conformity to an exemplary 
pattern of peaceful domestic life.^
These values led the Ahl-i-Hadis to maintain a strict 
personal code of behaviour. It led them to establish
and maintain 19 madrassahs throughout northern India
2of which three were located in Delhi. The result of
their ’neo-traditionalist’ and militant attitude was
a high degree of parochialism and, as their activities
during the pan-Islamic and Khilafat movements revealed,
3a high degree of commitment to religious values.
1
Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 
1857-1964 (London, I96 7), p. 116.
2
They were the Madrassah Ali Jan, Madrassah Abdul Wahab, 
and Madrassah Mahomedia.
3
Their most noticeable attitude can be summarised as 
follows: ’With all their horror of fitna, chaos and 
uprising, with all their passionate attachment to 
quietism, the pacifism of the Ahl-i-Hadis was not 
entirely non-violent. They accepted jihad in certain 
circumstances, not only as a fact of life but as an act 
of piety. Unlike the modernists they offer no apologe_t- 
ics to explain it as a defensive institution, The 
purity of purpose in jihad lies only in the principle 
that it should be waged ’for the sake of G o d ’ and not 
in quest of booty. It can only be waged in absolute 
obedience to the reigning caliph.’ Aziz Ahmad,
Islamic Modernism, p. 119»
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The Ahl-i-Hadis received most of its support from 
the Panjabian merchant community and from some artisan 
groups. Those who combined a parochial outlook with a 
high degree of religious sincerity were particularly 
susceptible to the neo-traditionalism of this group.
But the appeal of the movement was also indicative of 
a basic problem confronting Muslim society, This 
problem was how to deal with modernisation. The 
artisans who faced a severe economic depression as a 
result of modernisation, turned to religion for solace 
and developed sincere, fundamental and parochial 
attitudes. They sought to reinforce their religious 
values in order to secure stability in a rapidly 
changing world. The Panjabian were better informed 
about the problems of modern life, but they too reacted 
irrationally to a situation they could not accept. A 
large number of sharif, on the other hand, with their 
cosmopolitan attitudes and their high level of 
sophistication accepted the process of modernisation 
and even the process of westernisation.
The difference in outlook between the conservative
and parochial Panjabian and the modernised, westernised
sharif can be illustrated through their contrasting
attitudes towards the institution of purdah. The
Panjabian maintained the strictest attitude towards the
seclusion of women. Dr Ansari's daughter, on the other
hand, was permitted an immense amount of personal
freedom, described as follows:
She appeared at meals, though only when certain 
people were present; but she went about freely in 
her sari, drove a car as daring as any American 
girl, and took a keen interest in the affairs of 
her country, cultural, social, and political.1
1 Halide Edibe, Inside India (London, 1937), p* 32.
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This is not to argue that all the sharif abandoned 
purdah since even Dr Ansari1s wife strictly maintained 
the institution and was willing to see only Mahatma 
Gandhi, but it was certainly indicative of a change of 
mood .
Modernisation affected only a small elite in the 
half century after the Mutiny, But it was a problem 
that could no longer be ignored when such questions as 
the education and seclusion of females, or participation 
in politics were raised. The questions of what to change 
and at what pace raised by liberal leaders and by 
maulvis created insecurity and instability in the minds 
of many. And when such questions as the reduction of 
cow slaughter to gain the goodwill of the Hindus were 
raised, the process became acute. Some people accepted 
change and adjusted themselves to the new situation. 
Others rejected change and found security in the Shariah 
The process of modernisation broadened many people’s 
horizons, but the reaction to it also deepened the 
parochialism of those people who possessed insufficient 
cultural and intellectual resources to withstand the 
demise of a traditional order. A large number of people 
were willing to compromise (as the small number of kine 
killed in 1920 revealed), but the attempt of the Ahl-i- 
Hadis to stop the movement also revealed that such 
compromise was unacceptable to them.1 The response of 
the fundamentalists and traditionalists to the pan- 
Islamism of Mohamed Ali and to the Khilafat movement, 
however, reflected and reaffirmed their faith in 
religious values.
This incident is discussed below in Chapter Seven.
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The Shias were Muslims who followed the Shariah 
but who only accepted the hadith attributed to the 
fourth Khalif of Islam, namely, Ali. They numbered 
2,725 in 1921 and looked to Lucknow as the centre of 
the sect in India.1
The Shias had moderate resources of wealth, 
substantial status, and power commensurate to the size 
of the community. They had only moderate resources of 
wealth because they were not large landowners since 
most of the Mogul emperors had been Sunni, They could 
not pursue trade, which was the only other avenue of 
acquiring wealth in Delhi, since they were all sharif. 
This left them with the professions and the artisan 
crafts, both of which they pursued in large numbers.
The Shias had a high status because they were all 
sharif; they believed firmly in education; they included 
a large number of professionals; and they had members 
who were darbaris and title-holders. And they had a 
large degree of power since they always had a represent­
ative on the Municipal Committee and a member who was 
an honorary magistrate.
The Shias of Delhi tended to be firm supporters of 
the government, and only occasionally joined even the 
Moderate nationalists. The political outlook of the 
leader of the community was summarised as follows:
Census of India, 1921, XV, Part I.
1
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The one point which I particularly beg to refer 
is the attitude of the Shiah sect towards the 
reigning government on several trying occasions 
of the history of British India. It was mainly 
through religious influences that the large 
section of the Shiah Community residing in Delhi, 
Lucknow, and other places remained aloof and 
refused to join the rebels during the Sepoy 
Mutiny. The leaders of the Shiah Community were 
again active and successfully exerted themselves 
in keeping back the Indian Muhammadan from 
joining the combined Pathan clans during the 
Pathan revolt of 1907. Also during the present 
Balkan troubles the Shiah leaders have done their 
best to show that the war with Turkey is only a 
temporal and not a religious war. Similarly on 
the occasion of the Russo-Persian disturbances 
the Shiah sect remained unmoved and refused to 
give the Persians that form of sympathy which 
animated the members of the other community.
Thus not only myself but every Shiah in India 
looks upon his aloofness as a great blessing 
derived solely through his religious influences.
The anxiety of this Community [is] to preserve in 
every respect the integrity of their forms and 
practices which lead ultimately to higher and 
better results. . . .1
In 1910 the Delhi Shias founded the Anjuman-i-Shiah- 
u1-Safa. It was a local branch of the All-India Shiah 
Society of Lucknow whose purpose was to safeguard the 
rights of the Shia community and spread the tenets of 
their faith. All the members of the Shia community 
joined in the first instance. The Delhi Shia community 
acted as host to the All-India Shiah Conference in 191^ 
when 1,000 people served on the Reception Committee.
1
RDDA, Confidential File 7 (1913), ’Election of 
Members of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee, Delhi,’ 
Aqai Saiyid Umrao Mirza Rizawi to W.M. Hailey, 7 June 
1913.
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/The elan for a separate Shia political group 
diminished gradually. By 1917 the Anjuman-i-Shiah-ul- 
Safa disappeared. The sect’s only organisation in Delhi 
was the Shia College Committee which had 12 members 
with no influence in the community and 'no practical 
work'.1 They did, however, have a newspaper, the 
Isna-i-Ashari, which was founded in 1908. In 1911 it 
had a circulation of 850 copies weekly and was published 
by Saghir Hussain. The paper was concerned with 
religious matters only and was very popular among the 
Shias.2
The head of the Shia community in Delhi was Aqai 
Saiyed Umrao Mirza Rizawi. His father had been head of 
the community and a divisional darbari. He was 
appointed member of the Municipal Committee from 1915 
to 1922. He was an honorary magistrate and a sub­
registrar. He was a member of the Mela Committee for 
the Prince of Wales' visit in 1921 and the only Muslim 
member of the Provincial Council of the Delhi Boy Scout 
Association.
1
RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918), 'List of Political, 
Qasi-Political and Religious Societies, Sabhas and 
Anjumans in the Delhi Province for the Year Ending the 
30th June 1918.'
2
NAI, Home Poll 2-3 Part B, October 1912. It is 
interesting to note that the newspaper did become 
active in politics during the Khilafat movement. The 
classification of the Isna-i-Ashari changed from 
'religious paper' to 'liberal' denoting support of 
government policies to 'radical' denoting opposition to 
the government and support of the Khilafat Committee. 
RDDA, Home File' 25 Part B 1922, 'Quarterly Lists of 
Newspapers Published in the Delhi Province.'
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The Muslim community of Delhi, even though it did
contain a large number of fanatics,1 experienced little
outright violence between any of the sects such as was
2experienced in Lucknow, A major reason for this 
relative serenity was the fact that there were at least 
two institutions, one at the élite level, and the other 
at the mass level, which on most occasions could blur 
sectarian differences.
The institution which operated at the élite level 
was education. Shias attended the same schools as the 
Sunnis and co-operated in the management of the Anglo- 
Arabic School. The Managing Committee of the Anglo- 
Arabic School, which was composed of six Shias and six
1
The Superintendent of Police in Delhi was most 
reluctant to employ Afridis who inhabited the North- 
West Frontier Province because the characteristics that 
made them unemployable on the frontier, that is 'their 
religious fanaticism which renders them unreliable when 
employed on the frontier, or against their co­
religionists' also applied to Delhi, 'which also has 
its Mullahs; many of them with perverse views and 
political tendencies.' RDDA, Home File 62 Part B
1921, 'Question of Employment of Afridis in the Delhi 
Police.' Another group which was only slightly less 
fanatical were the Ahmadis who were violently opposed 
to both Christians and Hindus. An Ahmadi, Kasim Ali, 
was the editor of the A1 Haq in Delhi. For a general 
discussion of the Ahmadis see M. Mujeeb, Indian Muslims, 
pp. 543-4; J.N. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements 
in India (Delhi, 1967), pp. 137-48; and NAI, Home Poll 
46-47 Part A, November 1912, 'Position of Ahmadis in 
India.'
2
NAI, Home Poll 67 Part B, August 1911, 'History of 
the Shia-Sunni Controversy at Lucknow Subsequent to 7 
January 1909.'
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Sunnis and the deputy commissioner as the ex-officio
president, was founded in 1872 to run the School which
had been endowed by the Itmad-ud-Dowla Fund.1 They
represented the more eminent Sunnis and Shias who had
2large resources of wealth, status, or power. A large 
number of Shias attended the School and also attended 
the M.A.O. College at Aligarh.
The institution of education could also exacerbate 
sectarian tendencies. The attempt of the Shias in the 
United Provinces to form their own college in February 
1916 aroused the ire of many Sunnis who were afraid 
such a college would draw the Shias out of Aligarh and 
thus damage the movement to establish a Muslim
3university which began in December 1915* However, the
1
RDDA, Education File 3 Part A 1917» ’Origin of the 
Itimad-ud-Daula Fund.'
2
RDDA, Education File 160 Part B 1913» ’Report on the 
Anglo-Arabic School Delhi for the Year Ending 31 March 
19 1 3 ’; Education File 193 Part B 1913, 'Application for 
a Building Grant for the Anglo-Arabic High School Delhi'; 
Education File 26 Part B 1914, 'Accounts of the Itmad- 
ud-Doula Fund'; Education File l40 Part B 1914, 
'Constitution of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee Delhi'; 
Education File 76 Part B 1915, 'Constitution of the 
Anglo-Arabic School Committee Delhi'; and Education File 
84 Part B 1917, 'Constitution of the Anglo-Arabic School 
Committee Delhi.'
3
NAI, Home Poll 49 Deposit, March 1916, 'Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special 
Reference to the War, Received from all the Provinces 
for the First Fortnight of February 1916;'
l6l
fact that only 12 people joined the movement in Delhi 
proved that the flame of sectarianism burned low.
The institution which obviated sectarian tendencies
at the mass level was the Muslim 'festival cycle'. All
sects and factions participated in the nine Muslim
festivals that occurred during the year.1 The
participation of all Muslims in the festivals reflected,
and reinforced, the spirit of egalitarianism and
cohesiveness at all social levels. Here again, there
was some possibility of an institution providing a
source of enmity between sects since the Shias had two
festivals of their own: Moharram and Id-ul-Ghadir .
But more low class Sunnis than Shias participated in
the procession of tarzis since many of the more subtle
theological and sectarian differences were lost upon
them anyway. What could have been divisive in fact
tended to unite the Shias and Sunnis of Delhi. This was
2especially true during the Moharram of 1917»
The festival cycle of the Muslims like the festival 
cycle of the Hindus could act as a divisive force in 
Indian society. This resulted as much from other 
tensions as from enmity over the specific practices 
that were observed during such festivals as Holi and
1
The Muslim 'festival cycle' was as follows:
Moharram (Shia) Jamat-ul-Vida
Id-Milad-ul-Nabi Id-ul-Fitr
Mairaj-Alam Id-ul-Zuha (Bakr-I d )
Shab-i -Barat Id-ul-Ghadir ("ShiaJ
Shab-i-Qadar (Shia celebrate different day)
2
The incident that occurred at Moharram in 1917 is
discussed below in Chapter Five.
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Bakr-Id. But in times when tempers were cool, it was 
usual for low class Muslims to celebrate a Hindu tamasha 
such as Solono and Ganga Ashnan and low class Hindus to 
join in Moharram or the Urs Nizamuddin,1 The occurrence 
of secular festivals such as the Mahrauli Fair and the 
Proclamation Parade reinforced the spirit of gaiety 
which could witness Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Jains, and 
Christians participating in the Guru Granth Sahib or 
the Mahavir procession, And even though there was a 
tradition of Hindu-Muslim tension in Delhi, the lack of 
religious hostility among the lower classes was the most 
significant reason for the lack of communal violence in 
the half-century after the Mutiny (with the exception 
of 1886), It was this spirit which reasserted itself 
during the Rowlatt Satyagraha when a Hindu sanyasi was
1
The Urs Nizamuddin celebrated the famous Sufi pir 
[saint"] Shaikh Nizamuddin (d. 1325), who was buried in 
the village of Nizamuddin, south of Delhi. Sufism had 
a large following in Delhi. The two main leaders, Hasan 
Nizami, a pir in his own right who lived in Nizamuddin, 
and Sayid Irtiza Wahidi, who was the proprietor of the 
Dervesh Press in Kucha Chelan, founded the Halqa-i-Nizam- 
ul-Mashaikh. The organisation, which had a membership 
of 500 in 1918, was established in 1908 in order to unite 
the 14 different schools of Sufism in India. The 
organisation published a newspaper, the Nizam-ul-Mashaikh, 
which had a circulation of 1,000 in 1921. There were a 
fair number of pirs in Delhi who had a large number of 
murids [followers]. All the murids of the same pir were 
bound to aid and abet each other. There is some 
indication that the pirs who supported pan-Islamism 
influenced their murids to also lend support. This was 
especially true of Hasan Nizami, whose journal the Tauhid 
was prohibited in 1913. RDDA, Education File 1 (10")
Part B 1922, 'Application of one Khwaja Hasan Nizami to 
Found a Library in the Monastery of Nizamuddin Auliya 
at Humayun’s Tomb,’ W,M„ Hailey to C.A, Barron, 8 March
1922. For a short summary of the place of Sufism in the 
Muslim community see M. Mujeeb, Indian Muslims, p, 113 
and passim.
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The process of politicisation that Delhi underwent from 
1911 onwards heightened the religious consciousness of 
all the communities in Delhi. The heightened identity 
of each community that stemmed from the religious idiom 
of political agitation led to the five communal riots 
that occurred in Delhi in 1924, 1925, 1927? and 1928,2
invited to speak from the pulpit of* the Jama Masjid.
III
The Jain community in Delhi in 1911 numbered 
3,500. By 1921 the Jains had increased to 3,800 of 
which 75 per cent were traders and another 13 per cent 
were in the professions and government service. They
1
Discussed below in Chapter Six.
2
A communal riot occurred on Bakr-Id in July 
1924 in Pahari Dhiraj where most of the butchers lived. 
A riot also occurred the following day at the funerals 
for those who were killed. A communal riot occurred 
on Municipal election day in 1925; on the day that 
Shradhanand’s assassin was hanged in 1927; and at Bakr- 
Id in Jangpura in 1928.
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formed a stable and affluent élite in the city.1 They
had a high degree of cohesion since they all belonged
to the Aggarwal caste, and they generally attended the
same temple at the corner of Chandni Chauk and Lothian
Road. They also had the second highest rate of literacy
2in 1911, namely, 39 per cent.
A distinguished member of the Jain community in 
Delhi was Lala Sultan Singh. He was a very wealthy 
landlord with substantial interests in banking and
1
The population figures for the Jain Community in the
Delhi urban area by age is as follows:
I9II 1921
Age Total Males Females Age Total Ma le s Fe males
0-5 269 147 122 Under 1 112 62 50
5-10 279 143 136 1-4 315 148 167
10-15 358 216 142 5-9 4ll 209 202
15-20 356 197 159 10-14 353 235 118
20-40 1,346 782 564 15-19 358 197 I6I
4o-6o 735 422 313 20-29 833 467 366
60+ 188 101 87 30-39 547 316 231
40-49 455 274 181
50-59 292 176 123
60+ 179 104 75
3,531 2 ,008 1,523 3, 862 2,188 1,674
Census of India, 19 11, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921
XV, Pt . II. The community increased in number between
1901 and 1911 by eight per cent and by nine per cent
between 1911 and 1921, most of whom lived in Delhi
Municipality See Table 1-B, Chapter One.
2
The rate of literacy in the Jain Community increased 
to 44 per cent in 1921.
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industry. He was a director of the Delhi Biscuit 
Company, a director of the Delhi Cloth and General 
Mills, and the Managing Agent of the Delhi Flour Mills. 
As the head of the well-known banking family of Sheo 
Singh Rai Nihal Singh he was ’probably the richest man 
in Delhi'.1
In 1912 at the age of 35, he was a rai bahadur, a 
divisional durbari, and a nominated member of the Punjab 
Legislative Council. He had travelled extensively in 
Europe and was actively concerned with education in 
general and female education in particular. He was 
the honorary secretary of the Indraprastha Hindu Girls 
School, a member of the Managing Committee of Hindu 
College, and he became a member of the Provisional 
Executive Council of Delhi University in 1922. After 
he withdrew from the Punjab Legislative Council, when 
Delhi became a separate province, Sultan Singh turned 
to local affairs. He was elected to the Municipal 
Committee in 1912 and remained a member throughout the 
decade. He did not stand for election in 1922 but the 
Chief Commissioner reappointed him to the Committee,
He was an honorary magistrate (second class) and he 
became a provincial darbari in 1924.
The Rai Bahadur also became involved in nationalist 
politics. He was a personal acquaintance of Mahatma 
Gandhi and joined the Provincial Congress Committee and
1
Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, p. 77; 
’Evidence Taken before the Indian Industrial Commission, 
1916-1918,’ Volume I (Delhi, Bihar and Orissa), 
Parliamentary Papers, 1919, XVII [234],
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the Indian Association in 1917. He was a vice-president 
of the Reception Committee of the All-India National 
Congress which met for its annual session at Delhi in 
December 1918. He was also chairman of the Delhi 
Swadeshi Co-operative Stores which Gandhi opened on 
20 April 1918. The Rai Bahadur did not, however, support 
the Hindu-Muslim unity of many of his colleagues. Sultan 
Singh joined the Hindu Mahasabha when it was formed in 
1915 and subsequently became a member of its Executive 
Council. He was the chairman of a meeting of 200 Hindus 
who met on 21 March 1916 to protest against the 
construction of a new slaughter house for the Muslim 
butchers. He also joined the local Hindu Association 
at the height of Hindu-Muslim tension over the Ram Lila 
affair. He refused to join the Home Rule League, and 
somewhat surprisingly, he was not an active member of 
any of the Jain organisations in the city.
The Jains of Delhi did participate in various 
activities in the city. Since they were involved 
primarily in trade and the professions, they took an 
active role in the various organisations and panchayats
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that controlled them. There were important and 
influential Jains in the Punjab Chamber of Commerce, 
the Delhi Piece Goods Association, the Hindustani 
Mercantile Association, the Indian Bankers Association, 
the Delhi Bar Association, and the panchayats that 
controlled the commodities of grain, sugar, and ghee.
The Jain community in Delhi also had their own
2communal organisations, The community supported two
1
The following table shows the number of Jains in the 
more important categories of trade:
Sweetmeats, sugar, gur 673
Vegetable oils, salt, condiments 447
Jewellery, clocks, optical 297
Bank, insurance, money lenders 264
Textiles 216
Ready-made clothes, hats, shoes 156
Chemical products 151
Publishers, booksellers, stationers 108
Grains, pulses 100
Total: 2 ,412
[N.B. The two categories underlined were articles of 
trade in which Jains were the single largest group. The 
two categories with minuses were articles of trade in 
which the number of people concerned declined between 
1911 and 1921. All figures are for workers and dependents.] 
Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
2
The only example of communal conflict in the previous 
decade which concerned the Jain community occurred in 
1901, The Arya Samajists had conducted a widow 
marriage and Master Amir Chand then led the procession 
down a Jain street. They all sang the song, 'Hae roti 
hai bidwah bechari,' which caused enough ill-feeling that 
the Deputy Commissioner warned both sects. RDDA, 
Confidential File 70 (1915).
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primary schools and also supported any indigent widows 
and orphans. The major event of the year was the 
Mahavir procession which the Sri Jain Dharm Pancharni 
Sabha organised. Some members of the community became 
involved in the general political enthusiasm which 
accompanied the Home Rule League movement. The Hindu 
Model Library Committee and the Jain Seva Samiti were 
direct products of this.1
The Jains had large resources of wealth, status, 
and power, and a high degree of consistency of caste, 
sect, and occupation. Their wealth came from trade, 
commerce, and the professions. Their status derived 
from their highly sanskritised religious ethics and 
practices, and from the fact that they had representatives 
who were darbaris and title-holders. They derived power 
from the fact that they had an important voice in the 
economic organisations of which they were a part, and 
from the fact that they were represented on the Municipal 
Committee and as honorary magistrates.
IV
The community of indigenous Christians in Delhi was
very small in 1911. It represented one per cent of the
2total population and numbered about 2,500. A large 
number of the indigenous Christians had been converted 
from the depressed classes, while a few came from higher
1
RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918).
2
Census of India, 1911» XIV, Pt . II. See Table 1-B, 
Chapter One.
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socio-economic groups. The community depended upon the 
foreign missionaries for leadership, monetary assistance, 
social service programmes, and educational facilities,
It was the practice for Christians to live in segregated 
communities because their parent communities had nothing 
to do with them and because the missionaries found it 
easier to keep converts from backsliding if they lived 
in the proximity of other Christians; a fact which 
alleviated some of the problems of ostracism. It also 
allowed the community to work upon the moral values of 
the new convert. The indigenous Christians did not all 
live in one suburb but occupied small enclaves throughout 
the city.
An Indian from the depressed classes normally 
raised his status when he became a Christian, at least 
in his own eyes and the eyes of his fellow Christians.
He received a certain amount of attention from the 
missionaries and from the more established Christians.
He could eat and worship without distinction and he 
could mix socially with other Christians. He was also 
in a favourable position to ensure the education of his 
children and gain assistance in time of sickness.
The life of a convert, however, was most trying.
Many of his old taboos were no longer taboos and a new 
set of values had to be followed. Denominational 
differences were a source of considerable confusion. It 
was difficult for the new convert to understand why 
Roman Catholics did not associate with Methodists, and 
why Baptists had little to do with Lutherans. The new 
convert usually retained his former occupation and was 
just as despised by Hindus and Muslims as previously,
170
if not more so, for deserting his religion® He found 
that a few wealthy middle-class Indians exploited' the 
church to reinforce their social status and that bitter 
factionalism existed within the same denomination. He 
also found that there was a definite hierarchy of status 
within the Indian Christian Community based upon the 
longevity of conversion, A person whose father had 
been a Christian considered himself superior to a 
recent convert. He also found that indigenous 
Christians tended to marry within the same caste and 
inter-caste marriages, although not formally prohibited, 
were rare in practice.
The indigenous Christian Community in Delhi in 1921 
numbered 8,500.^ The largest number of these were 
sweepers and scavengers; artisans who made shoes, boots
1
The figures for the various sects were not given in 
1911. In 1921 they were as follows for Delhi:
Total Christians (Indian) 8,533 
2,927 
2 ,256
1,170
1 , 1 6 8  
1,012
Methodist 
Anglican 
Roman Catholic 
Baptist 
Other sects
(Lutheran, Presbyterian, 
Salvationist, American Church 
of God Mission, Brethren in 
Christ Mission, Church of Christ 
Mission, Church of India, 
Mennonite Mission, Seventh Day 
Advent, and Unspecified.)
Census of India, 1921, XV, P t . II.
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and sandals; charcoal burners; field labourers; and 
other artisans/ An Indian Christian Association 
sprang up, with a European president. Even with these 
numbers the Indian Christians remained a small, 
insular group. They were not unlike other minority 
groups whose primary concern was for their own social, 
financial and moral welfare and whose only concern 
with the city was for habitation and vocation. The 
Indian Christians differed with other minority groups 
in that they depended upon foreign leadership and 
monetary assistance which made them significantly 
different. The foreign leaders were concerned with 
the welfare of their flock (and all factors that 
contributed thereto), a goal which did not encompass
1
The major occupations of Christians in Delhi in 1921 
were as follows. Unfortunately it is impossible to 
ascertain how many Indian Christians there were in the 
professions, public service, etc.
Sweepers, scavengers, etc. 2,429
Shoe, boot, and sandal makers 1,776
Domestic servants 96l
Trade in fuel 201
Midwives, compounders, vaccinators 246 
(Professors and teachers of all kinds) (228)
Field Labourers 552
Ordinary cultivators 244
Other artisans and labourers 604
(Medical Practitioners) (l37)
The professions in parenthesis must have been more 
Indian Christian than European Christian. All figures 
are for workers and dependents. The remaining Indian 
Christians (Approximately 1,500 depending on how many 
are in the parenthetical occupations) were scattered 
through the government service and other professions. 
Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
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political activity as a means or an end except in the 
negative sense that 'loyalty* to the British government 
was more profitable than loyalty to nationalism,1
V
The Europeans in Delhi numbered 6ll in 1911. Of
these, 569 were from the United Kingdom, and the other
42 came from Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany,
Holland, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Switzerland, the
2United States, and Australasia, All the Europeans 
participated in one of three types of activities: 
commercial, governmental, and missionary. The ten 
females from the United States were missionaries as 
were the three people from Australasia. The other 29 
Europeans were involved in commercial activity.
The Europeans from the United Kingdom participated 
in government service, in commercial activity, and in 
missionary projects in that order. Of those in 
government service, the Europeans in the Army numbered
I
James Alter and Herbert Jai Singh, The Church in 
Delhi (Nagpur, 1964).
Total Male Female
Born in Europe 1911 611 480 131
Born in Europe 1921 2 , 8 9 9 2,469 430
Europeans 1921 4,370 3,452 918
Born in the
United Kingdom 1911 569 447 1221 1 1921 2,829 2,423 4o6
The number of Eurasions in Delhi, not included in the 
above figures, were 236 in 1911 and 417 in 1921. 
Census of India, 1911» XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 
1921, XV, Pt, II.
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the highest before the Europeans in the Government of 
India outnumbered them. There was no cohesive 
organisation outside the administrative system and the 
hierarchy of status was intricate and complicated.1 
During the months of summer the chief commissioner was 
the most important European in Delhi. In the winter 
the viceroy and the members of his Executive Council 
were more important with the infinite gradings of 
status between the personal secretary to the viceroy, 
the secretaries of the departments, the members of the 
Army and so forth extruding an almost prohibitive 
rigidity of social intercourse. The European president 
of the Punjab Chamber of Commerce was obviously more 
important than an assistant secretary in the Home 
Department. But the sessions judge was more important 
than the head of the Cambridge Brotherhood. This 
tangled web of rank and status manifested itself in a 
very complex and very formal code of behaviour.
Those Europeans from the United Kingdom who were 
involved in commercial activity managed banks, 
factories, and business concerns. The majority of 
their business establishments were north of the railway 
lines in Ward I, though the European banks and cloth 
shops were located in Chandni Chauk. They
1
A shorthand clerk in the chief commissioner's office, 
W. Bailey, received R s . 100 per month. The Personal 
Assistant to the Chief Commissioner received R s . 1,500 
and the Chief Commissioner received R s . 3>000 per month. 
RDD A , Home File 211 Part B 1913, 'Transfer of Bishen 
Das to the Finance Department and Appointment of Mr W. 
Bailey as Shorthand Writer in the Chief Commissioner's 
Office Delhi.'
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institutionalised their commercial activity through 
the Punjab Chamber of Commerce which always had a 
European president and secretary, and through the 
Delhi Piece Goods Association which involved those 
concerned with imported cloth. Both organisations 
had the same European as secretary and though the 
latter association had more Indian members than 
Europeans, the Europeans were powerful enough to 
effectively control its policies. The Punjab Chamber 
of Commerce nominated one member for the Punjab 
Legislative Council and it also had the right to 
elect one of its members to the Delhi Municipal 
Committee. When the Municipal Committee was 
reconstituted in 1922, this right was expanded to one 
European and one Indian member. The Delhi Piece Goods 
Association was also allowed one representative on the 
Committee in 1922; he was also a European.
The missionaries from the United Kingdom in Delhi 
were mainly connected with the Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel and the Cambridge Brotherhood. 
They concentrated on education and on social service.
The Cambridge Brotherhood ran the St Stephens Mission 
which included primary and secondary schools and St 
Stephens College, the most distinguished educational 
institutions in the city. The S.P.G. also ran primary 
schools for depressed classes. When the war began the 
St John's Ambulance Corps became very active.
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The Europeans lived primarily in the Civil Lines 
in sizeable houses in well-kept grounds.1 They 
focussed their social life on Ludlow Castle, There was 
a European Association to look after their interests 
and a Station School to educate their children. There 
was also a newspaper, the Morning Post whose Eurasian 
editor was 'liberal' in outlook, 'loyal' in politics, 
and 'responsible1 in criticism.
VI
The Sikh community in Delhi was smaller than the 
Jain community and the indigenous Christian community 
in 1911. It had increased from 229 members in 1901 to 
1,939 members in 1911* But this increase was mainly 
the result of large influx of male workers who worked
1
Sidney Low described the Civil Lines as follows: 
'Beyond the city on that side are leafy glades and 
avenues, with white bungalows and spreading suburban 
parks.' Sidney Low, A Vision of India (London, 191l), 
p. 168. The average European compound was set on a 
2|- acre plot which was valued at more than R s . 2,000 
per acre in 1911. There were normally three Europeans, 
20 Indians, a couple of horses and a carriage or a 
motor car in each compound. RDDA, Education File 265 
Part B 1915, 'Annual Report on the Working of the 
Municipal Committee Delhi’; Home File 9 Part B 1916, 
'Judgment in the Case of Ram Chand versus the Secretary 
of State.'
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on the Imperial Darbar . 1 These Sikhs remained in Delhi, 
but moved out of the municipality to work on the new 
imperial city. The Sikh community increased by 135 men 
and by 595 women between 1911 and 1921. The Sikh 
community had the highest rate of literacy of any 
community in Delhi City. There were 1,087 Sikhs literate 
in 1911 (56 per cent) and 1,256 in 1921 (47 per cent).
The decline in the rate was probably due to the 
immigration of illiterate females.
The Sikhs worked as contractors and skilled 
labourers in the construction industry. They were 
quite noticeable in transport and were especially 
noticeable in the Army. They served as municipal public 
servants and were sprinkled throughout the professions.
1
The population figures for the Sikh community in the 
Delhi urban area by age is as follows:
1911 1921
Age Total Males Females Age Total Males Female s
0-5 48 31 17 Under 1 67 34 33
5-10 38 29 9 1-4 170 83 85
10-15 36 21 15 5-9 226 129 102
15-20 177 162 15 10-14 194 127 67
20-40 1,457 1,367 90 15-19 256 180 76
40-60 163 136 27 20-29 869 666 203
60 + 20 18 2 30-39 486 385 101
40-49 235 177 58
50-59 100 75 25
60+ 66 46 20
1,939 1,764 175 2,669 1,899 776
Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India,
1921, XV, Pt . II. More Sikhs lived in Delhi City. 
See Table 1-B, Chapter One.
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Equal numbers were garden farmers and traders and yet 
others worked for the iron and electric industries.
By and large their economic condition was quite 
satisfactory.1
The institutional life of the community centred 
upon the gurdwara [temple]. The main Sikh temple in 
Delhi was the Sisgunj Gurdwara in Chandni Chauk, which 
commemorated the spot where Guru Tej Bahadur, the ninth 
Guru, was decapitated by Aurangzeb in 1675» The 
Rakabgunj Gurdwara, which was located in the village of 
Raisina south of the city, commemorated the spot at 
which the body of the martyr was cremated. The Sisgunj 
Gurdwara adequately served the Sikhs of Delhi in 1901.
It became quite burdened in the succeeding 20 years and 
sought to expand. Its numerous appeals for land from 
the civil authorities had to be denied as it was tightly 
hemmed in by the main Kotwal [ police station] in the 
city.
The gurdwara served the panth as a whole. Within 
the panth there were various factions and divisions.
The most important of these in 1911 were the Sri Guru 
Singh Sabha which was affiliated with the Chief Khalsa 
Diwan in Amritsar; the Delhi Khalsa Sangat which was 
also affiliated with the Chief Khalsa Dewan, and the 
Delhi Sikh Panchayat. Rai Bahadur Boota Singh, C.I.E., 
was president of the Panchayat. Rai Bahadur Narain 
Singh was president and Sardar Subha Singh was treasurer 
of the Khalsa Sangat, and Hari Singh was the secretary
1
For the occupation pursued by Sikhs see Tables 2<-B 
and 3-A through 3-E, Chapter One.
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of the Singh Sabha. The Khalsa Sangat was the most 
important of the factions. It had 150 members and 
centred on the Sisgunj Gurdwara.
Sardar Subha Singh was an eminent and fitting 
representative of the Sikh community in Delhi. He 
was born in 1889 and at the age of 26 was an aspiring 
contractor who had moved to the city. He received an 
appointment to the Municipal Committee in 1915 as the 
representative of the Sikh Community and he accepted 
reappointment at three-year intervals for the following 
decade. He became a trustee of the Ramjas College when 
it was founded in 1917 and was appointed honorary 
magistrate (second class) in 1922. Even though his 
primary concern was with his business as a contractor 
he soon branched out into other interests. He led the 
syndicate that bought the Jumna Cotton Mill and made 
it into the Khalsa Mills. As deputy chairman of this 
enterprise Sardar Subha Singh became a member of the 
Punjab Chamber of Commerce.
A major agitation affected the Sikh Community in 
the Punjab in the last half of 1913 and the first half 
of 1914. The complete lack of response among the Sikhs 
of Delhi reflected more than any other incident the 
passive attitude of the community towards politics.
The agitation centred around the demolition of the wall 
that surrounded the Rakabgunj Gurdwara at Raisina. The 
Gurdwara, which had been built in the late nineteenth 
century, was located quite close to the Secretariat of 
the new imperial capital. The engineers decided to 
remove the unsightly wall that surrounded the 
irregularly shaped grounds and to allow the Gurdwara to
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stand. Harchand Singh, a schoolmaster in the Punjab 
district of Lyallpur, immediately raised a wave of 
protest. He took the view that the location of the 
Gurdwara was sacred (although there was no historical 
reference to prove the exact spot) and that the wall 
was part of a gurdwara and hence sacred and inviolable. 
Most people accused him of stirring an agitation on 
the lines of the Cawnpore mosque affair.1 The little 
support that he enjoyed came from his own and a few 
surrounding districts, and mostly from Singh Sabhas
2that were not affiliated with the Chief Khalsa Dewan. 
The vehement stance adopted by the militants forced the 
Chief Khalsa Dewan in Amritsar to adopt a moderate 
attitude. They became the spokesmen for the Panth and 
Sadar Daljit Singh, additional member of the Imperial 
Legislative Council (from Kapurthala), acted as the 
mediator between them and the Chief Commissioner. On 
26 January 1914 Partab Singh, Granthi of the Chief 
Khalsa Dewan, delivered katha in the Sisgunj Gurdwara 
and asked them not to agitate because the government 
was kindly disposed and a satisfactory settlement was 
expected. Hailey had faced a similar situation on 
three occasions in 1913 and he handled this situation 
as well.
1
RDDA, Home File 81 Part B 1914, ’Papers Regarding 
Gurdwara-Rakabganj.' The Cawnpore mosque affair is 
discussed below in Chapter Four.
2
For a discussion of the militancy of the Singh 
Sabhas see Kenneth W. Jones, 1Communalism in the 
Punjab: The Arya Samaj Contribution,’ Journal of 
Asian Studies, XXVIII (November 1968), 39-5^•
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The significance of the whole episode is that the 
Delhi Sikhs did not agitate. They accepted the Chief 
Khalsa Dewan as the spokesman for the Panth and did 
very little to interfere during the agitation. On 9 
December 1913, 106 Sikhs signed a letter to Hailey 
stating that they would not arouse public concern and 
would consider the decision between government and the 
Chief Khalsa Dewan as final. And on 7 June 19 ik  a 
public meeting of the Singh Sabha of Delhi made no mention 
of the incident while it was passing a resolution 
protesting against the treatment of Sikhs in the ship 
Koma Gata Maru which had been detained off the coast of
Canada. They even went so far as to protest strongly 
against a meeting held at Lahore on 30 March 1914 which 
was the zenith of Harchand Singh’s agitation on the 
anniversary celebration of the fifth Guru.
The only point at which Delhi Sikhs showed any 
discomfiture was over the agreement reached. The 
government condescended to allow a 'Khalsa Gurdwaras 
Committee' to be formed to look after the improvement 
of gurdwaras in Delhi, The committee was to have seven 
members, four of which were to be elected by the Delhi 
Khalsa Sangat. The other three were to come from the 
Panth outside Delhi. The local Singh Sabha voiced its 
disapproval at being left out of the committee but 
never resorted to direct action.
It is possible to conclude from this incident that 
the leading Sikhs in Delhi were either conservative or 
moderate and had enough influence over the rest of the 
community to encourage their abstinence from extremist 
politics. The leaders maintained their control over
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the community when in the following year a militant
Sikh editor in Delhi sought to revive the agitation
over the Gurdwara.1 The moderate Sikhs also
responded to the activities of the more militant Sikhs
during the Home Rule League movement, The extremist
Sikhs founded the Khalsa Percharak Jatha in 1917» The
Sikhs who were government servants responded and
founded the Sikh Servants' Club. The process was
repeated in November 1920 when the extremists founded
the Sikh Provincial League and the Sikh Volunteer Corps,
and the moderates replied two days later with the Sikh
Young Men's Association and the Sikh Seva Samiti, the
latter two of which were larger and received the support
2of the majority of the community. The crucial test of 
the control of the moderates and conservative over the
1
Sardul Singh Cavasieur founded the Sikh Review in 
Delhi in 1914. He took a very antagonistic line toward 
the Christians and the Arya Samajists. In the course 
of this campaign he used the demolition of the wall 
around the Gurdwara as an example of the anti-Sikh 
attitude of the Christians and he campaigned for the 
restoration of the wall. The security for his press 
and newspaper was eventually raised to the maximum of 
R s . 2,000 in July 1915, after which the campaign 
subsided. RDDA, Home File 317 Part B 1916, 'Orders as 
to the Action Taken under the Indian Press Act against 
Newspapers and Presses in Delhi Province.'
2
RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918). N A I , Home Poll 
67 Deposit, April 1921, 'Activities of the Volunteer 
Associations in Delhi.'
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community came in March 1921 over the Nankana Sahib
affair.1 The extremists in Delhi, led by Gurbakhsh
Singh, again found it impossible to organise any Sikhs
2for a jatha to the Guru-ka-Bagh in September 1922.
1
NAI, Home Poll 282-315 Part A, May 1921, 'Fight at 
Nankana Sahib in Sheikhpura District between Mahant's 
Party and Sikh Reformers Resulting in Loss of Life.'
2
NAI, Home Poll 1922/18 (September), 'Reports on the 
Internal Political Situation in India During the Month 
of September 1922,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell,
15 September 1922.
PART TWO
NATIONALISM AND PAROCHIALISM 
Politics in the New Imperial Capital of India
’The superstitious... regard the transfer of the capital 
as of evil omen to the stability of British rule, as 
Delhi has proved to be the grave of many dynasties.1
Dire ctor 
Criminal Intelligence 
18 January 1912
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The style of politics in Delhi before it became the 
imperial capital of India was ’provincial’ and ’parochial'. 
The political style was provincial at least to some 
extent because only a small élite participated. This 
small élite was divided into those who supported some 
form of nationalism and a larger number of those who 
supported the government. Both groups in this élite 
focussed their attention on Lahore and thus effectively 
narrowed their geographic perspective.
The revolutionary nationalists sought to break the 
provincialism of the inhabitants of Delhi and to broaden 
their intellectual horizons. They found little support 
for their ideas and none for their methods. An attempt 
to assassinate the Viceroy, in fact, had the opposite 
effect and caused a revulsion against political violence. 
The arrest and trial, imprisonment and execution of a 
few Delhi residents in the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy case 
and the conspiracy case at Benares engendered some 
sympathy but occasioned no response.
The pan-Islamists also sought to break the 
provincial outlook of the residents of Delhi. The 
involvement of Muslims in the activities of the Ali 
brothers and of Dr M.A. Ansari, widened the horizons 
of a significant number of their followers. In their 
campaign to radicalise the political values of Muslims 
in the city - and north India generally - they used 
the press, organisations such as the An.j uman-i-Khuddam- 
i-Kaaba, institutions such as the mosque, and incidents 
such as the Cawnpore mosque affair. They had 
politicised enough Muslims by May 1915 that 7,000
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members of the community gathered to show their support 
for the Ali brothers when they were interned and the 
entire community participated in a half-day hartal.
Neither attack on provincialism achieved any 
significant diminution in the degree of parochialism in 
the city. The revolutionary nationalists did not intend 
to be entirely Hindu in character, but the religious 
overtones of Bengali nationalism which inspired the 
movement, and the fact that no Muslims joined the 
movement, gave the agitation an entirely Hindu character. 
The pan-Islamists were not specifically interested in 
the diminution of parochialism because, in fact, their 
appeal was founded upon religious values.
I
His Honour the Lieutenant Governor is well 
aware of the tension and ill-feeling that 
exists at present between certain classes of 
the community in Delhi. Without in any way 
adopting a too pessimistic view of the case,
I agree with the Deputy Commissioner that it 
is quite possible that a disturbance may break 
out which in view of the turbulent and lawless 
character of a portion of the population of 
the city, the local police would be unable to 
check.
Commis sioner 
Delhi Division
11 July 1910
The inhabitants of Delhi witnessed a mass meeting 
of Muslims at the Idgah on 3 July 1910. The 10,000 
Muslims who represented every shade of religious and 
political opinion, and economic condition, reacted to
/
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an attack upon their religion by the Arya Samaj, and 
met to endorse a petition to the Deputy Commissioner. 
This meeting, which knew no parallel in the rest of 
Punjab, was the first vague stirring of a parochial 
political consciousness within that community.
The meeting of July 1910 stemmed directly from
the collapse of the nationalist movement in Delhi
which began in 1905• The Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i-Sanat-o-
Hirfat was formed in 1905 as a branch of the Punjab
Swadeshi Association. Its object was to promote the
manufacture and sale of Indian goods.1 Its leaders
were Shankar Nath, a pleader, Amir Chand, an ex-
Headmaster of St Stephen's High School, Rup Ram, a
pleader, Lala Chandu Lai, a chawalwala, Ram Chand
2Peshwaria, Manzur Ali, and Saiyid Haider Raza. There 
were several other members of St Stephen's connected 
with the Sanat-o-Hirfat, more than likely as a result
1
For a very good summary of politics in the Punjab see 
Norman G. Barrier, 'The Arya Samaj and Congress 
Politics in the Punjab, 1894-1908,' Journal of Asian 
Studies, XXVI (May 1967), 365-79.
2
RDDA, Confidential File 1 (1907), 'Agitation at Delhi'; 
Confidential File 2 (1 9 0 7), 'The Anjuman-i-Sanat-o- 
Hirfat, Delhi'; Confidential File 3 (1909), 'Agitation 
at Delhi'; Confidential File 4 (1909), 'The Anjuman-i- 
Sanat-o-Hirfat, Delhi'; Confidential File 5 (l910),
'Amir Chand Master St Stephen's College, Delhi,
Agitator.'
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of the influence of C.F. Andrews who taught at the 
College from l^ O k to 1907.*
Shankar Nath, who was the leader of Extremist 
politics in Delhi, died in 1906, after which a struggle 
developed for the leadership of the movement. Amir 
Chand, who was later to be executed for his part in the 
Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case, led a group of Arya 
Samajists who slowly took control of politics in the 
city. Since the attendance at any type of political 
meeting was very limited, he and his followers 
concentrated on an intense propaganda effort. They 
used the Imperial Book Depot, of which Amir Chand was 
the proprietor, as an outlet for swadeshi and boycott 
tracts. They used the Imperial Book Depot Press to 
publish the tracts and a number of devoted volunteers 
to distribute them. Amir Chand also established a 
library for 'dissident' nationalists to meet and study.
The rival of Amir Chand for the leadership of 
Extremist politics in Delhi was Haidar Raza. He had a 
very small personal following and depended upon the 
virulence of his journalistic endeavours in the Aftab 
of which he was the editor. A fine of R s . 200 early in
1
Benarsidas Chaturvedi and Marjorie Sykes, Charles 
Freer Andrews: A Narrative (London, 19^9); RDDA, 
Confidential File 12 (1913), 'Police Surveillance of 
L. Raghbir Dyal, Professor of the St Stephen's College, 
Delhi'; Confidential File 38 (l9l4), 'Delhi Conspiracy 
Case, Question of the Grant of St Stephen's College, 
Delhi.'
2
NAI, Home Poll 110-117 Part B, October 1909» 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for 
the week ending 25 September 1909.
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1908 for a series of nationalist articles which appealed
for the overthrow of the government effectively curtailed
his efforts as a propagandist.1 His activities were
then confined to public meetings and political
organisations. He finally abandoned the role of
political agitator and departed for England in January
21909 in the company of Asaf Ali.
The year 1908 saw the formation of two organisations 
as subsidiaries to the Sanat-o-Hirfat. The organisation 
of less significance was the Bal Sabha which functioned 
as an organisation for youths who were interested in 
nationalist politics. Its leaders were Lachmi Narain, 
a Brahman who was convicted in the Benares Conspiracy 
Case in 1915, Sant Lai, and Bishan Sarup, a Bania by 
caste who acted as a minor leader during the Home Rule 
League agitation and the Rowlatt Satyagraha. The more 
significant organisation, which was founded on 9 August 
1908, was the District Association.
There was no difference in the leadership and 
membership between the Sanat-o-Hirfat and the District 
Association. Both organisations had a large number of 
Extremists who were members of the liberal professions 
(a number of whom had been educated in England), members
1
NAI, Home Poll 32-34 Part A, October 1908, ’Proposed 
Prosecution of the Aftab Newspaper, Per under the 
Newspapers (incitements to Offences), Act, 1908.’
2
NAI, Home Poll 2-11 Part B, February 1909, 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,’ 
weekly report on the state of political agitations in 
the Punjab for the week ending 4 January 1909.
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of the clerical profession who had received some type 
of western-oriented education or training, a number of 
Bengalis who had migrated to the city for business 
purposes or government service, the sons of wealthy 
merchants who had received some type of western-oriented 
education, Arya Samajists who had received an education 
at the D.A.V. College in Lahore, students at St Stephen’s 
and Hindu colleges and a number of representatives of 
the 'New Muslim Party' who also had received a western- 
type education.1 As a group the Extremists shared 
several characteristics in common. They had limited 
resources of wealth, status, and power and they were 
never the most eminent or successful men in their 
various professions. They all came from castes and 
families that had a high degree of social status, but 
they themselves suffered from a lack of prestige and 
influence. It is probable that many, though 
ideologically quite sincere, participated in nationalist 
politics in an attempt to gain recognition for talents 
and abilities that attracted little reward from 
traditional society with which they were irrevocably 
bound by ties of marriage and kinship. And finally, 
the Extremists of Delhi all spoke English. This is not 
to say that the medium of propaganda was English. Even 
though the speeches at meetings were invariably English 
the newspapers and pamphlets were predominantly in 
vernacular. The familiarity with English that the 
Extremists shared reflected instead their élite position
1
This summary is based upon those people who were 
specifically mentioned in all the preceding notes to 
this Chapter.
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in the society and provided a source of cohesion among 
members who came from various castes and communities. 
Among the more articulate it also provided the means 
through which western political ideas permeated the 
movement.
The formal membership of the three organisations
was limited, but the organisations were able to
attract audiences of between 300 and 400. The Sanat-
o-Hirfat held a meeting in May 1907 to protest against
the deportation of Lajpat Rai.1 The 300 to 400 who
attended were approximately the same audience which
attended the annual meeting of the organisation in
2December 1907. A 1swadeshi1 meeting on 5 July 1908 
attracted only 100, most of whom were students with 30 
or 40 Muslims, while a much larger audience of 700 to 
1,500 gathered on 26 July 1908 to protest the conviction 
of B.G. Tilak. Undoubtedly the meeting of 26 July had 
a larger proportion of traditionally minded followers 
of the Hindu nationalist leader than the previous 
meetings of the smaller westernised élite. The more
1
There was a note of parochialism at the meeting as a 
large number of Muslim boys stood at the door and 
attempted to persuade Muslims not to attend the meeting 
because Lajpat Rai was an Arya Samajist and such a 
meeting was against the interests of the Muslims.
These Muslim boys were under the direction of the 
Anjuman-i-Hidayat-ul-Islam and came from several of 
the local madrassahs. RDDA, Confidential File 3 (1907).
2
RDDA, Confidential File 1 (1907). Of the 300 to 400 
who attended the meeting, approximately 50 to 75 were 
Muslims. Confidential File 2 (19 0 7).
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traditionally minded dropped out very quickly though. 
The first public meetings of the District Association 
one month later, on l4 August 1908, attracted the usual 
audience of 400 of whom 70 were Muslim.1
Other groups attempted to attract followers, but 
met with very little success. The Citizens' Union, 
which was founded in 1902 to protest against newly 
imposed house and land taxes, held a meeting on 12 July 
1908 to protest against a proposed law on the 
registration of partnerships. Jagdish Rai, jeweller, 
Rup Ram, pleader, Jagan Nath, and Chandu Lai spoke to 
an audience of 80 people. They attempted to give their 
protest a political flavour by coupling this local
grievance to the general destruction of Indian trade by
2the British. In the same week the Muslim Panjabian 
community held a meeting to protest against a proposed 
Municipal tax on European goods, but only 30 persons 
attended. And finally a meeting to mourn the execution
1
NAI, Home Poll 1-8 Part B, August 1908. 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for 
the week ending 20 July 1908; Home Poll 49-58 Part B, 
September 1908, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of 
Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 15 August 
1908.
2
NAI, Home Poll 1-8 Part B, August 1908, for the week 
ending 27 July 1908. Of the 80 persons who attended,
30 were Muslim, most likely from the Panjabian community.
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of Khudi Ram Bose was held early in August 1908; it 
was confined to a small portion of the Bengali 
• + 1 community.
The parochial influences that were noticeable in 
the Punjab from the middle of 1908 onwards also 
manifested themselves in Delhi. The meeting to protest 
against the conviction of Tilak on 26 July 1908 was 
some indication that political styles drawing upon 
religious sentiment could provide an issue which was 
more likely to draw people to meetings. By April 1909 
Lala Moti Sagar and Wazir Singh, both of whom were 
pleaders, were able to convene a meeting of 500 Hindus 
to protest against the principle of separate electorates. 
(Following the annual session of the Indian National 
Congress at Lahore in December 1909, this group of 
Extremists who were primarily sanatani organised a 
local branch of the Hindu Sabha.) On 6 April the Hindu 
Shuddhi Sabha which was composed of Arya Samaj 
Extremists convened a meeting of 200 at which Ram Chand 
Peshwaria, editor of the Akash, and Pandit Bal Kishan,
1
NAI, Home Poll 49-58 Part B, September 1908, for the 
week ending 17 August 1908. The Bengalis also observed 
the day as a day of fasting. There were approximately
1,000 Bengalis in the city in 1911. Census of India, 
1911» XIV (Punjab), Part II (Tables). Khudi Ram Bose 
was a Bengali who had thrown a bomb into the carriage 
of Mrs and Miss Kennedy at Muzaffurpur on 30 April 1908, 
killing them both.
2
NAI, Home Poll 108-114 Part B, June 1909, 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,’ for 
the week ending 10 April 1909.
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Kashmiri, gave speeches on the drain of wealth from the 
country.1 A local branch of the Moslem League sprang 
up under the direction of Hakim Ajmal Khan and Shaikh 
Ataullah who was a pleader. The Muslims of Delhi then 
played host to the annual sessions of the Moslem League 
in both 1909 and 1910.
While politics became more parochial in Delhi from
mid 1908 onwards, with the split of the Hindu Extremists
into the Hindu Sabha and the Hindu Shuddi Sabha, and
with the Moderates in control of the District Association,
communal tension also became increasingly exacerbated.
The sanatanis founded two organisations, the Bengalis
one, the Arya Samajists two, and the Ahmadia Muslims 
2one. The Arya Samaj and the Anjuman-i-Hidayat-ul- 
Is lam confronted each other on every possible occasion 
and individual street preachers of all the sects
3attacked one another freely. Communal tension was
1
Ibid.
2
RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915), 'List of Societies 
and Anjumans in Delhi.' In 1910 the number of sectarian 
organisations increased by 11.
3
NAI, Home Poll 100-107 Part B, June 1909, 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for 
the week ending 22 February 1909; Home Poll 115-124 
Part B, June 1909, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of 
Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 8 May 1909; 
Home Poll 47-5*+ Part B, September 1909, 'Weekly Reports 
of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the 
weeks ending 7 August 1909 and 28 August 1909; Home 
Poll 4 Deposit, April 1912, 'Note on the Arya Samaj'; 
and see also note 1, page 29 of Chapter Three.
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further increased in 1910 by Patiala Case against some
Arya Samajists in February;1 The Hindu boycott of
2Muslim traders in the Punjab in March; the Peshwar 
riots between Hindus and Muslims in April; and the 
declaration of Rohtak District under the Seditious
3Meetings Act in June. Communal feeling was so intense 
in Delhi that a crowd of Muslims attacked a Hindu who 
was arguing over the price of shoes with a Muslim 
shopkeeper.^
1
This case concerned the State of Patiala versus B.
Jwala Prasada and others. It raised a great deal of 
bitterness because it was looked upon by everyone as an 
open attack of the State upon the Arya Samaj. This was 
welcomed by the Samaj's detractors and resented by its 
supporters. NAI, Home Poll 69-70 Part B, April 1910, 
'Resolutions Passed by the Arya Pratinidi Sabha, Meerut, 
Disclaiming any Connection of the Arya Samaj with the 
Seditious Movement.'
2
NAI, Home Poll 666-68 Part B, August 1910, 'Alleged 
Increasing Racial Bitterness in the Punjab Caused by 
the Hindu Boycott of Muhammadan Traders.'
3
NAI, Home Poll 114-121 Part A, July 1910, 'Declaration 
of the Rohtak District to Be a Proclaimed Area under the 
Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1907’; Home Poll 
10-17 Part B, August 1910, 'Weekly Reports of the 
Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the weeks ending
11 June 1910 and 25 June 1910; Home Poll 18-25 Part B, 
August 1910, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal 
Intelligence,' for the week ending 26 July 1910; and 
Home Poll 118 Part B, August 1910, 'Parliamentary Questions 
and Answers Regarding the Proclamation of the Rohtak 
District, Punjab, Under the S.M. Act.'
4
NAI, Home Poll 34-36 Part B, March 1911, 'Tension and 
Ill-Feeling between the Hindus and Muhammadans at Delhi.' 
The main impetus behind the attack was the fact that a 
Hindu had opened a shoe shop. This brought cries from 
the Muslims, who had traditionally been the shoe merchants 
in Delhi, that the Hindus were trying to drive the 
Muslims out of business.
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The final blow came with the publication of Afshai 
Raz which attacked the Prophet. Meetings were held in 
Delhi during the week which began on 26 June 1910 with 
Maulvi Kasim Ali (an Ahmadi) and Ahmad Masih (a blind 
native Christian preacher from the Cambridge Mission 
who although a Christian convert still agitated for the 
Muslims) voicing the strongest opposition, A ’monster 
meeting' was held at the Idgah on Sunday, 3 July 1910 
with Sayed Ahmad, the Imam of the Jama Masjjid, in the 
chair. He advised the Muslims to lay bare their hearts 
to the government with the greatest confidence of 
success. Haji Abdul Ghani, Haji Abdul Ghaffar and Syed 
Faiz-ul-Hussain were elected to write the memorial in 
protest against Arya literature. Estimates of the 
attendance ranged from 8,000 to 30,000 with a moderate 
estimate at 10,000 to 12,000.1 Maulvi Kasim Ali spoke 
vehemently against the Aryas and the butchers supported 
him with an immediate call for jihad.
The reaction in Delhi and throughout the Punjab to 
the meeting of the Muslims was quite significant. It 
was the only meeting of its kind in the Punjab and drew
1
NAI, Home Poll 3^-36 Part B, March 1911, Confidential 
Diary of the Superintendent of Police, 3 July 1910.
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Commissioner of Delhi judged the situation so perilous
that he requested on U July that the usual winter
exercises of the English garrison be postponed or that
the garrison be replaced. Once the Muslims had
expressed their indignation, however, their enthusiasm
waned and a meeting the following week at Hauz Muzaffar
2Khan drew only 200. The religious passion which was
displayed in July slowly cooled and by the end of 19103calm prevailed. C.R. Cleveland noted that while he
comments from all the Hindu press.1 The Deputy
The Jhang Sial (Jhang) said the purpose of the meeting 
was to inflame the Muslims as the Afghani had done in 
Peshwar so that Muslims could loot their Hindu neighbours. 
The Hindus tan (Lahore) thought that the government should 
have reprimanded the ’foul-mouthed and insolent members 
of the Muslim press,’ i.e., the editors of the Haq and 
the Hidayat of Delhi. The Muslim press of the Punjab 
defended the Muslims of Delhi. The Paisa Akhbar (Lahore) 
for example, stated that even though a group of Aryas 
had waited upon the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi to 
present a counter-memorial, nothing could weaken the unity 
and resolve of the Muslim community to resist attacks 
on their religion.
2 Ahmad Masih, Maulvi Abdul Subhan, Hafiz Mohammad Said, 
Mohammad Yahya, and Kasim Ali, all of whom were Ahl-i- 
Hadis or Ahmadis with the exception of Ahmad Masih, 
advocated the boycott of Hindu traders at this meeting.
The audience supported them, but the Muslim merchants 
would not even consider the idea.
3 Some apprehension was shown in August when Vivekanand 
and Ram Chand, both Arya Samaj preachers, held a meeting 
of Arya Samajists in Najafgarh to the west of Delhi.
The meeting had to be stopped because their intemperate 
language threatened to spur the Muslims in the village 
into a riot. The Ram Lila Committee was also somewhat 
hesitant about holding their annual procession in 
September, but when the festival passed off without 
incident, the entire city seemed to breathe a sigh of 
relief.
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was in Delhi in December 1910, serious riots occurred at 
Calcutta and these did not even ’ruffle the surface.’1
Parochialism waned but did not disappear. It became
an especially pressing problem again in 1912 as a result
of pressure from two sources, the sanatanis and the Arya
Samajists. The pressure from the sanatanis resulted from
2the Hindu-Muslim riots at Ajodhya at Bakr-Id in 1912.
1 NAI, Home Poll 34-36 Part B, March 1911.
2 There had not been any important riots in north India 
over kine-killing since 1893. In 1911 the Muslims of 
Ajodhya applied for a licence to slaughter kine for 
general consumption. The Municipal Committee refused 
and the Muslims sacrificed kine at Bakr-Id in retaliation 
The Hindus then petitioned the District Magistrate to 
order that no sacrifices should take place at Bakr-Id in
1912. A junior officer officiating as district magistrate 
ordered that there should be no kine sacrifices at 
Ajodhya because it was such a sacred place for Hindus and 
because sacrifices had not been allowed there before.
The Muslims appealed in Court and the order was overruled 
Much of the enmity engendered during this period was 
exacerbated by the conflict over separate representation 
far Muslims on Municipal Committees that was an integral 
part of the Reforms of 1909• A large number of irregular 
ities resulted in most cases with Hindu registrars 
attempting to disenfranchise Muslims. The levy of 
gaushala or a cess on business transactions for the 
payment of the maintenance of cattle. The upshot of the 
case was that on the morning of 20 November 1912, the 
Muslims attempted to sacrifice cattle to establish their 
right to do so as directed by the High Court. The local 
bairagis, inflamed by other Hindus, attacked the Muslims 
and troops had to be called in to restore order with 
some loss of life to both communities. NAI, Home Poll 
100-118 Part A, October 1913, 'Riot at Cawnpore in 
Connection with the Demolition of a Mosque in Machli 
Bazaar.’ R. Burn, Chief Secretary to Government of 
United Provinces, to the Secretary, Government of India, 
Home Department, dated Naini Tal, 17 September 1913; see 
also Home Poll 109-114 Part B, April 1913, 'Report on 
the Riot Which Occurred between Hindus and Muhammadans at 
Adjodhya in the Fyzabad District on the Occasion of the 
Bakr-Id'; Home Poll 52 Deposit, November 1916, ’Note on 
the Anti-Cow Killing Agitation in the United Provinces.’
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Letters which emanated in ever widening circles from 
the temples and religious associations at Ajodhya, 
called upon good Hindus to prevent the slaughter of 
cows, to boycott Muslims as far as possible, to refrain 
from charity to Muslim beggars, and to forbid the use 
of wells and the services of menials.
The second source which intensified the pressure 
of parochialism in Delhi came from the Arya Samajists.
The Arya Pratinidi Sabha issued a general circular 
which recognised from the census of 1911 that the 
Muslims were growing in numbers faster than Hindus.
They thought that this resulted from the conversion 
of lower class Hindus. The local Samajists were advised 
henceforth not to confine their efforts only to 
touchable castes, namely weavers and dhobis, but to 
'Hinduise' Chamars and Chuhras also.1
The result of both these pressures was an
undertaking, signed by the Chaudhri of the Chamar
brotherhood, that henceforth Chamars would not eat beef,
or food cooked by Muslims, or deal in bones of dead
animals. Ahmad Masih, during one of his public sermons,
commented that as a result of the action taken by the
Chamars Muslims were even looked down upon by
untouchables and that the boycott was really part of a
2plot to drive Muslims out of the leather market. The 
situation became very tense when the Hindu wholesale
1
RDDA, Confidential File 25 (l9l4), 'Mi scellaneous 
Confidential Papers,' Note by G.F. deMontmorency,
Personal Assistant to the Chief Commissioner, 25 November
1912.
2 RDDA, Confidential File 25 (l9l4), Weekly Diary No. 11 
of the Superintendent of Police, for the week ending 23 
November 1912.
1 9 8
merchants threatened to raise the gaushala tax from 
three pies per rupee on goods sold to six pies. There 
was also an incident during Dusehra when a Marwari 
woman put cow dung in a well in Kucha Natwan to 
consecrate it. The Muslims who used the well were 
incensed and considered the well unclean and filed a 
complaint in court. The Hindus then put a board on the 
well and claimed it as the sole property of the Hindus.1 
The incident resolved itself quietly, however.
Parochialism waned somewhat during 1913* Pan-
Islamism became a more important religious concern and
the activities of street preachers were severely
curtailed by threat of action from the police. The
situation became inflammable again in December of 1913
with the arrival in Delhi of Abdul Kabir who immediately
attacked the Arya Samajist Preacher Bhai Ramchandra
2Verma. The verbal battle resulted in a meeting of 300
Muslims ’including several influential persons’ on 25
r>June 19l4 in Sadar Bazaar. The meeting was remarkably
1
RDDA, Confidential File 25 (l9l4), Daily Diary of the 
Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., l4 November 1912.
2
RDDA, Confidential File 73 (l915)> 'Complaints against 
Certain Preachers Regarding Objectionable Preaching.'
3
Ibid., Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. l4 dated l4 
July 1914. The influential persons were Shaikh Nur 
Ilahi the president of the meeting, and Haji Abdul Samad. 
Others who spoke at the meeting were Zahur Ahmad,
Muhammad Subhan Ali, Muhammad Abdul Karim, Maulvi Abdul 
Kabir, and Hafiz Rahimuddin. This list is remarkably 
free from those persons who were active during the July 
1910 controversy. The majority were Ahl-i-Hadis.
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smaller than the several thousand who gathered to hear 
Mohamed Ali on 2k July 191^ at the Jama Masjid.1 The 
parochial leaders petitioned the government for redress 
and the police again threatened to arrest any preachers 
guilty of inflammable language. It became quite 
evident, however, that pan-Islamism and the War had 
temporarily curtailed interest in activities which drew 
upon parochial sentiment.
II
....the representative... of the Sovereign... has 
been struck down in the foulest manner with his 
wife sitting beside him. It is little short of 
a miracle that they were not both blown to atoms.
The Honourable Member 
for Finance^
27 December 1912
Revolutionary nationalism failed to excite any 
great interest in Delhi. The ardent revolutionary, Rash 
Behari Bosh, attempted to break the rigid wall of 
provincialism which he encountered in the United 
Provinces and the Punjab. But in terms of the support 
upon which he drew, and the response he received, he 
failed completely. Revolutionary nationalism did have
1 This meeting is discussed below.
2 Commenting on the same incident one month later, the 
Honourable Member observed: 'I think the thrower must 
have been a cricketer. It was a wonderfully good shot.' 
NAI, Home Poll 11 Deposit, December 1914, 'Attempt to 
Assassinate His Excellency the Viceroy on the 23rd 
December 1912,' Note of 3 February 1913.
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an important effect though. It convinced the government 
that all political agitation must lead to violence.
The connection that they saw between revolutionary 
nationalism and the more vehement Muslim panegyric which 
advocated jihad supplied a large measure of the 
justification for the internment of the Ali brothers.
Rash Behari Bose took a job in the Imperial Forest
Institute in Dehra Dun and began around 1908 to establish
a revolutionary party in the United Provinces and the
Punjab.1 He made active contact with the revolutionaries
who had gathered around Har Dyal before the latter*s
2departure to Europe and America. He then spent a period
This account is extracted from the various reports of 
D. Petrie of the Imperial Criminal Investigation Depart­
ment, and especially from Report Number 16 dated 8 
November 1914 contained in NAI, Home Poll 11 Deposit, 
December 1914. Uma Mujcherjee in Two Great Indian 
Revolutionaries: Rash Behari Bose & Jyotindra Nath 
Mukherjee (Calcutta, 1966), pp. 105-11 does not appear 
to have used this report. She differs slightly on 
points of detail.
2 Har Dyal was born in Delhi of Kayasth parents. He was 
educated at St Stephen’s Mission High School and College 
and then went to Lahore where he received a Masters 
degree. He won a scholarship to Oxford for which he 
departed in 1905. He became disgusted with the govern­
ment's educational policies, gave up his scholarship and 
returned to India (to Lahore) late in 1906. He then 
departed with his wife to Europe and returned early in 
1908 to Lahore once again. He departed for the last time 
in August 1908 and after a short stay in Europe and 
England, he arrived in America where he taught Philosophy 
at Stanford from which he disseminated revolutionary 
literature and fomented the Ghadar conspiracy in 1915»
Lajpat Rai, Young India: An Interpretation and a History 
of the Nationalist Movement from within (4th Reprint; 
Lahore, 1927), pp. 205-11; Uma Mukherjee, Two Great Indian 
Revolutionaries, pp. 101-2; Kali Charan Ghosh, The Roll 
of Honour: Anecdotes of Indian Martyrs (Calcutta^ 1965), 
p. 59ff. Sedition Committee, 1918, Report (Calcutta,
1918), pp. 143-5; Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh, 
Ghadar 1915: India’s First Armed Revolution (New Delhi, 
1966), pp. l6ff.
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of preparation which entailed the indoctrination of a 
small group of conspirators who were to use the 
instrument of revolutionary terror, not to drive the 
British from India, but to articulate the protest of 
Indians against the suppression of nationalism. The 
group was purposely kept small but students were 
actively recruited through Arjun Lai Sethi in Ajmere, 
Amir Chand in Delhi, and Awad Behari in Lahore, who 
also became the co-ordinator of all the work in 
western United Provinces, Punjab, and Rajputana.
The first effort of this group was undertaken by 
Rash Behari himself. He and a young Bengali who was 
also a relation called Basant Kumar Biswas threw a 
bomb at the Viceroy and the Vicereine as they went in 
procession down Chandni Chauk in Delhi. The newly 
appointed Viceroy was riding an elephant on the occasion 
of a State Entry into the new imperial capital of India 
on 23 December 1912. Rash Behari and Basant Kumar threw 
the bomb from the roof of the Punjab National Bank and 
escaped into the crowd. Lady Hardinge recorded the 
effect of the explosion as follows:
Passing down the Chandney Chowk where the 
cheering was on all sides, I suddenly felt an 
upheaval and was thrown forward. When I 
recovered my place I felt rather dazed and 
most decidedly deaf with loud singing in the 
head. The Viceroy turned to me and said, ’I 
am afraid, that was a bomb.’
I then began noticing more details; for 
instance that the howdah-back had gone and 
the Viceroy looked pale. I said, ’Are you 
sure you are not hurt?’
He answered, ’I am not sure. I had a 
great shock, but I think I can go on.'
202
I looked round again and noticed the legs 
of a man who was hanging backwards and dead.
Then I quietly said, 'Do let me stop the 
procession as I fear the man behind is dead. '
(’We have [sic] moved on 150 yards’)
He said, ’Of course we cannot go on under 
these circumstances.’1
The Viceroy, suffering from wounds in his neck,
shoulders, and hip, consented to leave the howdah and
he and Lady Hardinge departed in a motor car in which
the Chief Commissioner had arrived after being
hurriedly summoned from the Fort. The Procession then
continued on to the Fort leaving behind two dead and 
220 wounded.
The attempt on the life of the Viceroy sparked off 
a wave of revulsion against political violence in the 
city. A huge audience met at the Town Hall in the 
evening and collected Rs. 8,000 for a reward and many 
people in the city feared some form of reprisal from
1
Quoted from a letter read in a meeting at the Town 
Hall, Bombay, on 8 January 1913» in Kali Charan Ghosh,
The Roll of Honour, pp. 231-2.
2 The jamedar in the howdah, Mahabir Singh of Balrampur 
State, died instantly as the bomb exploded in his lap.
The other person who was killed was a 16 year old Jain, 
Suraj Bahn, who was sitting in the centre of the avenue 
between the two carriage ways. He received a wound in 
the head from one of the carding needles with which the 
bomb had been wrapped to improve its destructive capacity. 
His widow applied for a pension. RDDA, Home File 23 
Part B 1913, ’Gifts Awarded to Widow of Suraj Bahn, 
Spectator Killed in Crowd of State Entry Bomb Explosion.' 
The others who were wounded also received cuts from the 
carding needles.
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the government.1 Another large audience attended a ’mass
meeting' at the Queen's Gardens the following day. The
Maharaja of Kashmir presided and Pandit Madan Mohan
Malaviya, Pandit Har Narain Shastri, and Lala Hari Ram
of Multan addressed the citizens of Delhi, The Muslims
met separately at the Jama Masjid where Rs. 15,000 was
collected. All the various religious organisations met
2and conducted prayers for the recovery of the Viceroy,
There was good reason for the citizens of Delhi to 
fear some form of reprisal. Guy Fleetwood Wilson, the 
Finance Member on the Viceroy's Executive Council, was 
the most vociferous in his attempts to ensure that the 
city should not go unpunished. On 27 December he noted: 
'Are we to do nothing in the case of a city wherein the 
representative - I may almost say, the alter ego - of 
the Sovereign, a man who has endeared himself to every 
single Indian, has been struck down....’ NAI, Home Poll 
96-116 Part A, March 1913» ’Attempt t o Assassinate His 
Excellency the Viceroy on the Occasion of the State Entry 
into Delhi on 23 December 1912. '
2 The following committees and organisations held meetings 
on 24 December to express sympathy for the Viceroy: 
Municipal Committee; Mandir Sri Apa Gangadhor, Parade 
Ground; Temple Sri Jagannath Ji, Parade Ground; Temple 
Sri Sat Narain Ji, Parade Ground; Temple Sri Ram Chandar 
Ji, Parade Ground; Temple Sri Narsingh Ji, Parade Ground; 
Temple Lala Omrao Singh, Parade Ground; Temple Sri 
Hanumanji, Paharganj; Temple Sri Ghanteshwrji, Katra Nil; 
Temple Rai Bahadur Lala Sheopershad, C.I.E., Katra Nil; 
Temple Lala Ambapershad, Naya Bans; Temple Gurwala, 
Maliwara; Temple Lala Ramchand, Maliwara; Temple Sri Jain 
Temple, Urdu Bazaar; Sri Jamnaji Temple of Hanumanji, 
Nigambod Gate; Aryavartya Sawdeshek Aryapratinidi Sabha;
Anjuman-i-Vakil-Qaum-i-Panjabian; Jama Masjid; Sikh 
Prayer Committee. NAI, Home Poll 3-25 Part B, April
1913, 'Messages of Sympathy and Offer of Rewards from 
the Public, Native Chiefs, Etc., Subsequent to the 
Attempt to Assassinate His Excellency the Viceroy on 
the Occasion of the State Entry into Delhi.'
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while all the shopkeepers observed a hartal from noon
onwards on the same day.1 The Chief Commissioner
accepted offers of money for a reward and also published
a notice in which the government would pay Rs. 10,000
for information leading to the arrest of those 
2responsible. On Friday 27 December the Muslims held 
another mass meeting at the Jama Masjid after the Juma 
Prayers, and a general meeting took place at the Queen’s 
Gardens on Sunday afternoon the 29th. Activities in 
the city quietened thereafter in the face of a thorough 
investigation which lasted until March 1913*
The investigation into the attempt on the life of 
the Viceroy revealed three things. It revealed in the 
first instance that the populace was unwilling to co­
operate with the police, even in such an important
3matter as this. It revealed in the second instance
There was little doubt that the hartal resulted from 
an official suggestion. NAI, Home Poll 9^-116 Part A, 
March 1913, Note by G.F. Wilson, 27 December 1912.
2 The first notice of a reward was for Rs. 10,000, 
offered by the Chief Commissioner on 23 December. This 
was raised to R s . 15,000 on 27 December and then to R s .
50,000 on the 30th. The Home Member suggested that the 
reward should be Rs. 1,00,000 on 11 January 1913, to 
which it was raised. NAI, Home Poll 3-25 Part B, April
1913.
3 Most of the inhabitants of the city adopted a 
truculent mood and no one was willing to volunteer any 
information. It took four months and the most indirect 
means to obtain the statements of the women on the 
roof of the bank as to what they had seen. The endemic 
dislike of the police became so noticeable that the 
Chief Commissioner organised a committee of citizens 
to tour the city and obtain information. The committee 
returned empty-handed and gave up.
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that the enmity between Hindus and Muslims was still
alive and that both communities sought to throw the
blame for the outrage onto the other community.1
And it revealed in the third instance that none of
the inhabitants of Delhi were connected with the crime,
rather that the inspiration for the Delhi outrage
2came from Bengal.
While the plot to assassinate the Viceroy did 
not involve any citizens of Delhi, the Delhi-Lahore 
Conspiracy Case of ±9lk revealed that there was an 
organised party of revolutionary nationalists in
1
One example of the spread of such rumours was a 
report to the Chief Commissioner by Makhan Lai, a 
Tahsildar of Mandi who ’did not intend to indicate 
anything more than that Mahammadans might have been 
the authors of the bomb outrage.’ RDDA,
Confidential File 25 (191^0, W.M. Hailey to H.C.
Beadon, 23 January 1913.
2
There was an exact similarity between the 
Dalhousie Square bomb (2 March 191l), the Midnapore 
bomb (13 December 1912), the Delhi bomb, and then 
with bombs exploded at Maulvi Bazaar (27 March 1913), 
Ranigarj (April 1913), Lahore (17 May 1913), Mymensingh 
(30 September 1913), and Bhadreswar (31 December 1913).
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the city.1 The conspiracy case at Benares in the 
following year revealed four more residents of the 
city who were also involved in revolutionary
1
The Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case revolved around the 
fact that Basant Kumar Biswas had planted a bomb in 
the Lawrence Gardens in Lahore on 17 May 1913 with the 
intention of killing a European. Unfortunately he 
planted it on a path that Europeans seldom used and 
the chaprassi who ran over it with his bicycle was 
killed instead. Abad Behari and Rash Behari Bose were 
intimately connected with the murder and with the 
distribution of seditious literature. The conspiracy 
then, consisted of those people who had associated 
with Basant Kumar Biswas, Abad Behari, and Rash Behari 
Bose and who had distributed seditious literature. 
l4 people were originally charged with the conspiracy. 
Rash Behari absconded, Dina Nath turned approver and 
received a pardon as did Sultan Chand. Charan Das 
confessed, but was committed to trial. The trial 
lasted from 21 May until 1 September 1914 and sentence 
was passed on 5 October. Three were sentenced to 
death, three to transportation for life and five 
acquitted. The High Court of the Punjab delivered its 
judgment on the appeal on 10 February 1915. The three 
death sentences were upheld; the three men were Amir 
Chand, Abad Bihari and Balmokand. The sentence of 
transportation for life for Basant Kumar Biswas was 
changed to one of death. Charan Das who had been 
acquitted, was sentenced to transportation for life.
And Bal Raj and Hanwant Sahai who had been sentenced 
to transportation for life were sentenced to transport­
ation for seven years. The Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council rejected the appeal and three of the men 
were executed on 8 May 1915. The fourth was executed 
on 11 May 1915. NAI, Home Poll 1-2 Part A, July 191^, 
’Reports by Messrs D. Petrie and C. Stead on the Delhi- 
Lahore Conspiracy Case’; Home Poll 13^-137 Part A, 
January 1915, Judgments Delivered by Mr M. Harrison, 
Temporary Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, in the 
Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case’; Home Poll 12-21 Part A, 
May 1915, ’Judgment of the Punjab Chief Court on the 
Appeals in the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case’; Kali 
Charan Ghosh, The Roll of Honour, pp. 230-9; Sedition 
Committee, 1918, Report, pp. 1^3-6.
207
politics.1 There was little public support in Delhi,
2however, for these men or for their politics. They 
were considered misguided intellectuals whose solution 
for the political problems of India was irrelevant.
The nine men from Delhi who were involved in 
revolutionary nationalism shared several characteristics.
1
NAI, Home Poll 49 Deposit, May 1915, 'Fortnightly 
Reports on the internal Political Situation in Special 
Reference to the War for the Second Fortnight of April 
1915,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 30 April 1915; RDDA, 
Home File 226 Part B 1915, 'Internment of Lachmi Narain 
and Ganeshi Lai Khasta of Delhi'; Kali Charan Ghosh,
Roll of Honour, pp. 254-94; Khushwant Singh and Satindra 
Singh, Ghadar 1915; Sedition Committee, 1918, Report, 
pp. l45-6l.
2
There was an article in the St Stephen's Mission News 
which espoused a personal support of Amir Chand in 
April 1914 before the trial began. NAI, Home Poll 142- 
145 Part B, June 1914, 'Weekly Reports of the Director 
of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 26 May 
1914; RDDA, Confidential File 38 (l9l4). The warmest 
support for the accused came from an article in the 
New Age. NAI, Home Poll 254 Part A, July 1915, 
'Objectionable Article Entitled "Indian Loyalty" in 
the Newspaper Called the New Age Published in England, 
Dated 22 October 1914.' There was, however, no one in 
the court room on 5 October 1914 when the verdict was 
delivered, neither was there any opinion expressed in 
the local press. NAI, Home Poll 30 Deposit, December
1914, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political 
Situation in Special Reference to the War for the First 
Fortnight of October 1914,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler,
17 October 19l4.
3 The nine men were:
Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case Benares Conspiracy Case 
Amir Chand, Bania Ram Nath
Sultan Chand, Bania Shankar Lai, Kayasth
Abad Behari, Kayasth Lachmi Narain,
Manu Lai Brahman
Hanwant Sahai, Kayasth Ganeshi Lai, Kayasth
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They were all between the ages of 15 and 30 (with the 
exception of Amir Chand who was over 45). They were 
all university students or university graduates; and 
they were all from high castes, namely, the Brahman, 
Bania, Khatri, and Kayasth castes. Most of the nine 
were either Arya Samajists or social reformers, though 
none were sanatanis.1 And finally, all nine had 
limited resources of wealth, status, and power.
Although the two instances of revolutionary
nationalism in Delhi received no support from the
populace and had little influence over the inhabitants,
the movement did have several effects. It impressed
the minds of some people and became the outlet for
idiosyncratic behaviour. Gokal Chand of Sonepat
exploded a bomb in the compound of the Delhi Club on
10 February 1915, the day on which the Punjab High
Court announced its judgment in the Delhi-Lahore2Conspiracy Case. A Sadhu boy from Jubbulpore jammed 
the firing mechanism of six guns in the Red Fort on
1
The prosecution during the trial made much of the 
fact that Rash Behari Bose in his teachings, leaned 
heavily upon traditional concepts of yoga, karma, and 
dharma. These did not, however, influence the 
revolutionaries in Delhi as much as the writings of 
the European nationalists such as Mazzini.
2
The authorities originally thought there was some 
connection between the two incidents. At his trial 
they discovered that he had detonated the bomb to 
provide substance to a rumour which he had originally 
spread, that another bomb outrage was imminent at 
Delhi. It was all part of his attempt to obtain 
employment as a police informer. NAI, Home Poll 777“ 
780 Part B, February 1915, 'Weekly Reports of the 
Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the weeks 
ending 9 February and 16 February 1915*
2 0 9
30 June 1915»* And a merchant from Dehra Dun had two
bombs made and sent to the Railway Station at Delhi on
3 December 1915 in an attempt to incriminate a resident
2of Delhi as part of a commercial feud. There were 
also numerous leaflets distributed in Delhi which
1
NAI, Home Poll 516-519 Part B, July 1915, ’Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,1 
for the weeks ending 13 July and 20 July 1915.
2
NAI, Home Poll 709-711 Part B, December 1915, ’Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,’ for 
the week ending 14 December 1915»
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contained' revolutionary themes, and there was an
1
The most popular of the revolutionary leaflets were 
those entitled ’Liberty Leaflets', which appeared in 
seven editions in May, July, and November 1913? January 
and June 1914, January 1915 (which was found affixed to 
the door of the office of the Delhi C.I.D.) and October 
1915 respectively. The fifth edition of June 1914 read 
as follows: 'The subject we have to put before you is 
meant to aware [sic] you of your duty. We should free 
our country from the hands of these western tyrants, who 
have taken our India by treacherous and wicked means.
The faithless and selfish policy of these dogs leads us 
to treat them in the same manner. Now we are practically 
seeing that our infants are starving and these dogs are 
enjoying our delicious food. When we threaten them with 
our staff, they bark at us and often bite us to death. 
Should we, then, sit quiet, afraid of these barking and 
let them spoil our things? Never; not at all. Time has 
come, arise, awake and stop not till the goal is reached. 
To get rid of them keep "Liberty" as your motto and bombs 
as your weapon and you are to succeed at last. Throw 
bombs at every white head and fear not of death. One 
killing a single Briton is sure to enjoy heaven. Die 
yourself, sacrifice your wealth and children, but free 
mother Bharata from destruction. Do not be afraid of 
Jails; a man striving for justice never fails. We hope 
to see you a murderer of a Briton soon.' NAI, Home 
Poll 259-262 Part B, August 1914, 'Weekly Reports of the 
Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending
21 July 1914. Two other well-known leaflets which found 
wide circulation in Delhi were 'Ana Leila' which invited 
Hindus and Muslims to 'Rise for the sake of your honour, 
your self respect, your country, your orphans, and your 
dear freedom, and smash into pieces the curtains of 
ignorance and disunion. Drive out from your country 
the tyrannical, selfish, faithless, oppressive, and 
blood-shedding dacoits of Europe.,' and 'Shabash'.
RDDA, Home File 3 Part B 1915» 'Declaration of Pamphlets 
to Be Forefeited to H.M. under the Press Act'; 
Confidential File 75 (1915)» 'Translation of the 
Proscribed Pamphlet Shabash.'
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occasional seditious speech. The major problem, 
however, and the major effect of revolutionary 
nationalism, was the connection that the authorities 
saw between it and the Muslim agitation during the same 
period, of which more later.
The Viceroy and his government became firmly 
convinced after 23 December 1912, that agitation of 
any sort led inevitably to violence. The first speech 
of the Viceroy after the bomb outrage contained this 
sentiment. In an address to the Imperial Legislative 
Council at Delhi on 27 January 1913 (the first to meet 
in the new imperial capital) Lord Hardinge emphasised 
the fact:
....that such crimes cannot be dismissed as the 
isolated acts of irresponsible fanatics, and 
that they are in most cases the outcome of 
organised conspiracies in which the actual 
agent of the crime is not always the most 
responsible. The atmosphere which breeds the 
political murderer is more easily created than 
dispelled. It can only be entirely and for ever 
dispelled by the display and enforcement of public 
opinion in a determination not to tolerate the 
perpetration of such crimes and to treat as 
enemies of society, not only those who commit 
crimes, but also those who offer any incentives 
to crime. Amongst such incentives to crime 
should be included every intemperance of political 
language and methods which are likely to influence 
ill-balanced minds and lead them by insidious 
stages to hideous c r i m e s . 2.
A sikh returning from Hong Kong made a seditious speech 
on l4 November 1914 in Delhi, and two more Sikhs also 
returning from Hong Kong made speeches on 1 December 1914. 
NAI, Home Poll 223-226 Part B, December 1914, 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,1 for 
the week ending 24 November 1914; Home Poll 227-9 Part B, 
December 1914, ’Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal 
Intelligence,' for the week ending 8 December 1914.2 Speeches by Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, 3 volumes 
(Calcutta, 1913-6), I, 457.
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The Officiating Secretary of the Home Department 
observed that past experience had shown that when 
’seditious activity' underwent a temporary lull due 
to repressive measures, a period of toleration was 
induced because of the moderation of journalists and 
speakers. During this period of toleration and 
moderation those writers and speakers who were not 
’well affected' to British rule grew bolder and 
increasingly less restrained.1 The Secretary concluded 
that even though 'anarchist outrages' had little direct 
connection with ordinary political agitation, it was 
just such agitation which prepared the ground and 
created the atmosphere for the indoctrination of 
'especially young and impressionable minds.' It was 
incumbent upon all local governments not to indulge any 
excesses that could lead to 'morbid growths' and 
'atrocious crimes.'
The Government of India had been confronted with 
revolutionary nationalism from 1905 onwards while it 
resided in Calcutta. The Viceroy and his government 
cherished the hope that the transfer of the imperial 
capital to Delhi would remove them from the more extreme
'So insidious is the advance of this boldness [he 
continued] from slightly increased acrimony and slightly 
greater perverseness of criticism to seditious innuendo 
and veiled sedition, that the steps by which carping 
criticisms gradually evolve themselves into dangerous 
writing and inflammatory talk are scarcely perceptible 
until the government once again finds itself confronted 
with a campaign against the ebullition of seditious 
unrest.' NAI, Home Poll 9-13 Part A, May 1913,
'Proposed Action to Be Taken to Strengthen the Hands of 
the Executive in Dealing with Sedition,' W.S. Marris 
to all chief commissioners and chief secretaries, 8 
April 1913.
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excesses of Bengali nationalism which should have 
quietened anyway after the annulment of the Partition. 
But they arrived in a euphoria of enthusiasm only to be 
confronted with continual evidence that anarchical 
conspirators still inhabited their very doorstep. Their 
first few years in Delhi, however, were to be most vexed 
by the pan-Islamic movement, which the government 
constantly feared would go underground, rather than by a 
lunatic fringe which adopted anarchical methods for 
personal ends.
Ill
We must, I think, recognise that Mohamed Ali 
and Shaukat Ali and their associated, will do 
everything possible to rouse Muhammadan feeling 
against us. It is very unfortunate that, 
although distrusted and disliked by many educated 
Indian Muhammadans, these people are popular 
heroes with many of the lower classes,...
Director of 
Criminal Intelligence
12 January 1915
Pan-Islamism, which is an integral part of Muslim 
consciousness at all times, assumed a more sharply 
etched image in the minds of Muslims in Delhi when the 
city became the new imperial capital of India. One of 
the main causes for this was the arrival in Delhi in 
September 1912 of a young Muslim agitator named Mohamed 
Ali, who brought along with him his English-language
214
weekly newspaper, the Comrade. The appeals to pan-Islamic 
sentiment in the Urdu languages weeklies that found 
considerable circulation in the city, namely, the Zamindar 
(Lahore) which Zafar Ali Khan edited, and the A.l-Hilal 
(Calcutta) which Abdul Kalam Azad edited, also 
contributed to a heightened awareness of larger issues.
But neither of these two journals, nor the Hamdard, 
which was an Urdu language daily published in Delhi by 
Mohamed Ali from May 1913> matched the Comrade in the 
quality of polemical journalism or in circulation. Pan- 
Islamism also received a fillip from the arrival in May 
1913 of Shaukat Ali (who directed the activities of the 
Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba), and from the return of Dr 
Ansari and the Red Crescent Medical Mission in July 1913»
There was a certain amount of disquiet in the Muslim 
community even before Mohamed Ali arrived in Delhi.
Italy’s invasion of Tripoli caused a great stir,1 but the
1...reports from Delhi, Lahore, Amritsar and other large 
towns show that the Punjab Muhammadans are becoming very 
excited over the Tripoli affair. Prom Delhi it is reported 
that the war is now the one topic of conversation amongst 
Muhammadans, who are daily growing more and more excited 
over the wrongs suffered by Turkey. Passengers in the 
Durbar Railway trains also are seen eagerly reading and 
discussing the latest newspaper War Supplements, and even 
khansamahs and other Muhammadan servants employed in the 
various camps are said to be taking an extraordinary 
interest in the war news. The sober treatment of the 
subject that first characterised the utterances of leading 
Muslim journals is fast disappearing, and is giving way 
to denunciation of European Christian Powers in general 
and of Italy in particular.1 NAI, Home Poll 121-123 Part 
B, January 1912, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of 
Criminal Intelligence,1 for the week ending 7 December
1911.
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announcement of the King-Emperor on 12 December 1911 
that the partition of Bengal was to be annulled caused 
even more concern in the months that followed. 1 The 
Mussulman (Calcutta) of 12 January summarised the opinion 
of the Extremist Muslims or the so-called ’New Muslim 
Party' as follows:
The Government of Lord Curzon, in order to dissuade 
the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal from joining the 
anti-Partition agitation gave them certain pledges; 
these pledges have not been fulfilled and the manner 
in which the modification has been carried out by 
the Government of Lord Hardinge goes to show that 
the Government of India cares a fig for the feelings 
and sentiments of the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal. 
His Excellency Lord Hardinge has not yet shown any 
sympathy towards Muhammadan aspirations, rather His 
Excellency has snubbed the Muhammadans whenever he 
had got an opportunity to do so. Under the 
circumstances it has become necessary for the 
Mussalmans to turn out agitators, to try to stand 
on their own legs and demand the satisfaction of 
their claims as a matter of right. The present 
Government of India has taught the Muhammadans the 
lesson - ’No agitation, no concession.' It is 
accordingly incumbent upon our co-religionists to 
change their policy and to tread in the footsteps 
of their Hindu fellow-countrymen. If they be 
unable to make their position felt, their claims 
will continue to be trampled underfoot and their 
rights totally ignored,^
1
A Muslim police inspector from the United Provinces 
joined a group of Muslims in Delhi on the evening of 12 
December. He reported that the conversationalists 
considered the repeal of partition as a 'great triumph 
for the Hindus of Bengal and for agitation.' NAI, Home 
Poll 65-68 Part B, February 1912, 'Weekly Reports of the 
Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending
11 January 1912.
2 ■/.NAI, Home Poll 65-68 Part B, February 1912, for the 
week ending 23 January 1912.
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Zafar All Khan reiterated these sentiments in the 
Zamindar and hinted that they were another example of 
the hostility towards Islam that was evident in the 
efforts of Russia and England to overthrow Persia.1 
Mohamed Ali also looked upon the repeal of partition as 
an attack upon the Muslim community. He proposed a 
resolution at the sixth annual session of the All-India 
Moslem League in the first week of March 1912 which read 
as follows:
That the All-India Moslem League places on record 
its deep sense of regret and disappointment at 
the annulment of the partition of Bengal in utter 
disregard of Muslim feeling, and trusts that 
government will take early steps to safeguard^
Muslim interests in the Presidency of Bengal.
He launched this resolution with the observation that the 
Muslims of India learned the lesson of unity from the 
Hindus who made the question of Bengal an all-India one.
He added that such unity proved that government’s action 
could no longer be considered a ’settled fact' since it 
could be unsettled if 'agitation against it were persisted
1
Ibid.
2
NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913, 'Supply to the 
India. Office of the History Sheet of Mohamed Ali.'
Although he had declared in the Comrade after the announce­
ment that 'in our judgement the Muslims should accept the 
decision of the government.' Select Writings and Speeches 
of Maulana Mohamed Ali, Afzal Iqbal, comp. (Lahore,1944), 
p. 26l.
NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913»
3
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A series of in.ciden.ts occurred in 1912 which served 
to reinforce the opinion of the Muslim agitators that the 
British Government and the Government of India were 
hostile towards Muslims. The Government of the Punjab 
demanded a security of Rs. 2,000 from the Zamindar in 
February 1912 for its articles on the repeal of partition 
and Britain’s motives in Persia. This was seen as the 
first step towards a general attempt to throttle the 
Muslim press in India under the Press Act of 1910.
Mohamed Ali publicly proclaimed that he had contributed 
Rs. 100 to ’stiff-necked and law-despising magistrates... 
[who expose] before the whole country what precious 
knowledge of vernacular they have acquired in their 
intercourse with syces and ayahs.’1 In April Edwin 
Montagu, the Under Secretary of State for India, observed 
during the second reading of the Government of India Bill 
that it was impossible to consider the Muslims of India 
as a homogeneous nationality. The Moslem League of the 
Punjab at a well attended meeting on 5 May protested 
vigorously against this statement as an ’unjustifiable 
reflection' on the solidarity of the Indian Muslims, 
especially since such solidarity was a foremost doctrine 
of Islam and a basic principle of Muslim society. The 
statement was also regarded as 'opposed to actual facts'
1
Article in the Comrade of 6 April 1912 contained in 
ibid.
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and a departure from an ’oft-recognised principle' that 
looked upon all Muslims as one community.1
The stir caused by Montagu's remark was followed by
an incident which had a far reaching significance for
India. This was the impact of the debate between Lord
Curzon and Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India,
on 24 June and 20 July in the House of Lords over the
meaning of paragraph three of the Delhi Despatch of 25
2August 1911. Mohamed Ali commented in the Comrade of 
19 June 1912, that Lord Crew's statement had turned the 
vague hopes of colonial self-government into a sharp and 
clearly articulated desire for political autonomy. The
NAI, Home Poll 37-40 Part B, June 1912, 'Weekly Reports 
of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week 
ending 14 May 1912. A Muslim government servant then 
drew up a report which was thought to verify the truth 
of Montagu's statement. Home Poll 85 Part B, September 
1912,' Note relating to the Remarks Made by Mr.Montagu 
about the Muhammadans of India Being a Homogeneous 
Nationality.'
2 The Delhi Despatch can be found in NAI, Home Delhi 8-11 
Part A, December 1911, 'Transfer of the Seat of the 
Government of India from Calcutta to Delhi and the 
Constitutional Changes in the Bengals.' The Despatch 
itself has been printed in 'Announcements Made by and on 
Behalf of H.M. The King-Emperor at the Coronation Durbar 
Held at Delhi on 12 December 1911» with Correspondence 
Relating thereto,' Parliamentary Papers, 1911, LV [5979]. 
Paragraph three is reprinted in C.H. Phillips, ed.j The 
Evolution of India and Pakistan, I858 to 1947: Select 
Document s (London, I962), pp. 90-1« The debate between 
Lord Curzon and Lord Crewe also appears in Phillips, pp. 
91-5 « It is interesting to note the reaction of the 
Government of India in Home Poll 7 Deposit, September 
1912, 'Considerations Arising from the Interpretation of 
Paragraph 3 of the Government of India Despatch, Dated 
the 25th August 1911»1
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Secretary of State had in effect sown the seed for an
agitation that was likely to spring up in the immediate
future and grow to become ’as unpleasant as any the
country has seen.'1 The effect of Lord Crew's statement
was obvious by December 1912 when the Central Committee
of the All-India Moslem League met and drafted changes
for the constitution which included the attainment of a
system of self-government 'suitable to India1 under the
aegis of the British Crown, and co-operation with other
2communities to achieve its goals. The repeal of 
partition had initiated this response, and Lord Crewe's 
statement provided the final raison d*etre for the League 
and Congress to join forces. The battle with the Agha 
Khan for leadership of the League followed, and found 
reflection in the victory of the 'New Muslim Party' under 
the Raja of Mahmudabad, Marzhar-ul-Haque, and Wazir 
Hussain when the proposed changes were adopted at Lucknow 
in March 1913-
1 NAI, Home Poll 1^9 Part B, November 1913»
2 NAI, Home Poll 85-86 Part A, February 1913» 'Revised 
Constitution and Rules of the All-India Moslem League.'3 The Member for Education reassured his colleagues on 
the Council that there was no immediate cause for worry 
as it was 'quite impossible for the Hindus and Muhammadans 
of the Punjab and west of the United Provinces to join 
hands at present.' He did not hesitate to say that the 
Muslims of northern India were more concerned with 
separate representation on district boards and municipal 
committees than with self-government, which was 
incompatible with a coalition with Hindu Extremists, 
even though individuals might combine. NAI, Home Poll 
85-86 Part A, February 1913» Note by S.H. Butler, 19 
February 1913*
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The debate over self-government, significant though
it was for the political future of India, influenced only
a small and articulate élite. The announcement of the
decision of Lord Crewe over the Muslim university in July
1912, on the other hand, had the effect of antagonising
a much larger portion of the Muslim community. 1 The
Secretary of State decided that it was possible to
establish both a Muslim university and a Hindu university,
but that both of these institutions must bear the name of
the city in which they were located, namely, Aligarh and
Benares respectively. He also decided that neither
university should have the power to affiliate colleges.
The Comrade reacted adversely to these decisions and
accused the Government of India of bad faith. Mohamed
Ali argued that the government had known of Crewe's
decision, but had waited until after the Imperial Darbar,
and the consequent excitement, before it had made the
2decision public. What was more surprising, however, was 
the reaction of the Muslim press which was usually loyal. 
The two exceedingly moderate Muslim journals in Lahore 
reacted with considerable vehemence, certainly more than 
they exhibited during the Turco-Italian War. The 
Observer of 24 August 1912 stated:
1
There is a very good summary of the Muslim university 
movement in Abdul Latif, 'The Moslem University Movement, 1 
Indian Review, XVII (May I916), 332 -5. It is interesting 
to note that while the Central Committee of the All-India 
Moslem League was meeting at Christmas 1912 and recommend­
ing a change in the constitution of the League, the Moslem 
University Foundation Committee met at Lucknow at the same 
time to begin definite steps to establish an independent 
Muslim university.
2 NAI, Home Poll 7-10 Part B, October 1912, 'Weekly Reports 
of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week 
ending 17 September 1912.
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Muhammadans, if they were wise, should welcome the 
decision of the Secretary of State to limit the 
benefits of our proposed Muhammadan University to 
Aligarh, and to name it only the University of 
Aligarh. So much the better. It will give the 
greater pleasure to make the Secretary of State 
modify his orders. The decision is final. So 
much the better. It will be a greater triumph for 
us to make him rescind his decision. They now know 
how to rescind decisions. Nothing is ’settled,* 
and they have taught us the way to achieve success.
So let us welcome this decision. They are trying 
our mettle. Let us show them that it is not easy 
to dictate ideals. We committed the initial 
mistake of begging for the University as a matter 
of favour. We should have demanded it as a matter 
of right. We grovelled in the dust when we did 
the former and our wishes were not accepted. Let 
us do the latter and we shall be respected. It is 
now a trial of moral strength, and whoever yields is 
not of us. Better poverty with honour^than riches 
with slavery. This is our final word.
The Paisa Akhbar was equally indignant with the government
and exasperated with the Hindus who were willing to accept
the decision: 'You should do this, you who are past
masters in the art of agitation, and who with reference
to the Partition of Bengal brought in the aid of sedition
2and of anarchist crimes.'
Finally, the continued propaganda of the Comrade and 
the Zamindar during the months of June, July and August, 
over the Turco-Italian War contributed substantially to 
the growth of pan-Islamic sentiment in the city and in
1
NAI, Home Poll 21-24 Part B, September 1912, 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for 
the week ending 28 August 1912.
2
NAI, Home Poll 7-10 Part B, October 1912, for the week 
ending 17 September 1912.
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north India prior to Mohamed Ali's arrival in Delhi. An
officer in the Home Department noted- on 10 June 1912 that
•the tendency to pan-Islamism seems to be growing in
India and has perhaps been accentuated by the Turco-
Italian War and the alleged aggressions of Russia and
England in Persia. The Comrade and Zamindar rather voice
this feeling.'1 The growth of this pan-Islamic sentiment
was especially noticeable at Aligarh College. The
Director of Criminal Intelligence reported that the growth
of an anti-Christian spirit was stimulated by the writings
of the Islamic press on political developments in Tripoli,
Morocco, and Persia. He noted that students who went home
for the vacation circulated bitter charges to the effect
that the British Government conspired with the other
2Christian powers of Europe to ruin Islam. The Director 
received reports from 'several classes of educated and 
well-to-do Muhammadans in the north of India1 that young, 
educated Muslims favoured a combination with the Congress 
party. As regarded the lower classes he was told that:
1
NAI, Home Poll 16 Deposit, July 1912, 'Questions Asked 
by the Army-in-India Committee,' the Secretary of the Home 
Department, H. Wheeler, noted on 18 June, however, that 
'we have evidence that the subject [the Turco-Italian 
War] is frequently referred to in the Muhammadan Press, 
noticeably in the Comrade and Zamindar and a certain 
number of resolutions on the subject have been forwarded 
to Government by Muhammadan bodies. There is no 
evidence of any general anti-British feeling having been 
caused by the War.'
2
NAI, Home Poll 7-10 Part B, October 1912, for the week 
ending 24 September 1912.
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...the danger to Muhammadan religion, represented 
by the betrayal of Turkey in Europe and by the 
encroachments of Russia- in Persia, has been of 
late the constant theme of discourse by religious 
Muhammadans in the mosques, and that their cry 
that the Muhammadan religion is in danger and 
under no sufficient protection from the British 
Government is meeting with considerable response 
from the uneducated Muhammadan public.
Thus the scene was set in Delhi for the arrival of
Mohamed Ali in the new imperial capital of India.
Mohamed Ali, a Pathan, was born in Rampur State in 
1878, the son of a wealthy zamindar. He graduated from 
Aligarh in I898 and from Oxford in 1902. He returned 
to India and joined the Rampur Darbar and then the 
Baroda Darbar during which time he campaigned vigorously 
for the newly formed Moslem League and was elected a 
trustee of the M.A.O. College at Aligarh for a period
1
NAI, Home Poll 26-30 Part B, August 1912, 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for 
the week ending 16 July 1912. On 7 August 1912 the 
Home Department called for reports from all local 
governments on the state of Muslim feeling. The replies 
are contained in Home Poll 45-55 Part A, March 1913» 
'State of Muhammadan Feeling in India.' Delhi received 
no special mention.
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Darbar in January 1911 to commence a journalistic career
with the Comrade. In just seven months Mohamed Ali
revealed his extraordinary ability as a journalist and
elevated the Comrade into the 'most reputable and
important among the Muslim newspapers,' with a circulation
2of 1,200. This earned him one of the seven invitations 
offered to the 'native' press in Bengal for the Imperial 
Darbar at Delhi in December 1911. The paper doubled its 
circulation by May 1912 to 2,500 and was still considered 
'a popular paper, although occasionally disfigured by the
3cheekiness of youth.' Mohamed Ali applied to have his
of five years from 1910. 1 He resigned from the Baroda
1
There is a great deal of eulogistic and polemic 
literature about Mohamed Ali. A short balanced 
biographical sketch appears in M. Mujeeb, The Indian 
Muslims (London, 1 9 6 7), pp. 536-9« Afzal Iqbal has 
edited an autobiographical manuscript entitled My Life a 
Fragment: An Autobiographical Sketch of Maulana Mohamed 
A 1 i (Lahore, 1 9 4 2 ) andthe Select Writings and Speeches 
of Maulana Mohamed Ali (republished in 19^3 in two 
volumes). The speeches of the Ali brothers after their 
release from their first internment appear in For India 
and Islam (Calcutta, 1922) while the record of their 
trial in Karachi appears in R.V. Thadani, The Historic 
State Trial of the Ali Brothers and Five O t h e r s (Karachi, 
1922). Short biographical sketches appear in Syed Abul 
Khair, Short Life of Mohamed Ali (n.p.,1935); A1 Kafir, 
Pillars of the Nation, A Psycho-Political Study of 
Indian Leaders (Delhi, 1928 ), J~t 43-64; 
and Zin Sharif al-Mujahid, 'Maulana Muhammad Ali: A 
Political Study,' Pakistan Quarterly, V (Winter 1955)» 
54-9. None of these latter sketches is satisfactory.
2
NAI, Home Poll 21-52 Part B, November 1911, 'Issue of 
Invitation to Representatives of the Indian Press for 
the Delhi Durbar,' C.J. Stevenson-Moore to Secretary, 
Government of India, Home Department, 4 August 1911.
3
NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913; Home Poll 
37-40 Part B, June 1912, for the week ending 21 May 1912.
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newspaper registered at Delhi on 9 October 1912 and to 
be excused from furnishing security. The District 
Magistrate, H.C. Beadon, ordered that no security was 
necessary because the editor 'had passed through a trial 
of two years in Calcutta during which time he had kept 
out of trouble.'1
With his arrival in Delhi and the outbreak shortly
afterwards of the Greco-Turkish War, Mohamed Ali launched
a vigorous campaign in support of the Red Crescent Medical
2Mission. He immediately encountered active opposition 
from the wealthy, influential, and established leadership 
among the sharif and merchant community in the city and 
the Moderates in the local Moslem League. He appealed 
instead to the petty bourgeoisie and the artisans, and 
received support from the 'New Muslim Party'. Mohamed Ali
1
NAI, Home Poll 142-149 Part A, October 1913» 'Demand of 
Security, Under Section 3 (l) of the Indian Press Act,
1910 (i of 1910), From the Keepers of the Comrade and the 
Baitul Sharaf Press, Delhi, For the publication of 
objectionable writings in the Comrade and Rafiq Newspapers, 
Respectively,' quoted in the order of the District 
Magistrate dated 8 August 1913» Mohamed Ali contended 
that he had to see several high officials before he was 
exempted from security. He also describes the other 
vissicitudes of his journalistic career in Delhi in My 
Life a Fragment, pp. 71-85»
2
The idea for the Mission originated with Dr M.A. Ansari 
who was to lead it when it departed from India in December 
1912. It was designed to make up for the deficiencies 
of the German Red Cross Hospital, the British Red Crescent 
Hospital (sent by Ameer Ali) and the French Red Cross 
Hospital all of whose doctors through lack of skill or 
interest 'deliberately maimed and dismembered the patients 
when a conservative treatment would have saved the lives 
and limbs of many....' NAI, Home Poll 1^9 Part B,
November 1913»
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published articles in the Comrade highlighting acts of
sacrifice by contributors to the Red Crescent Society,1
and made a public appeal to 18 of his fellow trustees
at the M.A.O. College to support the transfer of funds
from the Moslem University Fund to the Red Crescent
2Medical Mission.
The rival Turkish Relief Fund received support from 
the leading maulvis of the city, from Hakim Ajmal Khan, 
the Panjabian community, the Anglo-Arabic School 
Committee and the managing committees of the Fatehpuri 
Mosque and the Jama Masjid. This group, plus the 
Moderates in the Moslem League which had successfully 
controlled the religious enthusiasm of July 1910, 
arranged to have all the skins of the animals which were 
sacrificed at Bakr-Id collected at the Jama Masjid as a
3contribution to the Turkish Relief Fund. Haji Abdul 
Ghaffur distributed free sweets when the city received 
the news on 10 November that the Balkan Confederation had
1
RDDA, Confidential File 25 (191^), weekly Diary of the 
Superintendent of Police, No. 11, 23 November 1912. An 
old man of Chela Lane was asked by a deputation from the 
Delhi Red Crescent Society to contribute. He offered 
them a small box that contained Rs. 1,000 in sovereigns 
and notes. The man was obviously of limited means and 
the sum represented his entire savings, for which Mohamed 
Ali kissed his hands. Another instance concerned a Sayid 
woman. She gave her mehar[marriage portionjwhich her 
’poor' husband had settled on her.
2
NAI, Home Poll 88-91 Part B, December 1912, 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for 
the week ending 12 November 1912.
3 RDDA, Confidential File 25 (191^0 » weekly diary of the 
Superintendent of Police No. 11, 23 November 1912. They 
collected over 1,100 hides and skins.
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been defeated at Adrianople; and Syed Ahmad, Imam of the 
Jama Masjid, Maulvi Ibrahim of Mas.j id Hussania, Maulvi 
Muhammad Said, and Nawab Bashiruddin Ahmad urged an 
audience of 5,000 people at the Jama Masjid after the 
Juma Prayers on Friday 22 November to contribute to the 
Fund.1
The supporters of the Turkish Relief Fund had the 
added advantage of support from some members of the Hindu 
community. The Raja of Darbhanga had visited Delhi at 
the beginning of October and advised his fellow Hindus to 
find some way to reduce the number of cows killed at Id. 
The Hindus offered to contribute liberally to the Fund 
in return for a promise that conscientious efforts would 
be made to reduce the number of kine killed. These 
contributions, plus collections, plus the sale of skins
and hides from Bakr-Id enabled the sponsors of the Fund
2to despatch Rs. 37,000 to Turkey.
The results of the agitation for the Red Crescent
Medical Mission and the Turkish Relief Fund were obvious
to some observers. The Director of Criminal Intelligence
wrote to Hailey that he had received independent reports
1
RDDA, Confidential File 25 (191^0, daily diary of the 
Deputy Superintendent of Police, D.I.D., 12 November 1912, 
and weekly diary of the Superintendent of Police No. 11,
23 November 1912. Before the usual evening prayers,
2,000 men held a meeting in support of the Turkish Relief 
Fund .
2
RDDA, Confidential File 25 (191^0, daily diary of the 
Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., 10 November
1912. The move to reduce kine-killing received the 
warmest support of Hakim Ajmal Khan.
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that ’there was a good deal of excitement among
Muhammadans in Delhi who were becoming anti-British in
their feelings. ' 1 The Chief Commissioner observed that
although Mohamed Ali had whipped up a remarkable amount
of enthusiasm 'among men of the young barrister type
and students,' the older men opposed him and the
supporters of the Turkish Relief Fund would have nothing *
2to do with the Medical Mission. Mohamed Ali and Dr 
Ansari did succeed, however, in obtaining the necessary 
funds for the Medical Mission and it duly departed from 
Bombay on 15 December 1912.
It would seem, then, that there were at least two 
types of pan-Islamism manifest in Delhi in late 1912.
The older, established and responsible Muslims tended to 
look upon the plight of Turkey as worthy of support.
They were quite willing to contribute to the Turkish 
Relief Fund; but such contributions were in no way designed 
to be an expression of anti-British sentiment. For the 
conservative Muslims there was no conflict of loyalties 
between support of the government and support of the Fund. 
Their response to the attempt to assassinate Lord Hardinge, 
namely, the collection of Rs. 15,000 on 24 December 1912 
at the Jama Masjid, underscored their loyalty to the 
British Government in a most convincing manner. The pan- 
Islamism of the 'New Muslim Party', which was involved 
in Extremist politics, looked upon the Red Crescent 
Society as a direct expression of hostility towards the 
Christians in general and towards the British Government 
in particular.
1 RDDA, Confidential File 25 (1914), C.R. Cleveland to 
W.M. Hailey, 2 December 1912.
2 NAI, Home Poll 1^9 Part B, November 1913»
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Mohamed Ali looked upon the despatch of the Red 
Crescent Medical Mission as a sign of support for, and 
a vindication of, his anti-Christian views. The Turco- 
Italian and the Greco-Turkish Wars had convinced him 
that there was a Christian conspiracy afoot against the 
Muslims, and the annulment of the partition of Bengal 
plus the decision over the Muslim university drove him 
to the conclusion that a policy of loyalty to the British 
Government would convey no rewards at all. He became 
very active from 1913 onwards in an attempt to disseminate 
his views to the petty merchants, the lower classes such 
as artisans and labourers, and the students in the Muslim 
community. The support that he derived from the Extremists 
was helpful, but it was limited, and he therefore launched 
a campaign to generate a popular movement which would 
wrest concessions from the government. 1 His passion for
Compare for instance the moderation of a statement in 
the Comrade on the Balkan War on 20 July 1912: 'It is a 
matter of common knowledge that all the stages of the war 
are being most closely followed in every home in Moslem 
India. The least suspicion that the British Government 
after its declaration of neutrality was siding with Italy, 
when there seemed to be no chance of an Italian triumph, 
would spread like wildfire among the Moslem community, 
and may lead to most serious consequences,' with a speech 
he made at Lahore after the departure of the Red Crescent 
Medical Mission (28 January 1913) : 'At first the British 
Government declared a policy of neutrality, but that 
policy was soon changed and at the funeral of this false 
declaration Mr Asquith was the chief mourner. Do not 
think that your cries have had no effect on British 
foreign policy. The English will either have to abandon 
their claim of republicanism and declare that they will 
rule us tyrannically with stick and sword, or the voice 
of seven crores of Muhammadans will surely have its 
effect. Otherwise we will break the heads of the English 
with the same stick of republicanism which they themselves 
have shown us.' NAI, Home Poll 1^9 Part B, November 1913«
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pan-Islamism provided the idiom for his appeal and almost 
all the issues he raised stemmed from his concern for 
the international unity of Islam.
The first attempt by Mohamed Ali to popularise his 
views took the form of the publication of a pamphlet 
from Turkey entitled ’Come over into Macedonia and Help 
Us,' which vividly illustrated Christian atrocities in 
the Greco-Turkish War. He republished the pamphlet in 
four instalments in the Comrade from 17 May to 7 June 
1913» This act eventually led to the forfeiture of the 
Comrade for those issues and the imposition of a maximum 
security of Rs. 2,000 on 8 August 1913« His appeal to 
the High Court in Calcutta, however, cleansed him from 
any stigma and he successfully retained his character 
as a journalist of position and repute.1
The Hamdard, an Urdu-language daily, was designed 
to communicate Mohamed Ali’s views to a wider audience
1
NAI, Home Poll 71-76 Part A, July 1913, 'Proscription 
under Section 12 of the Indian Press Act, 1910, of a 
Pamphlet Entitled "Come over into Macedonia and Help 
Us" Home Poll 40-41 Part A, August 1913, 'Forfeiture 
of the Copies of the Comrade and Hamdard Newspapers 
Containing Reprints of the Pamphlet "Come over into 
Macedonia and Help Usn ’; Home Poll 1-3 Part A, October
1913, 'Institution by Mr Mohamed Ali, Editor of the 
Comrade, of an Appeal before the High Court, Calcutta, 
Regarding the Forfeiture of the Pamphlet Entitled "Come 
over into Macedonia and Help Us."' The Comrade of 17,
24 and 31 May, and 7 June and the Hamdard of 6, 7, 8,
14, 17, 19» 21, 24, 2 5, 26, 27 and 28 June were forfeited 
on 17 August 1913«
2 3 1
than the English-educated audience of the Comrade.1 It
was planned in May 1912 to give a ’thorough grounding in
Sociology and Economics, with a view to bring them [the
Muslims ] into line even with the advanced communities of
2Europe.’ The Hamdard finally commenced operation on 16 
May 1913» when one of its first duties was to publish 
the rules for the newly organised An.juman-i-Khuddam-i- 
Kaaba [Society of the Servants of the Kaaba ].
The Society of Servants was designed to give organised 
support to the widely developing sentiment of pan-Islamism. 
The idea of a society had first been mooted by Mushir 
Husain Kidwai in January, but it was not firmly established 
until 6 May 1913 at Lucknow. The Society immediately 
established headquarters in Delhi with Shaukat Ali,
1
Mohamed Ali stated that; 'The Hamdard was intended to 
educate the people whereas the Comrade had to be their 
spokesman as well, and to act as a medium between them 
and their rulers, and I was anxious to exclude from the 
former all exciting topics such as could not be avoided 
from the latter in the heat of advocacy....I was adamant 
and the readers of the Hamdard were not permitted to 
overhear what passed between the Comrade and the 
Government in England. 1 My Life: A Fragment, p. 8 3. The 
circulation of the Hamdard was 3,500, the Zamindar 4,000, 
and the Al-Hilal 1,000. NAI, Home Poll 33-38 Part A, 
November 1 9 1 4 : 'Request made by Sir Valentine Chirol to 
His Excellency the Viceroy for Information on the Subject 
of the Muhammadan Situation in India.»
2
NAI, Home Poll 37-40 Part B, June 1912, for the week 
ending 21 May 1912.
2 3 2
Mohamed Ali's brother, as secretary. The two brothers
then began a recruiting campaign for the organisation
and in addition to the publication of the rules in the
Hamdard, addressed an audience of 5»000 at the Jama
Masjid in Delhi on 23 May outlining the purpose of the
Society. The brothers called upon the audience to fulfil
their duty under Islamic law to protect the sacred
shrine of the Prophet and then invited everyone
(including the C.I.D.) to visit the premises of the
Society in Delhi to satisfy themselves about the
2legitamacy of its activities. Mohamed Ali followed 
this speech with articles in the Comrade of 31 May and 
7 June (which also carried the third and fourth
1
The idea for the An.juman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba did not 
receive much popularity when it was first mooted. Kidwai 
sent the proposal to Abdul Kalam Azad, the editor of the 
Al-Hilal (Calcutta), but nothing further was done.
Shaukat Ali then called for the formation of such a 
society in a speech at Amritsar on 31 March. Abdul Kalam 
subsequently published the scheme on 23 April and the 
meeting of six men at Abdul Bari's residence on 6 May 
resulted from that. The six men were Abdul Bari, M.H. 
Kidwai, Shaukat Ali, Mohamed Ali, Hakim Abdul W£li of 
Lucknow and Dr Naziruddin Hassan, Barrister, Lucknow. 
Abdul Bari was elected the Khadim-ul-Khuddam, Kidwai and 
Shaukat Ali were the secretaries and the other three were 
Mutamidin Khidim-ul-Khuddam. NAI, Home Poll 7 Deposit, 
July 1913, 'Formation in the United Provinces of a New 
Society Called the "Khuddam-i-Ka1aba" or Servants of the 
Ka'aba'; Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914, 'Reports 
Regarding the Society Started in the United Provinces 
Called the An .juman- i-Khuddam-i-Kaabat or "Society of the 
Servants of the Kaaba"'. The rules for the Society 
appear in Appendix A of this Chapter.
2
RDDA, Confidential File 25 (191^-)» confidential diary 
of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., for the 
week ending 30 May 1913.
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instalments of the pamphlet 'Come Over into Macedonia 
and Help U s 1).1 He stated that:
Russia is openly casting greedy eyes over Armenia. 
France is fomenting disturbances in Syria and 
rousing the Arabs against the Turks, just as 
Russia is encouraging Armenians to entice the 
Kurds into acts of violence in order to make the 
excuse of intervention plausible0 Trouble is 
also brewing in Baghdad and Basra, and one may be 
sure that every effort will be made to make the 
differences of Arabs and Turks in the Hedjaz and 
Yemen as dangerously acute as possible. The future 
of Turkey is, therefore, no less dark and gloomy 
than her recent past.
With the realisation of all these depressing 
facts, can the Moslems of the world seek solace 
in indolence and indifference to the fate of their 
holy places? Can they sit with folded hands, 
ruminating over the past or fretting against the 
stern and inexorable decrees of fate? No, Mr 
Asquith is right; 'things can never be as they 
were;' and if those Moslems who have hitherto 
formed part of the ruling races of mankind cannot 
safeguard the effective sovereignty of some Moslem
1
Mohamed Ali used this opportunity to express his anti- 
British sentiments as is evident in the following 
quotation: 'We who are living today have witnessed 
perhaps one of the most decisive wars of any period in 
history. Mr Asquith announced even before the war was 
over that "things can never be again as they were," that 
"the victors are not to be robbed of the fruits which 
cost them so dear", and that "the map of Eastern Europe 
has to be recast." Those who foretold a future for the 
Turk only in Asia have occasion to rejoice as the true 
prophets of evil. But even some of them, such as His 
Highness the Agha Khan, who could not but feel distressed 
at this result, cannot foretell with anything like the 
same certainty whether Turkey's control over her Asiatic 
empire would be allowed to remain adequate and effective. 
Her robe of power is indeed in rags and tatters, and 
even these are being pulled at and torn by grasping hands 
on every side. ' NAI, Home Poll 49 Part A, May 1914.
234
State over the holy places of Islam, the 
hundreds of millions of Musalmans, who are 
numbered amongst the subject races, must now 
make up their minds to do so.
To the Mussalmans of India we have just 
one word to say. You know well enough that the 
protection of the holy places of Islam is a 
religious duty which is as much yours as that 
of the Turks, and you also know that it is a 
duty more sacred than any other.1
These appeals to Muslim sentiment and the rules of the 
Society tended to arouse more suspicion than support. 
The suspicion which Muslim leaders exhibited toward 
Abdul Bari and Shaukat Ali on their visits to Bareilly, 
Badaun, Delhi, Ajmere, and Deoband from 2 June onwards 
led the organisers of the Society to reframe its rules 
so that the ’oath* became a 'promise* and the words 
'sacrifice their lives and property' became 'give all 
possible help,' changes which were published on 9 July
1913. 2
1
NAI, Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914, report of F. 
Isemonger, Assistant Director of Criminal Intelligence, 
dated Delhi, 20 February 1914.
2
The Viceroy noted on 26 June 1913 as follows: 'I 
gather from Mr Mazar-ul-Haque that the Society is one of 
no importance and will soon fizzle out. It should however 
be watched to see that it does not become a disloyal 
organisation.' NAI, Home Poll 7 Deposit, July 1913. He 
made this observation even though Mohamed Ali had 
specifically stated in the Comrade on 7 June that 'nothing 
is farther from the minds of the organisers of this 
movement than to identify themselves with lovers of secret 
societies, and the only revolution that this organisation 
aims at creating is a revolution which would convert 
millions of illiterate, indifferent, indolent and 
unproductive Moslem units into a united and well regulated 
society of productive workers, true to themselves and 
therefore false to none.1 Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914.
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Mohamed Ali was further able to gain a great deal 
of popular support, and the grudging support of the more 
wealthy members of the community, when he protested 
vigorously against the demolition of a mosque in the new 
imperial area of Delhi. The mosque of Maulana Abdul 
Haq (the famous traditionalist of the eighteenth century), 
which was located at Okla, was in such a bad state of 
disrepair that the engineer in charge ordered it to be 
demolished for a new road. Mohamed Ali immediately seized 
upon this desecration and began to whip up public protest 
to have it restored.' The Chief Commissioner handled the 
situation very judiciously and agreed to restore the 
damaged portion and to avoid the demolition of any other 
mosques in the area. The Comrade of 24 June published the 
successful outcome of the incident.1
The next issue but one of the journal on 5 July 
carried a report about the demolition of a mosque at 
Cawnpore. It also published the correspondence which 
Mohamed Ali had had with the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir
1
RDDA, Revenue File 39 Part B 1915» 'Demolition and 
Restoration of Maulana Abdul Haq's Mosque Near Okla.' All 
of the temples, mosques, tombs, and graveyards in the area 
of the new imperial capital were surveyed and classified 
into a three-fold system as shown in RDDA, Revenue File 
47 (lO) Part B 1914, 'Lists of Religious Buildings Which 
Should (a ) Be Preserved; (b ) Not Be Destroyed Unless 
Destruction Is Imperative; and (c) Not Be Preserved.'
The Chief Commissioner received an enormous number of 
petitions which requested the preservation of this and 
that sacred building or monument. Hailey's policy was 
not to destroy any of these if there was any possible 
alternative available. New Delhi today still reflects 
many of the compromises reached in those early years.
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James Meston, and bemoaned the fact that the Governor 
had refused to act sagaciously in the matter. Mohamed 
Ali then began a campaign to have the mosque restored. 
This campaign received a tremendous fillip from the 
return of Dr Ansari from Turkey.
Dr Ansari was an active leader of the Extremists 
of the ’New Muslim Party', even though he had only 
arrived in India in 1910 after ten years in England.
He was born in 1880 and spent his youth at Yusafpur in 
Gazipur District in the United Provinces. He was 
educated at Benares, Allahabad, Hyderabad, and Madras, 
and received his M.D., M.S. in 1901 in London where 
he became the house surgeon at Charing Cross Hospital.
He returned to India in 1910, set up practice in Delhi, 
and immediately became involved in the Moslem League.
As a member of the ’New Muslim Party1 he was the first 
to suggest the idea of the Red Crescent Medical Mission. 
He was described by one observer as follows:
Dr Ansari was the head of the Mission and to 
me, the most representative Indian Muslem. 
Externally he has not changed much. The 
same small moustache, the brooding mouth 
with the delicate design which one associated 
with the Hindu, very black energetic eyebrows 
stretched over his deepset eyes. They were 
purposeful eyes, nay kind in spite of the 
unwavering determination in their depths. His
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clothes had that masculine elegance which one 
associated with London. He talked very little, 
but always to the point....-*-
Dr Ansari had written letters back to India from 
Macedonia, some of which were published in the Comrade. 
He criticised the German Red Cross Hospital, the British 
Red Crescent Hospital sent by Ameer Ali, and the French 
Red Cross Hospital, and praised the Ottoman Croissant 
Rouge. A letter by Dr Ansari which appeared in the 
Indian Daily Telegraph of 29 June 1913 claimed that the 
British Red Crescent Medical Mission had a death to
admission ratio of 18 per cent while the All-India.
2Mission's ratio was only 0.5 per cent. The newspaper 
articles kept people informed about the activities of 
the Mission and gave the inhabitants of Delhi a special 
interest in the war and in Turkey.
Dr Ansari and the Medical Mission arrived at Delhi
Station on 10 July 1913« They were greeted by several
thousand enthusiastic supporters who completely overran 
3the premises. The following day, Friday the 11th, he
Halide' Edibe, Inside India (London, 1937)» P. 17. It 
is interesting to note other comments she made about Dr 
Ansari. 'Among Muslems he is a rare example of a 
doctor who has adopted the modern method; for in India 
the old school of medicine dominates. Dr Ansari may be 
considered as bridging the Muslem outlook and Western 
science. His conception of citizenship is based on 
equality and co-operation among Indians of conflicting 
sects and ideas.'
2
NAI, Home Poll 100-118 Part A, October 1913» R. Burn 
to Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 17 
September 1913»
3 RDDA, Confidential File 10 (1913)» 'Inadvisability of 
Allowing the Delhi Railway Station to Become a Scene of 
Political Agitation. '
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spoke to about 5» 000 people in the Jama Masjid after the 
Jama prayers. His speech was passionately pan-Islamic 
and anti-Christian. He said the Turks had to fight not 
only the actual belligerents but also the European 
countries who covertly assisted them. He saw towns and 
cities (which had been captured by the Christians) in 
which the Muslim quarters were brutally destroyed while 
the Christian quarters went untouched. He advised his 
audience not to forget these atrocities when they dealt 
with Christians who were determined to wipe Islam 'off 
the face of the earth.' Mohamed Ali, who was present 
on the occasion and dressed in the uniform of the Mission, 
also spoke and read a poem by Maulvi Shibli Naumani of 
Lucknow which expressed unequivocal anti-British 
sentiment s.1
Mohamed Ali launched his campaign against the
2sacrilege at Cawnpore in earnest on 12 July 1913« He 
stated his reluctance to deal with the case, even though
1
NAI, Home Poll 14-9 Part B, November 1913» RDDA, 
Confidential File 16 (1 9 13)» 'Terms under Which the Jama 
Masjid Was Made over by Government to the Muhammadan 
Community of Delhi.'
2
The Cawnpore mosque affair is a very long and detailed 
episode which is primarily outside the scope of this 
thesis. Only a small portion of the affair is given in 
order to illustrate Mohamed Ali's views. It is based 
upon NAI, Home Poll 100-118 Part A, October 1913 and 
Home Poll 142-149 Part A, October 1913» 'Demand of 
Security, Under Section 3(l) of the Indian Press Act 
1910 (i of 1910), From the Keepers of the Comrade and 
Baitul Sharaf Press, Delhi, For the Publication of 
Objectionable Writings in the Comrade and Rafique 
Newspapers, Respectively.'
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his ’Urdu contemporaries 1 had been exercising themselves 
over it for some weeks, because of the passions which 
could be aroused so easily over such an issue.1 But he 
rued the fact that he had tried to negotiate privately 
and had not led a public agitation to stop the 
'sacrilege'. He foresaw a danger in the whole affair:
Sir James's courtesy has been unable, even if it 
has ever attempted, to disguise his firm beliefs 
that what the officials say must be unreservedly 
accepted, that what officials desire to do must 
receive the backing of the head of the Indian 
Civil Service in the province, and that the best 
policy to deal with Moslem feelings is to teach 
the Mussalmans their proper place in an official
1
The Municipal Committee of Cawnpore in 1909 decided to 
carry out certain improvements in the city to facilitate 
future expansion and transportation. One such improve­
ment was the realignment of the road that ran through 
Machli Bazaar. The Improvement Trust indicated that 
certain temples and mosques would suffer partial or total 
demolition for which compensation would be paid. As 
this had occurred elsewhere in the Province on other 
occasions and no special objection was raised, the owners 
of the temples were notified and asked to remove their 
images. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Province visited 
the city in November 1912 and upon special representation 
that one was particularly historic and architecturally 
significant he accepted the suggestion that the road be 
made a dual carriageway which copld straddle the temple. 
Local Muslims then began to question why the mosque at 
Machli Bazaar should lose its dalan and instituted 
petitions to the Municipal Committee from February to 
May 1913 to stop the demolition. The attempts to stop 
the demolition through the Municipal Committee or through 
appeals to the Lieutenant-Governor failed and contact was 
made with leading journalists and Moslem League officials. 
Mohamed Ali was one of the first outsiders to petition 
Meston, an acquaintance for some years, to reverse the 
decision. The Raja of Mahmudabad also contacted Meston 
to which Meston replied that the decision was final and 
irrevoc able.
2ho
cosmology wherein the Anglo-Indian at one 
time refused to occupy any place but the 
first, and after the sagacious and cheerful 
acceptance of the inevitable by the New 
statesmenship equally persistently refuses 
to occupy any place lower than second.
Evidently the Moslem ’nuisance' was discussed 
in the highest circles recently and Sir 
James's view prevailed. The Cawnpore 
sacrilege may, therefore, be taken to be the 
first of a series of lessons which the  ^
undisciplined Moslem is to be taught....
Mohamed Ali hinted at the official irregularities which 
preceded the demolition (irregularities on which Lord 
Hardinge noted 'I hope that these irregularities will 
not become known'). And he fully alluded to the 
demolition on which the local collector had set his 
heart as an accomplished fact which could be presented 
to the Muslim as one more 'final' decision, and 
concluded that such government action proved that they 
desired to unite Hindus and Muslims.
The Comrade of 25 July delivered a tour de force on
the affair. In a very long article, Mohamed Ali refuted
all the official announcements on the subject which had
appeared since February 1913» He especially took issue
with the charge that agitators from outside Cawnpore
were the first to take any notice of the situation, and
that after a Hindu temple in the vicinity of the mosque3had been spared. He reiterated the accusation of the
1 NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913«
2 NAI, Home Poll 100-118 Part A, October 1913» note 
by Lord Hardinge, 12 September 1913»
3 The government later revealed maps to show that 
this was untrue.
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Muslims of Cawnpore that the local government decided to 
demolish the dal an because the temple had been spared.
And finally he pilloried the ineptitude and 
authoritarianism of the local European officials.
The main punch of the article of the 25th, however,
was delivered upon the ’supreme issue*. Mohamed Ali
was emphatic that the dalan was an integral part of the
mosque and, as such, sacrosanct. He pointed to the fact
that five maulvis had signed a fatwa which declared that
no mutawalla could accept compensation for the demolition
of a sacred portion of a mosque.1 Mohamed Ali concluded
that the integrity of the government could only be
restored if the dalan were rebuilt, and that this was
the absolute minimum that the Muslim community expected
of the authorities. He further maintained that the
incident seriously undermined the government’s claim
that it looked upon the different religious communities
with an impartial eye, and demanded that, * the Government
of India and even the British Parliament if need be,
shall have to enunciate once more the principle of British
2religious neutrality to enforce its rigid application.* 
Mohamed Ali then advised the Muslims of Cawnpore not to 
put their trust in Sir James Meston because he had become
1
The government was in a particularly weak position.
It remarked time and again that it had taken the advice 
of several outstanding Muslims about the sanctity of the 
dalan, and had been reassured that it did not form part 
of the sacred area of the Mosque. They could not, 
however, reveal the names of those who had given their 
advice since those persons would bear the brunt of what 
was becoming a vicious public debate.
2
NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913*
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'unhinged* as a result of the intensity of Muslim feeling 
which was displayed over the Balkan War. The Muslims of 
India, and especially those in Cawnpore according to 
Mohamed Ali could only have faith in their God and act 
with vigour.
A large number of Muslim agitators among whom were 
Mohamed Ali, Shaukat Ali and Abdul Kalam Azad, visited 
the scene of the sacrilege in the last week of July and 
delivered several inflammatory speeches. It was no 
surprise, therefore, that a crowd should gather at the 
Mosque on 3 August after attending a meeting at the 
Idgah where Azad Subhani delivered an especially 
inflammatory speech and attempt to rebuild the portion 
which had been demolished with the rubble which had not 
been removed since 1 July. The police attempted to 
interfere and the Muslim industrial workers of Cawnpore 
who formed a substantial portion of the crowd, took the 
opportunity and the availability of brickbats to resist 
the police. The incident snowballed as latent passions 
came to the surface and eventually a large force of 
police dispersed the crowd after killing 18 rioters (and 
one of their colleagues), wounding 2 7, and arresting 189 
men and boys. In reply to the 4l police who were 
wounded the Administration could point to 522 expended 
cartridges. A great deal was to be said about this ugly 
tragedy in the ensuing weeks and months.1
1 The formal petitions of complaint against the demolition 
of the mosques at Delhi and Cawnpore and against the riot 
at Cawnpore appear in NAI, Home Poll 1-36 Part B, November 
1913> 'Petitions Complaining against the Destruction of a 
Portion of the Machli Bazaar Mosque at Cawnpore.' The 
comments of the members of Council appear in Appendix B 
of this Chapter.
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Mohamed Ali had been ordered on 8 August to deposit 
a security of Rs. 2,000; but this did not dissuade him 
from publishing a long article about the riot in the 
first issue of the Comrade to appear after the riot on
11 or 12 August. He described a meeting at the Idgah in 
Delhi on the 10th of 5»000 Muslims who, peacefully but 
forcefully voiced their indignation over the riot. (This 
meeting marked the coalition of the two Muslim parties 
that had existed late in 1912, of which more later.)
The president of the meeting was Hafiz Abdul Aziz, a 
pleader by profession. He was a member of the Anglo- 
Arabic School Committee, secretary of the Managing 
Committee of the Fatehpuri Mosque, secretary of the local 
branch of the Moslem League, and president of the Anjuman-
i-Muin-ul-Talim [the butchers ]. Two other conveners of 
the meeting were Zikur Rahman, also a pleader and 
MUmtazuddin, who was the owner of a printing press.
The issue of the Comrade which appeared on 11 August
carried several inflammatory articles. Mohamed Ali
accused the District Magistrate of provoking a riot to
justify his arbitrary actions and to 'teach the Mussalmans
another lesson.' He revelled in lurid scenes of
'children mangled to death or crying in agony, venerable
old men hunted out of the places of hiding in the mosque
and gored with spears.'1 He raised the question whether
the Magistrate had ordered the police to shoot in order
to disperse a crowd or to kill people. If the former
was the case, then it was strange that so many of the
2injured had received wounds in their backs.
1 NAI, Home Poll 142-149 Part A, October 1913.
2 NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913.
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The following issue, dated 16 August (but published 
on 21 or 22 August), carried an article entitled ’The 
Battle of Nauknagar (From our Special Military Correspond­
ent). ’ It was a satirical account of the riot and 
included the characters 'Little Simian,' 'Tileria,’ and 
'Field Marshall D'Odd1 which corresponded to Sim, Tyler, 
and Dodd, the superintendent of police, the district 
magistrate and the deputy superintendent of police. In 
reply to reports of humane treatment of the wounded, 
Mohamed Ali wrote the following:
Too high praise cannot be given to the Moltke 
and the Napoleon of this great battle. And yet 
they made of war something even more tender than 
peace. When under their orders and their very 
eyes the vital thread of old men were severed, 
it was done with all the unctuous tenderness of 
a Moslem performing the qurbani. When young lads 
were shot at, they were potted with the utmost 
care and at the shortest possible range so that 
the struggle for nirvana may be of the mildest.
When the boys of ten and twelve had to be passed 
on from this life to the life eternal, the 
journey was made as soft and easy for them as 
that of the Scotland Express from Euston. From 
life's glad history to death's dark mystery they 
were hurled without an interval of painful 
suspense or superfluous ceremony. The young were 
handled so lovingly and the old so kid-glovingly 
that it won frank admiration from the bazaar men 
and women.-*-
NAI, Home Poll 144-149 Part A, October 1913«
1
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The article despaired that any justice could result from 
the case against the 106 men who were to be tried.1
Mohamed Ali departed for England on 6 September in 
the company of Wazir Hasan. The trip had a dual purpose; 
to protest to the British Government about the Cawnpore 
mosque affair, and to protest against the activities of 
the Balkan allies in Macedonia. The two leaders were 
absent from India for over six months, during which time 
a second meeting to protest the Cawnpore mosque affair 
was organised in Delhi on 19 September and the Anjuman-i- 
Khuddam-i-Kaaba began its activities once again.
The meetings of 10 August and 19 September were the 
first real test of Mohamed Ali's popularity in Delhi.
He had spoken to audiences of 5»000 at the Jama Masjid 
on several preceding occasions, but these were audiences 
of curious, if not indifferent, citizens rather than warm 
supporters. The protest over the Delhi mosque, the return 
of Dr Ansari, the Cawnpore mosque affair and the 
imposition of a security of Rs. 2,000 on Mohamed Ali's
1
Of the original 189 males arrested on 3 August, 55 were 
released unconditionally on account of their youth and
28 others were released because the 'circumstances of 
their arrest left some doubt as to their being concerned 
in the riot.1 The case was scheduled to begin on 18 
October 1913» but Lord Hardinge intervened personally on 
14 October when he visited Cawnpore and pardoned the 
entire group. He also promised that the dal an should be 
rebuilt in the original position but as a raised arcade 
so that traffic could pass below. NAI, Home Poll 100- 
118 Part A, October 1913» R* Burn to Secretary, Government 
of India, Home Department, 30 September 1913; Speeches by 
Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, II, 29-33.
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newspaper combined to impose a religious idiom upon 
political agitation.1 In this way Mohamed Ali was able 
to develop a certain amount of religious enthusiasm 
among some of the traditionalists and fundamentalists 
who looked upon religion as a stronger motive for 
political loyalty than support for a government which 
took for granted the loyalty of the Muslim community.
The annulment of partition and the decision over the 
Muslim university also started to have effect on some 
of the more wealthy merchants.
The main support for Mohamed Ali and for pan- 
Islamism in Delhi came from the hide merchants, the 
shoe merchants, the butchers and the artisans who worked 
with leather. The principal reasons for their support 
were economic and parochial. The artisans who worked
1
The following report from the Commissioner of the Agra 
Division in the United Provinces dated 2 September 1913» 
is one of many illustrations of the type of readership 
that the Comrade reached. 'There is a village called 
Muhammadabad, near Itimadpur, where there are two 
Muhammadan Zamindars, Hasan Ali and Umrao Ali. Their 
house serves for a meeting place for the following: 
Muhammad Abbas Khan, Tahsildar of Itimadpur; Abdul 
Majid, sub-inspector of Tundla (who is a cousin of the 
Tahsildar of Itimadpur); Ahsan-ud-din, railway police 
sub-inspector at Tundla; Kifayat Husain, a railway guard; 
and Maqsud Ali, son of Hafiz Ali, an Aligarh student and 
a relation of Hasan Ali's. This coterie generally hold 
their meetings on Saturdays and Sundays, Maqsud Ali 
bringing papers including the Zamindar and...the Comrade 
.... Mr Welby himself saw Abdul Majid and the Tahsildar 
of Itimadpur on the Tundla platform on the evening of the 
28th August talking to Muhammad Ali, the editor of the 
Comrade, who was a passenger by the mail train. Ali 
Husain is a friend of Muhammad Ali's and all that lot. 
When Dr Ansari passed through here on his return from 
Turkey, he was one of the people who went in deputation 
to greet him. NAI, Home Poll 100-118 Part A, October
1913.
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with leather (excluding those who made shoes, boots,
and sandals who were mainly Hindu), declined by 57 per
cent between 19H  and 19 2 1, a figure not dissimilar to
the previous decade. Likewise, the butchers declined
1by 57 per cent between 1911 and 1921. The decline in
numbers was a definite indication that both groups
suffered from economic hardship, yet their response was
not solely a consequence of economic hardship, since
other artisans who were faced with a declining industry
did not, from all indications, respond in significant
numbers. They responded also because of all the groups
in Muslim society, they were the first to react to
communal tension involving the Hindus. One reason was
that Hindus held these groups in as low esteem as they
did the Chamars, from which caste most likely they had
been converted. Another reason was that the butchers
were the actual slaughterers of cattle, over which issue
rising tension was noticeable from the riots at Ajodhya
2onward. A third reason was that the leather workers 
were completely dependant upon the Chamars for their raw 
materials, and when the Arya Samaj was successful in its 
campaign to make the Chamars anti-Muslim, the tension 
increased immeasurably. The shoe merchants also suffered 
in this regard as they were completely dependant upon one
1 See Table 3-D, Chapter One.
2 There were always isolated occurrences adding fuel to 
the communal fire. For example the publication of a 
picture which showed the killer of cows as a swine­
headed monster, while not causing an immediate response 
or protest, obviously had some effect which could become 
a latent cause for some later activity. RDDA, Confidential 
File 76 (1 9 1 3), 'Proposed Proscription of the Picture 
Entitled "The Cow Containing 84 Gods . 1’ 1
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group of Hindu artisans, namely the Chamars, for the 
marketing of their product. They looked upon the opening 
of a shoe shop by a Hindu in 1910 as an attempt to 
penetrate a trade over which there existed a Muslim 
monopoly. The anti-Muslim campaign of the Chamars was 
regarded as an attempt to drive Muslims out of the 
leather trade. The butchers were also the object of a 
campaign by the Municipal Committee, a campaign which 
sought to stop the activities of hawkers who walked the 
galis to sell meat and to restrict butchers' shops to 
certain areas. The butchers petitioned against the bye- 
laws and refused to use a completely new market erected 
for them by the Municipal Committee. The agitation of 
Hindus over the construction of the new slaughterhouse 
which was located near a Hindu Temple did little to 
convince the butchers that the only object of civic 
interest in the butchers was sanitation.1 The hide 
merchants were less directly affected in economic terms 
before the War, but they were certainly affected by the 
religious sentiment that was centred upon the leather 
industry. It is most significant that Abdul Rahim, the 
leader of the butchers, was a hide merchant who was 
considered one of the wealthiest men in Delhi and that
1
RDDA, Education File 16 Part A 1 9 1 3» 'Review of the 
Report on the Working of the Delhi Municipality for the 
Year 1912-13'; Education File 23 Part B 1 9 1 3» 'Proceedings 
of the Ordinary Meetings of the Delhi Municipal Committee*; 
Education File 16 Part B 1914, 'Proceedings of the 
Meetings of the Delhi Municipal*Committee *; Education 
File 262 Part B 1914, 'Proposed Construction of a New 
Slaughter House in Delhi.'
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he became closely associated with the Ali brothers and 
the Antjuman- i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba.1
The An,juman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba began its activities 
once again in October 1913» after refusing to have 
anything to do with the Cawnpore mosque affair. It 
held its first meeting at Delhi on Sunday 26 October.
At this ’well attended’ meeting the two shaidars 
[votaries], Syed Ayub Ahmad of Shajahanpur, and Syed 
Manzur Ali of Delhi, described the history and spoke 
of the glory of the birth-place and home of the Prophet. 
And though they did not dwell upon any actual danger to 
the holy places, they stated that it was the duty of 
every Muslim to unite against an impending attack. The 
Central Committee published a report on 31 October in 
which it claimed a membership of 3»^31» There was, as 
yet, no local branch in the city.
The Society began to gather increased support as 
the result of a meeting of the Central Committee at 
Delhi on 15 February 1914. The Committee decided to 
apply for formal recognition from the government so that 
no doubt should exist about its aims. Abdul Bari
1
Chaudhri Abdul Rahim, who was the contractor that 
supplied meat to the northern army, was characterised 
as superstitious and gullible, though he knew the price 
of a commissariat contractor. 'Like many of the 
butchers he is a bigot; but I think money plays a very 
important part in his outlook and his leanings toward 
making a position are probably pretty strong.1 RDDA, 
Confidential File 90 (1915)» 'Influx of Baluchis to the 
Nomana School in Delhi and Enquiries in Connection 
therewith,' note by G.F. deMontmorency, 20 October 1915»
2
NAI, Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914.
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proceeded  to c arry  out t h i s  r e s o l u t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  the 
S o c i e t y  was d is a p p o in t e d  at the V i c e r o y ' s  response  w h ich  
was co m p le t ely  n e u t r a l . 1 A s e r i e s  o f  meetings  then  took 
p lac e  at D e l h i  on 19 A p r i l ,  4 May,  21 May,  and 1 J u n e .
T h e  main  speakers  were M aulana  S h i b l i ,  Mohamed A l i ,  
Shaukat  A l i ,  and Azad S u b h a n i  ( o f  Cawnpore mosque f a m e ) .  
T h e  m e e t i n g s ,  w hich  were ' w e l l  a t t e n d e d ' ,  were the  venue 
o f  such  comments as what degree  of c i v i l i s a t i o n  could  be 
c la im ed  b y  a n a t i o n  w hich  c o n s id e re d  that  w h ite  men were 
e n t i t l e d  to every  p r i v i l e g e  and that  b l a c k  men were only  
f i t  f o r  s u b j e c t i o n ;  or that  the C h r i s t i a n  n a t i o n s  had 
combined to wipe I s l a m  o f f  the f a c e  of  the e a r t h ;  or that  
r e a l  p rog ress  meant the growth  of  a s p i r i t u a l  f e r v o u r  
w h ic h  imbued the Muslims o f  old w ith  a d e s i r e  f o r  
ind ep en d en ce  and s e l f - s a c r i f i c e .  The m e e t in g s ,  however ,  
d id  not draw as lar g e  au die nc e s  as the F r i d a y  m ee ting s  
in  the mosque.
Mohamed A l i  supported  the s e r i e s  of m eetings  held  b y  
the S o c i e t y  o f  S e r v a n ts  w ith  another  at tac k  on the  
governm ent .  He wrote th ree  a r t i c l e s  betw een  30 May to
13 June  1 9 1 3  in  the Comrade e n t i t l e d  'The  Press  Act and 
P r o s e l y t i z a t i o n . ' I n  these  a r t i c l e s  he commented on the
1
N A I ,  Home P o l l  7 D e p o s i t ,  J u l y  1 9 1 4 ,  'C o rre s p o nd e nc e  
b etween  the P r i v a t e  S e c r e t a r y  to H is  E x c e l l e n c y  the 
V i c e r o y  and M a u lv i  Abdul  B a r i ,  P r e s i d e n t ,  Anjuman-i- 
Khuddam-i-K ' aba (The S e r v a n ts  of the K ' a b a  S o c i e t y )  
R e g a r d i n g  the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-K' aba (The Se r v a n ts  
of  the  K ' a b a  Soc ie ty  ) • '
2
N A I ,  Home P o l l  142- 145  Part B,  June 1 9 1 4 ,  'W e e k ly  
R e p o rts  of  the D i r e c t o r  of  C r im in a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e , '  f o r  
the  weeks  e nd ing  5 May and 19 May 1 9 1 4 ;  Home P o l l  124-
1 2 8  Part  B,  J u l y  1 9 1 4 ,  'W e e k ly  Reports  of  the D i r e c t o r  
o f  C r im in a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e , '  f o r  the weeks e n d i n g  2 J u n e ,
16 June and 30 June 1 9 1 4 .
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i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  the Government of  Punjab  w hich  
f o r f e i t e d  the Badr  ( Q a d i a n )  of  3 0  O c tob e r  1 9 1 3  and w hich  
demanded a maximum s e c u r i t y  o f  R s . 2 , 0 0 0 . ^  The Badr  was 
an Ahmad ia. Muslim  v e r n a c u l a r  jo u r n a l  w h ich  ind ulg ed  in a 
s c u r r i l o u s  r e l i g i o u s  debate  w i t h  an  I n d i a n  C h r i s t i a n .  
Mohamed A l i  d i s c u s s e d  the a r t i c l e s  at great  l e n g t h  in  a 
l e a d e r  in w h ic h  he q u e s t io n e d  the v e r a c i t y  of  the C h r i s t i a n  
b e l i e f  in  immaculate  c o n c e p t i o n  and s e v e r a l  other  b a s i c  
t e n e t s  of  the C h r i s t i a n  f a i t h .  The  Government of  I n d i a  
d e c i d e d  to order  the f o r f e i t u r e  of  the j o u r n a l ' s  s e c u r i t y  
but  had to r e s c in d  th is  d e c i s i o n  b e c a u s e  the o r i g i n a l  
a c t i o n  i n  the Punjab  had b e e n  based  on e xc e r p ts  o f  the 
Bad r  and not a f u l l  t r a n s l a t i o n .  I t  was d ecid ed  that the 
q u e s t i o n a b l e  n a t u r e  of the Punjab  p roc e e ding s  
j e o p a r d i s e d  any a c t i o n  that  the Government of  I n d i a  might 
take  a g a in s t  the Com rade . Mohamed A l i  was thus le t  o f f  
w i t h  a w a r n i n g ,  w h ic h  was a v i c t o r y ,  s in c e  he had been  
warned p r e v i o u s l y  f o r  h i s  a r t i c l e s  on the Cawnpore r io t s  
and the government did  not warn c r i t i c a l  e d i t o r s  t w i c e .
D e s p i t e  government s u s p i c i o n ,  however ,  the S o c i e t y
of  S e r v a n t s  gained  a c e r t a i n  amount of  p o p u l a r i t y .  The
2
t o t a l  membership  was put at over  9 , 0 0 0  by  June  1 9 1 4 .
1
N A I , Home P o l l  12  D e p o s i t ,  August  1 9 1 4 ,  ' P r o p o s a l  to 
F o r f e i t  u n d e r  S e c t i o n  4 ( 2 )  of  the I n d i a n  Press  A c t ,  1 9 1 0  
( i  of  1 9 1 0 ) ,  The S e c u r i t y  of  R s . 2 , 0 0 0  D e p o s it e d  by  the 
K e e p e r  o f  the Comrade and Hamdard Press  in  Respect  of an 
A r t i c l e  W h ic h  Atppeared in  the Comrade Newspaper  o f  6 
June  1 9 1 4  E n t i t l e d  "The  Press  A ct  and P r o s e l y t i z a t i o n " *; 
Home P o l l  180- 182  Part  A ,  J a n u a r y  1 9 1 5 ,  ' O b j e c t i o n a b l e  
A r t i c l e s  P u b l i s h e d  in  the Comrade and Hamdard N ew sp ap ers .  
W a r n i n g  G iven  to the E d i t o r ,  Mr Mohamed A l i . '
2
N A I ,  Home P o l l  124- 128  Part B,  J u l y  1 9 1 4 ,  f o r  the week 
e n d i n g  3 0  June 1 9 1 4 .
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The  l o c a l  b r a n c h  in  D e l h i  had a membership of  2 , 0 0 0 ,  by  
any  measure  an  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  a c h i e v e m e n t . 1 Mohamed A l i ,  
Sh auk at  A l i  and Dr  A n s a r i  succeeded  in  t h e i r  attempt 
to f o r m a l i s e  the c o a l i t i o n  b e tw e e n  some of  the 
e s t a b l i s h e d  l e a d e r s  of  D e l h i  and the 'New  M uslim  P a r t y ' • 
The  p r e s id e n t  of  the l o c a l  b r a n c h  was Say id  Muhammad, 
the  Imam of  the I d g a h ; the s e c r e t a r i e s  were H a j i  Muhammad 
S a d d i q ,  the p r o p r i e t o r  o f  the C e c i l  H o t e l  and H a f i z  
A b d u l  Rahim ,  the h i d e  merchant who had supported  the 
T u r k i s h  R e l i e f  Fund and who was a lso  the s e c r e t a r y  ( t h e n  
p r e s i d e n t )  of  the An.juman- i-Muin-ul-Tal i m. One of  the 
more important members was S h a i k h  A t a u l l a h ,  a p l e a d e r ,  
and the  l e a d e r  o f  the Moslem League»  I t  a lso  in c lu d e d  
s uc h  men as M a u lv i  Ahmad S a i d ,  H a j i  A b d u l  G h a f f a r  who 
was j o i n t - s e c r e t a r y  o f  the l o c a l  Ahl-i-Hadis  C o n f e r e n c e ,  
and S h a i k h  S u r a j u d d i n ,  a member of  the j u n i o r  b r a n c h  of  
the L oharu  f a m i l y .
Mohamed A l i  a d v e r t i s e d  a m e e t i n g  to be held  on 
F r i d a y  24  J u l y  1 9 1 4  a f t e r  the k h u t b a  presum ably  in  
p ursuance  of  the S o c i e t y ' s  aim of  a s s i s t i n g  in the h a j .
T h e  m e e t i n g  was  c a l l e d  to d i s c u s s  t h e  p r o p o s e d  h a j
2
r e g u l a t i o n  and a t t r a c t e d  b etw een  1 , 0 0 0  and 2 , 0 0 0 o 
Mohamed A l i  spoke to the a u die nc e  on the same l i n e s  as 
he had w r i t t e n  in  the Comrade in the past  w eeks .  He 
s c o f f e d  at the id e a  that I n d i a n  p i l g r i m s  were so 
d e s t i t u t e  that  the y  were u n a b le  to pay t h e i r  r e tu r n  f a r e .
1
R D D A ,  C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  7 0  ( 1 4 1 5 ) .
2
T h i s  account is taken  from N A I ,  Home P o l l  259- 262  Part
B,  A ug ust  1 9 1 4 ,  'W e e k ly  Reports  of  the D i r e c t o r  o f  
C r im in a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e , '  f o r  the week e n d i n g  28 J u l y  1 9 1 4 .
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I t  was a simple  c a s e ,  he th o ugh t ,  of  a c c e p t i n g  a fre e  
jo u r n e y  when it  was o f f e r e d ,  the one time that the 
government had paid  the r e tu r n  p a s s a g e s .  He looked  upon 
the tonnage r e s t r i c t i o n s  as an attempt to d r iv e  the two 
Muslim  sh ip  companies out o f  the p i l g r i m  market and an 
attempt to g ive  a monopoly  to an E n g l i s h  f i r m .  He was 
eloquent  in p o i n t i n g  out that  the Government o f  I n d i a  
was w i l l i n g  to c o n t r ib u t e  one l a k h  o f  rupees  o f  p u b l ic  
money fo r  the haj  when it  was im p oss ib le  f o r  it to 
i n f r i n g e  i ts  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e l i g i o u s  n e u t r a l i t y  and 
c o n t r ib u te  to the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  c o s ts  o f  the Cawnpore 
mosque.  A f t e r  he had compared the old and new r e g u l a t i o n s ,  
he asked i f  the audie nc e  would accep t  any in fr in g e m e n t  of  
t h e i r  r e l i g i o u s  d u t i e s .  He r e c e iv e d  a r e s o u n d i n g l y  
n e g a t i v e  r e p l y .  He then  asked i f  peop le  were aware of  the 
e x i s t e n c e  of  a l o c a l  Ha j  Committee.  He r e c e i v e d  the same 
r e p l y  and s ta te d  that  it  was only  b y  a c c id e n t  that  he had 
found out about i t .  S h a ik h  A z i z - u d d i n  i n t e r r u p t e d  him at 
t h i s  point  to conf irm  that there  was such  a committee.  
Mohamed A l i  promptly  responded  that the committee had no 
more u t i l i t y  than  a newborn  c h ild  o f  unknown p a r e n ta g e .
The  m eeting  decided  to d espatch  a telegram  to the 
C h i e f  Commissioner  and the V ic e r o y  to exp re s s  t h e i r  
d is a p p r o v a l  o f  the proposed  r u l e s .  W h i l e  the telegram  
was b e i n g  w r i t t e n ,  Abdul  M a j id  s uggested  that  the Imam 
should be asked to lead  prayers  f o r  the Cawnpore m a rty rs .  
The  Imam consented  and led  the prayers  to c r ie s  of  
' h y p o c r i t e 1 and ' s y c o p h an t*  w i t h  tears  in  h is  e y e s .
When asked to s ig n  the telegram  he r e f u s e d  to do so,  even 
a f t e r  it was po inted  out to him that he had s igned  a 
c o n g r a t u l a t o r y  message to the Shah  o f  P e r s i a  a few  days
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e a r l i e r .  The Imam was then  denounced as a c r e a tu r e  of  
the a u t h o r i t i e s  b e ca use  he had a l l e g e d l y  s ided  w i t h  the 
government in  the Cawnpore mosque d i s p u t e . 1
I t  is i n t e r e s t i n g  to s p e c u l a t e  on the rapprochement
between  the 'New Muslim  Party*  and the e s t a b l i s h e d
l e a d e r s ,  in  v ie w  o f  the f a c t  that Mohamed A l i  did  not
2
know about the H a j  Committee .  I t  is  p o s s i b l e  that the 
Committee was moribund and that  there  was no oc c as io n  
f o r  Mohamed A l i  to l e a r n  o f  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  s in c e  he was 
absent  from D e l h i  when the second m eeting  took p l a c e .
But Mohamed A l i  stated  that  there  was a c a l c u l a t e d
1
He had in  fact  g iven  h i s  o p i n i o n  to S i r  James Meston  
that the d a la n  was not a sacred  part  o f  the Mosque» N A I , 
Home P o l l  100-118  Part  A ,  O c tob e r  1913»  M inute  of  S i r  
James Meston,  21 August 1 9 1 3 .
2
The l o c a l  Ha j  Committee had i ts  f i r s t  m ee ting  on 3 June  
1913»  and c o n s iste d  of  the ten  members of the M a naging  
Committee of  the Jama M a s j id  as ex-off  ic io members, plus  
f i v e  other  l e a d i n g  M usl im s ,  w i th  Hakim  Ajmal  Khan as 
p r e s i d e n t .  I t  in c lu d e d  H a j i  A b d u l  G h a f f a r  and H a j i  
Mohamad S a d d iq ,  b o th  o f  whom became members o f  the 
Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba. The m ee ting  r e fu s e d  to come 
to any  c o n c lu s io n  b e c a u s e  the members did not want to 
become party  to a d e c i s i o n  that  was c e r t a i n  to i n j u r e  
the r e l i g i o u s  s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s  of  t h e i r  c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s .
The C h i e f  Commissioner  d e c id e d  that  the Committee was too 
la r g e  and d ir e c t e d  that  it  should  be r e c o n s t i t u t e d  and 
meet a g a i n .  A s m a lle r  committee met on 7 September 1 9 1 3  
and a g a in  re fused  to make any recommendation because  of  
the in te n s e  f e e l i n g  over  the Cawnpore mosque a f f a i r .  I t  
does not appear to have met o f f i c i a l l y  a f t e r  t h i s .  RDDA, 
E d u c a t io n  F i l e  6 Part  A 1 9 1 3 , 'P rop osed  Formation  o f  a 
Haj  Committee in D e l h i  fo r  the R e l i e f  of  I n d i g e n t  P i l g r i m s ' ;  
E d u c a t io n  F i l e  7 Part A 1 9 1 3 , ' P r o p o s a l s  in  C o n n e ct io n  
w i t h  the Help  of I n d i g e n t  I n d i a n  P i lg r im s  in  the H a d j a z ' ;  
E d u c a t io n  F i l e  72  Part B 1 9 1 4 ,  'Form a tion  o f  a Ha j  
Committee of  D e l h i  P r o v i n c e ' ;  E d u c a t io n  F i l e  1 2 0  Part  B
1 9 1 6 ,  'Conduct of  the Ha j  P i l g r i m  T r a f f i c . '
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attempt to keep  him ignorant  about the e x i s t e n c e  of  the 
Committee ,  I f  this  be so,  it  is p r o b a b l e  that  the 
l e a d i n g  Muslims did  not want the m atter  of  the h a  j to 
become a p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e .  By m aking  it into  a p o l i t i c a l  
i s s u e  Mohamed A l i  p ro b ab ly  s t r a i n e d  what was at b e s t  a 
tenuous  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  The  r e l a t i o n s h i p  was s u b j e c t e d  to 
f u r t h e r  s t r a i n s  in  the course  of  the next  year  w i t h  
d e t r im e n t a l  e f f e c t s .
The tenuous  a l l i a n c e  between  a few  Moderates  of  the 
Moslem L e a g u e ,  a few  w e a l t h y  merchant and p r o f e s s i o n a l  
f a m i l i e s ,  and E x t r e m i s t s  who composed the 'New  Muslim  
P a r t y , '  the s tu d e n t s ,  the p e t t y  b o u r g e o i s i e ,  and f i n a l l y  
those  M uslim  a r t i s a n s  connected  w i t h  l e a t h e r  s u f f e r e d  
from i n c r e a s i n g  s t r a i n s  throughout  the rem ainder  of  1 9 1 4  
and the f i r s t  few  months o f  1915»  One source o f  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  te n s io n  was the i n c r e a s i n g  vehemence o f  the 
p a n - I s l a m i s t s .  At a m e e t in g  o f  the S o c i e t y  o f  S e r v a n t s  
in  D e l h i  on 4 Septem ber ,  A b du l  M a j i d  (who was a t e a c h e r  
at the Madrassah  Nomania o f  w h ich  h i s  f a t h e r  was the 
m ana ge r )  made a v i o l e n t  sp eech  w h ich  he then  r e p e ate d  at 
the  Urs  N izam u d d in  on 10 S e p t e m b e r . 1 He was o f f i c i a l l y  
a member o f  the c e n t r a l  b r a n c h  and the l o c a l  committee 
was un ab le  to c o ntrol  h is  a c t i v i t i e s .
A n o t h e r  source  of  t e n s i o n  in  the a l l i a n c e  between  
d i f f e r e n t  s e c t io n s  of  Muslim s o c i e t y  in  D e l h i  stemmed
1
N A I , Home P o l l  32  D e p o s i t ,  November  1 9 1 4 ,  ' O b j e c t i o n ­
a b l e  Speeches  Made by  One A bdul  M a j i d ,  A N o t o r io u s  
F ir e b r a n d  o f  D e l h i ' ;  Home P o l l  216-217 Part B, December
19 14 ,  'W e e k l y  Reports  of  the D i r e c t o r  of  C r im in a l  
I n t e l l i g e n c e , 1 f o r  the week e n d i n g  15 Septem ber  1914 .
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from Mohamed A l i ’ s f q u r t h  a t t a c k  up on  the government,  an 
a t t a c k  w hich  was f a t a l  f o r  the C om ra d e . 1 The Times  
(London)  ran  a l e a d i n g  a r t i c l e  on 29 August  1 914  e n t i t l e d  
'The  C h oice  o f  the T u r k s . ' Mohamed A l i  wrote a l e a d e r  on
26 September  1 9 1 4  b e a r i n g  the same t i t l e  to rebutt  that 
e d i t o r i a l .  The  government s e i z e d  the  o p p o rt u n ity  to 
a t t a c k  the j o u r n a l i s t ,  and d e c la r e d  Mohamed A l i ' s  s e c u r i t y  
f o r f e i t  and p r o s c r ib e d  the Comrade o f  26 September  1 9 1 4 .  
I r o n i c a l l y  enough ,  the n o t i f i c a t i o n  of  f o r f e i t u r e  was 
announced on 2 November,  one day  a f t e r  the A l l i e s  d e cla r e d  
War on T u r k e y .  A sum of  R s . 1 0 , 0 0 0  was demanded as 
f u r t h e r  s e c u r i t y  in  the event  Mohamed A l i  w ished  to 
continue  h i s  n e w s p a p e r s .  Mohamed A l i  r eacted  im m ediately  
to the f o r f e i t u r e  and ap p e a led  f o r  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  to pay 
the enhanced s e c u r i t y .  He i n s t i t u t e d  a house to house 
canvas 'among b u t c h e r s  and low  c l a s s  M u s l i m s '  of  D e l h i  
(who could  not read the Com rade ) and c o l l e c t e d  R s . ' 4 , 0 0 0
1
N A I , Home P o l l  76-97 Part  A ,  J a n u a r y  1 9 1 5 ,  ' F o r f e i t u r e  
un de r  S e c t i o n  4 ( i )  of  the I n d i a n  Press  A c t ,  1 9 1 0  ( i  of  
1 9 1 0 ) ,  Of  the S e c u r i t y  o f  R s . 2 , 0 0 0  D e p o s ite d  in  Respect  
of  the Comrade and Hamdard Press  and of  A l l  C op ies  of  the 
Newspaper  C a l l e d  the Comrade B e a r i n g  the Date  26 September  
1 9 1 4 ' ;  Home P o l l  265- 292  Part  A ,  F e b r u a r y  1 9 1 5 ,  'Ap p eal  
by  M. Faro oq  A l i ,  K e e p e r  o f  the Comrade and Hamdard P r e s s ,  
D e l h i ,  U n d e r  S e c t i o n  17  o f  the I n d i a n  Press  A c t ,  1 9 1 0 ,  
A g a in s t  the Order  of  the Government of  I n d i a  u n d e r  S e c t i o n  
4 ,  F o r f e i t i n g  the S e c u r i t y  of  R s . 2 , 0 0 0  D e p o s it e d  in 
Respect  of  the Comrade and Hamdard P r e s s ,  D e l h i ,  And A l l  
C opies  o f  the Comrade N e w s p a p e r ,  Dated  26 September  1 9 1 4 ' ;  
Home P o l l  3-8 Part A ,  May 1 9 1 5 ,  ' D i s m i s s a l  b y  the C h i e f  
Court of  the Pun jab  o f  the A p p l i c a t i o n  Made u n d e r  S e c t i o n
17 of  the I n d i a n  Press  A c t ,  1 9 1 0 ,  b y  M. Faro oq  A l i ,
K e e p e r  o f  the Comrade and Hamdard P r e s s . '
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w i t h i n  a f o r t n i g h t . 1 He did  c o l le c t  the  e n t i r e  R s .
1 0 , 0 0 0  but decided  to r e i s s u e  o n ly  the Hamdard from the 
press  of Mumtazuddin  f o r  which  he only  had to d e p o s it  
R s . 2 , 0 0 0 .  I t  appeared  on 29 December 1 9 1 4 .
The outbreak  of  War w ith  T u r k e y  imposed an even
g r e a t e r  burden  upon the a l l i a n c e  betw een  the Muslim
e stab l ishm e n t  and the p an - Is lam is ts  of  D e l h i .  Mohamed
A l i  and the E x t r e m is t s  sought to avert  an open b r e a k
and became s i g n a t o r i e s  o f  a m a n i f e s t o ,  a l o n g  w i t h  69
eminent Muslim l e a d e r s  in  the c i t y ,  to the e f f e c t  that
T u r k e y ’ s d e c l a r a t i o n  of  b e l l i g e r e n c y  was a p o l i t i c a l
2
r a t h e r  than a r e l i g i o u s  d e c i s i o n .  T h i s  compromise was 
negated  the f o l l o w i n g  month, however ,  when the f i r s t  
e d i t i o n  of  the Hamdard to appear  a f t e r  the s e c u r i t y  was 
f o r f e i t e d  c a r r ie d  the S u l t a n ' s  message from the throne  
p r o n o unc ing  a j i h a d ,  and E n ve r  P a s h a ' s  message to the 
Muslim  s o l d i e r s  of  I n d i a ,
Many of  the e s t a b l i s h e d  l e a d e r s  of  Muslim  s o c i e t y  
in  D e l h i  now b egan  to loo k  f o r  excuses  to r e s ig n  from 
the S o c i e t y  of  Se rv a n ts  without  e a r n in g  the a p p r o b a t io n  
o f  t h e i r  c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s . As a p r e te x t  they  s e i z e d  upon 
the rumour that Shaukat  A l i  was i l l e g a l l y  f o r w a r d i n g  
money from the S o c i e t y  to T u r k e y  d e s p it e  T u r k i s h
1
N A I ,  Home P o ll  31  D e p o s i t ,  December 1 9 1 4 ,  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  
Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  in  S p e c i a l  
R e fe re n c e  to the European  W ar ,  For the F i r s t  F o r t n ig h t  
of  November 1 9 1 4 ,  ' W .M ,  H a i l e y  to H. W h e e le r ,  21  
November 1 9 1 4 .
2
N A I ,  Home P o l l  256- 370  Part A ,  December  1 9 1 4 ,  
'A s sur a nc e s  of L o y a l t y  from Muhammadan P u b l i c  Bodies  
and I n d i v i d u a l s  in  C o n n e c t io n  w i t h  the War w i t h  T u r k e y ,  ' 
forwarded  in  W .M .  H a i l e y  to H .  W h e e le r ,  22 November 1 9 1 4 .
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p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  the War on the s id e  of  Germany. The
l o c a l  branch  p u b l i c l y  accused  the c e n t r a l  b ranc h  of  the
m alv e r s at io n  of  funds  and demanded a report  o f
e x p e n d it u r e .  Shaukat  A l i  ignored  the c h a l l e n g e  but the
l e s s  eminent members of the c e n t r a l  committee indulged
in a good deal  of  acrim onious  d e b a t e .  The s i t u a t i o n
reached  a c l im ax  on 12 F e b r u ar y  when the o f f i c e r s  of  the
l o c a l  b ranc h  d isb an d ed  the S o c i e t y .  T h i s  seemed to
s i g n a l i s e  the breakdown  of  the rapprochement , but  it did
l i t t l e  e l s e .  The  A n tjuman-i-Khuddam -i-Kaaba r e t a i n e d  a
membership of  1 , 4 0 0  un de r  new o f f i c e r s . 1 The S o c i e t y  had ,
however ,  lost  most of  i t s  members who had any  s i g n i f i c a n t
resources  of  w e a l t h ,  s t a t u s ,  and power .  The d i s s i d e n t
l e a d e r s  held  a m ee ting  on 15 May 1 9 1 4  u n d e r  the p r e s i d e n c y
of  S h a ik h  A t a u l l a h ,  a p l e a d e r ,  at w h ich  an a u d ie n c e  of  400
condemned the c e n t r a l  committee f o r  i ts  d is r e g a r d  o f  the
2
w ishes  of  the b r a n c h e s .  S e v e r a l  days l a t e r  Ayub A l i  
d i s t r i b u t e d  l e a f l e t s  which  c o n t a in e d  a record  o f  the
1
N A I , Home P o l l  55  D e p o s i t ,  March  1 9 1 5 ,  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  
Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  w i t h  S p e c i a l  
R e fe r e n c e  to the War for  the F i r s t  F o r t n i g h t  of  Fe b r uar y
1 9 1 5 ,  1 VT.M. H a i l e y  to H. W h e e le r ,  1 8  F e b r u ar y  1 9 1 5 ;  Home 
P o l l  4 1 2 - 4 1 5  Part B, A p r i l  1 9 1 5 ,  'W e e k l y  Reports  o f  the 
D i r e c t o r  of  C r im in a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e , '  f o r  the week e n d in g  
9 March 1 9 1 5 ;  Home P o l l  4 l 6 - 4 l 9  Part B, A p r i l  1 9 1 5 ,
'W e e k ly  Reports  o f  the D i r e c t o r  o f  C r im in a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e , '  
f o r  the week e n d i n g  20 A p r i l  1 9 1 5 ;  RDDA, C o n f i d e n t i a l  
F i l e  134 ( 1 9 1 6 ) ,  ' L i s t  of  S o c i e t i e s  and Anjumans  in  D e l h i  
P r o v i n c e . '
2
N A I ,  Home P o l l  8 5 5 - 8 5 8  P a r t  B ,  M ay  1 9 1 5 ,  ' W e e k l y  
R e p o r t s  o f  the D i r e c t o r  o f  C r i m i n a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e , ' f o r  
t he  w eek  e n d i n g  25  M ay  1 9 1 5 «
259
proceeding s  o f  the m e e t in g  and had v i t r i o l  thrown in  h i s  
face  by  A bdu l  M a j i d « 1
The rapprochement b etw een  th.e p an - Is lam is ts  and the 
e s t a b l i s h e d  i n t e r e s t s  in  Muslim  s o c i e t y  ended on 12 
February  1915»  T h e r e a f t e r ,  Mohamed A l i  cont inued  to draw 
support from the low er  c l a s s e s  w h ich  had i n i t i a l l y  been  
drawn to h i s  b a n n e r .  T h ese  groups had a g r e a t e r  i n c e n t i v e  
to f o l l o w  him a f t e r  the outbreak  o f  war  than b e f o r e .
T h is  i n c e n t i v e  was a d r a s t i c  i n c r e a s e  in  p r ic e s  f o r  w h ich  
they  v o c i f e r o u s l y  blamed the government.
Those  concerned  w i t h  l e a t h e r  and s l a u g h t e r i n g  were 
g e n e r a l l y  a f f e c t e d  by  the outbreak  of  h o s t i l i t i e s .  A l l  
trade  w ith  Germany and A u s t r i a  was stopped  by  the War,  
which  meant that  the market which  took most o f  the h i d e s
and skins  was c losed  and the p r ic e  of  h i d e s  dropped by  50
2
per c e n t .  Both  the b u tc h e r s  and h i d e  merchants  s u f f e r e d  
because  the sale  o f  h i d e s  was the most rem unerative  aspect
1
N A I , Home P o l l  549- 5 52  Part B, June  1 9 1 5 ,  'W e e k ly  Reports  
of  the D i r e c t o r  of  C r im in a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e , ' f o r  the week 
e n d in g  15 June 1915»  The  grant-in-aid  from the government 
to  the M a dra ssah  Nomania  was stopped b e ca us e  the school  
r e fu s e d  to stop  the p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  Abdul  M a j i d .  
Home Poll  25 D e p o s i t ,  December 1 9 1 5 ,  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  
on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  R e c e iv ed  from the 
S e v e r a l  Prov in ce s  in S p e c i a l  R e fe r e n c e  to the War f o r  the 
F i r s t  F o r t n ig h t  o f  November 1 9 1 5 , ' W .M .  H a i l e y  to H. 
W h e e le r ,  19  November 1915»
2
RDDA, Home File 368 Part B 1914, 'Question of the
Increase of Prices of Articles of Food in D e lh i ,' report
by Deputy Commissioner, 15 August 1914.
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of  the b u s i n e s s . 1 The b u t c h e r s  and the a r t i s a n s  a ls o
s u f f e r e d  a c u t e l y  from the r i s e  in p r ic e s  that  accompanied
the outbreak  of  the W ar .  I t  was e stim ated  that the
p r ic e s  of  d i f f e r e n t  commodities  rose  from s i x  per  cent
2
to 50 per c e n t .  The Government of  I n d i a  became 
concerned  when it  saw wheat s e l l i n g  at ' f am in e  p r i c e s '  
and issued  an or d in an ce  on 27 November 191^  w h ich  enabled
1
I n  a report to the I n d i a n  I n d u s t r i a l  Commission ,  it  was 
stated  that b e f o r e  the War the volume o f  the h id e  trade  
was an  estim ated  R s . 5 0 » 0 0 » 0 0 0 .  I n  two years  it  shrunk 
to Rs .  1 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 0 .  H id e s  from a n im als  w h ich  died  were 
worth  R s . 6 or  7 a p i e c e ;  h i d e s  from s la u g h t e r e d  anim als  
p r o p e r ly  treated  were w orth  R s . 1 5 0  to R s . 2 10  per  20 
h i d e s ;  and b u f f a l o  h i d e s  were w orth  R s . 6 0  to Rs .  80 per 
maund.  These  f e l l  by  h a l f  a f t e r  the outbreak  of  the War .  
A l l  the m erchants ,  a g e n t s ,  c o l l e c t o r s ,  and d e a l e r s  were 
M uslim s ,  A l l  the a c t u a l  p h y s i c a l  l a b o u r  was performed 
by  Cham ars . RDDA, Commerce F i l e  5 Part  A 1916 , ' P r e l i m i n ­
ary  Note  on I n d u s t r i e s  at D e l h i  Prepared  f o r  the I n d i a n  
I n d u s t r i a l  C o m m i s s i o n . ' The  b u tc h e r s  r a i s e d  the  p r ice  
of  meat from 4 annas per  s e e r  to 6 annas  per  s e e r  in small  
com pensation  f o r  t h e i r  l o s s .  Home F i l e  368 Part B 1 9 1 4 .
2
The p r ic e  changes  f o r  a few  s e l e c t e d  items were as 
f o l lo w s  (quoted in  seers  per  r u p e e ) :
wheat f l o u r 10  to 8 peas 16 to 10
wheat i o i 9 l e n t  i l s 14 8
gram 17 11 m aize 16 10
pulses 7 A b a r l e y 16 11
b a j r a 16 10 shakur 9 5
f u e l 30 24
RDDA, Home F i l e  368 Part  B 1 9 1 4 .  Wheat dropped to 7 
seers  per  rupee in  November.  Revenue F i l e  1 1 7 ( b )  Part 
B 1 9 1 4 ,  'The  War  in  Europe  - Pr o p o s al  to Open Cheap 
G r a i n  S h o p s ' ;  N A I , Home P o l l  31 D e p o s i t ,  December 1 9 1 4 ,  
' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  
in  S p e c i a l  R e f e r e n c e  to the War f o r  the F i r s t  F o r t n ig h t  
of  November 1 9 1 4 , '  W .M .  H a i l e y  to H .  W h e e l e r ,  21 November
1 9 1 4 .
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l o c a l  governments to take  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  a l l  stocks  of
commodities w h ich  were 'u n r e a s o n a b l y  w i t h h e ld  from the
m a r k e t . '  I t  a lso  d is c o u ra g e d  the export  of  wheat from
I n d i a . 1 P r i c e s  eased in Ja nua ry  as wheat climbed back
to 9^ seers  per rupee from a low  o f  7 in November,  but
2
f e l l  a g a in  in  F e b r u a r y .  The  ' p o o r e r  M u s l im s '  who 
watched t h e i r  economic c o n d i t i o n  r a p i d l y  d e t e r i o r a t e  
blamed the government f o r  the  f a l l  i n  p r i c e s .  T h ey  
f e l t  that the government must be r e s p o n s i b l e  s in c e  it
3
had passed  an ord in an ce  to c o n t r o l  p r i c e s .  The p r ic e
of  wheat f e l l  to 6\ s eers  per  rupee at the end of  March ,
4
but rose to 9 a g a in  b y  m id - A p r i l .  The  p r ic e  s i t u a t i o n  
eased somewhat and remained  s te ad y ,  but the a n x i e t y  
p e r s i s t e d  among the low er  c l a s s e s  that  f u r t h e r  p r ice  
changes  would take p l a c e .
1
RDDA, Commerce F i l e  121  (e )  Part B 1 9 1 4 ,  'The  War in 
Europe  - R ise  in  the P r i c e  of  W h e a t , ' S e c r e t a r y ,  
Government of I n d i a ,  Department of Commerce and I n d u s t r y  
to S e c r e t a r y ,  K a r a c h i  Chamber of  Commerce, 27 November 
1914.
2
N A I , Home P o ll  5 k D e p o s i t ,  March  1915»  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  
Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  w ith  S p e c i a l  
Re fe r e n c e  to the War f o r  the Second F o r t n i g h t  of J a n u a r y  
1 9 1 5 » 1 W .M .  H a i l e y  to H .  W h e e l e r ,  1 Fe b r u ar y  1 9 1 5 ;  Home 
P o l l  55 D e p o s i t ,  March  1915»  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  on the 
I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  w ith  S p e c i a l  R e fe r e n c e  to 
the War f o r  the F i r s t  F o r t n ig h t  of  F e b r u ar y  1 9 1 5 , '  W .M .  
H a i l e y  to H .  W h e e le r ,  18  Fe b r u ar y  1915»
3
N A I ,  Home P o ll  55 D e p o s i t ,  March 1915«
4
N A I ,  Home P o l l  39  D e p o s i t ,  A p r i l  1915»  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  
Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  fo r  the 
Second Fortnight  o f  March  1 9 1 5 , '  W .M .  H a i l e y  to H. 
W h e e l e r ,  8 A p r i l  1 9 1 5 ;  Home P o l l  49  D e p o s i t ,  May 1915 , 
' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  
in  S p e c i a l  R e fe r e n c e  to the War f o r  the Second F o r t n ig h t  
of  A p r i l  1 9 1 5 , '  W .M .  H a i l e y  to H .  W h e e l e r ,  3 0  A p r i l  1 9 1 5
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I t  is p o s s i b l e  to conclude  that  the n a t i o n a l  and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  appeal  of  the pan-Islam ic  l e a d e r s  provided  
a f o c u s ,  and an o u t l e t ,  f o r  l a t e n t  g r ie v a n c e s  and 
d is c o n t e n t s  w i t h i n  M uslim  s o c i e t y .  I t  was the p a r t i c u l a r  
com bination  of  p a r o c h i a l  and economic g r ie v a n c e s  that  
caused Muslim  a r t i s a n s  and merchants  d e a l i n g  w i t h  h id e s  
and l e a t h e r  as a commodity to respond to the pan-Islamism  
of  the A l i  b r o t h e r s ,  the An.juman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, and 
Dr  A n s a r i  in  f a i r l y  la r g e  numbers at m e e t in g s ,  and 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  when the Comrade was p r o s c r i b e d .
I t  seems l i k e l y  that  pan-Islam ism  i n  D e l h i  a ls o  drew 
s u b s t a n t i a l  support from Muslim  s tud e nts  whose motive 
f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  was i d e o l o g i c a l .  A number of these  
students  came from the A ng lo- A rab ic  s c h o o l . 1 The  number 
of  such students  was p r o b a b ly  not l a r g e  because  in  the 
f i r s t  place  the school  was v e r y  c l o s e l y  connected  w i t h  
the government and the Muslim  e s tab l is h m e n t  in the c i t y  
(which  c o n t i n u a l l y  r e fu s e d  to come to terms w i t h  Mohamed 
A l i ) .  I n  the second p l a c e ,  the h e a d m a s te r ,  F a z l u d d i n ,  
opposed overt p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  and d is c o u ra g ed  stud ents  
whose zea l  became a p p a r e n t .  And in  the t h i r d  p l a c e ,  the 
m a j o r i t y  of  the stud ents  were the sons of  the e s t a b l i s h e d  
or nouveaux  r ic h e  Muslim  f a m i l i e s  w h ich  had larg e  
resources  of  w e a l t h ,  s t a t u s ,  and power .  The heads  of such  
f a m i l i e s  were u s u a l l y  s u c c e s s f u l  in  t h e i r  attempts  to 
d isc ou ra g e  a c t i v i t i e s  by  t h e i r  sons w h ich  might j e o p a r d i s e  
t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  the government or w i t h  oth er  nouveaux  
r ic h e  and l o y a l i s t  f a m i l i e s .  . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  some
The  Anglo- Arabic  H i g h  School  had an  enrolment of  285  in 
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students  were d e e p l y  moved b y  the s lo g an  o f  pan-Islam,  
and i f  they  were fo r t u n a t e  enough  to have p arents  who 
were of l i k e  mind ,  they  could  p a r t i c i p a t e .
I t  seems h i g h l y  l i k e l y  that  the students  h a i l i n g
> ■
from f a m i l i e s  w h ich  were once w e a l t h y  and p o w e r f u l ,  but 
w hich  had b e e n  impoverished  f o r  one reason  or an o th e r ,  
p a r t i c i p a t e d  in  pan-Islam ic  a c t i v i t y .  Such  s t u d e n t s ,  
however ,  would have  had to p oss e s s  a s t r o n g  sense  of  
independence ,  i f  they  were to d i s r e g a r d  the ap p r o b a t io n  
o f  a f a m il y ,  whose main goal  was to h a n g  on to every  
v e s t i g e  of  r e s p e c t a b i l i t y  r e s t i n g  on the v a lu e s  of a 
past g e n e r a t i o n .  I f  the f a m i l y  s l ip p e d  too f a r ,  as was 
true  f o r  a l a r g e  number of  Mogul f a m i l i e s ,  there  was 
l i t t l e  a p p r o b a t io n  ( u n l e s s  t h e y  h e l d  a p e n s i o n )  or 
a u t h o r i t y  to stop a son who saw p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  pan- 
I s l a m i c  a c t i v i t i e s  as a means to improve h i s  own p o s i t i o n  
in s o c i e t y .  G e n e r a l l y  the p o v e rty  of  t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n  was 
more conducive  to p a s s i v i t y  than to p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y .
I t  is d i f f i c u l t  to g e n e r a l i s e  about the p o l i t i c a l  
v a lu e s  o f  the Muslim  p e t t y  b o u r g e o i s i e  or t h e i r  sons who 
attended  government s c h o o l s .  T h e r e  does not seem to 
have been  any d i s c e r n i b l e  c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n  o f  v a l u e s ,  and 
l i t t l e  c o h e s io n  r e f l e c t e d  in the group ,  which  could 
le ave  the q u e s t i o n  of  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  an open one.  Any  
response  from th is  group ,  s tud e nts  or a d u l t s ,  p ro b ab ly  
depended  upon i n d i v i d u a l  p r o c l i v i t i e s .  Perhaps  a c lue  to 
t h e i r  p r o c l i v i t i e s  l i e s  in  the f a c t  that  the m a j o r i t y  of  
the Muslim  stud ents  of  the c o l l e g e s  in  D e l h i  came from 
the p e tty  b o u r g e o s i e .  (The w e a l t h y  sent t h e i r  sons to 
A l i g a r h  or E n g l a n d . )  The m a j o r i t y  of  the Muslim  students  
in c o l l e g e s  in  D e l h i  p a r t i c i p a t e d  in  the pan-Islam ic
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a c t i v i t i e s  of the A l i  b r o t h e r s ,  the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i- 
Kaaba  and Dr  A n s a r i .  T h e y  h e lp e d  w i t h  the Red Crescent  
M e d ic a l  M i s s io n ,  a t te nd e d  m e e t i n g s ,  canvassed  for  
s u b s c r ip t i o n s  for  the M i s s i o n ,  and canvassed  fo r  members 
and s u b s c r ip t i o n s  f o r  the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba. And 
they  supported  Mohamed A l i  when the Comrade was p r o s c r ib e d  
and f o r f e i t e d .
The Muslim students  in  the m adrassahs  also
p a r t i c i p a t e d  in la r g e  numbers in  the p o l i t i c s  of  pan-
Is la m is m .  The lead  was s u p p l i e d  b y  A b du l  M a j id  of  the
M a dr a s s ah  N o m a n ia , Ahmad S a id  o f  the M adrassah  A m i n i a ,
A b du l  Rashid  of  the Madrassah  M a h o m e d ia , and A b du l  Wahab
of Madrassah  Wahab (the  l a t t e r  two of  w hich  were Ahl-i-
H a d i s  madrassahs which  depended  upon the P a n j a b i a n
community f o r  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  and w h ich  had c lose  contact
w i t h  the H i n d u s t a n i  F a n a t i c s  in  A f g h a n i s t a n  and
B a l u c h i s t a n ) . 1 Many ot h er  te a ch e r s  in  madrassahs  made
t h e i r  d iscon tent  known over the Cawnpore mosque a f f a i r
by s i g n i n g  a fatwa  w h ich  condemned the  d e s t r u c t i o n  of  the
b a o l i  [ a b l u t i o n  t a n k ]  of  two mosques in D e l h i  in  August
1913 as part of  the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  the new c a p i t a l .
Seven  teachers  from M a dra ssah  F a t e h p u r i , three  te a ch e rs
from M adrassah  H u s a i n i a , two t e a ch e r s  from M a dra ssah  Dar-
2
u l- H u d a , and f i v e  others  s igned  the f a t w a . The large  
number of  f o r e i g n  stu d e n t s  in  the m adrassahs  was f u r t h e r  
inducement to pan- Islam ic  a c t i v i t y .
The  'New Muslim  P a r t y '  s u p p l i e d  the main le a d e r s  
f o r  pan-Islamism in  D e l h i .  T h e se  l e a d e r s  were drawn from
1 RDDA, C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  90  ( 1 9 1 5 )>  C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  227  
( 1 9 1 8 ) ,  ' L i s t  of  P o l i t i c a l ,  Q u a s i - P o l i t i c a l  and R e l i g i o u s  
S o c i e t i e s ,  Sabhas  and Anjumans  in  the D e l h i  Prov in ce  f o r  
the Year  end ing  the 3 0 t h  June 1 9 1 8 . '2
RDDA, Home F i l e  18  Part  B 1916 , ' P r e s e r v a t i o n  of  the 
Mosque and Ba©li  in  B l o c k  2 0  in the New C a p i t a l  A r e a . '
265
a l l  s o c i a l  groups and c l a s s e s  and were d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  
only  by  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  o p i n i o n s .  T h i s  group was quite  
small  d u r in g  the c l o s i n g  years  o f  the f i r s t  d e ca d e .  I t  
s u b s c r ib e d  to the v i e w  that  S i r  Syed Ahmad K h a n ’ s p o l i c y  
was outdated  and that Muslims ought ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  to set 
up a p o l i t i c a l  p a rt y  to g a i n  c o n c e s s io n s  from the 
government.  I t  a l s o  s u b s c r ib e d  to the v ie w  that Muslims 
should u n it e  w i t h  H in d u s  in  order  to make the case  f o r  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  reform  more e f f e c t i v e .  A f t e r  the annulment 
of  p a r t i t i o n  and Lord C r e w ’ s r e p l y  of  24 June 1 9 1 2 ,  the 
group gained  more support  and new a d h e r e n t s .  The group 
f i n a l l y  became the dominant w in g  in  the Moslem League ,  
it changed the c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  the  League  i n  1913»  it  
org an ise d  a j o i n t  m ee ting  of  the League  and Congress  at 
Bombay in  1915»  and f i n a l l y  it  n e g o t i a t e d  the Lucknow 
Pact of  1916 . T hese  people  looked  upon pan-Islamism  as 
a double  edged sword w h ich  would ,  on the one hand ,  
b e s t i r  the Muslim p o p u l a t i o n  in  I n d i a  from i ts  p o l i t i c a l  
apathy ,  and on the other ,  r e v e a l  to the Government of  
I n d i a  that Muslims who were n o r m a lly  p a s s i v e l y  l o y a l ,  
would support the demands f o r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  reform .
T h e y  were regarded  w i t h  s u s p i c i o n  b y  b o th  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n s e r v a t iv e s  and r e l i g i o u s  e x t r e m i s t s .  The former 
feared  any m a n i f e s t a t i o n  of  d i s l o y a l t y  and the l a t t e r  
feared  any  c o n c e s s io n s  to the H i n d u s .  Pan-Islamism ,  
how ever ,  was an iss u e  on w h ich  some members of a l l  three  
groups could agree  as lo n g  as the f a n a t i c i s m  of  the 
r e l i g i o u s  extremists  and the p o l i t i c a l  e x t re m is t s  could 
be c o n t r o l l e d .  The Cawnpore mosque a f f a i r  tended to 
s t r e n g t h e n  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n ,  but  the outbreak  of  War,  and 
even more so,  T u r k e y ' s  e ntry  into  the War on the s id e  
of  Germany, s e r i o u s l y  weakened  i t .  I n  o r d e r  to r e t a i n
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the support of the p o l i t i c a l l y  c o n s e r v a t i v e ,  the l e a d i n g  
members of  the ’New Muslim  P a r t y '  and the pan - Is lam is ts  
in  D e l h i  signed  the m anifesto  of November 1 9 1 4  which  
u n c a t e g o r i c a l l y  s ta te d  that  T u r k e y ' s  e n t r y  into  the War 
was a p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n  w h ich  did  not a f f e c t  the 
r e l i g i o u s  l o y a l t i e s  of  I n d i a n  M u s l im s .
Th ere  is l i t t l e  doubt that  a number of w e a l t h y  and 
i n f l u e n t i a l  members o f  the Muslim  community in  D e l h i  
supported  pan-Islamic  a c t i v i t i e s  in the c i t y .  The 
m eetings  w h ich  condemned the Cawnpore mosque r io t  on 10  
A ugust  and 19 Septem ber  r e v e a le d  that  a c o a l i t i o n  had 
come about between  such  Muslims and the low er  c l a s s e s .
T h e se  people  were a l s o  w i l l i n g  to j o i n  the Anjuman-i- 
Khuddam-i-Kaaba. I t  is  important  to n o t e ,  however ,  that  
even  though these  people  were! members of  the Anglo- Arabic  
School  Committee, the m anaging  committees o f  the Jama 
M a s j i d  and F a te h p u r i  Mosque,  the P a n j a b i a n  community and 
the small  Ahl-i-Haidis community,  they  were not a b le  or 
w i l l i n g  to i n f l u e n c e  the m a j o r i t y  of  the members of  these  
v a r io u s  groups to support such  a c t i v i t i e s .  I t  was more 
a m atter  of i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e .  They  became f r ig h t e n e d  
at the outbreak  o f  the War ,  at the f o r f e i t u r e  of  the 
Comrade f o r  a d i s l o y a l  a r t i c l e ,  and at T u r k e y ' s  e ntry  into  
the War .  They  were s l i g h t l y  m o l l i f i e d  b y  the m a n i fe s t o ,  
but  the s t r a i n  w h ich  the p a n - Is la m is ts  put upon the 
c o a l i t i o n  proved too much. The p u b l i c a t i o n  of  the S u l t a n ' s  
message from the throne  that  he had pronounced  j ih ad  and 
E n v e r  P a s h a ' s  message to Muslim  s o l d i e r s  in  the f i r s t  
i ssu e  of  the Hamdard a f t e r  the f o r f e i t u r e  on 29  December
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was one t h i n g . 1 The co n t in u e d  i l l e g a l  t r a n s f e r  o f  funds  
c o l le c t e d  by the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba and forw arded  
by  Shaukat A l i  to T urke y  provid ed  the o p p o r t u n it y  f o r  
th is  group to d i s s o c i a t e  i t s e l f ,  w hich  it did on 12 
February  1915*
The government began  to v i e w  the a c t i v i t i e s  of  the 
p an - Islam ists  w ith  s u s p i c i o n  in  1 9 1 4 .  T h ey  were 
d is t u r b e d  by  the r e t u r n  o f  Mohamed A l i  from En gland  and 
the i n c r e a s i n g  importance  of  the Anjuman-i-Khud dam-i- 
K a a b a . The Honourable  Member f o r  the Home Department 
observed  in  March 1 9 1 4  that  the p an - Is lam ists  in  g e ne ral  
and the S o c i e t y  of Se r v a n ts  in  p a r t i c u l a r :
. . .must e i t h e r  c o l l a p s e  a l t o g e t h e r ,  or  keep  
themselves  g o i n g  by  r e l i g i o u s  a g i t a t i o n  on 
l o c a l  events  w h ich  w i l l  at once assume a 
p o l i t i c a l  t i n g e ;  and th ey  w i l l  s p e e d i l y  take 
to secret  methods ,  secret  p r e a c h i n g  and so 
f o r t h ,  and no amount o f  e n c o u r a g in g  or g u i d i n g  
by  Abdul  B ar i  can a f f e c t  the q u e s t i o n . ^
The Member fo r  the E d u c a t i o n  Department no te d :
I  do not know how we can  d is c o u r a g e  it  without  
g i v i n g  it a n o t o r i e t y  which  it  is not d e s i r a b l e  
to g i v e .  But I  would c e r t a i n l y  not stand in 
the way of the l o c a l  governments d i s c o u r a g i n g
i t . . . .  3
N A I , Home P o ll  278- 282  Part B,  J a n u a r y  1915»  'W e e k ly  
Reports  o f  the D i r e c t o r  o f  C r im in a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e , 1 f o r  the 
week e n d i n g  5 Ja n u a ry  1 9 1 5 ;  Home P o l l  53 D e p o s i t ,  March  
1915> ' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  
S i t u a t i o n  w ith  S p e c i a l  R e fe r e n c e  to the War for  the F i r s t  
Fo r t n ig h t  of  J a n u a r y  1 9 1 5 » 1 W .M .  H a i l e y  to H. W h e e le r ,  16 
Ja nua ry  1915»  
p
N A I ,  Home Poll  46  Part A ,  May 1 9 1 4 ,  note  by  R.  C raddock ,  
28 March 1 9 1 4 .
3 N A I ,  Home Po ll  46  Part A ,  May 1 9 1 4 ,  note  by  S . H .  B u t l e r ,
27 A p r i l  1 9 1 4 .
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The  D i r e c t o r  o f  C r im in a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  co n c lu d e d :
I  t h e r e fo r e  lo o k  upon the s o c i e t y  as dangerous  
and I ,  p e r s o n a l l y ,  f i n d  it im p o s s ib le  to b e l i e v e  
that the foun d ers  and o r g a n i s e r s  do not intend  
it to be d an ge r o u s .  I n  any  case  the s o c i e t y  is 
n e c e s s a r i l y  an ob je c t  f o r  stud y  at the hands of  
the P r o v i n c i a l  and I m p e r i a l  C r im in a l  I n v e s t i g a t i o n  
Departments and that  th i s  should  be the case f o r  
a Moslem o r g a n i s a t i o n  in I n d i a  is  re g r et te d  by  
nobody  more than by  m y s e l f . ^
The L ie ute n ant- G o ve rnor  of  the P u n jab  observed  that 
there  was only  one b r a n c h  in  the P u n j a b ,  at L y a l l p u r ,  
and that  those in  Lahore  who jo in e d  were ' c l e r k s  in 
o f f i c e s . ' O th erw ise  only  a few p l e a d e r s ,  ,
b a r r i s t e r s  and m aulv is  and a l l  the members of  the l o c a l  
b ranches  of  the T u r k i s h  Committee of  Union  and Progress  
had j o i n e d .  He d e f i n i t e l y  looked  upon it  as ' s u s c e p t i b l e  
of  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  into  a secret  s o c i e t y  s i m i l a r  to the 
s e d i t i o n i s t s  and a n a r c h i a l  s o c i e t i e s  among the so- called  
H i n d u  p a t r i o t s .
The government thought it  had solved  the problem of  
how to c ontrol  the p a n - Is la m is ts  when it s u c c e s s f u l l y  
inte rne d  Z a fa r  A l i  Khan in  h is  n a t i v e  v i l l a g e  in the 
Punjab  on 17 Octob er  1 9 1 4  and when it d e c id e d  to act 
a g a in s t  the Comrade . S i l e n c i n g  the Com rade , however ,  
did not n e c e s s a r i l y  s i l e n c e  Mohamed A l i  and the C o u n cil  
d ecid ed  to deal  w i t h  the ardent  p an - Is lam is t  u n d e r  the
1
N A I ,  Home P o ll  46  Part A ,  May 1 9 1 4 ,  note  by  C . R .  
C l e v e l a n d ,  20  March  1 9 1 4 .
2
NAI, Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914, A .B . Kettlewell
to H. Wheeler, 15 April 1914.
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F o r e i g n e r s  Act o f  1 8 6 4 . 1 To t h e i r  c h a g r i n ,  they  found 
out that it was most i m p r a c t i c a l  to use  t h i s  act a g a in s t  
Mohamed A l i  or any oth er  I n d i a n  born  in a n a t i v e  s t a t e .
The a n x i e t y  o f  the government was f u r t h e r  inc r ea s e d  
by  the appearance  o f  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  pamphlets  which  
in v i t e d  Muslims to p a r t i c i p a t e  in the j ih a d  announced by 
the S u l t a n  in December 1 9 1 4 .  A j ih a d  l e a f l e t  in  Urdu 
was w i d e l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  from D e l h i  in  J a n u a r y  1 9 1 5 ;  it  was 
t r a n s l a t e d  and summarised as f o l l o w s :
The present  war is  a h o l y  w ar .  Those  who die  f o r  
it w i l l  e n t e r  p a r a d i s e ,  those  who r e fu s e  to 
r e c o g nise  it w i l l  l i v e  f o r e v e r  in h e l l .  The 
S u l t a n  of  T u r k e y  and H a j i  Muhammad W i l l i a m ,  K a i s e r  
of Germany, may h is  Empire  ever  l i v e ,  have 
announced that they  d e s i r e  a l l  the Muhammadans in  
the world to u n i t e  and r e g a i n  the lo s t  g l o r y  of 
I s l a m .  Shame on those s la v e s  and h i r e l i n g s  o f  the 
E n g l i s h  who say  that  t h i s  is  not a h o ly  war .
S h a l l  the world  o f  these  s e l l e r s  of  t h e i r  f a i t h  
p r e v a i l  a g a in s t  the v o i c e  of  God? What have the 
E n g l i s h  done to deserve  lo y a lt y ?  They  have broken  
every  promise made to Muhammadans. T h e y  sold  the 
Jama M a s jid  of  D e l h i ,  and now want to a u c t io n  the 
Ta j  M ahal .  They  dem olished  the mosque at Cawnpore 
and shot 5 , 3 0 0  Muhammadans. They  i n s u l t e d  the 
Prophet of  God in a b io s c o p e  show at K a r a c h i .  They  
treat  In d i a n s  worse than  d og s .  Lord H a r d in g e  has 
declared  that the sacred  p lac e s  w i l l  be r e s p e c t e d ,  
but the E n g l i s h  new sp aper ,  w h ic h  is  s e c r e t l y  
c i r c u l a t e d  to the a u t h o r i t i e s ,  s t a t e s  that Jeddah  
and J a f f a  have  been  bombarded .  What r e l i a n c e  can 
be placed  on the word o f  the f a i t h l e s s  E n g l i s h ?
The time has come to p u n is h  them f o r  t h e i r  
t r a n s g r e s s i o n s .  I t  is  our b ounden  duty  to d e c la re
1
N A I , Home Poll  365- 369  Part A ,  O c to b e r  1 9 1 4 ,  * Qu est ion  
W hether  Muhammad A l i ,  E d i t o r  o f  the Comrade Newspaper  of  
D e l h i ,  Can Be De alt  w ith  u n d e r  the F o r e ig n e r s  A c t ,  1 8 6 4  
( i l l  o f  1 8 6 4 ) . 1 The q u e s t i o n  e v i d e n t l y  o r i g i n a t e d  in 
Counc i l .
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jehad a g a in s t  them and to o b t a i n  p e r p e tu a l  
s a l v a t i o n  by  k i l l i n g  them. Be not h y p o c r i t e s ,  
but openly  d e c l a r e  that  you are Muhammadans and 
w i l l  s a c r i f i c e  y o u r s e lv e s  f o r  the g l o r y  of  
I s l a m .  R ise  up and show your  v a l o u r .  0 d w e l le rs  
in  I n d i a ,  s o l d i e r s ,  p o l ic em e n ,  and l e a r n e d  men, 
r i s e  up and d e s t r o y  the E n g l i s h . 1
Pam phlets ,  such as the one quoted im m ediately  above and 
o t h e r s ,  such as 'An a  L e i l a 1 and *786  B i s m i l l a h ' ,  proved 
to the government that r e v o l u t i o n a r y  n a t i o n a l i s m  among 
H ind us  had found a Muslim  co un te r p ar t  in  the ad vo cacy  of  
j ih a d  in I n d i a .  And even though  the m a j o r i t y  of  the pan- 
I s l a m i s t s  had n o t h i n g  to do w ith  the r e l i g i o u s  f a n a t i c s  
who advocated  j i h a d ,  the government thought it  was only  
a q u e s t io n  o f  time b e f o r e  Muslifa a n a r c h i s t s  made t h e i r  
a p p e a r a n c e .
The p o p u la r  a c c l a im  that  Mohamed A l i  c ont inued  to 
r e c e iv e  in the e a r l y  months of  1915 r e i n f o r c e d  the fe a r s  
o f  the government that  r e l i g i o u s  e nth us ia sm  would become 
u n c o n t r o l l a b l e .  Mohamed A l i ' s  use  o f  the H i g h  Court of  
the Punjab  as a forum f o r  h i s  sentim ents  had a far- 
r e a c h i n g  e f f e c t  upon the lower  c l a s s e s  of  n o r t h  I n d i a  and 
D e l h i .  The  C h i e f  S e c r e t a r y  o f  the Government of  the 
U n ite d  P r o v in ce s  commented that the l i b e r t y  w hich  the 
Pun jab  H i g h  Court a llow ed  Mohamed A l i  in d e fence  of  the 
Comrade enabled  him to enhance h i s  r e p u t a t io n  as ' p a t r i o t  
and h e r o . '  H i s  arguments were accla im ed  to show that he 
went to En gland  'not  only  to impress h is  v iews  on the 
B r i t i s h  M i n i s t r y  r e g a r d i n g  the Cawnpore Mosque a f f a i r ,
1
N A I , Home P o l l  278- 282  Part  B, J a n u a r y  1 9 1 5 ,  f o r  the 
week e n d in g  26 J a n u a r y  1915»
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but a l s o  to win b ack  A d r i a n o p l e  f o r  the T u r k s . 11 H is  
s u c c e s s f u l  e f f o r t s  to u t i l i s e  the Hamdard as an o th e r  
forum to d isse m in ate  h i s  pan-Islam ic  v a l u e s  f i n a l l y  
convinced  the government that  he and h i s  b r o t h e r  who 
a id e d  him in  th is  campaign  must be e f f e c t i v e l y  s i l e n c e d .  
The De fe nc e  of  I n d i a  Act  w h ic h  had become law in March
1915 s u p p l ied  the means by  w h ic h  the two most p opular
3
p an - Is lam is ts  in  I n d i a  could  be i n t e r n e d .
1
N A I ,  Home Po ll  21 D e p o s i t ,  A p r i l  1915»  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  
Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  in S p e c i a l  
R e fe r e n c e  to the War f o r  the F i r s t  F o r t n ig h t  of  March 
1 9 1 5 > ' R« Burn to H .  W h e e l e r ,  21  March 1 9 1 5 .
2
The C h i e f  Commissioner  commented on the a c t i v i t i e s  of  
the Hamdard d u r in g  March ,  A p r i l ,  and May as f o l l o w s :  
' B r i e f l y ,  it  may be s a i d ,  that  w h i l e  m a i n t a i n i n g  its  
g e n e r a l  Pan-Islamic  a t t i t u d e  i n v o l v i n g  a continuous  
ap p e a l  to the importance o f  the Ottoman power, to g e t h e r  
w i t h  a t o ta l  i n a b i l i t y  to r e c o g n is e  the d i f f e r e n c e  
betw een  the temporal and s p i r i t u a l  as p e c ts  of  I s l a m  the 
Hamdard has now adopted  a l i n e  of  g r e a t e r  c a u t i o n  i n  the 
weapons it  employs. I t  no l o n g e r  permits  i t s e l f  v i o l e n t  
d i a t r i b e s  a g a ins t  the opponents  o f  the I s l a m i c  powers;  
but it  reproduces  w henever  p o s s i b l e  such i n f o r m a t io n ,  or 
items o f  news,  as w i l l  be l i k e l y  to convey to the re a d e r  
the impression  that the at ta c k s  on T u r k e y  are  not j u s t i f i e d  
that  they  are doomed to f a i l u r e ;  and that  the reports  of  
E n t e n t e  successes  g e n e r a l l y  are  e x a g g e r a t e d ,  i f  not 
e n t i r e l y  u n tr u e .  The  campaign is  conducted  w i t h  much 
s k i l l .  The sources from w hich  news is taken  are  somewhat 
c a r e f u l l y  c h o s e n . . . . ' N A I ,  Home P o l l  3^-36 Part  A ,  J u l y  
1 9 1 5 ;  ' O b j e c t i o n a b l e  A r t i c l e s  in the Hamdard Newspaper  
and Orders  Is s u e d  u n d e r  the D e fe n c e  of  I n d i a  Act  f o r  the 
P r e c e n s o r s h i p  of  the Pa p er  b e f o r e  I t  is  P u b l i s h e d , ' W .M .  
H a i l e y  to H. W h e e ler ,  3 June  1915«
3
The  U n ited  Prov in ces  and Pun jab  governments  were 
e s p e c i a l l y  d e s ir o u s  that  the Hamdard should  stop  p u b l i s h ­
in g  i ts  well-chosen  s e l e c t i o n s  as the Hamdard was copied  
b y  the pan-Islamic  press  in  both  p r o v i n c e s .  N A I ,  Home 
P o l l  53  D e p o s i t ,  March  1 9 1 5 ;  Home P o l l  5 ^  D e p o s i t ,  March
1 9 1 5 .
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The A l i  b r o t h e r s  re c e iv e d  o f f i c i a l  n o t i f i c a t i o n
that they were to be inte rne d  on 1 0  May 1 9 1 3 . ^  On
T u e s d a y  the 1 1 th  there  was a p rotest  m ee ting  of
' t h o u s a n d s ’ a g a i n s t  the order .  H a f i z  Abdul  A z i z  was
chairman of  the m e e t i n g  and Dr  A n s a r i  addressed  the2
a u d i e n c e .  The Hamdard cont in ued  p u b l i s h i n g  a r t i c l e s  
on the War and commented e s p e c i a l l y  on the l a n d i n g  at
3
G a l l i p o l i .  And f i n a l l y  on 19  May it c o n ta in e d  an
a r t i c l e  which  condemned t h e i r  internment  and inc lud e d
a v e r y  long  l e t t e r  by  Mohamed A l i  w hich  b e w a i l e d  the
4
f a t e  of  M uslim  l e a d e r s  in I n d i a .  On T h u r s d a y  the 2 0 t h  
• t h o u s a n d s '  o f  Muslims  of  D e l h i  met to protest  a g a in s t  
the internment  order  w h ic h  was to take e f f e c t  the 
f o l l o w i n g  day .  On F r i d a y  the 21st  the b r o t h e r s  atte nd e d  
the Juma prayers  at the Jama M a s j i d  and a f t e r w a r d s  
p a r t i c i p a t e d  in  a mass m ee ting  of  7 » 0 0 0 .  T h e r e  were no 
p o l i t i c a l  s p e e c h e s ,  and the a u d i e n c e ,  w h ich  was made up 
m a in ly  of  ' b u t c h e r s ,  shoe t r a d e r s  and s i m i l a r  c l a s s e s '  
mobbed the b r o th e r s  as they  dep arted  by  motor c ar  f o r
5
M e h r a u l i .  T h e y  were not to be r e l e a s e d  u n t i l  25 
December 1919»  The e n t i r e  Muslim  community observed  a
1
N A I ,  Home P o l l  36 D e p o s i t ,  May 1915»  ' In te r n m e n t  of 
Muhammad A l i  and Sh aukat  A l i  at M e h r a u l i  in  the Pr o v in ce  
o f  D e l h i ,  and Pro p o s al  to P r o h i b i t  A b d u l  Kalam from 
V i s i t i n g  D e l h i ' ;  Home P o l l  30-33 Part  A ,  J u l y  1915»  
' In te rn m e nt  o f  Muhammad A l i  and Shaukat  A l i  un der  the 
D e fe nc e  of  I n d i a  A c t . '
2
N A I ,  Home P o l l  855- 858  Part  B ,  May 1915»  report  f o r  
the week e n d i n g  25 May 1915*
3
N A I ,  Home P o l l  34-36 Part  A ,  J u l y  1 9 1 5 .
4
N A I ,  Home P o l l  855- 858  Part B,  May 1915»  report  f o r  
the week e n d i n g  25 May 1915«
5
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h a r t a l  on the 2 1 s t .  Soon t h e r e a f t e r  a l l  s p e c i a l  prayers  
and ob se rvan c es  f o r  the s a f e t y  and w e l f a r e  of  the S u l t a n  
<n>f T u r k e y  were d is c o n t i n u e d  at the request  of  the 
Government o f  I n d i a . 1 T h i s  c h a l l e n g e  to Muslim  r e l i g i o u s  
sentim ent  was not s e r i o u s l y  q u e s t i o n e d .  The triumph of 
the Government of  I n d i a  over  pan-Islamism  was com plete .
T h is  does not e x p l a i n ,  however ,  why the e n t i r e  
M uslim  merchant community observed  a h a l f  day h a r t a l  on 
21 May on the day the A l i  b r o th e r s  were i n t e r n e d .  One 
e x p l a n a t i o n  is  that  it  was q u ite  e as y  to extend  the u s u a l  
h a l f - d a y  c lo s u r e  o f  shops on F r i d a y  into  a f u l l  day  h a r t a l .  
A more c y n i c a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  is  that  the e s t a b l i s h e d  
l e a d e r s  had n o t h i n g  to lo s e  by  such  a h a r t a l  as the A l i  
b r o t h e r s  would be s a f e l y  inte rne d  w i t h  no f e a r  o f  f u r t h e r  
a c t i v i t y  from that q u a r t e r  and they  could  always  make it 
loo k  as i f  th e y  had bowed to p o p u la r  p r e s s u r e .  A th ird  
e x p l a n a t i o n ,  and p r o b a b l y  the more correct  one,  was that  
the pan- Islam ic  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the A l i  b r o t h e r s  had drawn 
a l a r g e  amount o f  l a t e n t  support from the Muslim  p etty  
b o u r g e o i s i e .  T hey  p r o b a b l y  did not o r i g i n a t e  the idea  o f  
a h a r t a l ,  but  they  must have g iv e n  i t  t h e i r  f u l l e s t  
su p p o r t .  I t  seems f a r  more l i k e l y  that  the p e t t y  sh o p ­
k e e p e r s ,  who were f a c i n g  some economic d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  and 
who were encouraged  by  p u b l ic  d i s p l a y s  o f  p op u la r  support
1
N A I , Home P o l l  5 ^9 - 5 5 2  Part B, June 1915»  report  f o r  
the week e n d i n g  15 June  1 9 1 5 ;  Home P o l l  20  D e p o s i t ,
December 1916 , ’ D i s c u s s i o n  i n  C o n n e c t io n  w i t h  the 
A l l e g i a n c e  of  Mohammadan to the S u l t a n  of  T u r k e y ,  And 
the P o s s i b i l i t y  of  I n t r o d u c i n g  a P ra y e r  f o r  the King- 
Em peror  into  the F r i d a y  S e r v i c e ' ;  RDDA, C o n f i d e n t i a l  
F i l e  65 ( 1 9 1 5 ) »  'Note  by  the C . I . D .  R e g a r d i n g  the 
I n c l u s i o n  of  the Name of  the S u l t a n  o f  T u r k e y  in  Prayers  
O f f e r e d  in  Mosques on F r i d a y . '
on 11  May and 20  May,  f o r c e f u l l y  encouraged  the more 
important merchants  not to o b j e c t .  The a l t e r n a t i v e ,  that  
the l e a d i n g  Muslim  t r a d e r s ,  o n ly  a few  o f  whom had ever  
supported  the A l i  b r o t h e r s ,  could  fo r c e  a h a r t a l  onto the 
small  t r a d e r s ,  is most u n l i k e l y .  That  the l e a d i n g  
tr a d e r s  responded on the grounds  o f  r e l i g i o u s  sentiment 
is  e q u a l l y  u n l i k e l y  s in c e  they  had not p a r t i c i p a t e d  at a 
time when such a response  would have had l e s s  p o l i t i c a l  
o v e r t o n e s .  Mohamed A l i  and pan-Islam ism ,  then  had a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  upon the Muslims of  D e l h i .  T h e i r s  was 
a s u c c e s s f u l  a t t a c k  on p r o v i n c i a l i s m  but  the resentment  
that Muslims f e l t  at the r e f u s a l  of  the H in d u s  to j o i n  
in  the h a r t a l  showed that they  had not s u c c e s s f u l l y  
a ttac k ed  p a r o c h i a l i s m .
I t  is quite  obvious  that  the pan- Islam ic  movement in 
D e l h i  was a movement o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  I t  
was s i g n i f i c a n t  in terms of  the number of  persons 
i n v o l v e d ,  the type of  persons  i n v o l v e d ,  and the p o l i t i c a l  
v a l u e s  it d iss e m in ate d  in  the community.  The m ee t in g  of
7 , 0 0 0  at the Jama M a s j i d  on 21 May 1 915  was the l a r g e s t  
crowd o f  Muslims to assem ble  f o r  Mohamed A l i  (and h i s  
b r o t h e r )  on any s i n g l e  o c c a s i o n .  T here  were s e ve r al  
i n s t a n c e s  when he was a b l e  to a t t r a c t  a u d i e n c e s  of 5 * 0 0 0 »  
but  f o r  the m a j o r i t y  o f  o c c a s i o n s ,  an a u d i e n c e  of  1 , 0 0 0  
to 2 , 0 0 0  was u s u a l .  A m e e t i n g  in the Jama M a s j i d  on 
F r i d a y  a t t r a c t e d  the l a r g e r  w h i l e  a m e e t i n g  on Sunday  
a t t r a c t e d  the sm a lle r  a u d i e n c e .  The s p e c i f i c a l l y  
a d v e r t i s e d  m ee t in g  of  F r i d a y  2k J u l y  1 9 1 4  a t t r a c t e d  only  
between  1 , 0 0 0  and 2 , 0 0 0  w h ich  would seem to point  to the 
fa c t  that whereas la r g e  'numbers of  p eople  were w i l l i n g
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to l i s t e n  to h is  s p e e c h e s ,  h i s  f a i t h f u l  f o l l o w e r s  were 
fe w e r  in numbers .  The membership of  the l o c a l  b r a n c h  of  
the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, even  a f t e r  the n o t a b l e s  
had s p l i t ,  remained at 1 , 4 0 0 .  The response  to Mohamed 
A l i  v a r ie d  from f i v e  per  cent to 11  per  cent of  the 
a v a i l a b l e  male Muslim  p o p u l a t io n  of  D e l h i .  The c i r c u l ­
a t i o n  f i g u r e s  o f  the Hamdard c o n f irm  these  f i g u r e s ,  i f  
the s a le  o f  the paper  o u t s id e  D e l h i  is  s u b tr a cte d  from 
the to ta l  c i r c u l a t i o n  of 3 » 0 0 0 .  Here  a g a in  more persons 
were w i l l i n g  to l i s t e n  to Mohamed A l i  than were w i l l i n g  
to become a c t i v e l y  involv ed  in  p o l i t i c s .  The f a c t  that  
he was able  to r a i s e  enough money to f i n a n c e  the Red 
C rescent  M edica l  M i s s i o n  (around R s . 5 0 , 0 0 0 )  in  the face  
o f  s t i f f  o p p o s i t i o n  and the fac t  that  he was able  to 
r a i s e  R s . 1 0 , 0 0 0  when he f o r f e i t e d  the s e c u r i t y  o f  the 
Comrade and Hamdard press  are  ot h er  i n d i c a t i o n s  o f  the 
support he enjoyed  in  D e l h i .  I t  is  l e g i t i m a t e  to 
c o n c lu d e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  that  Mohamed A l i  and pan-Islamism  
made a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact upon the i n t e l l e c t u a l  h o r i z o n s  
of  the Muslims of D e l h i .  Perhaps  even  more s i g n i f i c a n t ,  
however ,  was the l a t e n t  e f f e c t  of  t h i s  movement upon the 
tumultuous events  o f  1919 w i t h  w h ich  we s h a l l  deal  l a t e r .
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Rules  Framed f o r  the An.juman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba.
6 May 1913*
APPENDIX A
1.  As the s a f e t y  o f  the K aaba  and the  resp ect  of  
our Haram **  appears  to be at s t a k e ,  and as we have not 
the same assurance  f o r  the w e l f a r e  o f  our s h r in e s  as we 
had b e f o r e ,  it  th e r e f o r e  seems d e s i r a b l e  to o r g a n is e  a 
s p e c i a l  Anjuman of  Muhammadans f o r  the s a f e t y  and upkeep  
o f  the Kaaba ,  w hich  w i l l  be h e r e a f t e r  known as Anjuman 
Khuddam-i-Kaaba.
2 .  The c h i e f  aim o f  t h i s  Anjum an  w i l l  be to m a in ta in  
the honour  of  the K a a b a ,  and to do every  s e r v ic e  to the 
house  of  God,  which  was b u i l t  by  the prophet Ib r a h im ,  and 
is  the very  f i r s t  centre  of  u n i t y  in  the w o r ld .  To care 
f o r  and protect  other  sacred  p lac e s  in the same way w i l l  
be cons id ered  to be e q u i v a l e n t  to s e r v ic e  rendered  to the 
K aaba  i t s e l f .  I n  order  to e f f e c t  i ts  aims the Anjuman 
should  adopt the f o l l o w i n g  measures
(a )  To form an a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  l o v e r s  o f  the K aaba  and 
of  u n i t y ,  the members o f  w hich  w i l l  be at a l l  times 
quite  ready  to s a c r i f i c e  t h e i r  l i v e s ,  p r o p e r ty ,  
honour ,  and comfort f o r  the s a f e t y  of  the K a a b a .
(b )  To i n s p ir e  such f e e l i n g s  among Muhammadans as may 
re s u lt  in p r o d u c in g  such  love rs  in  every  town, and 
to promote the true f a i t h  of I s l a m  i n  every  h e a r t .
(c)  To spread I s l a m ,  w h ich  is  the true s e r v ic e  to the 
K aaba ,  and to send Muhammadans to every  land to 
in s tr u c t  people  in  the K a l i m a .
R e p r in te d  in  a la r g e  number o f  v e r n a c u l a r  newspapers  
in May and Jun e .  T h i s  t r a n s l a t i o n  is conta ine d  in N A I , 
Home P o l l  46  Part A ,  May 1 9 1 4 ;  'R e p o rts  R e g a r d i n g  the 
S o c i e t y  Started  in  the U n it e d  P r o v in c e s  C a l l e d  the 
Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, or  " S o c i e t y  o f  the Servants  
o f  the K a a b a " ' .
* *
Probably haramain, an Arabic dual word meaning 'the
two sacred places * .
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(d)  T o  e s t a b l i s h  Muhammadan schools  and orphanages  at 
d i f f e r e n t  p laces  to a s s i s t  in the p r o p a g a t i o n  of  
I s l a m  and to prepare  the orphans f o r  the true 
s e r v ic e  of  the K aa ba .
(e )  To improve the e x i s t i n g  r e l a t i o n s  b etween  Muslims 
and the B a it - U l la h  S h a r i f ,  and to r e n d e r  ev e r y  
f a c i l i t y  f o r  the voyage ( H a j ) .
( f )  To safeguard  the K aaba  from e v e r y  m arauding  Power 
and to d e v ise  and carry  into  e x e c u t i o n  the best  
measures  for  the up-keep and s a f e t y  of  Haram. To 
d e v is e  plans  to save the Kaaba  from any  dangers  
w h ic h  may a r is e  from time to t im e .
3 .  A l l  the p r o f e s s o r s  of  the K a l i m a ,  wh eth er  they  
be male or fem ale ,  can become members o f  t h i s  Anjum an,  
and the procedure  of  m aking  a member w i l l  be c e le b r a t e d  
w ith  great  so lem nity .  E v e r y  Khadim  w i l l  have to repeat  
the f o l l o w i n g  oath b e fo r e  two Muhammadans, p l a c i n g  h is  
hand on the Qoran:-
nI ,  son o f ...................... .....................  b e i n g  in  the presence
of  God, a f t e r  repentance  fo r  my past  s i n s ,  w i t h  the 
K a l im a  on my l i p s  and f a c i n g  the K a a b a  ( p o i n t i n g  
towards the Kaaba  w i t h  h is  f i n g e r )  so lem nly  a f f i r m  
that  I  s h a l l  try  w ith  my whole  h e a r t  to m a i n t a i n  
the resp ect  of  the K aaba ,  and s h a l l  s a c r i f i c e  my 
l i f e  and p roperty  a g a in s t  non-Muslim a g g r e s s o r s .
I  s h a l l  f u l l y  c arry  out the orders  of the Anjuman 
Khuddam-i-Kaaba g iven  to me.**
Every  member who thus jo in s  the Anjuman w i l l  be c a l le d  
Khad im-i-Kaaba.
4 .  O f  these  a s s o c i a t e s  those who w i l l  be re ad y  to 
s a c r i f i c e  t h e i r  l i v e s ,  p roperty ,  and ho n o u r  at the 
d i r e c t i o n  o f  God and in the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the K aa b a ,  and 
would l i k e  to become v o l u n t e e r s ,  w i l l  have  to take the 
f o l l o w i n g  solemn a f f i r m a t i o n :-
111 ,  son o f ...........................................  w i t h  my fac e  turned
towards the Kaaba ,  b e i n g  th e re b y  i n  the presence  of  
God ,  h e r e b y  solemnly  a f f i r m  that I  have  g iv en  up my 
l i f e  f o r  the s e rv ic e  of  God.  I  now must serve the 
K aa ba  o n ly  and m a in t a in  the re sp e ct  o f  the K aa ba .  
The orders  of  the Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba w i l l  be
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my most r e s p o n s i b l e  duty ,  which  I  s h a l l  be always  
r e ad y  to carry  out w ith  my heart  and s o u l ,  and 
w ithout  any o b je c t io n  or d e l a y .  I  w i l l ,  w ith o u t  
o b j e c t i o n  or d e l a y ,  start  f o r  any  d e s t i n a t i o n  to 
w h ich  I  may be ordered to go :  no d i f f i c u l t y  w i l l  
k e e p  me bac k .  W it h  t h is  solemn promise I  e nte r  
in to  the S o c i e t y  of  S h a id a ia n - i- K a a b a , s w e a r in g  
f o r  a second time by  my God and my P r o p h e t ,  the 
Qoran,  my r e l i g i o n ,  and my honour  to remain  
f a i t h f u l  to the above p r o m i s e . "
5 .  I t  w i l l  be p o s s i b l e  f o r  some members of  t h i s  
s o c i e t y  to hold  o f f i c e  as S h a i d a i  K aa ba  f o r  a l i m i t e d  
time u n d e r  the same solemn a f f i r m a t i o n .
6 .  The Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba w i l l  be r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  m e e t in g  the requirem ents  o f  a S h a i d a i  and h i s  f a m i l y  
a c c o r d i n g  to h i s  s o c i a l  p o s i t i o n ,  and the Anjuman w i l l  
b e a r  a l l  expense  incurred  by S h a i d a i a n  in  p e r f o r m in g  the 
d u t i e s  e n tru ste d  to them. E v e r y  e f f o r t  w i l l  be made that 
t h e i r  s t a t u s  as S h a i d a i a n  may be an improvement on t h e i r  
p o s i t i o n  p r i o r  to employment. A S h a i d a i  K a a b a  e n t e r i n g  
the  a s s o c i a t i o n  fo r  a l im ite d  time w i l l  have  the r ig ht
of  e n j o y i n g  a l l  p r i v i l e g e s  as long  as he is a S h a i d a i .
7 .  I t  w i l l  be re q u ire d  that a l l  Khuddam should  
e x h i b i t  in  some prominent place  on t h e i r  d re ss  a y e l lo w  
c r e s c e n t  h a v i n g  Khadim  Kaaba  embroidered  in  b l a c k  in  
the c e n t r e .  Whenever they  j o i n  any g a t h e r i n g  of  the 
S o c i e t y ,  or are  employed on the work o f  the Anjum an ,  they  
must w e ar  t h i s  badge .
S h a id a ia n- i- K aa ba  w i l l  always wear  a green  aba ,  and 
a s i m i l a r  crescent  embroidered  w i t h  S h a id a i- K a a b a  in s te a d  
o f  Khadim  K aa b a .
8 .  A l l  the a f f a i r s  o f  th is  Anjuman w i l l  be u n d e r  
the c o n t r o l  of  a c e n t r a l  Anjuman composed o f  s e le c t e d  
Khuddam w h ic h  w i l l  be known as the A s a l  Anjum an  Khuddam- 
i-Kaaba .  For  the present  D e l h i  has b e e n  s e l e c t e d  to be 
the head- quarters  of  t h i s  Anjuman.  The orders  of th i s  
Anjuman w i l l  be f i n a l  and b i n d i n g  on a l l .  S u b o r d i n a t e  
Anjumans  w i l l  be organ ised  in  a l l  p r o v i n c e s ,  in  
ind e p en d en t  Muhammadan S t a t e s ,  in  M ecca ,  in  M e d in a ,  in  
Bag h d ad ,  and in  any  H in d u  S t a t e s  where the A s a l  Anjuman 
w i l l  deem proper  to e s t a b l i s h  them. T h e s e  Anjumans  w i l l  
be c a l l e d  Anjuman A l i a  Khuddam-i-Kaaba o f  the ......................
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P r o v i n c e .  These  Anjumans w i l l  b e  a u t h o r i s e d  to o r g an is e  
other  Anjumans  in  each d i s t r i c t  s u b o r d i n a t e  to i t .  T hese  
Anjumans  w i l l  be known in each  d i s t r i c t  as  d i s t r i c t  
Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba.
The d i s t r i c t  Anjumans w i l l  be  a u t h o r i s e d  to o r g a n is e  
Anjumans in  towns and v i l l a g e s  to be named a f t e r  the 
v i l l a g e  or  town.
9 .  E a c h  town and v i l l a g e  Anjum an  w i l l  nominate  a 
S h a i d a i  from amongst them as t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  to the 
D i s t r i c t  Anjuman (Anjuman Khuddam- i- Kaaba) .  The  d i s t r i c t  
Anjuman w i l l  s i m i l a r l y  nominate  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f o r  the 
p r o v i n c i a l  Anjuman (Anjum an-i- Alia )  and the p r o v i n c i a l  
Anjuman f o r  the C e n tr a l  Anjuman (A s a l  A n j u m a n ) .  T h i s  w i l l  
ensure  the proper  o r g a n i s a t i o n  of' the A n ju m a n s .  Thus the 
d i s t r i c t  Anjuman w i l l  be made o f  the s e l e c t e d  S h a i d a i s  of  
towns and v i l l a g e s .  The d i s t r i c t  nominees  w i l l  make up 
the p r o v i n c i a l ,  and the p r o v i n c i a l  nominees  w i l l  h e l p  to 
form the C e n tr a l  Anjuman.
The D i s t r i c t  Anjumans s h a l l  be s u b o r d in a t e  to the 
p r o v i n c i a l  Anjum ans ,  and the p r o v i n c i a l  Anjumans  to the 
C entra l  Anjum an .
1 0 .  I n  every  Anjuman only  such  men w i l l  be s e l e c t e d  
as o f f i c e  b e a r e r s ,  as have a l r e a d y  been  ta k e n  into  the 
Anjuman as a S h a i d a i  ac c ord in g  to s e c t i o n  4 .
1 1 .  At  present  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  f o r  the Anjuman w i l l  
be s e le c t e d  from the f o l l o w i n g  p l a c e s
(a)  A b ro ad .-  Mecca,  M edina ,  Baghdad ( o n l y  that  p o r t io n  
w h ich  is in co n n e ct io n  w i t h  K a r b a l a - i - M u a l l a ,  N a j a f  
A s h r a f  Kazmen and the Mausoleum o f  H a z r a t  G.aus-Ul- 
A z a m ) .  From these  p laces  o n ly  those  men w i l l  be 
s e le c t e d  who are r e a l l y  I n d i a n s ,  but have  gone to 
l i v e  t h e r e .  They  w i l l  a lso  be s e l e c t e d  a c c o r d i n g  
to the p r e s c r ib e d  r u l e s .
(b )  A c c o r d i n g  to provinces .  - E a s t e r n  and W e ste r n  B e n g a l ,  
B i h a r ,  O r i s s a ,  U n ite d  P r o v in c e s  of  A g r a  and Oudh,
the P u n ja b ,  North-West F r o n t i e r ,  S i n d ,  Bombay, M a dr a s ,  
C e n t r a l  I n d i a ,  B e rar ,  R a j p u t a n a ,  N o r t h e r n  I n d i a  and 
Burma.
(c )  Muslim  S t a t e s .-  Hy derabad ,  B h o p a l ,  Rampur,  J u n a g a r h ,  
B h a w alp u r ,  K h a i r p u r ,  S i n d ,  and T o n k .
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(d)  O t h e r  I n d i a n  S t a t e s .-  K ash m ir  and Mysore .
I n  a l l  these  there  are twenty- six  c i r c l e s ,  w hich  
w i l l  send in  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  to form the C e n tr a l  
A n j u m a n .
1 2 .  E f f o r t s  w i l l  be made to o r g a n is e  b r a n c h e s  of  
t h i s  Anjuman in a l l  towns and v i l l a g e s  where there  is a 
s u f f i c i e n c y  of  Muhammadans. I n  small  p l a c e s ,  the mosque 
w i l l  be made the m ee ting  place  o f  the Anjum an .  P o s s i b l y  
a l l  the Imams and Muazzans  of  mosques w i l l  be made 
members o f  the Anjuman .
1 3 .  A l l  the Anjum ans ,  w h e th e r  c e n t r a l  or  s u b o r d i n ­
a t e ,  s h a l l  hold a committee f o r  the e l e c t i o n  of  o f f i c e  
b e a r e r s  every  two y e a r s .
1 4 .  E v e r y  Anjuman w i l l  s e l e c t  a member as a P r e s i d e n t  
or S e c r e t a r y .  He s h a l l  be r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the whole  work 
o f  that  Anjuman  and w i l l  be c a l l e d  the Khadim-ul-Khuddam 
(S e r v a n t  of  S e r v a n t s ) .  He w i l l  be he lped  by  two a s s i s t a n t s  
who w i l l  be known as M utam iddin  Khadim-ul-Khuddam.
15» The o r d in a r y  members o f  the Anjum an  w i l l  have 
to obey  the orders  o f  the Khadim-ul-Khuddam, w ith o u t  any  
o b j e c t i o n  or d e la y .  Any member v i o l a t i n g  th is  s e c t i o n  
w i l l  be regarded  as committing  a ve r y  h e in o u s  o f f e n c e .
1 6 .  E v e r y  member o f  the A n jum an ,  w h e th e r  Khadim  or 
S h a i d a i  w i l l  have to pay an an nual  s u b s c r i p t i o n  of  one 
and o n ly  one rupee .  However  r i c h  a man may be ,  n o t h i n g  
more than  a rupee w i l l  be taken  from him,  so that  the 
e q u a l i t y  o f  I s l a m  may be held  supreme.
1 7 .  The sum thus  su b s c r ib e d  w i l l  be d iv i d e d  into  
three  equal  shares  and w i l l  be spent  in  the f o l l o w i n g  
w a y : -
(a )  One-third  of  t h i s  sum w i l l  be g iv e n  to that  
Muhammadan empire which  w i l l  have the duty  of  
l o o k i n g  a f t e r  the Khana K a a b a .  I t  w i l l  be spent 
in  the s e r v ic e  of  the K aaba  in any way  that the 
r e s p e c t ,  d i g n i t y  or the s a f e t y  of  that  sacred  
p lac e  demands.
(b )  One-third  o f  the sum w i l l  be g iv en  to d i f f e r e n t  
orp h a nag e s ,  and schools  w h ic h  are l i k e l y  to
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produce S h a id a is  of  I s l a m .  The sum s u b s c r ib e d  
from each  province  and d i s t r i c t  w i l l  be spent in 
the cause of  that province  or d i s t r i c t  from w hich  
the sum has been  c o l l e c t e d .
(c )  One-third  of  the sum w i l l  be r e s e r v e d ,  so that it 
may be a d v a n ta g eo u s ly  spent in time of  n e e d .  T h is  
sum may be devoted to any u n d e r t a k i n g  w h ich  may be 
f o r  the good of  the Kaaba and oth er  h o l y  s h r i n e s ,  
a s ,  f o r  example,  to purchase  V e s s e l s  in  w hich  
p i l g r i m s  may be conveyed e a s i l y  and c o m fo r tab ly  
and ch e ap ly  to the h o ly  places  of  I s l a m ;  any oth er  
works w hich  may seem e q u a l l y  ad va nta g eo us  may be 
u n d e r t a k e n .
1 8 .  E v e r y  P r o v i n c i a l  Anjuman s h a l l  nominate  a l e g a l  
a d v i s e r  (m ash ir )  from amongst the o r d i n a r y  Khadim  to act 
as its  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e  on the C e n tr a l  A njum an ,  in a d d i t i o n  
to the S h a i d a i  nominated  by i t .  T h is  l e g a l  a d v i s e r  w i l l  
not be r e q u ir e d  to r e s i d e  at head- quarters  but  must attend  
m eeting  o f  h i s  Anjum an .
1 9 .  The f o l l o w i n g  gentlemen have b e e n  e l e c t e d  o f f i c e  
b earers  and members f o r  one y e a r .  Th ey  can  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  
number. I t  s h a l l  be t h e i r  duty  to b e g i n  the work o f  the 
Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba in the whole  c o u n tr y ,  and ,  a f t e r  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  Anjumans ( A l i a ,  D i s t r i c t  and A s l i a )  in  
d i f f e r e n t  d i s t r i c t s ,  they  may resign :-
( 1 ) M aulana  M a u lv i  A b d u l  B a r i ,  F a ra n g h i  M a h a l ,  
Khadim-ul-Khuddam (Servant  o f  S e r v a n t s ) .
Lucknow,
( 2 ) Hakim  Abdul  W a l i  S a h ib  of Lucknow.
(3 ) Dr. N a z ir - u d d in  H a s a n ,  B ar r ister- at- L aw ,  Lucknow .
w Mr. Mohamed A l i  S a h i b ,  e d i t o r  of  the Comrade and 
Hamdard ,  D e l h i .
( 5 ) Mr. M u s h ir  H u s a in  K i d w a i ,  Bar r is te r - at- L aw , Lucknow.
(6 ) Mr. Shaukat  A l i  S a h i b ,  B . A . , o f  Rampur.
The l a t t e r  are  the two S e c r e t a r i e s .
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Notes  on the Cawnpore Mosque A f f a i r  Recorded  
by  the Honourable  Members o f  the C o u n c i l  o f  the 
Governor-General  o f  I n d i a ,  b e t w e e n  1 September  
and 8 September  1 9 1 3 *
APPENDIX B
I t  is  im poss ible  to record  any  o p i n i o n .  I t  is an 
u n f o r t u n a t e  case the m erits  of  w h ich  have  ceased  to be o f  
much p r a c t i c a l  i n t e r e s t .  The r e a l l y  important  q u e s t io n  
now is - how f a r  the a g i t a t i o n  w i l l  s p r e a d .
I t  seems to me unw ise  to run in  1 0 0  ac c u s e d .  I n  the 
la s t  Cawnpore r i o t s ,  w hich  were more s e r i o u s ,  23  were run 
in and 18  c o n v ic te d  i f  I  remember r i g h t .
Sd /-  H . B [ U T L E R ] ,  1 . 9 . 1 3
T h i s  u n f o r t u n a t e  case  has g r e a t e r  p o t e n t i a l i t y  f o r  
tr o u ble  than  any s ince  1857»  I t  is  u n i t i n g  a l l  s e c t io n s  
of  the Muhammadan community of  I n d i a  i n t o  a common b e l i e f  
that t h e i r  mD e e n B is  in  dan ger .  A p ar t  a l t o g e t h e r  from 
the m erits  of  the q u e s t io n  w heth er  or  not the a c q u i s i t i o n  
and subsequent  d e m o l it io n  o f  a part o f  the M a c h l i  B a z a r  
Mosque was l e g a l  or  o t h e r w is e ,  the r e l i g i o u s  p a s s i o n s  of 
the Mussalmans have been  roused and a f i r e  has been  
k i n d l e d  that  is  s p r e a d in g  f a s t .  I n  times of  excitem ent  
people  do not pause to c o n s i d e r  w h e th e r  they  have r e ason  
on t h e i r  s i d e .  T h is  is e x a c t l y  the p o s i t i o n  i n  w h ic h  
the Muhammadans stand in  r e l a t i o n  to the Cawnpore 
" t r a g e d y *  o f  the 3rd of  August  l a s t .  More o f t e n  than not 
it is the  u n r e a s o n a b l e  that  ap p e a ls  to the i m a g i n a t io n .  
Once a s i l l y  story  of  greased  c a r t r i d g e s  plunged  the 
country  into  a p p a l l i n g  and u n t o l d  m i s e r y .  A n o t h e r  s i l l y  
story  that  the B r i t i s h  Government has  au fond departed  
from i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i c y  of  n o n - in t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  the 
r e l i g i o n s  o f  the people  is r e c e i v i n g  c u r r e n c y .  I t  is  to 
be hoped that th is  is only  a p a s s i n g  p h a s e .  I  f o r  one 
do not t h i n k  it  is so w i t h  the Muhammadans u n l e s s  some
N A I ,  Home P o l l  100- 118  Part A ,  O c t o b e r  1913»  'R io t  at 
Cawnpore in C o nn e ct ion  w i t h  the D e m o l i t i o n  of  a Mosque 
in M a c h l i  B a z a a r . '
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immediate a c t io n  is taken  to d i s s i p a t e  th i s  erroneous  
im p r e s s io n  un de r  which  they  are l a b o u r i n g .  R ight  or 
wrong,  the Mussalman community of  I n d i a  b e l i e v e s  that 
from start  to f i n i s h  o f f i c i a l  p r o c e e d in g s  w i t h  r e fe r e n c e  
to th is  mosque are marked with  h igh- h and ed ness  and that 
the d i s a s t r o u s  r e s u l t s  that have fo l lo w ed  were p r e v e n t i b l e  
w ithout  s h e d d i n g  Muslim blood  on c o n s e c r at ed  and hallow ed  
g r o u n d . An a p p r e c ia b le  loss  o f  l i f e ,  i n c l u d i n g  the o ld ,  
the young and the c h i l d ,  has s t i r r e d  Muhammadan sentiment 
to its  deepest  d e p th s .  The l i t e r a t e  and the i l l i t e r a t e ,  
the orthodox and the h e te r o d o x ,  the men o f  the new school  
and those of  the old - have a l l  b e e n  e q u a l l y  a f f e c t e d .
My l a t e s t  in form ation  is  that the ide a  o f  " t h e  s a c r i l e g e ' 1 
and n the martyrdom" has entered  into  the ze n a n a s ,  and 
the i n f l u e n c e  of  the women is  on the s id e  o f  the i ll-  
c o n s id e r e d  but p op ular  g r ie v a n c e .  I n  my humble o p in io n  
a d e e p ly  r e s e n t f u l  and morbid s ta te  of  mind of  an 
em otional  people  l i k e  the Muhammadans of  I n d i a  should not 
be permitted  to grow and expand in  the best  i n t e r e s t s  of 
good government.  We may be s t r o n g  enough to r e p r e s s ,  but 
s u r e l y  we s h a l l  be s tron g er  i f  we remove the ve r y  c a l l  
f o r  r e p r e s s i o n .  I t  is im p o s s ib le  not to sym pathise  w i t h  
the d i f f i c u l t  p o s i t i o n  in  w hich  S i r  James Meston  f i n d s  
h i m s e l f .  O b v i o u s ly  he and h i s  o f f i c e r s  could  not have 
a n t i c i p a t e d  the turn  a f f a i r s  have ta ke n .  I t  was p r ob ab ly  
thought that e x p e d it io u s  a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e e d in g s  and a 
prompt d e m o l it io n  would c lose  the s u b je c t  w ith o ut  much 
n o is e  or e x c ite m e n t .  Perhaps n i n e  men out o f  ten  would 
have done e x a c t l y  what the U n it e d  P r o v in c e s  Government 
d i d .  But as is v e r y  w e l l  known, it  is the u n ex p e ct ed  
that  always  hap p en s ,  and we are fac e  to f a c e  w i t h  a 
s i t u a t i o n  w h ich  i f  not p e r i l o u s  y e t ,  t h r e a t e n s  to be so,  
i f  re m e d ia l  measures are postponed  or u n d u l y  d e l a y e d .
Much of  course  depends on S i r  James Meston  h i m s e l f .  I  do 
not f a i l  to see how much he stands  in  need  of  our  support ,  
but I  doubt very  much i f  in that alone  any  remedy l i e s .
The  m atte r  has a l r e a d y  emerged from p r o v i n c i a l  concern  
into  an A l l - I n d i a  p o l i t i c a l  problem.  I t  was fo r t u n a t e  
that  the d e p u t a t io n  he re c e ive d  was only  a p r o v i n c i a l  
one,  and that  a lt h o u g h  h i s  r e p ly  has in  some degree  
f e t t e r e d  h i s  h ands ,  there  is s t i l l  room to r e - co n s id e r  
the p o s i t i o n ,  were he d isposed  to r e c e i v e  an A l l - I n d i a  
Muhammadan d e p u t a t io n  which  might c l e a r l y  and e m p h a t i c a l l y  
express  i ts  d i s a p p r o v a l  of  d e f i a n c e  of  Law and Ord er ,  and 
f r a n k l y  throw i t s e l f  on h is  g e n e r o s i t y  to r e s t o r e  the 
demolished  p o rt io n  of  the mosque w ithout  p r e j u d i c e  to the 
Cawnpore t r i a l s  that are d r a g g in g  t h e i r  slow  c o u r s e .  My
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own v i e w  is  that those a lo ne  who i n c i t e d  the d is t u r b a n c e  
should be proceeded a g a i n s t ,  and that the ig n o r an t  
f a n a t i c s  who were m isguided  and m isled  by  a g i t a t o r s  
should be g iv en  a general  p ardon  a f t e r  c o n v i c t i o n  b e fo r e  
the S e s s i o n s  Judge who is about to try  them. As  f a r  as 
X have b e e n  able  to gauge Muhammadans f e e l i n g  n o t h i n g  
short of  the r e s t o r a t io n  o f  the demolished  part  o f  the 
mosque w i l l  restore  c o n f id e n c e  and peace o f  m ind .  I t  
w i l l  be d e p l o r a b le  i f  S i r  James Meston overlooks  the 
importance  of c o n f e r r i n g  upon the Muhammadans o f  I n d i a  
as a g i f t  what the futu re  may transform  in to  a demand, 
i r r e s i s t i b l e  and uncom prom ising .  I  have not the 
s l i g h t e s t  i n t e n t i o n  to appear  to be an a l a r m i s t .  I  am 
a c tu ate d  by  the sole  d e s ir e  to n ip  in  the bud ,  and at 
i t s  v e r y  i n c e p t io n ,  an a g i t a t i o n  w h ich  has in  it  the 
worst elements  o f  f a n a t i c is m  and b i g o t r y .  I  do not 
b e l i e v e  in  k e e p i n g  the sword o f  the S i r c a r  a lways  out 
of  the s c ab b ar d ,  as I  have f a i t h  in  the v i g o r o u s  and 
a c t iv e  us e  of  it once it  is o ut .  S i r  James M e s t o n ' s  
r e p l y  to the d e p u ta t io n  was tempered w i t h  sympathy and 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n ,  though he was f irm  in  h i s  r e f u s a l  as 
regards  the r e s t o r a t i o n .  He has only  to c ar r y  the 
s p i r i t  of  sympathy a l i t t l e  f u r t h e r  and save Muhammadan 
l o y a l t y  from permanent estran g em ent ,  f o r ,  I  f e a r ,  a 
r e f u s a l  to r e c o n s i d e r  h is  d e c i s i o n  w i l l  end in  n o t h i n g  
e l s e .
Sd /-  S . A .  I [M A M ] ,  2 . 9 . 1 3
The H o n ' b l e  the Law Member [ S .A .  Imam] speaks  w i t h  
s p e c i a l  knowledge  of Muhammadan s e n t im e n t ,  but I  cannot 
h e lp  the c o n v ic t i o n  that to accept  h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  would 
lead  us into  a very  s e r io us  e r r o r  of  p o l i c y .  E v e r y t h i n g  
i n d i c a t e s  that  the case was to be a te s t  t r i a l  o f  s t r e n g t h  
of a g i t a t i o n  a g a in s t  Government .  Local  f e e l i n g  had d ied  
down and was w ith  d i f f i c u l t y  worked up a g a i n  from the 
o u t s id e .  I t  seems to me that  S i r  James M e s t o n ' s  p o s i t i o n  
would become very  n e a r l y  u n t e n a b l e  i f  he went b a c k  on 
h is  f i r m  and d i g n i f i e d  r e p l y  to the d e p u t a t i o n  of  August  
l 6 t h  w h i l e ,  w hate ve r  reasons  were g iv en  f o r  the change 
o f  p o l i c y ,  the p a r t y  of  a g i t a t i o n  would be able  to brush  
them a s i d e  and to claim  a n o t a b l e  tr ium ph  f o r  t h e i r  
m ethods .
Sd /-  H . W .  C [L A R K ] ,  2 . 9 . 1 3
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I  t h i n k  that e very  p r e c a u t i o n  must be taken  to avoid  
a g g r a v a t i n g  the present  exc item ent  among Muhammadans:  but 
that it would be a m istake  to r e b u i l d  the d a l a n .
As regards  our treatment  of  the accused  in the 
C r im in al  case ,  we must c l e a r l y  a w a it  the r e s u l t  o f  that 
case  b e f o r e  d e c i d i n g  a n y t h i n g .
Sd /-  E . D .  M[ACLAGAN],  3 . 9 . 1 3
I  cannot help  t h i n k i n g  that  th ere  has been  r e g r e t t a b l e  
want of  judgment on the part o f  the l o c a l  Government in  
d e a l i n g  w i t h  this  m atter .  S i r  James Meston  must have been 
w e l l  aware - indeed the c o n c l u d i n g  p o r t i o n  of  h is  minute 
shows that  he was so - that Muhammadan f e e l i n g  is at 
present  in  a state  of  e x c i t a b l e  and u n h e a l t h y  t e n s i o n  
owing  to events  in  the B a lk an s  and e l s e w h e r e ,  and that 
un s cr u p u lo u s  a g i t a t o r s  were e n d e a v o u r i n g  to e x p l o i t  th is  
f e e l i n g  to the utmost fo r  t h e i r  own e n d s .  Why then give  
them a han d le  to make f u r t h e r  m i s c h i e f  b y  the d e m o l it io n  
o f  th is  mosque appurtenance?  T h e r e  was no h u rry  about 
i t :  so f a r  as I  can judge ,  the m a t t e r  could  p e r f e c t l y  
w e l l  have been  allowed  to l i e  over  t i l l  the general  
Muhammadan f e e l i n g  had r e la p s e d  into  a normal s t a t e .  S i r  
J a m e s . . .  argues  that he w ished  to get the m atte r  over  
s p e e d i l y  b ecause  o p p o s i t i o n  was b e i n g  e n g i n e e r e d  from 
o u t s i d e ,  and he apprehended  that  d e l a y  might lead  us into  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  in D e l h i .  T h i s  l a t t e r  motive  was c h i v a l r o u s ,  
but as a m atter  of fac t  what has o c c u r r e d ,  and the 
consequent  e x a c e r b a t io n  of  Muhammadan f e e l i n g  is 
i n f i n i t e l y  more em b a rr a s s in g  to us than  the F a b ia n  p o l i c y  
would have been .
On the other  hand ,  I  cannot a g r e e  w i t h  M r . A l i  Imam 
that  Muhammadan f e e l i n g  should  now be c o n c i l i a t e d  by  
r e s t o r i n g  the demolished  p o r t i o n  o f  the mosque p r e m ise s .  
A f t e r  what has occurred ,  such  a course  would i n e v i t a b l y  
be a t t r i b u t e d  to f e a r .  We should  get no g r a t i t u d e .  On 
the c o n t r a r y ,  the u n s c r u p u lo u s  a g i t a t o r s  who are at the 
back  of  the present  movement would t r y  a f u r t h e r  a t t a c k  
on the Government as soon as a p r e t e x t  suggested  i t s e l f .  
F irmness  and r e f u s a l  to y i e l d  to open or v e i l e d  th re a ts  
i s ,  I h o l d ,  our best  p o l i c y .  We have  got ,  i f  need b e ,  to 
show d is c o n te n te d  and i n t r i g u i n g  Muhammadans that we are 
str o n g e r  than they ,  and should  not take  any a c t io n  w h ich  
would le ad  to the im pression  that we are  w e ak e r .  I n  th i s
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c o n n e c t i o n  I  t h in k  it  most important that  prompt a c t i o n  
s h o u l d  be taken  a g a in s t  new spaper  a r t i c l e s  or pamphlets  
w h ic h  c o n s t i t u t e  inc item ents  to f u r t h e r  i l l - f e e l i n g  or 
a c t i v e  m i s c h i e f .
3 .  Nor  can I  agree  w ith  Mr. A l i  Imam t h a t ,  when there  
has b e e n  a ve r y  s e r io u s  r iot  r e s u l t i n g  in  l o s s  o f  l i f e  
th o se  who have taken part in it  s h o u ld ,  i f  c o n v ic te d  by 
a competent  Court ,  be im m ediately  pardoned  on the ground 
that  th e y  were ignorant  f a n a t i c s  m isled  from o u t s i d e .
Such  a course  is in  my o p in io n  c a l c u l a t e d  to put a premium 
on r i o t i n g  e l s e w h e r e ,  or in Cawnpore i t s e l f  h e r e a f t e r .
4 .  The  q u e s t io n  of the l e g a l i t y  of  the  step s  taken  
u n d e r  the Land A c q u i s i t i o n  Act  was m entioned  in C o u n c i l  
y e s t e r d a y ,  and I  u n de rsta nd  that S i r  R e g i n a l d  Craddock  
was to w r it e  p r i v a t e l y  to S i r  James Meston  on the s u b j e c t .  
F o r  the p r e s e n t  t h e r e f o r e ,  a l l  I  need say  is  th a t ,  i f  
th e r e  have  been  grave i r r e g u l a r i t i e s ,  we should  no doubt 
have  to r e c o n s i d e r  our p o s i t i o n  i n  reg ard  to g i v i n g  
support  to the a c t i o n  of  the l o c a l  Governm ent .  T h is  
w o u ld ,  h ow ever ,  land  us in a v e r y  u n p l e a s a n t  quandary ,  
s i n c e  the a c t i o n  taken  would p r o b a b ly  be a t t r i b u t e d  to 
f e a r  r a t h e r  than to s t r i c t  j u s t i c e .  But the matters  
m en tioned  in  paragrap h  10  of the L i e u t e n a n t - G o v e r n o r ' s  
m inute  seem to me p oints  of m ino r  importance  w h ic h  a 
s e n s i b l e  court would not c o n s i d e r  as of  s u f f i c i e n t  w e ig ht  
to i n v a l i d a t e  the p r o c e e d in g s .
Sd /-  W . S .  M [ E Y E R ] ,  6 . 9 . 1 3
I  am not prepared  to record any o p i n i o n  on the a c t i o n  
o f  the  l o c a l  Government at p r e s e n t .
I  b e l i e v e  we must give  them our support  and I  agree  
w i t h  p a r a g r a p h  2 of  the H o n ’ b le  F in an c e  M e m b e r ’ s [ W . S .  
Meyer]  note  above - in  my v ie w  any  o t h e r  a c t i o n  would be 
d i s a s t r o u s .
I  agree  w ith  the H o n ’b le  Law Member [ S . A .  Imam] that 
” in  my humble o p i n i o n  a d eeply  r e s e n t f u l  and morbid s ta te  
of  mind o f  an emotional  people  l i k e  the Muhammadans o f  
I n d i a  should  not be permitted  to grow and s p r e a d . "
T h i s  s t a t e  o f  mind was o r i g i n a t e d  i n  the s e d i t i o u s  
p re ss  w h ic h  is now engaged in  s p r e a d i n g  i t .  The immediate
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a c t i o n  w h ich  should in my o p in io n  be t a k e n  is  to prevent 
t h i s  a c t i o n  of  the p r e s s .  I f  it  be not done the state  
o f  a f f a i r s  w i l l  get worse b e fo r e  it is b e t t e r .
Sd /-  0«M.  C [ R E A G H ] , 6 . 9 . 1 3
I  am much impressed by  S i r  James M e s t o n ' s  ab le  
m i n u t e .
Small  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  in  mosque b u i l d i n g s  w ith  the 
r e a d y  consent  of  t h e i r  managers and of  the l e a d i n g  
members o f  the lo c a l  community have b een  q u ite  common 
f e a t u r e s  in  land a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e e d i n g s ;  and i f  any 
suc h  m o d i f i c a t i o n  of  temple or mosque were to be vetoed  
f o r  a l l  t ime ,  most of  our urb an  improvement schemes w i l l  
come to an end ;  s ince  the d e f l e c t i o n  of  a road to avoid  
one of  these  b u i l d i n g s  w i l l  almost c e r t a i n l y  invade  
a n o t h e r  somewhere e l s e .
The whole  a g i t a t i o n ,  as I  am assured  from 
i n d e p e n d e n t  D e l h i  sources ,  was e n g i n e e r e d  from D e l h i ,  
i n  o rd e r  to embarrass  us w ith  contem plated  D e l h i  
im p r o ve m e nts .
I n  d e c i d i n g  in regard  to such a m o d i f i c a t i o n  as 
that  i n  the Cawnpore case ,  we must deal  with, some 
r e c o g n i s e d  a u t h o r i t i e s  l i k e  the t r u s t e e s  of the b u i l d i n g .  
We cannot deal- w i t h  the whole  Muhammadan p o p u l a t i o n  of  
India every time that it is sought to make s t r u c t u r a l  
a l t e r a t i o n s  in  a mosque or w i t h  the whole  H i n d u  p o p u l a t i o n  
e v e r y  time that a corner  of  a temple yard stands  in  the 
way of  a p u b l i c  improvement.  R e a s o n a b le  compromise,  such 
as that  d u l y  ar r iv e d  at in  th is  present  c a s e ,  must be the 
b a s i s  o f  a l l  such  ar r a ng e m e nts , compromise a r r i v e d  at 
with, the p ersons  l o c a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d .
W he the r  the f o r c i b l e  d e m o l i t i o n  of  t h i s  l i t t l e  
annexe  to the mosque was w ise  at the p a r t i c u l a r  junctu re  
or not is  a m atte r  on which  [it ] is e a s i e r  to pronounce 
an o p i n i o n  a f t e r  the events  than  b e f o r e .
O r d i n a r i l y  sp e ak in g  the b u i l d i n g  up  of  the new 
w a s h i n g  p l a c e  s u p e r io r  to the old one should  have been  
the p r e l i m i n a r y  to the d e m o l i t i o n  of  the l a t t e r .  T h i s  
is  what the l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  c o n t e m p lat ed ;  but  the 
m u t w a l l i e s  of  the mosque were no l o n g e r  f r e e  a g e n t s .  They
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c ould  not do what they  wanted to do,  i . e . ,  to c a r r y  out 
t h e i r  own agreement without  b e i n g  put by  the Press  in a 
p u b l i c  p i l l o r y  as b e i n g  u n f a i t h f u l  to t h e i r  r e l i g i o n .
Had the m atter  been  brought  to S i r  James M e s t o n 's  
n o t i c e  when he was on the spot in  November  l a s t ,  he 
might  perhaps  have arranged  to e x c l u d e  both  mosque and 
temple  e n t i r e l y  from the improvement scheme,  though 12 
f e e t  o f f  a road-way is a ser io us  m a tte r ,  and might have 
com pelled  a re-alignment u n d o in g  three  y e a r s 1 a c q u i s i t i o n  
work  and r e n d e r i n g  a lot  of  it n u g a t o r y .
P o s s i b l y  a F a b i a n  p o l i c y  such as my H o n ' b l e  C o l l e a g u e ,  
S i r  W i l l i a m  Meyer,  has s u g g e ste d ,  might have  secured  the 
e v e n t u a l  compromise;  but I  doubt i t ,  once the D e l h i  
a g i t a t o r s  had come on the s cene .  How ever ,  wh eth er  the 
a c t i o n  taken  or a F a b ia n  p o l i c y  would have  been  the b e t t e r  
is  now o f  p u r e ly  academic i n t e r e s t .
The q u e s t io n  is what is to be done? I  can see no 
merit in  y i e l d i n g  b e fo r e  mob v i o l e n c e  or f a c t i t i o u s  
a g i t a t i o n .
No s e n s i b l e  Muhammadan b e l i e v e s  f o r  a moment that 
we are  d e p a r t i n g  from our a t t i t u d e  o f  s t r i c t  n e u t r a l i t y  
and p r o t e c t i o n  of  a l l  r e l i g i o n s .  I t  seems an im p o s s ib le  
p r o p o s i t i o n  that we shoulcl do som ething  w h ich  no 
r e a s o n a b l e  Muhammadan b e l i e v e s  to be r e a l l y  n e c e s s a r y ,  
and t h e r e b y  p r a c t i c a l l y  admit
( i )  that  S i r  James Meston was wron g ;  and
( i i )  that  no tr us tee s  of  any r e l i g i o u s  b u i l d i n g
s h a l l  ever  h e r e a f t e r  be competent to consent 
to the d is t u r b a n c e  of  a s i n g l e  stone in the 
e nc losure  of  a temple or mosque.
On the c o n t r a r y ,  i f  the Muhammadan l e a d e r s  w i l l  
a g r e e  to accept  a new and b e t t e r  wazu  K hana  as the g i f t  
of  the Government on the no rth  s ide  of  the mosque,  we 
m ight  at once agree  to the most l e n i e n t  treatment  of  a l l  
concerned  in  the u n fo r tu n a te  r i o t ,  and thus a l l o w  the 
i n c i d e n t s  to be b ur ied  in  o b l i v i o n .  But i f  the y  w i l l  
not a g r e e ,  then  the Muhammadan l e a d e r s  w i l l  stand 
condemned in  the eyes of  a l l  r ig h t  t h i n k i n g  men; and i f  
any  e v i l  consequences  ensue ,  they  w i l l  r e c o i l  on them 
and not  on Government.
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As to the present  a g i t a t i o n ,  it  w i l l  s u b s id e  as 
o t h e r  a g i t a t i o n s  have s ub s id e d  in the p a s t ;  men cannot 
k e e p  at w h i t e  heat  fo r  lo n g  t o g e t h e r .
I t  looks  as i f  the d ir e c t  n e g o t a t i o n s  between  
B u l g a r i a  and T u r k e y  w i l l  end in a s o l u t i o n  s o o t h in g  to 
Muhammadan p r i d e ,  and th is  alone  should  a l l a y  much of  
the Muhammadan e xc ite m e nt .
I n  the meantime,  I  have w r i t t e n  to S i r  James Meston  
about  the a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e e d in g s ;  but  on a g a i n  p e r u s i n g  
the m inu te  I  cannot th in k  that there  have  been  any  such  
i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  as could p o s s i b l y  be h e ld  by  any court 
to v i t i a t e  the p r o c e e d i n g s .  But i f  there  were such 
i r r e g u l a r i t i e s ,  I  would much p r e f e r  the s p e c t a c l e  of  a 
Government y i e l d i n g  to the p r o c e e d in g s  of  c i v i l  courts  
r a t h e r  than  to any v i o l e n c e  or f a c t i t i o u s  clamour.
Sd/- R . H . C[RADDOCK] ,  7 . 9 . 1 3
My own o p i n i o n  is that the d e m o l i t i o n  of  the out ­
b u i l d i n g  o f  the mosque at a moment when S i r  J .  Meston 
and eve ry b o d y  e ls e  knew that the n e r v e s  of  the 
Muhammadans were on edge was a s tup id  b l u n d e r  and one 
that  has  h a d ,  and may s t i l l  have ,  grave  c o n s e q u e n c e s .
I  r e a l l y  see  n o t h in g  to j u s t i f y  the a c t i o n  taken  on 
J u l y  1 .  I f  the l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  had o n l y  b u i l t  the 
new b u i l d i n g  to take the place  of  the o l d ,  and g iv e n  
R s • 1 0 0  to the m u t a w a l l i ,  we should  not have had a l l  
t h i s  t r o u b l e .  The  mere fact  that Mr. T y l e r  went w i t h  
armed p o l i c e  to p u l l  down the b u i l d i n g  shows that he at 
l e a s t  a n t i c i p a t e d  s e r io us  t r o u b l e ,  and he in fac t  
provoked  i t .  That there  was no t r o u b l e  at the time is 
no an s w e r .
I  have  no p a t ie n c e  w ith  such s h o r t s i g h t e d n e s s .  I  
cannot  f i n d  any i n d i c a t i o n  anywhere that  the m atte r  was 
u r g e n t ,  or that  the d e m o l it io n  could  not have been  
d e f e r r e d  t i l l  some months l a t e r .
I  do not t h in k  that S i r  J .  Meston  e v e r  r e a l i s e d  
the g r a v i t y  of  the general  s i t u a t i o n ,  s in c e  I  wrote to 
him on the  1 6 t h  J u l y ,  when I  saw s ig n s  of  the coming 
storm, u r g i n g  him to p u b l i s h  a communique in the Press  
in  the hope that th i s  might b r i n g  calm ,  and h e a r i n g  
n o t h i n g  from him I  te leg rap h ed  to him on the 23rd  J u l y
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and a g a i n  urged  him to make a communique to the p r e s s ,  or 
to hold  an independent  i n q u i r y  on w h ich  the Muhammadans 
would  be represented  in s t r e n g t h .  He th e n  issued  h is  
communique on the 2 4 th .  As we know,  t h i s  did no good.
The r i o t  f o l l o w e d .  S i r  J .  Meston  went to Cawnpore and 
i n q u i r e d  into  the m atter ,  h is  v i s i t  was u n d o u b t e d l y  a 
ca lm in g  l o c a l  i n f l u e n c e ,  and has  s in c e  r e t i r e d  to N a i n i  
T a l  a f t e r  r e c e i v i n g  a Muhammadan D e p u t a t i o n  when he 
a b s o l u t e l y  d e c l in e d  to l i s t e n  to any compromise.  I n  the 
meantime the Muhammadan community are s u l k y  and 
u n f a v o u r a b l y  d isposed  toward Government and I  shudder  
to t h i n k  of  the trouble  we might have i f  some other  
o f f i c i a l  were to be so short- sig h ted  as to act e lsew here  
in  the same manner as Mr T y l e r  [Deputy Com missioner  of 
Cawnpore]  on J u l y  1 s t .  I  know  it to be the s h i b b o l e t h  
of the Government of  I n d i a  that  the l o c a l  Government ,  
when it gets  into  trouble  or makes a m i s t a k e ,  has to be 
s u p p o r t e d .  I t  is a p r i n c i p l e  that  I  n e i t h e r  accept  nor 
b e l i e v e  i n ,  s ince  a Government ,  l i k e  a p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  
ought always  to be ready  to admit a m is ta k e  when one has 
been  made.  I  have supported S i r  J .  Meston  in  th is  a f f a i r ,  
a l t h o u g h  I  regard  it as a s tu p id  and u n n e c e s s a r y  b l u n d e r ,  
but I  do t h i n k  that the lo c a l  Government ,  and the 
Government of  I n d i a ,  w i l l  expose  them selves  to j u s t i f i a b l e  
c ensure  i f  they  f a i l  to s e i z e  the very  f i r s t  opening  that 
p r e s e n ts  i t s e l f  f o r  a s o lu t io n  w h ic h  may be a compromise,  
and w h ich  even now may prevent  the a l i e n a t i o n  o f  the 
sympathy and support of the most l o y a l  s e c t i o n  of  the 
community. I  do not regard  the ac tu al  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  the 
same com placency  as some of  my H o n o u ra b le  C o l l e a g u e s .
Sd/- H[ARDINGE] , 8 . 9 . 1 3
C h ap te r  F ive
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The campaign launched  by Mohamed A l i  i n  D e l h i  to 
p o l i t i c i s e  Muslim  s o c i e t y  in  the c i t y  met w i t h  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
s u c c e s s .  He was u n a b le  to win  over  the s h a r i f , but he did  
d e ve lop  a p o l i t i c a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  among the non-s h a r i f  
Muslims of  D e l h i ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  the s t u d e n t s ,  the small  
sh o p k e e p e r s ,  and the a r t i s a n s .  T h i s  success  was a c h ie v e d  
at some c o s t ,  however ,  b ecause  even though  Mohamed A l i  
w idened  the p o l i t i c a l  h o r i z o n s  of  new c l a s s e s  in  Muslim  
s o c i e t y ,  h i s  appeal  to r e l i g i o u s  sentiment  e f f e c t i v e l y  
r e i n f o r c e d  t h e i r  p a r o c h i a l  a t t i t u d e s .
Be fo r e  1917  the H in d u s  o f  D e l h i  had no coun terp art  
to Mohamed A l i .  They  had no a g i t a t o r  who could  capture  
the i m a g i n a t io n  and l o y a l t y  o f  the i l l i t e r a t e  and poor.  
T h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  movement,  w hich  had begun  as e a r l y  as 
1905 , depended  e n t i r e l y  upon a h i g h l y  p o l i t i c i s e d  s u b ­
e l i t e  w h ic h  was r e l a t i v e l y  homogeneous i n  terms of  
e d u c a t i o n a l ,  s o c i a l ,  and economic s t a t u s .  The D e l h i  
b r a n c h  o f  the Home Rule  L ea g u e ,  w h ich  was founded  e a r l y  
in  1 9 1 7 » was co m p le t ely  dependant  upon th is  s u b - e l i t e .
The i s s u e s  th e y  r a i s e d ,  h ow ever ,  d id  not a t t r a c t  the 
A r y a  Sam aj ,  or the H in d u  E x t r e m i s t s ,  b o th  o f  whom had 
been  a c t i v e  in the n a t i o n a l i s t  movement b e fo r e  1 9 1 1 . 
P o l i t i c a l  m eetings  w h ich  a t t r a c t e d  v e ry  small  numbers 
and the  i n a b i l i t y  of  the a g i t a t o r s  to arouse  any 
sentim ent  over  the internment  of  Mrs Besant ,  persuaded  
the H i n d u  l e a d e r s  to change t h e i r  idiom  and to attempt 
to i n c u l c a t e  p o l i t i c a l  v a l u e s  into  a l a r g e r ,  
h e te r o g e n e o u s  community.  T h i s  idiom ,  w h ic h  was a l s o  
r e l i g i o u s  in  tone ,  aroused  the g r e a t e s t  rejsponse d u r i n g  
the Ram L i l a  f e s t i v a l  in  1 9 1 7 5 but a l t h o u g h  the p o l i t i c a l  
l e a d e r s  e f f e c t i v e l y  widened  the h o r i z o n s  of  many H i n d u s ,
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the i n c i d e n t  a l s o  r e i n f o r c e d  s t r o n g  p a r o c h i a l  a t t i t u d e s  
w i t h i n  the H i n d u  community.
The exten t  to w h ich  Mohamed A l i  and the D e l h i  Home 
Rule  League  had widened  the p o l i t i c a l  h o r i z o n s  of  the 
i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  D e l h i  was r e f l e c t e d  in the Row latt  
S a t y a g r a h a .  The extent  to w h ic h  the events  o f  the ten  
years  p r e c e d i n g  non-co-operation r e i n f o r c e d  p a r o c h i a l  
a t t i t u d e s  was r e f l e c t e d  in  the non-co-operation  movement.
I
The E x t r e m i s t s  have abandoned  t h e i r  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
work f o r  the present  and are  a t te m p tin g  to o b ta in  
t h e i r  own ends w i t h  the borrowed weapons of  the 
M o d e r a t e s .
D i r e c t o r  of  
C r im in a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  
16  J a n u a r y  1917
T h e r e  were few events  o f  consequence  in the l a t t e r  
h a l f  o f  1 9 1 5  and in 1 9 1 6 .  The  p o l i t i c a l  le a d e r s  r a is e d  
few i s s u e s ,  and there  was almost no response  from the 
i n h a b i t a n t s  of  the c i t y .  The a p a th y  and i n d i f f e r e n c e  of  
the c i t i z e n s  of  D e l h i  was as consp ic uous  d u r i n g  th i s  
p er io d  as it was in any  y e a r  p r e c e d i n g  1910 .
Members o f  the H i n d u  community held  m eeting s  on 
three  d i f f e r e n t  o c c a s i o n s .  A m eeting  was c a l l e d  by  Ra i  
B ah ad u r  S u l t a n  S i n g h  on 21 March  1 9 1 6  to p rote st  the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  the new s l a u g h t e r  house n e a r  a H in d u  
temple at J h a n d e w a l ,  at w h ic h  2 0 0  people  were p r e s e n t . 1
1
RDDA, E d u c a t i o n  F i l e  1 01  Part  B 1915»  'Compulsory  
A c q u i s i t i o n  o f  Land  by the M u n i c i p a l i t y  f o r  a S l a u g h t e r  
H o u s e . '
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The second m ee t in g  on 18 A p r i l  1 9 1 6 ,  was c a l l e d  by  the
Chamar brotherhood  o f  shoemakers and sandal  m akers .
Over  8 0 0  Chamars met at Lachman C h a u d h r i ' s  house  in
Sh ah g an j  to protest  a g a in s t  d e d u c t io n s  w h ic h  the Muslim
merchants  made to f i n a n c e  an i n d u s t r i a l  s c h o o l . 1 And
f i n a l l y ,  a m ee t in g  of  4 0 0  H in d u s  was convened by  the
I n d r a p r a s t h  Sana tan  Dharam Mahamandal on 24 September
1 9 1 6  to p r o te st  a g a in s t  Muslim  d a n c in g  g i r l s  p o r t r a y i n g
2
H i n d u  gods and g o d d e ss e s .
Members o f  the Muslim  community a l s o  he ld  only  
three  m eetings  o f  no te .  The Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba 
h e l d  m eeting s  on O c tob e r  1 9 1 5  and March 1 9 1 6  both  of
3
w h ic h  a t t r a c t e d  1 0 0  p e r so n s .
1 RDDA, C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  1 2 9  ( 1 9 1 6 ) ,  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  R e p o rt s ,1 
D e l h i  P o l i c e  Sec ret  A b s t r a c t  No.  1 7 ,  22  A p r i l  1 9 1 6 .  
p
N A I ,  Home P o l l  29  D e p o s i t ,  O c t o b e r  1916 , ' F o r t n i g h t l y  
R eports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  in  S p e c i a l  
R e f e r e n c e  to the War Re c e iv ed  from A l l  the P r o v in c e s  f o r  
the Second F o r t n i g h t  of  Septem ber  1 9 1 6 ,  ' H . C .  Beadon  to
S . R .  H i g n e l l ,  3 0  September  1 9 1 6 ;  RDDA, C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  
1 2 9  ( l 9 l 6 ) ,  D e l h i  P o l i c e  S e c r e t  A b s t r a c t  No.  4 0 ,  30  
Septem ber  1 9 1 6 .  The  men u n d e r  whose s ig n a t u r e  the p o s te r  
c a l l i n g  f o r  the m e e t in g  was iss u ed  w e r e ;  R a i  Bahadur  
G h a n ia  L a i ;  R a i  S a h ib  W a z i r  S i n g h ;  Lachhmi N a r a i n ,  v a i d ;
Ram Chand Kure  M a i ,  ironm onger ;  P a n d it  Banke R a i ,  
mahamahapadayaya;  R a i  S a h ib  I r s h i  P e r s h a d ; Pa nd it  K a n sh i  
N a t h ;  L a l a  M ina  M a i ,  hon orary  m a g i s t r a t e ;  R a i  B ah ad ur  
Gaur  S h a n k a r ;  Pa n d it  H a r n a r a i n ,  mahamahapadayaya;  L a l a  
Amba P e r s h a d ,  honorary  m a g i s t r a t e ;  L a l a  B a s h e s h a r  Na th ,  
G oenka ,  p l e a d e r ;  R a i  S a h ib  K i d a r  N a th ;  L a l a  B isham bar  N a th .
3
N A I ,  Home P o l l  9 D e p o s i t ,  November 1915»  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  
Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  in  S p e c i a l  
R e f e r e n c e  to the W ar  f o r  the Second F o r t n ig h t  of  O c to b e r  
1 9 1 5 » 1 W .M .  H a i l e y  to H .  W h e e l e r ,  2 November 1 9 1 5 ;  Home 
P o l l  19  D e p o s i t ,  A p r i l  1 9 1 6 ,  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  on the 
I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  R e c e iv e d  from a l l  the 
P r o v in c e s  f o r  the Second F o r t n i g h t  o f  March 1916 , '  W .M .  
H a i l e y  to H.  W h e e le r ,  4 A p r i l  1 9 1 6 ;  RDDA, C o n f i d e n t i a l  
F i l e  87 ( 1 9 1 5 )>  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  R e p o r t s , ' D e l h i  P o l i c e  
Se c r e t  A b s t r a c t  No .  4 l ,  23  O c t o b e r  1 9 1 5 ;  C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e
1 2 9  ( 1916 ) ,  D e l h i  P o l ic e  S e c r e t  A b s t r a c t  No.  21 ,  20  May 1916.
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There  was l i t t l e  enth usiasm  f o r  p an - Islam ism , however ,  
and the S o c i e t y  q u i c k l y  l a n g u i s h e d .  The i n d i f f e r e n c e  
of  the community toward pan-Islamism  was c o n v i n c i n g l y  
d is p la y e d  at a m eeting  on 6 J u l y  1916 to p rote st  a g a in s t  
the r e v o lt  of  the S h a r i f  o f  Mecca  from the S u l t a n  of 
T urke y .  On ly  1 , 5 0 0  Muslims g ath ered  at the Q u ee n 's  
Gardens  on that Sunday to pass a mild  r e s o l u t i o n  un der  
the guidance  of  the Imam of  the Jama M a s j i d . 1
Economic d i s t r e s s  was e v id e n t  d ur in g  the y e a r  and 
a h a l f .  The p r ic e  of  wheat which  had reached  a low of 
92 seers  per  rupee ( s t i l l  one s e e r  per  rupee l e s s  than  
normal)  in J u l y  began  to r i s e  in  September  as it  c lim bed  
to e ig h t  seers  per  rupee in November where it remained 
u n t i l  March 1916 a f t e r  w h ich  it dropped to. 1 0 ^ .  P r i c e s  
c ontinued  s t e a d i l y  u n t i l  November 1916 when there  was a 
r i s e  to n in e  seers  w i t h  a more d r a s t i c  r i s e  to 7^  i n 
December.  The p r ic e  o f  s a l t  rose  from R s . 2 / 4 / -  per 
maund in  O c to b e r  to R s . 4 / 8 / -  per  maund in mid-December.  
The  M u n ic i p a l  Committee was forced  once a g a in  to open 
cheap g r a i n  shops and s a lt  depots  w hich  a l l e v i a t e d  some 
o f  the d i s t r e s s  u n t i l  a r e l e a s e  of new stocks  of  g r a i n  
brought the p r ic e  down to 10^  seers  per  rupee  in  A p r i l
1
N A I , Home P o l l  26  D e p o s i t ,  J u l y  1916 , ' F o r t n i g h t l y  
Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  in S p e c i a l  
R e fe r e n c e  to the War Re c e iv ed  from a l l  the Prov in ce s  
f o r  the Second F o r t n ig h t  o f  June  1916 , '  W .M .  H a i l e y  to
H. W h e e le r ,  1 J u l y  1 9 1 6 ;  Home P o l l  24 D e p o s i t ,  A ugust
1 9 1 6 ,  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  
S i t u a t i o n  in S p e c i a l  R e f e r e n c e  to the War Rec e iv ed  from 
the S e v e r a l  P r o v in c e s  f o r  the F i r s t  F o r t n ig h t  of  J u l y
1 9 1 6 , '  W .M .  H a i l e y  to S . R .  H i g n e l l ,  21  J u l y  1 9 1 6 ;  RDDA , 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  129  ( 1916) ,  D e l h i  P o l i c e  Sec ret  
A b s t r a c t  No.  28 ,  8 J u l y  1916 .
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1 9 1 7 .  Th ere  were ,  however ,  no p o l i t i c a l  i ss u es  upon 
w hich  to focus  the economic d i s t r e s s  and the p er io d  
passed w ithout  s e r io u s  i n c i d e n t . 1
There  was a g e ne r al  r e c r u d e s c e n c e  of  p a r o c h i a l  
f e e l i n g  in 1917»  The C h i e f  Com missioner  o b se rve d ;
The s tr a in e d  r e l a t i o n s  of  H i n d u s  and Mahomedans 
g e n e r a l l y . . . show l i t t l e  change f o r  the b e t t e r .
On two o c c as ions  l a t e l y  t r o u b le  has a r i s e n  in 
regard  to m arriage  p r o c e s s io n s  and the l i k e ,  and 
though  the le a d e r s  o f  the two communities  have 
been  persuaded  to compromise the c a s e s ,  there  
would seem f o r  the time b e i n g  to be u n u s u a l l y  
s t r o n g  f e e l i n g  between  l e s s  r e s p o n s i b l e  members. 
C u r i o u s l y  enough there  is at  the same time much
1
N A I , Home P o l l  2 D e p o s i t ,  A ugust  1 9 1 5 ,  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  
Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  in S p e c i a l  
R e fe r e n c e  to the European  War f o r  the F i r s t  F o r t n ig h t  
of  J u l y  1 9 1 5 , 1 W .M .  H a i l e y  to H.  W h e e l e r ,  23  J u l y  1 9 1 5 ;
Home P o l l  58 D e p o s i t ,  Septem ber  1915»  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  
Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  in  S p e c i a l  
R e f e r e n c e  to the War f o r  the F i r s t  F o r t n ig h t  of  September  
1915> 1 W .M .  H a i l e y  to S . R .  H i g n e l l ,  21  September  1 9 1 5 ;
Home P o l l  24 D e p o s i t ,  Fe b r u ar y  1916 , ' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  
on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  i n  S p e c i a l  R e fe re n c e  
to the War,  Rece ived  from the S e v e r a l  P r o v in ce s  f o r  the 
Second F o r t n ig h t  of  J a n u a r y  I 916 , ' W .M .  H a i l e y  to H.
W h e e l e r ,  3 F e b r u a r y  1916 ; Home P o l l  18  D e p o s i t ,  A p r i l
1 9 1 6 ,  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  
S i t u a t i o n  R ece iv ed  from A l l  the P r o v in c e s  f o r  the F i r s t  
F o r t n i g h t  of  March 1916 , '  W .M .  H a i l e y  to H .  W h e e l e r ,  1 6 
March 1 9 1 6 ;  Home P o ll  2 D e p o s i t ,  J a n u a r y  1917»  'Report  
on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  in the D e l h i  P rov in ce  
f o r  the F o r t n ig h t  E n d i n g  the 3 0 t h  November 1 9 1 6 , '  W .M .  
H a i l e y  to J .  DuBoulay ,  1 December 1 9 16 ; Home P o l l  44 
D e p o s i t ,  J a n u a r y  1917»  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  
P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  in  S p e c i a l  R e fe r e n c e  to the War 
R e c e iv ed  from A l l  the P r o v in c e s  f o r  the F i r s t  F o r t n ig h t  
o f  December  I 9I 6 , ' W .M .  H a i l e y  to J .  DuBo ulay ,  17 December 
1 9 1 6 ;  Home P o l l  70  D e p o s i t ,  May 1 9 1 7 ,  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  
on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n ,  I n  S p e c i a l  R e fe r e n c e  
to the W ar ,  R ece iv ed  from A l l  the P r o v in c e s  f o r  the 
Second F o r t n i g h t  of  A p r i l  1 9 1 7 ,  ' W .M .  H a i l e y  to J .  Duboulay ,
2 May 1 9 1 7 .
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d i s p l a y  of  f e e l i n g  w i t h i n  the communities 
th e m selv e s .  T here  has b e e n  a good deal  of  
t r o u b le  between  the H a n a f i s  and W a h a b is ,  
and some b i c k e r i n g  b etw een  the s e c t io n s  o f  
the A r ya  S a m a j . ^
T h i s  p a r o c h i a l i s m  and f a c t i o n a l i s m  were l a r g e l y  the 
r e s u lt  of  i r r i t a t i n g  but minor  i n c id e n t s  w i t h i n  and 
between  the two communities and d id  not form the b a s i s  
f o r  any n o ta b l e  i n c i d e n t s .  The m arginal  re c ru de s c e n c e  
of  p a r o c h i a l i s m  in  1917 combined w i t h  the a g i t a t i o n  of  
the Home Rule  L ea g ue ,  however ,  to produce an in c id e n t  
of  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e .
The idea  f o r  a l o c a l  b r a n c h  of  the Home Rule  League  
in  D e l h i  was f i r s t  mooted by  P a n d it  Madan Mohan M a la v i y a .  
He used  h i s  v i s i t  to t e s t i f y  b e f o r e  the I n d i a n  I n d u s t r i a l  
Commission in  November 1 9 1 6  at D e l h i  as an o c c as io n  to 
urge D e l h i  to e s t a b l i s h  a b r a n c h  of  the L e a g u e . 1 A
N A I ,  Home P o l l  3 D e p o s i t ,  A ugust  1917»  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  
Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n ,  For  the 
Second H a l f  o f  J u l y  1917»  1 W .M .  H a i l e y  to J .  DuBoulay ,  31 
J u l y  1917«  The S e c r e t a r y  to the Government of Punjab  
Prov ince  noted t h a t :  'The  newspapers  o f  the Ahmediyya 
and A hl- i- Hadis  sects  among Muhammadans, and of  the A rya  
Samaj and Dev Samaj sects  among H i n d u s ,  denounce one 
a n o t h e r ' s  b e l i e f s ;  and the lan g uag e  c o n t r o v e rs y  - Urdu 
v e rsus  H i n d i  - is  b e i n g  c ont in ue d  on the u s u a l  r a c i a l  
l i n e s . ' L . French  to J . H .  DuBo ulay ,  dated S im la ,  31 J u l y  
1917»  D e l h i  a lso  had i ts  H i n d i  p r o t a g o n i s t s  who founded  
the H i n d i  S a n c h a l n i  Sabha  in 1917»  But it had only  15 
members, most of  whom were q u ite  i n s i g n i f i c a n t . RD DA , 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  182  ( 1 9 1 7 ) »  ' L i s t  of  P o l i t i c a l  S o c i e t i e s  
and Anjumans e t c .  in  D e l h i  P r o v i n c e . '
2 N A I ,  Home P o l l  4 2  D e p o s i t ,  J a n u a r y  1917»  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  
Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  in  S p e c i a l  
R e fe r e n c e  to the War Re c e iv ed  from A l l  the Pr o v in ce s  f o r  
the F i r s t  F o r t n ig h t  of  November 1 9 1 6 , '  W .M .  H a i l e y  to J .  
DuB o ulay ,  15 November 1916 . He re fu s e d  to make a p u b l ic  
speech ,  however .
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branch  e v e n t u a l l y  came into  e x i s t e n c e  on 19  Fe b r u ar y  I 9 1 7 /  
I t  had 16 members, the two most a c t i v e  of  whom were Miss  
L .  Gm einer  and Dhamraj S i n g h .  M iss  Gmeiner ,  who was the 
h e a d m is t r e s s  of  the I n d r a p r a s t h  H in d u  G i r l s '  S c h o o l ,  was 
an A u s t r a l i a n  of German e x t r a c t i o n .  She was an a c t i v e  
T h e o s o p h i s t  and an ardent  a d m ir e r  of A nn ie  B e s a n t .  Dhamraj 
S i n g h  was a u n i v e r s i t y  graduate  who taught  at Ramjas H ig h  
S c h o o l .
The D e l h i  Home Rule  League  e s t a b l i s h e d  a r e a d i n g
room at the K huni  Darwaza  in  C handni  Chauk.  The  r e a d i n g
room, w h ic h  d id  double  d uty  as a m ee t in g  room, contained
a l i b r a r y  w h ic h  inc lud ed  a l l  the p o l i t i c a l  pamphlets  of
2
A n n ie  Besant  plus the l e a d i n g  E x tr e m is t  n e w s p a p e r s .  Two 
l o c a l  H i n d i  ne w sp a pe rs ,  the Al-Hind  and the H i n d i  Samachar
O
(w i t h  H i n d u  e d i t o r s ) ,  supported  the new o r g a n i s a t i o n .
The l o c a l  Home Rule  League  im m ediately  came into  
c o n f l i c t  w i t h  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  The C h i e f  Commissioner
1
C . F .  Andrews  was in D e l h i  when the b r an c h  was e s t a b l i s h e d .  
He p r o b a b ly  took an a c t i v e  part in i ts  i n c e p t i o n .  N A I ,
Home P o l l  625- 628  Part B, March  1 9 1 7 ,  'W e e k ly  Reports  of  
the D i r e c t o r  of  C r im in al  I n t e l l i g e n c e , '  f o r  the week e n d in g
3 March I 9 1 7 .
2
The newspapers  that were s u b s c r ib e d  to were New I n d i a  
(M a d r a s ) ,  A m rita  B a z a a r  P a t r i k a  ( C a l c u t t a ) ,  Bombay C h r o n ic l e  
(B o m b a y ) , B e n g a lT  ( C a l c u t t a ) , L e a d e r  ( A l l a h a b a d ) ,  and 
P u n j a b i  ( L a h o r e ) .  R D D A , C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  167 ( 1 9 1 7 ) ,  
' F o r t n i g h t l y  R e p o r t s , ' D e l h i  P o l i c e  Se c r e t  A b s t r a c t  No .  9 ,
3 March  1 9 1 7 .
3
N A I ,  Home P o l l  4 D e p o s i t ,  June 1 9 1 7 ,  ' O b j e c t i o n a b l e  
A r t i c l e  in  the D e l h i  G a z e t t e  of  25 F e b r u a r y  19 1 7  - Summar­
ised  in  Para  11 o f  the S e l e c t i o n s  from I n d i a n  Newspapers  
P u b l i s h e d  in  the D e l h i  Prov in ce  fo r  the Week E n d i n g  10  
March  1 9 1 7  - On the S u b je c t  of  the S t a t e  of A g r i c u l t u r e  in  
I n d i a . '
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c a l l e d  Miss  Gmeiner in  fo r  an i n t e r v i e w  at the b e g i n n i n g  
of  March and asked h e r  to d e s i s t  in v ie w  o f  h e r  r e s p o n s ­
ib le  p o s i t i o n  in  an a id e d  s c h o o l .  Miss  Gmeiner  r e le a s e d  
the f u l l  d e t a i l s  of  the i n t e r v i e w  to the l o c a l  press  
which  a l s o  appeared  in  the New I n d i a  (Madras)  o f  17  March.  
The C h i e f  Com missioner  then attempted  to b r i n g  p ressure  
on the M a n ag in g  Committee of  the school  to d is m is s  he r .  
S u l t a n  S i n g h ,  who was the h o n o r a r y  s e c r e t a r y  of  the 
Committee,  ap o lo g is e d  to H a i l e y  f o r  Miss  G m e i n e r 's  
a t t i t u d e  and f o r  the fa c t  that  she had re le a s e d  d e t a i l s  
of  the i n t e r v i e w  w ith  the C h i e f  C om missioner .  He 
promised that i f  she c ontinued  to d e f y  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
he would ask  h e r  to le ave  the s c h o o l . 1 M iss  Gmeiner 
re fu se d  to compromise,  that  i s ,  d e s is t  from p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t y  or r e s i g n ,  but the M a n a g in g  Committee r e fuse d  
to support S u l t a n  S i n g h .  The C h i e f  Com missioner  stopped 
the s c h o o l ' s  grant-in-aid  and it was then  d i s a f f i l i a t e d  
on 29 A p r i l . 2
The D e l h i  Home Rule  League  soon embarked upon a 
programme of  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i s m  in  the c i t y .  The f i r s t  
s i g n i f i c a n t  m eeting  took p lace  on 24 March  when Mohandas 
Gandhi  a r r i v e d  in D e l h i  in  c o n n e c t io n  w i t h  h i s  campaign 
a g a in s t  indentured  l a b o u r .  He le c tu r e d  to a c losed  
a u d ie n c e  at St S t e p h e n ' s  C o l l e g e ,  but h i s  broken
3
H i n d u s t a n i  rendered  him almost u n i n t e l l i g i b l e .  He then
1
RDDA, C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  167 ( 1 9 1 7 ) »  S u l t a n  S i n g h  to 
C h i e f  Com missioner ,  D e l h i ,  11 March 1917»
2
RDDA, E d u c a t io n  F i l e  118  Part B 1917»  'W ith d r a w a l  of  
R e c o g n i t i o n  and the S u s p e n s io n  o f  the Grants  to the 
I n d r a p r a s t h a  G i r l s '  School  D e l h i . '
3
I n t e r v i e w  w ith  S h r i  S .  S a n g h a l ,  17 A p r i l  1967 .
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proceeded  to the K r i s h n a  T h e a t r e ,  where an a u die nc e  of
5 , 0 0 0  aw a ited  him to j o i n  w i t h  an o u t s t a n d i n g  group of
I n d i a n  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s . 1 Hakim  A jm al  Khan  was voted
to the c h a i r  where he d e c la r e d  that  the ob ject  of  the
m ee ting  was to express  t h e i r  p u b l ic  g r a t i t u d e  to the
V i c e r o y  f o r  a b o l i s h i n g  the in d e n tu r e d  l a b o u r  system.
The g e ne r al  te no r  of  the speeches  at the m e e t in g  was
that the government had bowed to p u b l ic  a g i t a t i o n  and
that I n d i a n s  had gained  some measure of s e l f- r e s p e c t
through  the a s s e r t i o n  of  t h e i r  op in io n s  and the c e s s a t i o n
o f  th i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n i q u i t o u s  system. A n  overwhelm ing
ap p lause  broke  out as e ac h  s p e a k er  was introduced  and as
they  c o n c lu d e d ;  t h i s  was e s p e c i a l l y  true  f o r  G an d h i ,
2
Andrews and Mrs N a id u .  The League  was not to a t t r a c t  
such support a g a in  from e i t h e r  the i n h a b i t a n t s  or the 
l e a d e r s  of  the c i t y  u n t i l  Septem ber .
Mrs N a id u  remained in  the c i t y  f o r  almost a month, 
but even he r  presence  could  not arouse  any  enth usiasm  
f o r  the movement. Mr H . S . L .  Po lak  gave a l e c t u r e  on Home
1
Those  on the p lat form  in c lu d e d  the h o n o u ra b le s  Mr 
S h a s t r i ,  Mr Sharma, Mr I y e n g a r ,  Hakim A jm al  Khan ,  Dr  
A n s a r i ,  Hamid A l i  Khan (Bar-at-Law, L u c k n o w ) ,  Hasan  
N i z a m i ,  C . F .  Andrews ,  Mrs N a id u ,  Lady  T a t a ,  Mrs P e t i t ,  
and M iss  Gmeiner.
2
N A I , Home P o ll  625- 628  Part B, March 1 9 1 7 ,  f o r  the 
week e n d in g  31  March 1 9 1 7 ;  Home P o l l  6l  D e p o s i t ,  A p r i l  
1917}  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  
S i t u a t i o n ,  I n  S p e c i a l  R e f e r e n c e  to the W ar ,  R ece iv ed  from 
A l l  the Prov in ces  for  the Second F o r t n i g h t  of  March 1 9 1 7 ,  1 
W .M .  H a i l e y  to J .  DuBo ulay ,  31 March  1 9 1 7 ;  RDDA, 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  167  ( 1 9 1 7 ) ,  D e l h i  P o l i c e  S e c r e t  A b s t r a c t  
No.  1 3 ,  31 March I 9 1 7 .
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Rule  on 15  A p r i l ,  a m eeting  w h ic h  was p o o r ly  a t t e n d e d . 1
Somewhat more support was shown when the knowledge  of
the d i s a f f i l i a t i o n  o f  the G i r l s '  School  became known in
May. The l o c a l  press  and the Bombay C h r o n i c l e , through
its  s p e c i a l  correspondent  in D e l h i ,  A s a f  A l i ,  aroused
s u f f i c i e n t  p u b l ic  support over the iss u e  so that  the
2
income f o r  the School  was met by  s u b s c r i p t i o n .
The League  drew a c t i v e  support from the fo u n d a t i o n  
o f  the In d r a p r a s t h  Sewak M a n d l i . T h i s  group of  young 
v o l u n t e e r s  was a f f i l i a t e d  w i t h  the V e s h  Young M e n ' s  
A s s o c i a t i o n  and comprised about 1 5 0  members, a l l  of  
whom were H in d u s  and the m a j o r i t y  of  whom were s t u d e n t s .  
The  v o l u n t e e r  o r g a n is a t io n  had no d ir e c t  c o n n e c t io n  w i t h  
the L e a g u e ,  but its  l e a d e r s ,  B ish am ber  Nath ,  S r i  Ram 
(B ar - a t- L a w ) , Jaggan  Nath  S i n g h ,  and B i s h a n  Sarup  were 
sym pathetic  to the g o a ls  and i d e a l s  of  s w a r a j . ( i t  was 
ve r y  a c t i v e  d u r in g  the Ram L i l a  a f f a i r . )  The  League  a ls o  
drew some support by  becoming  the c e ntr e  of  o p p o s i t i o n  to
1
N A I ,  Home P o l l  700- 703  Part B, A p r i l  1917»  'W e e k ly  
Reports  o f  the D i r e c t o r  o f  C r im in a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e , ' f o r  
the week e n d i n g  21 A p r i l  1 9 1 7 ;  Home P o l l  69 D e p o s i t ,  May
1 9 1 7 ,  ' F o r t n i g h t l y  Reports  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  
S i t u a t i o n ,  I n  S p e c i a l  R e fe r e n c e  to the War,  Re c e iv ed  from 
A l l  the Pro v in ce s  f o r  the F i r s t  F o r t n i g h t  o f  A p r i l  1 9 1 7 ,  1 
W .M .  H a i l e y  to J .  DuBoulay ,  l4  A p r i l  1917*
2
N A I ,  Home P o l l  69 D e p o s i t ,  June  1 9 1 7 ,  'R e p orts  on the 
I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  R e c e iv ed  from A l l  the 
Pro v in ce s  f o r  the Second H a l f  o f  May, I 91 7 , ' W .M .  H a i l e y  
to J .  DuBo ulay ,  1 June 1 9 1 7 ;  Home P o l l  17 D e p o s i t ,  
September  1 9 1 8 ,  'C en su re  Passed  on L ie u t- C o l .  H . C .  Beadon ,
I . A . ,  I n  V iew  of  C e r t a i n  I n s t r u c t i o n s  W h ich  Were I ss u e d  
by  Him to the A s s i s t a n t  D i s t r i c t  M a g i s t r a t e  Who Was to 
T r y  the Cases  o f  Muhammad A s a f  A l i  and N e k i  Ram Sharma 
o f  D e l h i . '
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the removal d u r in g  May of  the t r e e s  that l i n e d  Chandni
, 1 Chauk.
The internment o f  A n n ie  B e s a n t ,  W a d ia ,  and A r u n d a l
by the Government of  Madras in  June  1 9 1 7  provided  a
d e s p e r a t e l y  needed p u b l ic  i s s u e .  The D e l h i  League
planned  m eetings  of  p u b l ic  p r o te st  f o r  1 J u l y  w i t h  A s a f
A l i  and Pe a re y  L a i  (mot or waul l a )  in  the f o r e f r o n t .  (T h is
m eeting ,  and s u c c e s s i v e  m eetings  planned  f o r  the 2nd ,  3 rd ,
2
and 7 t h ,  were a l l  p r o h i b i t e d  by  the C h i e f  C o m m is s io n e r „ )
T he  D e l h i  League  then held  a c lo s e d  m eeting  of  
members on 2 J u l y ,  but  postponed  it b ecause  only  f i v e
1
N A I , Home P o l l  17 D e p o s i t ,  Septem ber  1 9 1 8 ;  RDDA, 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  182  ( 19I 8 ) ,  ' L i s t  of  P o l i t i c a l  S o c i e t i e s  
and A njum ans .  Deputy  Com missioner  Beadon d e c id e d  in 1 9 1 3  
as a r e s u l t  of  the a s s a s s i n a t i o n  attempt on the V i c e r o y ,  
that the trees  on Chandni  Chauk should  be removed to 
a f f o r d  b e t t e r  p o l i c e  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  p r o c e s s i o n s .  A v e r y  
s u b m iss iv e  M u n i c i p a l  Committee agreed  w i t h  him.  E d u c a t io n  
F i l e  23 Part B 1 9 1 3 , ' P r o c e e d i n g s  o f  the O r d i n a r y  M eet ing s  
o f  the D e l h i  M u n ic i p a l  C o m m i t t e e . '
2
The C h i e f  Com missioner  j u s t i f i e d  h i s  a c t i o n ,  w h ich  was 
the s u b je c t  of  a q u e s t io n  in  the Im p e r ia l  L e g i s l a t i v e  
C o u n c i l ,  as f o l l o w s :  ' I  h e ld  that  it would i n j u r e  the 
i n t e r e s t s  of  r e c r u i t i n g  i f  we a llow ed  in areas  such  as 
D e l h i  the growth of  a campaign w h ic h  involved  an open 
approval  o f  the v i o l e n t  a t ta c k s  on government w h ich  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  the a g i t a t i o n  c a r r i e d  on by  Mrs Besant  in 
M a d r a s . '  RDDA, C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  1 79  ( 1 9 1 7 ) :  ' I n t  ernment 
of  Mrs B e s a n t . ' The  C h i e f  Com missioner  l a i d  h i m s e l f  open 
to c r i t i c i s m  s ince  he had p a r t i a l l y  j u s t i f i e d  h i s  a c t i o n  
in  the w ith d r a w a l  o f  a id  from the I n d r a p r a s t h  G i r l s '
School  on the grounds that s i m i l a r  a c t i o n  had b een  taken  
e lsew here  in I n d i a ,  and yet h i s  was the only  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
w hich  p r o h i b i t e d  a m ee ting  to p rote st  the internment  order  
o f  Mrs B e s a n t .  He p le ad e d  the s p e c i a l  c irc um stan ce s  of  
D e l h i ,  but even the ar c h - c o n s e r v a t iv e  S i r  M i c h a e l  0 'Dwyer  
d id  not p e r c e iv e  any  d an ge r  in  the m e e t in g s ,  a l t h o u g h  he 
p r o h i b it e d  p u b l i c a t i o n  of  t h e i r  r e s o l u t i o n s  in  the P u n ja b .
302
members a t t e n d e d .  The f o l l o w i n g  day A s a f  A l i ' s  a r t i c l e  
in the Bombay C h r o n ic le  c r i t i c i s e d  the i n a c t i v i t y  at 
D e l h i :  'The  c oun try  must be w o n d e r in g  at I m p e r ia l  
D e l h i ' s  en igm atic  r e t i c e n c e  at this  j u n c t u r e ,  and t h i n k i n g  
that the D e l h i  S p h i n x  has imparted much of  h i s  m ysterious  
s i l e n c e  to the D e l h i t e s . . . . ' 1 T h i s  was the f i r s t  time 
that any p u b l i c  n o t ic e  was g i v e n  that  D e l h i ,  because  of  
its  p o s i t i o n  as the i m p e r ia l  c a p i t a l ,  should  o f f e r  a 
lead  to the rest  of  the coun try ,  or that  it should  
m anife st  some response  to the p o l i t i c a l  c urre nts  in  the 
coun try .  T h i s  was a l s o  the f i r s t  time that anyone stated  
e x p l i c i t l y  or i m p l i c i t l y  that  D e l h i ' s  p o l i t i c a l  h o r i z o n s  
should be n a t i o n a l  r a t h e r  than p r o v i n c i a l .
On the 5th ,  Dr  A n s a r i ,  Dr  A b d u l  Rahman, Sh a ik h
A t a u l l a h  ( p l e a d e r ) ,  Dr  A . C .  Sen ,  Ram K r i s h a n  D a s ,  and
A s a f  A l i  wrote  to the C h i e f  Com missioner  p r o t e s t i n g  h i s
p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  the m eetings  and p l e a d i n g  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
nature  of  the p rotest  and the fa c t  that s i m i l a r  meetings
were h e ld  throughout  I n d i a .  The D e l h i  League  f i n a l l y
h e ld  a c lo s e d  m eeting  o f  11 members on the 9th  at Dr
A n s a r i ' s house  a f t e r  w h ich  a telegram  was despatched  to
the Prime M i n i s t e r  of  B r i t a i n .  The r e g u l a r  members of
the League  a lso  wanted to announce that  Dr  A n s a r i  had
j o i n e d ,  but he thought it b e t t e r  to w ait  f o r  a p u b l ic
2
meet m g .
1
RDDA, C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  167  ( 1 9 1 7 ) .
2
RDDA, Confidential File I 67 (1917)» Delhi Police
Secret Abstract No. 27.
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The D e l h i  League  did  not ho ld  any  p u b l ic  meetings  
d u r in g  J u l y  or A ugust  and much of  the movement 's  
p o t e n t i a l  é la n  w i t h e r e d .  The  C h i e f  Com missioner  wrote 
a c i r c u l a r  l e t t e r  to the headm asters  and p r i n c i p a l s  of  
a l l  the h i g h  schools  and c o l l e g e s  in D e l h i  to keep  s tudents  
from j o i n i n g  the Home Rule  League  m ovement .1 Hasan  N i z a m i ,
a S u f i  l e a d e r  o f  D e l h i ,  who had supported  the pan-Islamism
2
of  Mohamed A l i ,  openly  opposed the Home Rule  L e a g u e .  The  
v o c i f e r o u s  support of  the H i n d i  Samachar was the only  
b r ig h t  spot in an otherw ise  d ism al  p i c t u r e .  To make the 
p ic tu r e  even more d ism al ,  o n ly  f o u r  people  atte nd e d  the 
r e g u la r  m ee ting  o f  the D e l h i  League  on 4 A ugust  1 9 1 7 .  
N a t io n a l i s m  in  D e l h i  had reached  i ts  n a d i r .
The announcement by  the S e c r e t a r y  of S t a te  f o r  I n d i a ,  
Edwin  S .  Montagu ,  on 20  A ugust  1917»  that I n d i a  was to 
undergo  the ' p r o g r e s s i v e  r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b l e  
g o v e r n m e n t ' re c e ive d  a joyous  welcome in  I n d i a .  The Home 
R u le r s  were s a t i s f i e d  because  they  looked  upon the 
statement as the v i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  s ta n d .  T h e y  a lso
1
R DDA , C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  181  ( 1 9 1 7 ) »  'Home Rule  
A g it â t  ion 1 .
2
N A I , Home P o l l  5 D e p o s i t ,  Septem ber  1917»  'R e p orts  on 
the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  f o r  the F i r s t  H a l f  of  
A u g u s t ,  1 9 1 7 , 1 W .M .  H a i l e y  to J .  DuBoulay ,  18  August  1 9 1 7 .
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looked upon the subsequent  r e l e a s e  o f  B esan t ,  W a d ia ,  and 
A r u n d ale  as a v i c t o r y  f o r  t h e i r  a g i t a t i o n . 1
The D e l h i  Home Rule  League  shared  the g eneral
e nthusiasm  that r e s u l t e d  from the announcements of  the
S e c r e t a r y  of S t a t e , a n  e nth us ia s m  w h ic h  was n o t i c e a b l e
throughout  the c o u n tr y .  By e a r l y  Septem ber  th e y  had
persuaded  the lo c a l  b r a n c h  of  the Moslem League  to h o i s t
the Home Rule  f l a g  over t h e i r  premises  as a f i r s t  step  in
2
p a s s iv e  r e s i s t a n c e .  The l o c a l  Home R u lers  held  f o u r  
meetings  between  the 8th and 19t h ,  w i t h  a t te n d an ce s  of  
b etween  2 0  and 60 ,  and e s t a b l i s h e d  the Home Rule  League 
V o l u n t e e r  Corp on the 1 1 t h .  The  most n o t i c e a b l e  trend 
in  the speeches  o f  Pa nd it  S h iv  Dutt  Sharma, Pa nd it  
Lachmi N a r a i n  S h a s t r i ,  P a n d it  S h iv  N a r a i n  H a k s a r ,
Shambhu N a th  Chopra and A s a f  A l i  was the i n c r e a s i n g  
vehemence of  t h e i r  la n g u a g e ,  w h ich  succeeded  in d raw ing  
l a r g e r  a u d i e n c e s .  The p resence  of  Dr  A n s a r i ,  Dr  Abdul  
Rahman, Sh ank ar  L a i ,  and L a l a  P e a re y  L a i  ( m o t o r w a l l a ) , 
on the other  hand ,  added enough p r e s t i g e  to the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n  that a la r g e  group of  G u j r a t i  shopkeepers  
from C haori  B a z a a r  attended  the m ee t in g  w h ich  was on 
the 19th.
1 N A I , Home P o l l  239- 243  Part B, Septem ber  1 9 1 7 ,  'W e e k ly  
Reports  o f  the D i r e c t o r  o f  C r im in a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e , ' f o r  
the week e n d in g  15 September  1 9 1 7 ;  Home P o l l  6 D e p o s i t ,  
November 1917»  'Rep orts  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  
S i t u a t i o n  f o r  the F i r s t  H a l f  o f  Septem ber ,  1 9 1 7 , 1 W .M .  
H a i l e y  to J .  DuBoulay ,  13  September  1917»  The statement 
of  the S e c r e t a r y  of  S t a t e  can be found in  C .M .  P h i l i p s ,  
e d . ,  The  E v o l u t i o n  o f  I n d i a  and P a k i s t a n ,  1 8 5 8 - 1 9 4 7 :  
S e l e c t e d  Documents ( L o n d o n , 1 9 6 2 )  , p"! 2 6 4 .
2
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The Home R u lers  in  D e l h i  reached  a z e n i t h  o f  success  
on 26 Septem ber ,  the night  o f  the L e a g u e ' s  f i r s t  p u b l ic  
m eeting .  Dr A n s a r i  convened the m e e t in g  at the Town H a l l  
but the au die n c e  grew so l a r g e  that  everyone moved out 
into  the Q u e e n 's  G a r d e n s .  The  a u d i e n c e ,  w h ich  numbered 
over 4 , 0 0 0 ,  then  passed  f i v e  r e s o l u t i o n s ,  one of  which  
c a l l e d  f o r  the r e l e a s e  of  the Muslim  i n t e r n e e s ,  and 
an other  w hich  condemned the c e s s a t i o n  o f  a i d  to the 
I n d r a p r a s t h  G i r l s '  S c h o o l .  Hakim  A jm al  Khan  c h a ir e d  the 
m eeting ,  w h ich  heard  13 people  s p e a k in g  in f a v o u r  o f  the 
r e s o lu t  i o n s . 1
The  m eeting  a t t r a c t e d  a r a t h e r  narrow  range of  
p ersons ,  almost a l l  o f  whom were l i t e r a t e .  Among s e v e r al  
r e c o g n i s a b l e  and n o t i c e a b l e  groups were a large  number o f  
s t u d e n t s ;  the 'New Muslim  P a r t y ' ;  a larg e  number of  p e tty  
shopkeepers  and a s m a lle r  number of  s u b s t a n t i a l  and 
i n f l u e n t i a l  m erchants ,  most p ro b ab ly  A r y a  S a m a j is t s  from 
the K h a t r i  and K a y a s t h  c a s te s  (w i t h  a few A g g a r w a l s ) ;  
some members of  the l i b e r a l  p r o f e s s i o n s  w i t h  a somewhat 
l a r g e r  number from the c l e r i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n s .  T h e r e  was 
a lso  a f r i n g e  group of  camp-followers  and hangers-on .  The 
m eeting  was rem arkably  w e l l  a t t e n d e d ,  though,  f o r  a 
Wednesday  n i g h t .
1
The speakers  at the m e e t in g  w e r e :  Abdul  A z i z  ( p l e a d e r ) ,  
K h a l i q ,  T a s s a d u q  Ahmad Khan  Sh erw a ni  (Bar-at-Law,
A l i g a r h ) ,  G . S .  B h a r g a v a ,  Brahm Dutt Brahm ach aria  o f  the 
gurukul  at K a n g r i ,  S h iv  N a r a i n  ( p l e a d e r ) ,  Rangaswami 
A y e n g e r  ( e d i t o r  o f  the A d vocate  of  A l l a h a b a d ) ,  Pand it  
Harde  Na th  K u n z r u  o f  A l l a h a b a d ,  A s a f  A l i ,  A bdu l  M a j i d ,  
Pa nd it  S h iv  N a r a i n  H a k s a r ,  Dr A bdu l  Rahman, Ram K i s h a n  
Das .  RDDA, C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  181  ( 1 9 1 7  ) ,  D e l h i  P o l i c e  
Secret  A b s t r a c t  No.  39» 29  Septem ber  1917«
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There  was one d i s t u r b i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  the m e e t in g  on 
the 2 6 t h .  T h i s  was the d i s t r i b u t i o n  by  S a y i d  S h a r i f u d d i n  
and Abdul  Qayum o uts id e  the Town H a l l ,  o f  h a n d b i l l s  which  
r i d i c u l e d  the idea  o f  u n i t y  b etw een  H ind us  and Muslim s ,  
and w h ich  a l s o  denounced Dr  A n s a r i  as chairman o f  the 
m eeting .  Hakim A jm al  Khan  took note  of  the enmity  that 
e x i s t e d  between  Hindus  and Muslims and d u r in g  the m ee t in g  
he appealed  f o r  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  betw een  the two 
com munities .  He requested  Muslims  not to b e l i e v e  the 
rumour that Home Rule  could  o n ly  b r i n g  harm to t h e i r  
community.
The Home Rule  League  i n  D e l h i  was e q u a l l y  s u c c e s s f u l  
the f o l l o w i n g  Wednesday ,  3 O c t o b e r .  Sard h a  Ram (p l e a d e r )  
was in  the c h a i r  at a m eeting  in  Q u ee n 's  G ard ens .  The 
au d ie n c e  w hich  numbered 2 , 0 0 0  at the b e g i n n i n g ,  and 
s lo w ly  sw elled  to 4 , 0 0 0 ,  heard  Mrs N a i d u  speak  on the 
g r e atn es s  o f  the Moguls  and t h e i r  t o l e r a t i o n  towards 
H i n d u s .  She s t r e s s e d  the need f o r  Hindu-Muslim  u n i t y  
and paused f o r  a v e r y  long  time to a l l o w  the c a l l  to 
prayers  at the n e a r b y  mosque to be heard  without  h i n d r a n c e .  
She was v e r y  c r i t i c a l  o f  B r i t i s h  ru le  and the e d u c a t io n  
system. The l e c t u r e  was t r a n s l a t e d  by  A s a f  A l i  f o r  the 
a u d ie n c e  and was fo llo w ed  in  turn  by  G . S .  B h a rg a va .  H is  
speech  was so vehement that the chairman  stopped him and 
Hakim A jm al  Khan c losed  the m e e t in g .  The Home R u ler s  
then  s e le c t e d  s i x  d e l e g a t e s  to a ttend  the m e e t in g  at 
A l l a h a b a d  on 6 O c to b e r  and at a tea  p a r t y  f o r  Mrs N a id u  
h o i s t e d  a new Home Rule  f l a g . 1
1 R D D A , C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  1 6 7  ( 1 9 1 7 ) ,  D e l h i  P o l i  ce S e c r e t  
A b s t r a c t  N o .  4 0 ,  6 O c t o b e r  1 9 1 7 »  The  s i x  d e l e g a t e s  w ere  
D r  A n s a r i ,  P e a r e y  L a i  ( m o t o r w a l l a ),  S h a n k a r  L a i ,  A s a f  A l i ,  
Sham bhu  N a t h  C h o p r a ,  and G . S 0 B h a r g a v a .
tThe f o l l o w i n g  W ednesday ,  10  O c to b e r ,  the Home Rule 
League  he ld  a th ird  p u b l ic  m e e t in g .  A g a i n  they  a t t r a c t e d  
almost 4 , 0 0 0  p e op le .  Mrs N a id u  spoke ,  but the main  
s peakers  were Mr and Mrs Wood, who were T h e o s o p h i s t s
The m eetings  on three  s u c c e s s i v e  Wednesday  n i g h t s  
reve ale d  that  s i g n i f i c a n t  s e c t io n s  o f  the community in  
D e l h i  were in t e r e s t e d  in  b r o a d e r  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s .  The 
fac t  that  the Home R u l e r s  could  draw 4 , 0 0 0  re v e a le d  that 
there  was a good deal o f  l a t e n t  support for  the movement, 
and that  even though most people  were u n w i l l i n g  to 
become formal members of  the Home Rule  Lea g ue ,  l a r g e r  
numbers than ever  b e fo r e  were w i l l i n g  to attend  m eetings  
w h ich  were sponsored by  the o r g a n i s a t i o n .  T h is  was a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  comment upon the degree  of p o l i t i c i s a t i o n  
w h ich  the i n h a b i t a n t s  of  the c i t y  had un d e r g o n e .  The 
p e t t y  b o u r g e o i s i e  o f  the c i t y  was w i l l i n g  to attend  
m eetings  on Wednesday  n i g h t s  w hich  o f f e r e d  no appeal  to 
r e l i g i o u s  p a s s io n s  and only  s e c o n d ary  ap p e a ls  to r a c i a l  
a n im o s i t y .  I t  is a l s o  i n t e r e s t i n g  to note  that  even 
though many speakers  were vehement in condemnation  of 
B r i t i s h  r u l e ,  the moderate  E x t r e m i s t s  s t i l l  c o n t r o l l e d  
the movement and could  e f f e c t i v e l y  channel  the e n e r g ie s  
o f  their more r a d i c a l  c o l l e a g u e s .  T h is  was not to remain  
true f o r  lon g ,  however ,  as f a c t i o n a l i s m  and p a r o c h i a l i s m  
soon e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e i r  hold  over  the tone o f  n a t i o n a l i s t  
p o l i t i c s  in  D e l h i .
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N A I ,  Home P o l l  29 D e p o s i t ,  November 1917»  'R e p o r ts  on 
the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  f o r  the F i r s t  H a l f  of  
O c t o b e r  1 9 1 7 , 1 W .M .  H a i l e y  to J .  DuBo ulay ,  16 Octob er
1 9 1 7 .
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The Home Rule  L e a g u e . . . is s t r o n g l y  H i n d u . . 0
C h i e f  Commissioner ,  D e l h i  
30  November 1 9 1 7
F a c t i o n a l i s m  arose  over  who was to rep r e s en t  the 
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  of  the I n d i a n  body  p o l i t i c  b e fo r e  
the S e c r e t a r y  of  S t a te  fo r  I n d i a .  E d w in  S « Montagu who 
came to I n d i a  to h e a r  the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of d i f f e r e n t  
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  b e f o r e  d e c i d i n g  upon a reform scheme, 
w itn e s s e d  the u n e d i f y i n g  d i s u n i t y  of  the Moderates  and 
E x t r e m is t s  in both  the N a t i o n a l  Congress  and the Moslem 
L ea g u e ,  each  o f  whom sought to impose t h e i r  v iew s  on 
each  o t h e r .  The E x t r e m i s t s  had c o n t r o l  o f  the m ac hin ery  
o f  both  the n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s , but the i ssu e  was 
f a r  from c l e a r  at the l o c a l  l e v e l .  I n  D e l h i  the Moderates  
had c o n t r o l  o f  b o th  l o c a l  b r a n c h e s  o f  the Congress  and 
League  w h i l e  the E x t r e m i s t s  could  only  c la im  to control  
the Home Rule  L ea g u e .  The  s i t u a t i o n  i n  D e l h i  became 
c o n fu s e d ,  however ,  when some people  who were o s t e n s i b l y  
E x t r e m is t s  supported  the M o d e r a t e s '  p la n  f o r  r e s p o n s i b l e  
g ove rnm e nt .
The s p l i t  came about at A l l a h a b a d  on 5 and 6 O c tob e r  
when the n a t i o n a l  committees o f  both  the Congress  and 
League  met to conf irm  a Congress-League  scheme f o r  self-  
government.  The  E x t r e m i s t s  in  the Moslem League  e le c t e d  
Mohamed A l i  as p r e s id e n t  to w h ich  the M o de r a te s ,  led  by  
Mohamed A l i  J i n n a h ,  r eacted  and e v e n t u a l l y  s u b s c r ib e d  to
I
a scheme proposed  by  a c o m bin a t io n  o f  Moderates  and
II
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c o n s e r v a t i v e s  who formed the Muslim  D e fe nc e  A s s o c i a t i o n  
at A l i g a r h . 1
The  s p l i t  between  Moderates  and E x t r e m i s t s  did  not
take the same form in  D e l h i  as it  did  in  the U n it e d
P r o v i n c e s .  Hakim A jm al  K han ,  who attended  the m ee ting
at A l l a h a b a d  in  O c to b e r ,  d i s a g r e e d  w ith  the Moslem
2
L e a g u e ' s  d ra ft  to the S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e .  He then  
returned  to D e l h i  and founded  the I n d i a n  A s s o c i a t i o n  to 
present  the views  o f  M o d e r a t e s ,  both  H i n d u  and Muslim,
3
in  D e l h i  to Montagu .  The A s s o c i a t i o n  h e ld  i t s  f i r s t  
m e e t in g  on 13 Octob er  at the Lachmi N a r a i n  Dharm asala .
An  a u d ie n c e  o f  6 0 0  l i s t e n e d  to the temperate  v iews  of  
R a i  S a h ib  Pearey  L a i  (p l e a d e r )  who was chairm an ,  S . N .  
Bose ( p l e a d e r ) ,  A b du l  A z i z  ( p l e a d e r ) ,  Ra j  J a i  N a r a i n  
( p l e a d e r ) ,  P rag  N a r a i n  S e h g a l ,  and Raj  N a r a i n  (Bar-at- 
L a w ) . A s a f  A l i  and B i s h e n  Sarup  atte n d e d  but did  not
4
sp eak .  T h is  was the e xten t  to w h ich  f a c t i o n a l i s m  had 
advanced  when p a r o c h i a l i s m  took over  and f u r t h e r  d i v i d e d  
the n a t i o n a l i s t s  into  even  s m a lle r  g roups .
1
N A I , Home P o ll  1 D e p o s i t ,  J a n u a r y  1 9 1 8 ,  'R e p orts  on 
the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  f o r  the F i r s t  H a l f  o f  
November 1 9 1 7 , 1 S . P .  O ' D o n n e l l  to S . R .  H i g n e l l ,  17 
November 1 9 1 7 .
2
N A I ,  Home P o l l  29  D e p o s i t ,  November 1 9 1 7 .
3
R D D A , C o n f i d e n t i a l  F i l e  227  ( 1 9 1 8 ) ,  ' L i s t  of  P o l i t i c a l ,  
Q a s i - P o l i t i c a l  and R e l i g i o u s  S o c i e t i e s ,  Sabhas  and 
Anjum ans  in  the D e l h i  P r o v in c e  f o r  the Y e a r  E n d i n g  the 
3 0 t h  June 1 9 1 8 . '
4
RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), Delhi Police Secret
Abstract No. 42, 20 October 1917»
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P a r o c h i a l i s m  a f f e c t e d  D e l h i  and no rth  I n d i a  on 28 
September  w i t h  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s t r e n g t h .  I n  D e l h i  p a r o c h i a l  
ism e xp r e s s e d  i t s e l f  in  the form o f  f r u s t r a t i o n  over  the 
announcement that the government had r e f u s e d  to r e l e a s e  
any of  the Muslim  a g i t a t o r s  who were i n t e r n e d . 1 T h i s  led  
to an immense amount o f  b i t t e r n e s s  on the part o f  Muslims 
Somewhat i r r a t i o n a l l y ,  most of  the Muslims who had 
opposed any p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  looked  upon those few 
Muslim  p o l i t i c i a n s  who had p a r t i c i p a t e d  in  the a g i t a t i o n  
to r e l e a s e  the Home Ru lers  of  Madras as a Muslim 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  to a H i n d u  c a u s e .  They  took it  as an 
i n s u l t  to t h e i r  community that  the H in d u s  were u n w i l l i n g  
to r e t u r n  the f a v o u r  once the H in d u  l e a d e r s  had b een  
r e l e a s e d .
The i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  D e l h i  r e ac te d  in  s e v e r a l  ways to
the announcement that  the A l i  b r o t h e r s  were not to be
r e l e a s e d .  On the day o f  the announcement ,  Dr  A n s a r i  met
and spokft w i t h  la r g e  numbers of  Muslims as they  l e f t  the
2
Id g a h  a f t e r  the s e r v ic e  f o r  Id - u l - Z u h a . He a ls o  set in  
motion a t r a i n  o f  events  w h ich  c r y s t a l l i s e d  into  the 
C e n tra l  Bureau  f o r  the R e l e a s e  o f  Muslim  I n t e r n e e s  w h ich
1
C h i e f  Com missioner  H a i l e y  had s t r o n g l y  a d v ise d  a g a in s t  
the grant  o f  an amnesty  to the A l i  b r o th e r s  in  A u g u s t „
N A I , Home P o l l  305- 332  Part  A ,  Septem ber  1917»  'Q u e s t i o n  
o f  the Grant o f  a G e n e r a l  Amnesty  to P o l i t i c a l  O f f e n d e r s ,  
W .M .  H a i l e y  to J .  D uB o ulay ,  20  August  1 9 1 7 .
2
N A I ,  Home P o l l  7 D e p o s i t ,  November 1917»  'R e p o r ts  on 
the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  f o r  the Second H a l f  of  
Septem ber ,  1917»  ' W .M .  H a i l e y  to J .  DuBo ulay ,  1 O c tob e r
1 9 1 7 .
was originally founded in Allahabad, but which moved to 
Delhi. The Bureau had a membership of 22 and was run 
by the followers of the Doctor Sahib.1
A more significant effect of parochialism on the
inhabitants of north India and of Delhi came from the
riots of Bakr-Id on 28 September. The most violent riots
occurred in the Shahbad and Gaya districts in Bihar,
with smaller riots in the Jaunpur, Meerut, Moradabad, and
Allahabad districts in the United Provinces. The
startling fact about these riots was that they were all
triggered off by massed groups of Hindus who sought to
prevent the garbani [sacrifice of cows] » The knowledge
of these riots created considerable resentment against
2the Hindus among the lower class Muslims. These were 
the first massive communal riots since the clash in 
Ajodhya in 1912. (This was the beginning of a period 
which saw a major communal riot every year and which 
entailed a high cost in lives and mutual distrust.)
The parochial feeling, which was aroused by the 
continued internment of Muslim leaders and the Shahbad 
riots, struck Delhi in a significant manner when the 
local Home Rulers sought to use a religious idiom for 
political agitation. It became apparent as early as
1
NAI, Home Poll 59 Deposit, January 1918, 'Reports on 
the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of 
December 1917» ' W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 17 December
1917. The officers of the Central Bureau were Raja of 
Mahmudabad, president; Dr Ansari and Dr Abdul Rahman, 
secretaries; Abdul Rahman (pleader), treasurer. RDDA, 
Confidential File 227 (1918).
2 NAI, Home Poll 29 Deposit, November 1917«
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August that trouble was in store for the Ram Lila 
procession which was due on 24 October 1917? The 
difficulty lay in that the Ram Lila procession and the 
Moharram procession occurred on the same day for the 
first time in 30 years. The Administration was fully 
aware of the possibilities of communal conflict that 
were thrown open by such a concurrencer In order to 
avert trouble the Administrâtion undertook, in 1915» 
to alter the route of the Ram Lila procession so that 
it would not enter Chaori Bazaar when the Moharram 
procession was in progress. 1 The change in routes was 
accepted by the Hindu community, since the route was 
not sacrosanct, and the Ram Lila processions of 1915 
and 1916 followed routes different from the traditional 
one with no ill-feeling. In the crucial year of 1917, 
the Ram Lila Committee, which was composed of self- 
appointed local leaders, once again accepted the changed 
route for the third year, but it was unable to arouse 
any support for the change in the Hindu community as a 
majority of Hindus wanted the traditional route followed 
and the Moharram route changed. The situation became 
ominous when the Home Rulers invaded the Committee and 
sought, with the aid of the Indraprasth Sevak Samiti and 
the Home Rule League Volunteer Corps, to canvass support 
for their efforts to reinstall the traditional route.
The communal tension which slowly built up through 
September became alarming after the Shahbad riots. Two
1 RDDA, Confidential File 71 (1915), 'Maint enance of Note 
Books by District Officers Showing What Action Should Be 
Taken When Hindu and Muhammadan Festivals Synchronise.'
313
weeks of continuous negotiations ensued between the 
Deputy Commissioner, who refused to change the Moharram 
procession, the Home Rulers, who refused to compromise, 
and the Moderate and loyal Hindu leaders, who vascillated 
miserably. Finally, after the Indian Association meeting 
on 13 October, the Moderates worked out the details of a 
public meeting to discuss the problem.
The mass public meeting to discuss the route of the 
Ram Lila procession took place on 15 October. Lala 
Girdhari Lai was the chairman of an audience of 6,000 
Hindus who met in the Queen's Gardens. The Moderate Hindu 
politicians counselled calm, and Asaf Ali, who attended 
the meeting, claimed that the Shias were willing to 
compromise and change their route. 1 The Shias, however, 
refused to yield a position which was supported by the 
Administration and an impasse then confronted all parties.
The Hindu agitators decided, after the Shias had 
refused to compromise, to apply for a licence for a 
procession which would follow the traditional route. The 
Deputy Commissioner refused to issue such a licence, and 
the leaders then helcj a meeting on the l6th at which 
Pearey Lai (motorwalla), Ram Lai (choudhri of the cloth 
merchants), and Sri Ram (Bar-at-Law) decided to organise 
a hartal. They used the Indraprasth Sevak Mandli and 
most of the Hindu students of St Stephen's and Hindu 
colleges to contact the merchants in the city. It was 
too late to begin on the 1 7th, the first day of the Ram 
Lila festival, but on Thursday the 18th all the Hindu 
shops and services in the city ceased to function.
1 RDDA, Confidential File I67 (1917)» Delhi Police Secret
Abstract No. 42, 20 October 1917»
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The relations between Hindus and Muslims became very
strained after 18 October. The Muslim merchants and
students refused to join the Hindu merchants and students
in the hartal for the reason that the Hindus had not
observed a hartal when Mohamed Ali was interned» The
Hindus then embarked upon a campaign to starve out the
Muslims and keep them from obtaining food. Small
incidents, such as the presence of filth in a mosque,
and the attempt to abduct the sister of Muhammad Abdul
Rahman (pleader), exacerbated feelings to a considerable
extent. Sentiments were even more aroused when rumours
of the Hindu-Muslim riots at Arrah on the 24th spread
through the city. 1 The tension resulted in a full
display of support for the Mendhi procession on the 25th,
a procession which was supported even by Sunni maulvis
who had expressed public disapproval of the practice in
earlier years. Huge bands of Pathan labourers from
Raisina, and butchers from Pahari Dhiraj filled the
mosques and accompanied the procession, prepared to
resist any attack from the Hindus. There was no violence,
however, nor were there any incidents on the 27th for
the Tazia processions which were attended by the entire
Muslim community. On both occasions few Hindus were to
2be seen on the streets.
1
NAI, Home Poll 30 Deposit, November 1917» 'Reports on 
the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of 
October 1 9 1 7,' W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 31 October 
1917; Home Poll 1 Deposit, January 1918.
2
RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), Delhi Police 
Secret Abstract No. 43, 3 November 1917; Home File 320 
Part B 1917, 'Memorial from the Members of the Ram Lila 
Committee, Delhi.'
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The hartal broke on Monday the 22ndy after which date 
the support that the Hindu community gave to the hartal 
and the support that the Sunnis displayed for the Shia 
festival released a vast store of bitterness and enmity,, 
The Hindu cloth merchants immediately proposed to 
boycott the Muslim piece-goods dealers who had remained 
open during the hartal and prepared plans to renew the 
hartal at the Dewali festival in November. Another 
result of the hartal was that the Moderate Hindu 
politicians who were rigid sanatanis broke away from the 
Indian Association and founded the Hindu Association, A 
small group of 17 men held a meeting at the house of Ram 
Kishan Das of the Mercantile Bank on 25 October, the day 
of the Mendhi procession. A second meeting was held on 
the 26th and finally on the 28th the new organisation 
could claim a membership of 75» Among these 75 were some 
of the most eminent sanatanis of the city, 1
The parochial attitudes displayed by both 
communities, at all levels of society, inevitably
1
The officers of the Hindu Association were Shiv Narain 
(pleader), president; Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh, vice- 
president; Rai Sahib Pearey Lai (pleader), vice-president; 
Bulaqui Das (Gorewala), vice-president; Pearey Lai 
( motorwalla) , vice-president; Madho Ram Khanna, vice- 
president; Seth Ram Lai (choudhri of the cloth merchants), 
vice-president; Sri Ram (Bar-at-Law), general secretary; 
Beni Pershad (cloth merchant), joint secretary; Hargobind 
Pershad Nigam, joint secretary; R.B„ Sen, joint secretary; 
McK. Acharya (editor of the Indraprasth), joint secretary; 
Suraj Pershad, joint secretary; Ram Kishan Das (of the 
Mercantile Bank), treasurer; and Lala Bansi Dhar, auditor. 
RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918).
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rebounded upon the Home Rule League. The Moderates,
Hindu and Muslim, dissociated themselves from the 
movement, while the Hindu Moderates were further split 
between the Indian Association and the Hindu Association. 
The Home Rulers held a closed meeting on 3 November, but 
it was poorly attended and the tone of the speeches was 
very mild», They held a public meeting on the 9th but 
were able to attract only 1 ,000, a large number in itself, 
but only a quarter as large as those of September. The 
Muslims replied in kind and held two anti-Home Rule League 
meetings on the 12th and the 19th. The 100 Muslims who 
attended, most of whom were wealthy businessmen, departed 
dramatically from their traditional attitude of manifest­
ing no opposition to opinions with which they disagreed. 
Their meetings were broken up, however, by the presence 
of over 300 Hindu members of the Home Rule League 
Volunteer Corps.
The healing balm of time and the efforts of several 
eminent leaders who firmly believed in Hindu-Muslim unity, 
such as Dr Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan, would have 
restored calm and muted the parochial conflict between 
the two committees. But the activities of some individuals 
kept the fires of communalism aglow. Abdul Bari and a 
majority of the ulema of Firangi Mahal issued a fatwa in 
November which declared that if any permissive religious 
right were opposed, it became compulsory. A large number 
of leading orthodox Sunnis in Delhi then applied for 
permission to perform the garbani (a practice which was 
strictly limited to only a few areas in the city) in
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their homes. The lower classes of both communities also
showed signs of restiveness as a result of the hartal,
the riots at Arrah, and the rains and floods which had
wiped out the kharif crop and driven the prices of wheat
2'dangerously high'.
It appeared that the Home Rulers of Delhi were in 
complete disarray. They had meddled in the affairs of 
the Ram Lila Committee in response to the League's 
activities in the United Provinces, but their only claim 
to success was that Delhi had not experienced a riot and 
was the one city in India to hold a hartal on that 
occasion. The Home Rulers managed to derive sufficient 
élan from the arrival of the Secretary of State on 10 
November however, to regain the support of a large 
number of Hindu and Muslim Extremists in the city.
1
The Muslims of the city displayed their disgust of 
Hakim Ajmal Khan by accepting invitations for, and then 
refusing to attend, a banquet at his house. The lavish 
arrangements for over 1,000 people overwhelmed the 200 
people who attended the reception for the national leaders 
who arrived in Delhi to present petitions to the Secretary 
of State. The Muslim community was most unhappy at the 
Hakim Sahib's support of Hindu-Muslim unity and the Home 
Rulers were equally dissatisfied with his support of the 
views of the Moderates. RDDA, Confidential File 167 
(1917)» undated and unsigned note entitled 'Fortnightly 
Report', most of which appeared in NAI, Home Poll 2 
Deposit, January 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political 
Situation for the Second Half of November 1917,' W.M.
Hailey to S.R. Hitnell, 30 November 1917»
2
NAI, Home Poll 2 Deposit, January 1918; Home Poll 59 
Deposit, January 1918. The price of salt was 'prohibitive' 
and fuel was unobtainable. The Municipal Committee had 
to open cheap grain shops and salt depots for the third 
time during the War, and some relief was experienced.
318
The arrival of Edwin S. Montagu at the Delhi Station
was the occasion for a great deal of excitement. Large
crowds gathered around the Station and in the Queen's
Gardens to witness his arrival and others lined the
procession route from the Railway Station to Government
House. Popular enthusiasm received a greater fillip
from the continuous arrival of national leaders who came
to Delhi to present petitions. The arrival of B.G. Tilak
was the most momentous, as a huge throng surrounded the
noted Hindu leader and in the enthusiasm of the moment
elected him president of his own reception committee. 1
Tilak and Mrs Besant (who was also present in the city)
did not give any public lectures but their lack of public
oratory was more than compensated for by other leaders
who came to Delhi. Over 8,000 Hindus enthusiastically
responded to the ten lecturers who spoke at a meeting 
2on 26 November. This meeting, which was twice as large 
as any of the previous Home Rule meetings, was as large 
as the meeting of Muslims on 21 May 1915« And like that 
meeting, the audience of 26 November reflected a higher 
degree of politicisation than was generally evident 
during the earlier days of the movement.
1
Interview of Sri Ram Sharma, 22 April 1967, by the 
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.
2
RDDA, Confidential File I67 (1917)? Delhi Police 
Secret Abstract No„ 4-7, 1 December 1917» The speakers 
were S aR. Bannerji, B.B.N. Iyer, G.S„ Khaparde, Asaf Ali, 
Rangaswami Aiyangar, T.B. Sapru, Pandit Gopi Nath Mitra, 
Pandit Gokarnath Misra, Jumna Das Dwarka Das, and Neki 
Ram Sharma.
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Whether any solid advantages will result from 
the flood of oratory thus let loose upon Delhi 
[at the annual sessions of the Congress and 
League] may be questionable. It will be 
interesting to see whether future developments 
will prove that the safety valve for the letting 
off of anti-Brisith steam has been opened too 
wide or not.
Chief Commissioner, Delhi 
7 January 1919
There were two significant trends observable in the 
year 1918, both of which raised the temperature of 
politics in Delhi. The first of these trends was a 
steady deterioration in economic conditions in the city, 
which increased the misery and heightened the discontent 
of the inhabitants of the city. The second trend was the 
increased activity of the nationalists, who consciously 
sought to politicise the citizens of Delhi to a degree 
which would make the annual sessions of the Congress and 
League a success.
After the panic,which had occurred at the beginning 
of the War had quietened, the more substantial interests 
in the city probably benefited as much as they suffered 
from wartime conditions. The iron mongers reaped large 
profits from government contracts, as did two of the 
biscuit factories and two of the flour mills. Others 
benefited from the fact that they no longer faced stiff 
competition from foreign goods. The cloth merchants 
were able to procure supplies and only in 1916 were they 
forced to sell at a loss when they were unable to despatch
III
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orders from Delhi to smaller trading centres. By I9.I8, 
however, all classes of persons were beginning to suffer 
from the dislocation caused by the War. A trade 
depression developed in January 1918 when a shortage of 
railway cars meant that no goods could be despatched from 
Delhi, For the first time since the War began, the 
cloth merchants refused to order goods from England. It 
was also noticeable that continuously rising prices, 
which had all along weighed heavily upon the lower 
classes, were beginning to push on the petty bourgeoisie. 1
The substantial economic interests in the city
suffered more problems in the first six months of 1918*
Their traditional immunity from income tax was invaded
by a new income tax which came into effect on 1 April
1918, and which exacerbated the impact of the super tax
2that had been imposed in April 1917* On top of this 
apparent attack from the government, those who aspired 
to join the Punjab Chamber of Commerce were refused entry.
1
NAI, Home Poll 38 Deposit, March 1918, »Reports on the 
Internal Political Situation for the First Half of 
January 1918*, W.M* Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 17 January 
1918.
2
The new income tax was thought to be especially 
iniquitous because people paying the tax were required 
to fill out a form which violated the traditional 
proclivity for Banias toward secrecy in financial matters. 
The new tax also upset people because there were provisions 
for the reassessment of income which had not been assessed 
formerly, and of income which had been underassessed.
3 NAI, Home Poll 64 Deposit, May 1918, 'Fortnightly Reports 
on the Internal Political Situation in India for the First 
Half of April, 1918,' W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 17 
April 1918.
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And finally, the lack of a silver coinage imposed hardship 
on all groups as paper currency no longer received the 
support and confidence of those who had commercial 
interes ts.
The lack of a silver coinage was a pressing problem 
since it affected all types of monetary transactions. 
Merchants would no longer accept hundis [bills of exchange ] 
in payment for goods, but demanded silver instead. The 
process rebounded on the merchants who also were unable 
to buy goods and many grain carts were seen leaving the 
city full with their loads unsold. The shortage of silver 
forced the currency exchange to close, which in turn 
restricted the amount of notes in circulation and further 
increased suspicion of paper money. The lack of silver 
began to affect the industry and construction activity 
since labourers became increasingly reluctant to accept 
paper currency. And since contractors could not pay in 
silver, they began to lose their labourers with no hope 
of finding more. The general suspicion of paper currency 
in any form put a premium on commodities with an intrinsic 
value and led to a massive urge to acquire urban property. 
This trend exacerbated the problem of silver shortage 
since large sums changed hands and then were hoarded.1
1
NAI, Home Poll 491-494 Part B, June 1918, 'Weekly Reports 
of the Director of Criminal Intelligence', for the week 
ending 15 June 1918; Home Poll 28 Deposit, August 1918, 
'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the lst- 
half of May, 1918', W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 21 May 
1918; Home Poll 29 Deposit, August 1918, 'Report on the 
Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of May 
1918', 4 June 1918; Home Poll 30 Deposit, August 1918, 
'Report on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st 
Half of June, 1918', W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 19 June 
1918.
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But the most pressing problem of all was the rise 
in prices, Kerosene oil reached such a high price and 
was so scarce in supply that the Municipal Committee had 
to open depots. Wheat prices continued to rise despite 
a good rabi crop and climbed to 8-j seers per rupee at 
the beginning of July and then to 7'2 the end of the
month. By August it had climbed to 7 seers and atta to
6 seers.1
The parochial fervour which was so noticeable in 
October and November 1917 began to dissipate by the end 
of the year. This was primarily due to the euphoria 
which surrounded the arrival of Montagu and the efforts 
of the nationalists to heal the divisions which were so 
woefully evident as a result of their attempt to use a 
religious festival for political ends. The Home Rulers 
reasserted themselves, overwhelmed the Moderates in the 
Indian Association in December, and decided to use the 
Indian Association to contest the Municipal elections 
of 1918.2
NAI, Home Poll 31 Deposit, August 1918, 'Reports on 
the Internal Political Situation for the 2nd Half of 
June, I9I8 1 , WoM. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 3 July 1918; 
Home Poll 20 Deposit, September 1918, 'Reports on the 
Internal Political Situation for the 2nd Half of July 
I9I8', H.C. Beadon to S.R. Hignell, 1 August 1918; Home 
Poll h0 Deposit, September 1918, 'Reports on the Internal 
Political Situation in India for the First half of August 
1918', H.C. Beadon to S.R. Hignell, 17 August 1918,
2
NAI, Home Poll 59 Deposit, January 1918. The only 
contest for a seat in the Municipal Committee occurred 
in the previous election of 1915 at which the incumbent 
won. RDDA, Education File 83 Part B 1915, 'Election of 
the Members of the Municipal Committee, Delhi.1
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The major activity of the nationalists in Delhi in 
1918 was a propaganda campaign to politicise the 
inhabitants of the city. The Extremists wanted to 
heighten the political consciousness of the citizens of 
Delhi in order to ensure the success of the annual 
sessions of the Congress and the League which were to be 
held in Delhi in December 1918.1 They initiated their 
campaign in January with a public meeting which was 
sponsored by the Home Rule League and at which Horniman 
spoke."' This was followed by two public meetings on 16 
and 17 February to celebrate the anniversary of the Delhi
3Home Rule League. These meetings revealed that the Home 
Rule League had doubled its membership from 150 to 300, 
but the public meetings could only attract audiences of
2,000, which included a number of Muslims. The Honourable 
Mr Khaparde spoke and asked the audience to pray every 
day for the success of the deputation of Tilak and himself, 
who were departing for England to fight for self-government.
1 NAI, Home Poll 214-217 Part B, February 1918., 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the 
week ending 9 February 1918. For the first time in memory 
the annual session of the All-India National Congress 
which met at Calcutta in December 1917, did not decide on 
the venue of its next annual session. Sultan Singh 
invited the Congress in January 1918 to hold their 33rd 
annual session at Delhi in December 1918.
2 NAI, Home Poll 38 Deposit, March 1918. Mrs Besant and 
Mrs Naidu were present, but declined to speak.
3 NAI, Home Poll 4l Deposit, March 1918, 'Reports on the 
Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of 
February 1918,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 2 March 1918; 
RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), ’Fortnightly Reports', 
Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 8, 23 February 1918.
324
Dr Ansari and Sayid Shabbir Hussain, the brother of Wazir 
Hussain of Lucknow, also made speeches; but it was the 
more vehement speeches of Pandit Shiv Narain Haksar,
Shankar Lai, and Dr Abdul Rahman which gained enthusiastic 
responses from the audience.1
The Extremists began planning for the December 
sessions with a meeting on 16 February at Sultan Singh's 
house. They had found that the local District Association 
(which was controlled by the Moderates) could not be used 
for their purposes, so they created a Provincial Congress 
Committee which included Ajmere-Marwara. The meeting of 
200 at Sultan Singh's house elected Hakim Ajmal Khan to 
preside and immediately removed Asaf Ali from the 
secretaryship of the Committee. The main task of the 
Committee, however, was to elect a president of the 
Reception Committee. Dr Ansari proposed Hakim Ajmal 
Khan whose nomination was seconded by Rai Bahadur Kanhya 
Lai. Dr A.C. Sen then proposed Sultan Singh and the 
debate developed into a struggle between Hindus and Muslims 
with the members of each community supporting their co­
religionist. Rather than risk an open break the Hakim
Sahib intervened and deferred the election until February
2when representatives from Ajmere would be present.
1
The Honourable Mr Sharma who was also there spoke, but 
Mrs Besant and M.K. Gandhi who were in Delhi to attend 
the All-India Congress Committee meeting of 23 February 
did not make an appearance.
2
RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police
Secret Abstract No. 8, 23 February 1918.
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The campaign of public meetings continued apace.
The anniversary meeting of the Chaori Bazaar Arya Samaj 
on 2k February became the venue for a speech for Home 
Rule. This was, in fact, a most remarkable meeting for 
several reasons. The first reason was that the audience 
contained 3,000 even though there were only 200 members 
of the organisation. The second reason was the fact 
that the speaker was Mahatma Munshi Ram or Shradhanand 
as he now styled himself. The audience had obviously 
gathered to hear the Mahatma who was the leader of the 
1gurukul' group of the Arya Samaj and who, more 
importantly, was one of the most outstanding Hindu 
religious leaders of north India. He had resigned as 
principal of the Gurukula Mahavidyalaya at Kangri and 
had taken the vows of a sanyasi (hence his change of 
name). He also announced that his political views were 
not the views of the Arya Samaj, but the fact that he 
became involved in politics at all was most extraordinary 
in view of his attitude in 19-10, that the Arya Samaj 
was not a political organisation. He delivered a 
passionate lecture on Dayanand's views on swaraj and then 
launched into a dissertation of swadeshi. He stated that 
the Brahmachari School was far superior to the American 
and English schools which turned out students who suffered 
from all types of venereal diseases. He remarked that 
Home Rule would be obtained when Indians attained unity 
in language, style of living and refused to imitate 
Western manners and customs. He concluded that the 
members of the audience should reform their own characters 
and should take as their model Mahatma Gandhi.1
1 RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police Secret
Abstract No. 9» 2 March 1918.
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The Home Rule League finally showed signs of creating 
enthusiasm for their campaign. Their campaign for the 
Municipal Committee elections was in full swing and at a 
meeting of 3 March they drew an audience of 6,000. Dr 
Ansari presided over the meeting and both he and the main 
speaker, Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru of Allahabad, 
emphasised Hindu-Muslim unity.1 The emphasis on Hindu- 
Muslim unity, however, did not seem to awaken much of a 
response since on the following Sunday, 10 March, Ma.zh.ur- 
ul-Haq, the president of the All-India Moslem League, and 
Abdul Kasim, a member of Bengal Legislative Council, could 
only attract an audience of 1,500. The Home Rulers were 
somewhat more successful the following week when on 
Tuesday the 19th they drew an audience of 3>500 to hear 
the honourable members M.A. Jinnah and T.B. Sapru, and 
Abdul Kasim. The first two were quite moderate in their
orations, but Abdul Kasim delivered a violent polemic
2against the police.
Enthusiasm for the campaign waned quickly, however. 
None of the Extremists won election to the Municipal 
Committee and both Gandhi and Abdul Bari refused to make 
public speeches while they were in the city in March.
In fact, the Chief Commissioner observed that:
1
RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police 
Secret Abstract No. 10, 9 March 1918.
2
RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police
Secret Abstract No. 11, 16 March 1918.
327
Generally speaking, the public speeches delivered 
a [sic] Delhi by the visitors to the Secretary of 
State, and by the members of the Legislative 
Council, have been moderate in tone. They have 
on more than one occasion proved disappointing 
to the local Home Rulers, who have looked for 
something even more potent than the stuff served 
out to them by local fire-eaters.1
The lack of response to National Education Week which was 
held the first week of April confirmed the fact that the 
citizens of Delhi had lost interest in a campaign which
used members of the Imperial Legislative Council who
2were unwilling to use strong words.
The effort to politicise the citizens of Delhi was 
at best only a qualified success during the first three 
months of 1918. The largest audience was around 6,000 
and drew upon the same classes and communities which had 
supported the Home Rule League in September 1917- And 
even though some of the most significant leaders were 
Muslim, the only Muslims who supported the movement were 
the Extremists of the ’New Muslim Party’. The Hindu 
character of the movement was most evident in the wrangle 
over the choice of a president for the Reception Committee 
of the Congress. The people who gathered on 28 February 
to make final selection failed to come to any decision 
and resolve whether a Hindu or a Muslim was the more 
acceptable. A meeting of 150 at Sultan Singh's house 
on 21 April finally decided upon Hakim Ajmal Khan, after
1 NAI, Home Poll 22 Deposit, May 1918, ’Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second 
Half of March, 1918,' W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 5 April 
1918.
2 NAI, Home Poll 64 Deposit, May I9I8 .
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a ’long and disorderly meeting' . But the election of* a 
Muslim drove the most enthusiastic Hindus out of the 
Provincial Congress Committee.1
With the problem of election out of the way, the 
local Extremists could resume their propaganda activities. 
The Extremists, who now controlled the Home Rule League, 
the Provincial Congress Committee, the Indian Association, 
and the Moslem League, held meetings on the 26th, 27th, 
28th and 30th April. The speakers were G.S. Khaparde,
Dr Abdul Rahman, B.P. Bomanji (from Bombay), Asaf Ali, 
and Shankar Lai, The meeting of the 28th held special 
significance for the Home Rulers and a large number of 
the politically conscious in the city who attended the 
opening of a swadeshi store in Delhi by Mahatma Gandhi. 
Although the Mahatma said very little, the entire project 
received the enthusiastic support of the students and 
petty bourgeoisie. To many it was a spiritual and 
material reaffirmation of Indian virtues and values.
And to an even larger proportion of the population there 
was now a visible symbol of the abstract political values
2that the articulate in the society sought to disseminate.
The opening of the swadeshi store, which attracted 
thousands, was the only bright spot in the Home Rule
1
RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police Secret 
Abstract No. 8, 23 February 1918. There were 37 persons 
elected to the Executive Committee of the Reception 
Committee, of which four were Muslims (Hakim Ajmal Khan,
Dr Ansari, Hafiz Abdul Aziz, pleader, and Asaf Ali).
2
RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police Secret 
Abstract No. 17, 4 May 1918. Shankar Lai became the 
manager of the store.
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movement for many months. There were meetings on the 10th, 
13th, 15th, l6th, and 24th June, but these usually drew
1,000 and rarely 2,000 persons, The Extremists, mainly 
Asaf Ali. and Neki Ram Sharma, made successively more 
vitriolic speeches, but were unable to sustain sufficient 
elan among significant sections of the city. The majority 
of their supporters were students and Extremists as the 
rest of the community saw little reason to attend meetings 
at the height of a stifling Indian summer.1 The movement 
also suffered from the fact that the more respected 
leaders were in the hill resorts. It was significant, 
however, that no meeting reached the same nadir of 4 
August 1917 and that there was a significant amount of 
politicisation evident. The fact that a political meeting, 
which was held during the week, could draw between 1,000 
and 2,000 persons, the majority of whom were not literate 
in English, revealed that some progress had been made over 
the conditions which existed before 1911. It also 
revealed that the concepts of Home Rule, swadeshi and 
swaraj had become meaningful concepts for significant 
sections of the community. It was still a small group, 
however, since the majority were literate and pursued 
non-manual occupations. In addition to the growth of the 
number of people who had been politicised, there was a 
change in the political idiom. The people who supported 
political activity before 1911 had some vague notions of 
social reform which would either result in political 
change or which political change would bring about. The 
new idiom reaffirmed traditional values and was couched
RDDA, Confidential File 212 (1918), 'Home Rule Agitation'.
1
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in a language which could serve as a focus for a much 
wider range of grievances, economic, religious, or social. 
This, in fact, became the means by which the nationalist 
leaders politicised ever larger groups in the society, as 
the agitators became more successful in their attempt to 
focus limited grievances onto larger political issues.
The nationalist agitators in Delhi seized upon two 
local grievances to raise political issues in June, July, 
and August. The first was the arrest and trial of Neki 
Ram Sharma and Asaf Ali. These two had been served with 
orders on 12 June not to address any public meetings under 
the Defence of India Act. The Chief Commissioner decided 
that the meeting they addressed on 24 June contravened 
the order and had the pair arrested on 6 July. The Home 
Rule League held a meeting of protest at which a large 
subscription was collected for their defence. The trial 
commenced on the 17 July before a packed court room 
which was similarly filled each day throughout the 
proceedings. The popular imagination immediately seized 
upon this issue as another symbol of the Home Rule 
movement which was eloquently expressed by a mass meeting 
to celebrate the acquittal of these two whom the 
Administration had made into intrepid heroes.1 This 
meeting was immeasurably larger than the meeting of
1
NAI, Home Poll 4l Deposit, September 1918 , 'Report on 
the Internal Political Situation in India for the Second 
Half of August 1918,' H.C. Beadon to S.R. Hignell, 31 
August 1918. Interview with Sri Ram Sharma, 22 April 1 9 6 7, 
by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.
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18 August which was held to protest the report of the 
Montagu-Chelmsford reform scheme.1
The second local issue which the agitators used to 
capture the public imagination was somewhat more parochial. 
The Extremist Muslims formed the Central Bureau for the 
Release of Muslim Internees which then began to publish 
a series of pamphlets. The first pamphlet contained the 
correspondence between the mother of Mohamed Ali and Mrs 
Besant; the second pamphlet offered a selection of Mohamed 
Ali's poetry; while a third contained questions about the
internment of Mahmud-ul-Hasan; all of these appeared in
2June. They were followed in July by a campaign 
inaugurated on Jamat-ul-Vida in the mosques to raise 
subscriptions for the internees and their families. The 
agitators persuaded several prominent Muslim citizens in 
almost every mosque to carry subscription boxes which 
bore the inscription:
....the nation delights to honour those whom 
Government submits to disgrace, since this is the 
only reply that a subject race can give to the 
tyranny of its rulers.3
The same practice was repeated on Fitr-Id with equal 
success and with the addition of a leaflet from the 
Calcutta branch of the Bureau which sought to demonstrate 
that there was an organised conspiracy afoot to destroy
1 RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police Secret 
Abstract No. 33, 24 August 1918.
2 RDDA, Confidential File 214 (19 18), ’Inquiry about the 
Publication of a Pamphlet about M. Muhammad Hasan.'
NAI, Home Poll 31 Deposit, August 1918.
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Islam. This group was most vociferous, however, with the 
publication of the Report of the Sedition Committee which 
accepted the guilt of Mahmud-ul-Hassan. Religious 
sentiment permeated the entire community and it appeared 
that the Bureau would ride an upswell of support in its 
efforts to get the Muslim internees released. This 
effort was severely curtailed by the spread of an 
influenza epidemic which struck with such tenacity that 
it lasted for three months and which struck with such 
ferocity that it killed 7,000 people in the city and an 
additional 16,000 outside the city.
The last four months of 1918 combined issues of 
national significance with those of local importance.
The events of national significance heightened the tone 
of political opinion in the city. The Muslim community 
raised its voice to protest against the Rowlatt Report's 
condemnation of Mahmud-ul-Hasan, while the orthodox Hindu 
community were equally vociferous against the government 
which allowed the introduction of the Hindu Marriage 
Validity Bill (the Patel Intercaste Marriage Bill) into 
the Imperial Legislative Council in September. Shortly 
thereafter the Indian Daily News, an English-language 
journal published by an Anglo-Indian in Calcutta, issued 
an article which was thought to have 'grossly insulted1
the Prophet.1 A meeting of protest was advertised in 
Calcutta at the Nakoda Mosque with the hope of drawing 
speakers from all over India. The meeting was prohibited 
and a riot took place on 9 September with many Muslim 
casualties. The riot at Calcutta was closely followed by 
riots during the Bakr-Id celebration at Karturpur in the 
United Provinces, where Hindus attacked Muslims and
burned 30 of them, many of whom were still alive, in
2their homes.
While events of a national significance attracted 
the attention of the politicised segments of the community 
in Delhi internal conditions took a disquieting turn in 
the city. A serious influenza epidemic broke out in the 
Punjab and the United Provinces during September, October,
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1
NAI, Home Poll 164-201 Part A, November 1918, 'Report of 
the Recent Mohamedan Disturbances in Calcutta.' The phrase 
was 'not far away the wayfarer decries an Arab with clear 
cut features and a world of mysticism in his eyes looking 
as reverently into a gutter as if it was his Prophet's 
tomb.' The general reasons given for the riot were the 
competition between loyalty to the British Empire and 
sympathy with Turkey; the rise in the cost of necessities; 
and the 'bitter memories' of the Shahbad riots in Behar 
during Bakr-Id in 1917 when Hindus attacked Muslims.
There was a small meeting in Delhi to protest the 
article in the Indian Daily News, but the Calcutta riot 
drew no immediate response. NAI, Home Poll 31 Deposit, 
October 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation 
for the First Half of September 1918, ' H.C. Beadon to S.R. 
Hignell, 18 September, 1918.
2
There were 30 Muslims killed in the riot. NAI, Home 
Poll 43 Deposit, October 1919, 'Reports on the Internal 
Political Situation for the First Half of August 1919*'
This riot drew no immediate response from Muslims in 
Delhi.
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and November, with the worst-hit areas in the region of 
the Jumna River, The districts of Gurgaon and Rohtak in 
the Punjab had the highest death rates, and Delhi, being
close by, did not escape.1 The epidemic was exacerbated
2in turn by the high cost of necessities. The price of 
atta (flour) was less than five seers per rupee, which
3were extreme famine prices. The price of salt was four 
times what it had been in 1914 and kerosene oil was 
almost unobtainable. The Municipal Committee had to 
open cheap grain shops and salt depots to alleviate the
4economic distress of the poorer classes in the city.
Events of local and national significance impinged 
jointly upon Delhi in December 1918. The city became 
the venue of 31 national organisations, prominent among 
which were the All-India National Congress and the All-
1
RDDA, Home File 33 (a) Part B 1919» 'Report and 
Investigations in Connection with the Influenza Epidemic.’ 
The rural areas suffered most from the lack of convenient 
medical facilities. The epidemic was so bad at its height 
that the Recruiting Committee used the plea that it was 
safer in the Army than in the home. RDDA, Foreign File
10 Part B 1919> 'Celebration of the Peace at Delhi.1
0 NAI, Home Poll 24 Deposit, November 1918, ’Reports on 
the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of 
October 1918.' Chief Commissioner Hailey stated that 
the high cost of essential food stuffs over a long period 
had brought on malnutrition which left large portions of 
the populace too weak to withstand the disease.
NAI, Home Poll 32 Deposit, October 1918, ’Report on the 
Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of Sept­
ember 1918,’ H.C. Beadon to S.R. Hignell, 2 October 1918.
^ RDDA, Revenue File 61 Part B 1919> ’Orders Regarding 
the Development and Control of Goodgrains in Delhi.'
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India Moslem League. The Chairman of the Reception 
Committee of the Congress was Hakim Ajmal Khan, one of 
the most eminent of the traditional leaders in the city. 
The Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Moslem 
League was Dr M.A. Ansari . 1 Pandit Malaviya and Fazl-ul- 
Haq were the respective presidents. There were 6,000
observers at the Congress sessions in addition to 5,700
2delegates.
The initial address to the Congress came from Hakim 
Ajmal Khan, whose speech, delivered in English, dealt 
mainly with the inadequacy of the Montagu-Chelmsford 
Reform Scheme. The speaker also discussed the attitude 
of the Muslims towards Turkey, the Holy Places and the
1
N A I , Home Poll 42 Deposit, January 1919, ’Report on the 
Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of 
December 1918.’ There was a great deal of dissension 
among the members of both reception committees and between 
them and groups in the city. The Congress Reception 
Committee was refused permission to stage a procession 
through the city because of the attitude of the Muslims 
as a result of the Karturpur riots. (These Muslims met 
at the Jama Masjid on 20 December to protest the Hindu- 
Muslim unity which the Congress and the League were 
advocating.) The Extremist congressites detrained 
Malaviya at Ghaziabad on 25 December and had him arrive 
in Delhi on a later train so that instead of the eight 
persons waiting to welcome him at 9*00 a.m., there were
8,000 waiting for him at noon. Hakim Ajmal Khan succeeded 
in whisking him away to his house before they could lead 
Malaviya on an illegal procession.
2
NAI, Home Poll I6O-I63 Part B, January 1919 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for the 
week ending 11 January 1919« The Extremists had paid the 
fees for 700 peasants from the surrounding districts to 
give the Congress the appearance of having a mass base.
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Khilafat. He concluded with a plea for Hindu-Muslim 
unity and asked all the political leaders to exert their 
influence to prevent any further 'painful incidents', 
such as the communal riots at Karturpur.1
The annual session of the Moslem League followed
2the general pattern of the Congress session. The star 
performance of both sessions, however, was the opening 
speech of Dr Ansari, which was delivered in Urdu and had
3four basic themes. The first theme posited that the
1
NAE, Home Poll I6O-I63 Part B, January 1919» 'Report 
for weekend 11 January 1919• 1
2
The League also desired to have a mass base. But instead 
of recruiting peasants, they invited the ulema to the 
session. If the ulema had responded the influence of the 
League over the masses of Indian Muslims would have been 
infinitely greater than if peasants had been recruited 
to attend. Only ten maulvis responded, however, and 
little was achieved even though the Shams-ul-Ulama of 
Deoband did send a letter of support for the League's 
resolution on the Khilafat and the Holy Places. It is 
interesting to note that two of the ten maulvis who did 
attend were from Delhi. They were Ahmad Said and 
Kifayatullah who read out a resolution passed at a meeting 
of maulvis at the Fatehpuri Mosque and added that the 
ulema did not consider politics and religion two separate 
things. He added that no doubt the ulema had left 
politics to the League in the past, but when the call 
went out, they were only too glad to join the political 
body.
3
NAI, Home Poll I6O-I63 Part B, January 1919» 'Report 
for the week ending 11 January 1919*1 Choudhary 
Khaliquzzaman in Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore, 1961), 
states that Abdul Rahman, Mohammad Shuaib, and himself 
helped to write Ansari's speech, p. 43. C.R. Cleveland 
thought it had been written by Abdul Ghaffar, who was 
formerly editor of the Jamhur and who was expelled from 
Calcutta after the riots there.
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pending dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, which was 
attributable to the dislike of the Muslims and the 
avarice and greed 'of the chancellories of Europe', 
denied the Khalifa control over the Holy Places.1 The 
second part of the speech accused the British of being 
prejudiced against the Muslims. The third section of 
the speech, which dealt with Hindu-Muslim unity, 
reiterated Dr Ansari's belief in the vitality of the 
Lucknow Pact and his disbelief that pan-Islamism was 
inimical to Indian nationalism. The final topic of the 
speech concerned self-determination. Dr Ansari ended 
on the note that the exclusion of India from the 
application of Wilson's Fourteen Points was inexcusable 
in the light of India's contributions and sacrifices 
during the War.
The impact of Dr Ansari's speech on the session, 
on the city, and on Muslims in north India was quite 
s tartling.
There is no doubt that the masses were grieved 
to hear of the Sultan's defeat [stated a Muslim 
officer in the Central Intelligence Department], 
but beyond that, there was no feeling. Now Dr 
Ansari's address with its quotations from the 
Qoran and the support of the ulemas is producing 
anger and hate among them. The address has been 
widely read and by now every Musulman knows that 
the Holy places are going out of the hands of the 
Musulman sovereign and that the English are 
responsible.^
The entire text of Dr Ansari's speech to the eleventh 
annual session of the All-India Moslem League appears in 
the Appendix to this Chapter.
2 N A I , Home Poll I6O-I63 Part B, January 1919» 'Report
for the week ending 25 January 1919•1
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The speech was, in fact, a passionate resume of the 
fears and frustrations of the entire Muslim community in 
India in general and in Delhi in particular.
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APPENDIX
Speech Delivered by Dr. M.A. Ansari. , Chairman, 
Reception Committee, All-India Muslim League 
11th Sessions, Delhi, 30th December 1918.*
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
Members of the All-India Muslim League, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, -
I have been entrusted with the duty of welcoming 
you, on behalf of the Muslim citizens of Delhi, to this 
ancient city, which was once the seat of Muslim power 
and glory and the home of Muslim civilization and culture; 
and which has, alas I also seen their gradual decline and 
decay. This assembly of Mussalmans, from all parts of 
India, awakens in one's imagination the memory of many a 
brilliant gathering which, in the palmy days of its Muslim 
Rulers, Delhi must have witnessed. It was this city from 
where such great saints as Khwaja Qutbuddin Bakhtiar Kaki, 
Sultan Nizam-uddin Aulia, Khwaja Baqi-Billah, Shah 
Kalimullah Jahanabadi and famous divines as Sheikh Abdul 
Haqq Muhaddis Dehlavi, Shah Fakhr-ud-din, Shah Abdul Aziz 
(may the blessings of God be upon them all) sent forth 
the light of Muslim religion, Muslim theology and Islamic 
philosophy, not only to the four corners of India but 
beyond its geographical limits, to Bokhara and Samarkand, 
to Persia and Baghdad and even to Mecca and Medina. It 
was Delhi that gave to India that beautiful language which 
is the offspring of all that is sweet in Arabic, Persian 
and Turkish on one side and Sanskrit and Prakrit on the 
other. From the mere lingua of the camp followers it rose 
to the eminence of being designated the Urdu-i-Maulla 
[sic] of the Red Palace and gradually it became the 
aknowledged literary, economic and political language of 
the country. It was Delhi again which blended the Indian 
with the highly polished Persian Art, and gave to the 
world that eminent peot [sic], Sufi and genius, Amir
* Disorders Inquiry Committee, 1919-1920, Minutes of 
Evidence, Volume I (Delhi), containedin the written 
evidence of C.A. Barron.
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Khusru, and the great philosopher-poet Assadullah Khan 
Ghalib. Delhi, under its Muslim name Shahjahanabad, 
with its Jama Masjid, the Diwan-i-Aam and the Diwan-i- 
Khas, shall always give to India the highest place in 
the world of architecture, as much as that lofty monument, 
the Qutub Minar, holds high the mighty power of the Faith 
to which it was consecrated as one of the towers of the 
Masjid-i-Quwwat-ul-Islam. Time has not yet effaced the 
landmarks of Islam in the history of this country nor has 
the dust of centuries buried the footprints of our 
ancestors. Gentlemen, I welcome you to the cradle of 
Islamic civilization in India and to the city of Muslim 
memories.
Our departed friends.
Since we met last at Calcutta, we have lost some of 
our leading men and sincere and zealous workers. The 
death of Nawab Haji Muhammad Ishaq Khan at this most 
momentous period of the history of our country, has 
removed from amongst us not only a true patriot but also 
a great champion of the rights of progressive Muslim 
India. He had a courage which did not fail at the 
critical time and his support one could rely upon even 
during the most adverse circumstances. The late Justice 
Khan Bahadur Mian Muhammad Shah Din leaves a gap in our 
society which it will be difficult to fill. As a great 
lawyer and scholar he was held in high esteem in our 
community. Another and a still more painful loss has been 
that of Sheikh Wilayat Ali, Qidwai, of Barabanki, who was 
snatched away, in the prime of life, from a most fruitful 
literary career. As a humourist Bambooque was unequalled. 
His numerous sketches in The Comrade and The New Era form 
classics that will always keep his memory fresh and green. 
Last of all, we mourn the death of that silent worker, 
great thinker and philosopher, Dr. Abdur Rahman, Bijnori, 
who, in his simplicity and modesty coupled with great 
learning, reminded one of the scholars and masters of 
early Islamic days. The Muslim University, whenever it 
comes into existence, will bear the impress of his mind 
for always. The Sultania College, a child of his 
imagination, will not receive his fostering care and 
Muslim education in India will be the poorer in the loss 
of its best champion. He was devoted to the service of 
Urdu and at the time of his sad death, at the beginning 
of a promising career, he was engaged in writing a learned
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introduction to the Diwani-i-Ghalib, shortly to be 
published by the Anjuman-i-Taraqq-i-Urdu. May Almighty 
Allah give their souls eternal rest and peace. AmenI
Muslim world situation: Temporal Power of Islam
Gentlemen, we are meeting to-day at a very critical 
period in the history of the world. The Great War, in 
which the nations of the East and West were engaged, has 
come to an end and bloodshed and carnage have ceased. But, 
although the war is over, our anxieties have only begun. 
Momentous issues hang in the balance and the entire course 
of human history is to be determined, at least for a very 
long time to come, by the decisions of the Peace Conference. 
It is an anxious moment for every nation, but for the 
Musalmans it is especially so. Never in their varied 
history of over 1,300 years have they been faced with a 
situation as it is to-day.
Gentlemen, the British Government, in its inter­
national engagements and relations, has always claimed, 
as a matter of right, the attention of the world because 
the King of England rules over the largest number of 
Muslim subjects. But it must be remembered that every 
right has a corresponding duty and responsibility, which 
a Government, howsoever strong, cannot afford to ignore.
The time has now come when the Musalman subjects of His 
Majesty demand that the Ministers of the Crown, who are 
in charge of the destinies of the British Empire, shall 
do their duty by the Musalmans of India.
We all know how Islam has suffered in its temporal 
power since the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Each succeeding generation has witnessed the gradual 
disruption of the House of Islam. Divers reasons have 
been brought forth and plausible explanations have not 
been wanting; lofty political doctrines have been invented 
to screen aggressive designs and humanitarian principles 
have been advanced to justify the acts of robbery done to 
Islamic Kingdoms. The white man's burden too has been 
paraded before an innocent and all-believing world. But 
bereft of all the verbiage of innocent-looking doctrines 
and high-sounding principles, this tragedy can be traced 
to the common dislike of the Muslim or the avarice and 
greed of the chancellories of Europe.
3^2
That belt of* Muslim States which once extended from 
the shores of the Atlantic to the confines of the Chinese 
Empire has, bit by bit, shrunk to a mere shadow. In 
Europe, the Northern littoral of the Black Sea, Wallachia, 
Reumelia, Greece and Macedonia have been lost, one after 
the other, in quick succession. In Africa, Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli and Egypt are gone, Caucasia and 
the Khanates of Central Asia shared the same fate, and 
the integrity and independence of Persia, after the Anglo- 
Russian Convention of 1907, is a huge political joke. Even 
the bedouin of the African and Arabian deserts is being 
seduced to give up his nomadic life and take to the 
refinements of cafes chantants. Turkey, which has fought 
the battles of Islam for many centuries, is in imminent 
and grave danger of being parcelled out into small States 
to the great detriment of the Muslim world.
The Khilafat„
It is an acknowledged fact of history that in 918 A.H. 
(1518 A.C. [sic]) the last Khalifa of the house of Abbas, 
Muhammad Abbasi of Egypt, transferred, with the consent 
and concurrence of the Musalman people, the office and 
dignity of the Khilafat and the spiritual sovereignty of 
Islam along with the symbols of this exalted office, the 
sword, the standard and the cloak of the Prophet, to the 
Osmanli Sultan Salim, the Great. The Sultan, accompanied 
by Muhammad Abbasi, took these holy relics to Istambol.
It is from this day that the Sultans of the house of Osman 
have received the honoured appellations of Khalifat-ul- 
Muslimin, Sultan-ul-Islam and Khadim-ul-Haramain-ish- 
Sharifain and the Musalmans of the world have recognised 
them as their spiritual Imams and the successors of the 
Messenger of God. Not only in the harams of Mecca and 
Medina but throughout the wide expanse where the religion 
of Islam is practised, prayers for their success and glory 
are offered every Friday and on the occasions of the two 
Ids .
Sharif Barakat of Mecca, on getting a firman from 
Sultan Salim, acknowledged him as Khalifa and ordered the 
name of the Turkish Sultan to be introduced in the prayers. 
No Sharif has, since then, questioned the authority of the 
rulers of Turkey and even Sharif Husain recognised the 
Sultan as the lawful Khalifa and submitted to his 
spiritual overlording.
3^3
During the course of the present war, actuated by 
personal ambitions and selfish interests, Sharif Husain 
raised the standard of revolt against the unquestioned 
Khalifa of Islam, whom he himself had recognised as such.
By this action of his he not only disregarded a rule of 
political morality, but, according to Muslim belief and 
religious teaching, broke an explicit and clear command­
ment of God and His Prophet. It has been distinctly 
ordered in the Holy Qur'an that:-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted ]
"If one party become disloyal to the other (which
is in power), fight against the one that has
become disloyal until it return to the bidding of 
God." [Ch. 26; S. 49; V. 9 ]
and the Prophet has said that:-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"Various dissensions shall take place after me. If 
any one attempts to divide the unity of my people, 
kill him with the sword, whosoever he be." [SAHIH 
MUSLIM.]
The scholars and divines of Islam in commenting upon 
this hadis have said that:-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted ]
"Behead the person who revolts against the Imam 
even if he be superior and more exalted (than the 
Imam himself) and even if you also consider him to 
be in the right and more exalted."
The Prophet has further said that:-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"If allegiance is demanded for two Khalifas, kill 
the latter among them." [SAHIH MUSLIM. ]
These are the definite and conclusive injunctions 
which leave no room for doubt, and, therefore, on religious 
grounds, the revolt of the Sharif transgresses the law of 
Islam and consequently is totally HARAM (forbidden and 
s inful).
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The most important duty of the Khalifa is to keep 
the Holy Places under Muslim protection. This protection 
means nothing less than the complete and unquestioned 
sovereignty of the Sultan over them and their immunity 
from interference on the part of non-Muslims. It must 
not be lost sight of that every age has its special needs 
and requirements and with the change of times these needs 
and requirements also change. No sovereign to-day can 
discharge this great religious duty, satisfactorily and 
faithfully, unless the essentials of modern civilization 
are within his reach. He should, in the first place, 
command the sympathies and support of the people whose 
holy places he guards and protects. The economic and 
natural resources at his disposal should be adequate and 
effective to enable him to defend these places. His 
councillors and ministers should be well-versed in modern 
arts and sciences and they should possess sound experience 
of modern diplomacy and statecraft. He should be well- 
equipped with all the latest weapons of war. For the 
last four hundred years, in the opinion of the Musalmans, 
no Muslim sovereign has satisfied the above conditions 
better than the Sultans of the Turkish Empire. It is 
the firm conviction and deliberate judgment of the Muslim 
world that, from the time of Sultan Salim down to the 
present day, the house of Osman has discharged its duties 
in respect of the holy places, to its entire satisfaction. 
Therefore, His Imperial Majesty Sultan Wahid-ud din 
Muhammad VI is the one and the only Musalman who is and 
can be the rightful Commander of the Faithful and the 
Khalifat-ur-Rasul, capable of protecting the two harams 
along with the other Holy Places of Islam and of 
successfully combating against the intrigues and secret 
machinations of non-Muslim Governments.
That the opinion of the Musalmans alone is the 
determining factor in this matter was officially 
acknowledged by Lord Robert Cecil, on behalf of His 
Majesty's Government on November the 29th, 1917»
"Mr. King asked the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs whether, since the outbreak of War, Russia 
had any communications with this country relative 
to the proposals that the Sultan of Turkey should 
no longer be recognised as Khalifa; if so, what
The Holy Places
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attitude was then assumed on behalf of this 
country; and whether he will now declare that the 
Khalifate is a question for Islam alone to decide?
LORD R. CECIL: The answer to the first part of 
the Hon. Member’s question is in the affirmative, 
but His Majesty's Government have never departed 
from the attitude that the question of the 
Khalifate is one for Muslim opinion alone to 
decide."
[Parliamentary Debates: Commons: 
Vol. XCIX. page 2192. ]
We demand that this decision of the Government be 
put into practice and be not relegated to the domain of 
pious hopes and broken promises.
J azirat-ul-Arab.
What are the Holy Places of Islam? The greatest 
authority that a Musalman can quote in proof of his 
contention, next to the Qur'an, is that of the ahadees.
It is reported that the Prophet once said:-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"Remove the non-Muslims from the Jazirat-ul-Arab."
[SAHIH BOKHARI AND SAHIH MUSLIM. ]
The same tradition is reported by Hazrat Ibn-i- 
Abbas in the following words:-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"The Prophet, may the blessings and peace of God 
be upon him, had left three things as legacy, 
one out of which was 'remove the non-Muslims 
from the Jazirat-ul-Arab.'"
[SAHIH BOKHARI AND SAHIH MUSLIM. ]
The question naturally arises as to what is meant by 
Jazirat-ul-Arab ? No explanations could carry greater 
weight than those given by Arabian scholars and Arabic 
lexicons.
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"That which is surrounded by the Indian Ocean and 
the Sea of Sham (Syria) and also by the Tigris 
and Euphrates."
[QAMUS. ]
Then again it is said that;-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"Jazirat-ul-Arab extends from Aden to the mountains 
of Sham in length; and in breadth from Jeddah and 
the Sea Coast to the agricultural lowlands of Iraq 
(Mesopotamia)."
[LISAN-UL-ARAB. ]
Further, the reason for its being called the "Island 
of Arabia" has been explained thus:-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"All these lands are called Jazirat-ul-Arab because 
they are surrounded by the Sea of Fars (Persian 
Gulf) and the Sea of Abyssinia and the Tigris and 
Euphrates.
[LISAN-UL-ARAB. ]
The injunction, that non-Muslims should not rule 
over the smallest portion of the Jazirat-ul-Arab, was 
given because in this portion of the world are situated 
the cities consecrated by the religion, history and 
traditions of the Musalmans. In it are buried all the 
prophets, imams and divines of Islam and from the midst 
of its desert started that world-force which has not yet 
exhausted itself and which according to the faith of the 
Musalmans, will endure till the Day of Judgment.
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
Mecca .
In the Jazirat-ul-Arab is situated the Holy City of 
Mecca which contains the Baitul1ah, the first house of 
God, built by Abraham and reconstructed by the last of 
the prophets, towards which the Musalmans of all climes 
and countries turn their faces five times a day. It is
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the birthplace of the Prophet and it was to Mecca that 
he addressed the words:-
"0 land of Mecca, I love thee better than any 
other portion of God's earth and if my people 
had not driven me out I would never have 
forsaken thee,"
Surrounded by Mina, Arafat and numerous other places, 
a visit to which is an essential part of the Haj every 
inch of Mecca and the land around it is sacred territory, 
where, never since the days of Abraham, has a bird been 
shot or a tree felled. For, has not Allah himself said:-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"Do they not behold that We have made Mecca a 
sanctuary."
[Ch. 21; S. 29; V. 67.]
Medina.
Yasrib, where the Prophet found safety and a home 
after his migration from the city of his birth, became 
renowned as the Madinat-un-Nabi or "the city of the 
Prophet." God named it Taiba or Tab a (holy) as the 
Prophet once said;»
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"God has named it the holy city." [SAHIH MUSLIM. ]
Medina was raised to the high dignity of a haram 
(sanctuary) by the Prophet who said;-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"Abraham made Mecca a haram and I declare Medina 
to be one...." [SAHIH MUSLIM.]
'It is of this city that the Prophet declared:- 
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
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"He who comes with the intention of seeing me will 
be near me on the Day of Judgment; I shall be his 
witness and intercede on his behalf on the Day of 
Judgment who adopts Medina as his home and bears 
its hardships with patience while he who dies 
within the holy precincts of Mecca or Medina will 
be immune from punishment on the Day of Judgment."
[MISHKATs BAIHAQI.]
A major portion of the Divine Book was revealed in 
Medina and from there were issued the orders and 
instructions which gave final shape and form to the 
constitution and organization of the Islamic Theocracy. 
Medina again was the centre from which radiated the 
resplendent rays of the Light of Islam and it was here 
that the mortal remains of the Prophet were entrusted 
to the earth.
Mecca with its Baitullah and Medina with its Rauza- 
i~athar are together called the Haramain-ish-Sharifain 
and in the words of the Holy Qur1 an;-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"Those who join others with God are unclean, so 
let them not come near the Sacred Mosque after 
this their year."
[Ch. 10; S. 9; V. 28] 
non-Muslims are forbidden to enter them.
Jerusalem and Palestine.
Bait-ul-Muqaddis, "city of the Holy House," is also 
held sacred by the Musalmans. This was the city towards 
which, not only all the prophets of Beni Israel turned 
their faces in prayers, but it was also the qibla of the 
Prophet of Islam and his followers for full 1 4 years. 
After the Kaaba, the Masjid-il-Aqsa of Jerusalem is the 
first house of God in Islam. It has been referred to 
in the Qur1 an in connection with the Mi'raj where it is 
said: -
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"Glory be to Him Who took His servant a journey 
by night from Masjid-il-Haram to Masjid-il-Aqsa 
whose precincts we have blessed."
[Ch. 15; S. 17; V. 1.]
Allah ordered Moses to remove his shoes in its 
vicinity in the words;-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"Thou art in the holy valley Tuwa."
[Ch. 16 ; S. 20; V. 12. ]
Just as President Wilson would refuse to hand over 
the government of the United States to the head of some 
forgotten Red Indian tribe or just as the whites in the 
European colonies would decline to withdraw in favour of 
the native aboriginals or even just as we ourselves would 
oppose a revival of the Bhil and Gond Empire in India, 
Palestine cannot be handed over to the Zionists, whose 
sole claim to that land is, that centuries before the 
birth of Christ, the ancestors of the wandering sons of 
Israel had once lived in it. The achievements of 
Salah-ud-din Ayyubi and the blood of millions of Muja­
hidin did not flow, in the days of the Crusades, to lose 
it to a people who cannot put forward any recognisable 
claim to it. The Muslim rulers of Palestine have, as 
acknowledged by Christians and Jews themselves, always 
kept the door open to all. It has given no amount of 
pain and much resentment has been created, among the 
Musalmans of India, to see that the attitude of their 
own Government, in connection with this matter, has 
been diametrically opposed to their wishes and sentiments.
"Mr. King asked the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs (on the 19th November 1917) 
whether the desire of the Government to see 
established a Jewesh [sic] Zionist nationality 
in Palestine has been communicated to the 
Allied Powers, especially to France, Russia,
Itlay [sic] and the other Allied States; and 
whether it is one of the Allied war aims, or 
only a British war aim, to set up a Zionist 
community in the Holy Land?
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Mr. Balfours No official communication has 
been made to the Allies on the subject, but 
His Majesty’s Government believe that the 
declaration referred to would meet with their 
approval. His Majesty's Government hope that 
the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home of the Jewish people will result from 
the present war."
[Parliamentary Debates: Commons;
Vol. XCIX, page 8 3 8. ]
This decision on the part of the Cabinet was served 
out to us here, in India, by Reuter and the Official 
Censor with the following additions-
n(His Majesty's Government) will use their 
best endeavours to facilitate the achievement 
of this object, it being understood that 
nothing will be done to prejudice the civil 
and religious rights of the non-Jewish 
communities, in Palestine or the rights and 
political status of the Jews in any other 
country."
Nedjeff and Karbala.
Nujaf-i-Ashraf contains the sacred remains of Ali, 
the Lion of Allah and Khalifa of Islam. He is regarded 
as the fountain-head of the different schools of 
spiritualism by the Sufis.
In Karbala-i-Mualla is buried the greater martyr of 
Islam, Husain-ibn-i-Ali, who gave his life to uphold 
right against wrong.
Baghdad.
Baghdad with its mausoleum of Shaikh Abdul Qadir 
Jilani is the centre of the Qadiria school of Sufis which 
claims millions of votaries among the Musalmans all the 
world over. The names of Maruf-i-Karkhi, Ibn-i-Jauzi, 
Imam Ghazzali and that greatest of Muslim jurists Imam 
Abu Hanifa endear the city of Baghdad to the heart of 
every Muslim.
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The Government of India published on behalf of His 
Majesty’s Government on behalf of the Governments of 
France and Russia, a declaration on the 2nd November 1914 
which says:-
"In view of the outbreak of war between Great Britain 
and Turkey, which to the regret of Great Britain has 
been brought about by the ill-advised, unprovoked 
and deliberate action of the Ottoman Government, His 
Excellency the Viceroy is authorised by His 
Majesty’s Government to make the following public 
announcement in regard to the Holy Places of Arabia 
including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the 
port of Jedda, in order that there may be no 
misunderstanding on the part of His Majesty's 
Government most loyal Muslim subjects as to the 
attitude of His Majesty1s Government in this war 
in which no question of a religious character is 
involved. These Holy Places and Jedda will be 
immune from attack or molestation by the British 
Naval and Military Forces so long as there is no 
interference with pilgrims from India to the Holy 
Places and Shrines in question. At the request of 
His Majesty's Government, the Governments of France 
and Russia have given them similar assurances."
I leave it to you, Gentlemen, to judge how far even 
this most carefully worded proclamation, has been carried 
into effect.
Muslim States.
Essential though they are to the Musalmans, these 
are not the only questions they desire to see settled to 
their satisfaction. There is another question of vital 
importance to the peaceful evolution of the human race 
which awaits our immediate and careful attention. This 
war, Gentlemen, has demonstrated, if any demonstration 
were needed, the instability of the present order of the 
world. It was the logical outcome of the policy of 
selfish aggrandisement and exclusive national ambitions 
pursued by the nations of the West who placed their 
national interests above the liberty and freedom of other 
nations. This general holocaust of the best and the
His Majesty's Declaration.
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choicest of the human race would have taken place for 
nothing if we did not realize this fact and reconstruct 
the world on principles which would for ever preclude 
any chance of the domination of one portion of humanity 
by another and would give equal and fair chance to all 
nations to contribute to the efforts of MAN to realize 
himself. I have already reviewed the painful history 
of the fate of Muslim peoples before you. As men and as 
Musalmans we cannot be indifferent to the fate of 400 
millions of our co-religionists in the world. We are 
deeply interested in their future and demand that not 
only the integrity and independence of the present Muslim 
States be maintained intact but the wrong done to the 
Arabs of North Africa and the' Tartars and Turks of 
Central Asia be redressed and all these peoples be given 
a free chance of determining their own form of government. 
In this connection, Gentlemen, I feel it my bounden duty 
to offer, on your behalf and mine, our grateful thanks 
to that acknowledged intrepid leader of India, Mr. M. K. 
Gandhi, who is never afraid to speak out the truth and 
who has, by his noble actions, endeared himself as much 
to the Musalmans as to the Hindus. In his famous letter 
of the 29th April 1918, addressed to His Excellency the 
Viceroy, he has laid down the correct definition of 
Indian Nationalism and explained the attitude that should 
be adopted by Indian politicians towards Muslim sentiments.
Musalmans in India.
Looking back to the last four years of war through 
which we have passed, one can only characterise this 
period, so far as the relations of the officials and the 
Musalmans are concerned, as one varying from bias against 
them to that of antipathy, suspicion, mistrust and even 
dislike. The apparent cause of this attitude seems to 
be the entry of Turkey in this war against England and 
her Allies, In this choice of the Turks the Musalmans 
of India had no hand. Indeed, it can be authoritatively 
stated to the contrary that what little influence they 
possessed in this matter was used to dissuade the Turks 
from pursuing the course which they did. Neither did the 
Musalmans fail in their duty to urge their own Government 
to adopt a policy of reconciliation and not coerce the 
Turks to join its enemies. Our sympathies for the Turks 
are well-known and patent. The Musalmans, however,
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exercised admirable self-control over their feelings, 
and, in spite of innumerable provocations, proved 
successful under the severest tests. As if the anxieties 
and agonies of the war were not sufficient, nearer home 
in India, we were being subjected to a treatment which no 
self-respecting people would have tolerated. Had it not 
been that our rulers were engaged in a struggle of life 
and death the Musalmans would have taken such constitution­
al measures as would have compelled attention0
Muslim Internment.
Eminent Muslim divines and acknowledged political 
leaders, have been deprived of their freedom and liberty- 
on the flimsiest pretexts. Those of us who have been 
fortunate enough to receive the attentions of the all- 
powerful C.I.D. know full well how its secret machinery 
works. No wonder if the authors of the Arabian Nights, 
Tilism-i-Hoshruba, and Qissa-i-Halim-Tai jump out of 
their graves to payl homage to the great masters of the
C.I.D. for their creative imaginations and inventive 
faculties. To give to their fabrications the sorely 
needed touches of reality and truth, it has now become 
common practice to appoint official commissions and 
committees of inquiry which invariably put their seal 
of approbation and finality on them. While the Musalmans 
are keenly feeling the absence of men like Maulana 
Mahmud Hasan, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Mr. Shaukat Ali 
and his brilliant brother, Mr. Muhammad Ali, and host of 
others, a greater tragedy has been and is being enacted 
in the marshy and malarial lowlands of Bengal, where the 
youth and intellect of that unhappy province has been 
imprisoned and put in shackles.
Muslim Press.
Gentlemen, you are all aware of the methods adopted 
by the bureaucracy to strangle the Muslim Press and to 
destroy the organs of Muslim public opinion one by one, 
so much so, that in the whole of India not a single free 
Muslim newspaper exists to-day. Our voice has been 
silenced and we have been prevented from carrying our 
views to the public, the Government and the British 
Democracy. Where the omnivorous Press Act could not 
catch its prey, the Defence of India Act was brought to
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assist it in devouring, one after another, the Zamindar, 
the Muslim Gazette, the C omrade 9 the Hamdard 3 the Tauhid, 
the Tar.juman, the Sadaqat , Al~Hilal 9 Al-Balagh 0 the New 
Era, Jamhur and many others.
Muslim Meetings.
The lack of sympathy for Muslim views and grievances 
has been further evidenced by the repressive policy 
adopted in the stopping of the meeting at Calcutta in 
September last. The objects of this meeting were not 
only perfectly lawful but involved a question vitally 
connected with the religious sentiments of the Musalmans, 
who were justified in their wish to give expression to 
their natural resentment at the insulting and vile 
references made to the Holy Prophet's tomb. The action 
of the Bengal Government in this matter was highly unjust, 
partial and one-sided and the responsibility for the loss 
of life and property rests entirely on its shoulders.
Gentlemen, you will thus observe that the two 
avenues of ventilating their grievances, a free press 
and the right of association, have been closed to them.
Separate Muslim Representation.
As a further evidence of the changed "angle of 
vision" on the part of the Government to the detriment of 
the rights of our community, I would refer you to the 
adverse and unfavourable remarks made by Mr. Montagu and 
Lord Chelmsford on the question of separate electorates 
and communal representation, which is the life and soul 
of all our political activities of the present day. In 
view of the solemn pledges given to us by the Government 
and in view of the understanding arrived at between our 
Hindu brethren and ourselves and in our own interests, 
we cannot "release" the Government of its pledges and 
promises. The absence of any representative of the 
Musalmans of India from the deliberations of the Imperial 
Conference has added to this feeling of neglect, which 
has been further intensified by their non-representation 
at the War Cabinet and still more at the Peace Conference, 
where questions affecting the very existence of the 
Musalmans are to form subjects of discussion. No non- 
Muslim, however sympathetic or friendly he may be, can
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claim to speak on Muslim questions with authority nor 
can he put the Muslim case in so forcible and convincing 
a manner as would be expected from a Musalman,
Religious Liberty,
Finally, there is a growing feeling among the 
Musalmans that attempts have been made to interfere with 
the religious liberty guaranteed to them under the 
Proclamation of 1858, which is the fundamental basis of 
their allegiance to the Crown, The indirect influence 
brought to bear upon the managers of mosques to remove 
the name of the Khalifat-ur-Rasul from the Friday 
prayers and the peregrinations of certain persons in 
search of signatures on the fatwa purporting to declare 
the rebel Sharif of Mecca as the future Khalifa of the 
Musalmans, are matters which cannot be ignored. The 
continuance of the cruel and unjust incarceration of 
Mr. Shaukat Ali and his brother Mr. Muhammad Ali, because 
they prefixed a few important sentences, regarding their 
allegiance to God and their adherence to the faith of 
Islam, to the undertaking sent them by the Director of 
the Criminal Intelligence Department, gives an added 
credence to this feeling. It is our duty, as law-abiding 
citizens, to beg the Government not to allow this feeling 
to take root in the minds of the people.
Hindu-Muslim Unity.
So far, Gentlemen, I have discussed topics which 
affected the Musalmans alone. But that does not mean 
that I am not keenly interested in the problems of our 
motherland. I have heard it said that the extra­
territorial patriotism of the Indian Musalman is opposed 
to Indian Nationalism and that he would be prepared "to 
sacrifice the whole of India for an inch of land in 
Gallipoli." This is a travesty of truth not sanctioned 
by facts. The Musalmans have fought the battles of India 
shoulder to shoulder with their Hindu brethren, their 
political programme has come in line with that of the 
Hindus, the Hindu-Muslim rapprochement entered into at 
Lucknow has, year after year, gained strength and 
vitality and I believe that as time goes on we shall 
understand each other better and any causes of friction
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that remain, shall cease to exist» It is my firm 
conviction that a true Musalman is always a good 
Nationalist. If we sympathise with the Musalmans of 
Turkey and Persia, we have also proved that we are second 
to none in our sincere advocacy of the rights of our 
countrymen in foreign lands and it was left to an Indian 
Musalman - Ahmad Muhammad Kachalia - to fight the battles 
of India in South Africa and fill the place vacated by 
that dauntless champion of our rights, Mr, Gandhi 0 But 
while anxious to fight for the common rights of the two 
communities, the Musalman is determined to maintain his 
position in this country and will jealously guard all 
his legitimate rights. It has pained me beyond 
expression to read the harrowing details of the barbarous 
treatment meted out by the Hindus of Katarpur to the 
unoffending and innocent Musalmans of that place. It is 
impossible to put into words the feelings of indignation 
and anger that are present in the hearts of every one of 
us here. Incidents like these embitter the relations 
between the two communities and strike at the very root 
of the entente cordiale. I appeal to my Hindu brethren 
to take effective measures to prevent any recurrence of 
such deplorable incidents. If it is necessary for the 
Musalmans to co-operate with the Hindus to realize their 
political ideals, the Hindus too cannot fulfil their 
national destiny by excluding the Musalmans.
Accommodation, not retaliation, should be the motto of 
both of us.
Self-Determination.
It would be impossible to conclude my remarks without 
clearly putting before you the situation which this 
world war has created. Out of the welter and blood of 
the Armageddon have emerged certain definite principles 
on which will be based the foundations of a new and better 
world.
These principles were enunciated by the President of 
the American Republic and accepted by the statesmen of 
the leading nations of the world. They have been repeated, 
explained and amplified, time after time, until no doubt 
has been left in the minds of men that their application 
will be universal and not confined to the geographical 
limits of a country or continent, nor will they be 
circumscribed by the prejudices of race, colour or creed.
To my mind there is but one single doctrine in which is
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focussed the entire thought of the whole human race. This 
doctrine, Gentlemen, is the doctrine of self-determination. 
If every nation, small or large, weak or strong, free or 
under subjugation, is given the chance to realize itself 
and to determine its own destiny, without any outside 
intervention, it will develop its own form of government, 
its own national culture and its own peculiar civilization. 
It is only on such lines that free nationalities could 
expand and develop and it is only under such conditions 
that the world could be made fit to live in„ The phrase 
"subject nationality" would then be obsolete and there 
would be no such thing as national greed or aggression.
The world would then consist of a sisterhood of free and 
trusting States, each helping the other for the common 
good of mankind.
It was to facilitate the establishment of this happy 
order that India contributed so lavishly in men and money, 
and in the final reconstruction of the world she cannot 
be left out. The blood of her sons has not flowed on the 
continents of Europe, Asia and Africa to win freedom and 
liberty for other nations and perpetuate her own bondage. 
The tradition and history of the Hindus and Musalmans 
support her claims to recognition. The Hindus possessed 
a civilization which preceded even those of Greece and 
Rome and long before the modern Western world had emerged 
out of its darkness she possessed democratic institutions 
in her village panchayats. Her guilds of artisans and 
traders and the constitutional limits placed on the powers 
exercised by her rulers, as we find them described in her 
ancient books, leave no doubt in our mind that she had 
attained, at that early period of the world’s history, a 
standard of liberty which would entitle her to be 
recognized as a leader of democracy in our own day.
Democracy is the very essence and life-breath of 
Islam. The world cannot show a spectacle of such absolute 
equality and fraternity as the assemblage in the plains 
of Arafat, during the Haj, of millions of Musalmans dressed 
in white unsewn garb with shaved heads and bare feet 
obliterating all distinction between the rich and the poor, 
the king and the subject, the master and the slave. Can 
the world preach equality in a clearer and more effective 
manner than when Allah made His Messenger declare:-
[Quotation in Urdu omitted]
"Say, I too am a human being like unto you."
[Ch. 16 ; S. 18; V. 110.]
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Apart from this perfect equality in matters of 
religion the same spirit permeates all the social and 
political institutions of Islam, Students of history 
are fully aware how, in the reign of that greatest of 
Muslim Khalifas Umar-ibn-ul-Khattab, the poorest of 
Musalmans criticised, most freely and fearlessly, the 
actions of the Khalifa» How on one occasion when Umar 
asked his hearers at the congregation as to what they 
would do if he did not rule them according to the law 
of the Sheria19 a wild bedouin, imbued with the true 
spirit of Islam, unsheathing his sabre retorted, that 
he would bring the Khalifa to the right path at the 
point of the sword. This is not an isolated instanceo 
Muslim history abounds in them. The vicissitudes of 
time might have somewhat suppressed the latent 
instincts inherent in the two great peoples inhabiting 
India, but given full opportunities of development, 
they are bound to regain their former splendour and 
greatness.
If Ireland, in spite of her hostile attitude even 
during the war, can bring forward her interesting 
doctrine of "suppressed sovereignty" and compel English 
ministers to grant her Home Rule, if England and her 
Allies can champion the cause of Poland, the Czecho- 
Slavs and the patched up and degenerate nationalities 
of the Balkans, if it is proposed to breathe new 
political life into the dead remains of the Armenian 
kingdom and if the scattered sons of Israel are to be 
once more gathered into the folds of Judla [sic], equity 
and justice, political honesty and loyalty to the 
principles, accepted and preached by the statesmen of 
Europe and America, demand that India shall not be 
deprived of her innate right to determine her future and 
control her destinies.
If the claims of India are not satisfied, from the 
point of view of the Indians, the Great War shall have 
been fought in vain.
Chapter Six
THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM: II 
The Rowlatt Satyagraha, 1919
I
The Lul1
II
The Storm 
III
The Reaction
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The citizens of Delhi had participated in several 
parochial agitations and demonstrations by the end of
1918. These included the meeting of a substantial 
section of the Muslim community at the Idgah on 3 July 
1910; the meeting in support of the Ali brothers on 21 
May 1915j and the half-day hartal which followed it; 
and finally the six-day hartal by the Hindu community 
which began on 17 October 1917» Each of these crises 
registered a protest, but more importantly each had a 
startling effect upon the two respective communities.
By raising parochial issues and indirectly attacking 
provincial attitudes, the local leaders of Delhi were 
able to politicise significantly larger sections of 
these communities. The degree to which the inhabitants 
had become politicised as a result of these crises, and 
as a. result of other nationalist and parochial issues 
which the leaders also raised, was reflected in the 
extraordinary interest invoked by the political movement 
known to posterity as the Rowlatt Sa.tyagra.ha. Never 
before the Rowlatt Satya.gra.ha had the citizens of Delhi 
shown a willingness to confront the armed might of the 
Raj as they were between 30 March and 18 April. Never 
before this event had so many people consistently 
attended political meetings as they did during those 21 
days. And never again was parochialism to be so 
completely submerged in an India-wide movement as it 
was when a. Hindu sa.nya.si spoke to an enormous congregation 
of Hindus and Muslims from the pulpit of the Jama Masjid.
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Delhi has been resting after the orgy of 
oratory in which it indulged during the 
holidays....
Chief Commissioner, Delhi 
l6 January 1919
The public interest which had been aroused in Delhi 
by December 1918 in political, economic, social, and 
religious problems was not allowed to dissipate in the 
succeeding months. A new vernacular press, public 
meetings, and volunteer organisations provided continual 
excitement during the three months that preceded the 
Rowlatt Satyagraha.
There were five vernacular newspapers in Delhi 
which started publishing between November 1918 and 
February 1919» These journals, whose primary goal was 
political agitation, were the Qaum and the Inqila.b, 
which were published in the Urdu language and oriented 
toward a Muslim public; and the Vi jay a., Congress, and 
Hindi Sa.ma.char, which were published in Hindi and 
oriented toward a Hindu public. Their combined 
circulation was impressive in itself; but the issues 
which they debated gained an even wider dissemination 
from being read aloud and discussed in halwai shops,
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tea stalls and other popular gathering places."*" Some
measure of their success was apparent to G-.S. Khaparde,
a Chitpavan Brahman who was the representative from
Berar to the Imperial Legislative Council, when he noted
on 6 March 1919 that the city was buzzing with rumours
about the Rowlatt Bills and that even an illiterate Muslim
rickshawwallah could complain bitterly about the ill
2effects that would follow their enactment.
The public meetings held in Delhi between January 
and March 1919 reiterated the issues that had been 
heralded in the press. The main topics of discussion 
and protest at these meetings, of which there were nine, 
were the Rowlatt Bills, the Excess Profits Tax Bill and
1
In 1911 Delhi had 22 newspapers with a circulation of 
about 12,000-13»000. In 1921 Delhi had 22 newspapers 
with a circulation of about 14,000. During these years 
there had always been an •extremist' or 'radical' 
newspaper with a. fairly large circulation. The Curzon 
Gazette had a circulation of 4,800 in 1911; the Comrade 
had a circulation of 8,500 and the Hamdard had one of
3,000. NAI, Home Poll 2-3 Part B, October 1912, 'Report 
of Newspapers in the Punjab, 1911'; RDDA , Home File 25 
Part B 1922, 'Quarterly List of Newspapers Published in 
Delhi Province.' The Vijaya claimed a circulation of
13,000 at its peak. NAI, Home Poll 373 Part B, February 
1920, 'Secret Memoranda put before the Disorders Inquiry 
Committee by the Hon'ble J.P. Thompson C.S.I., When He 
Gave Evidence as Chief Secretary to that Government.'
2
NAI, G.S. Khaparde Diary Manuscript, entry for 6 March
1919.
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the Patel Marriage Bill. The largest of these meetings 
was held on 7 March. The presence of Gandhi gave a 
special significance to this meeting, which was attended 
by about 6,000 persons, mostly students, Hindu merchants,
These nine meetings were as follows:
26 Jan - Meeting of Delhi Muslims at a. garden party.
Resolutions on provincial autonomy and the 
Congress-League scheme for central government.
28 Jan - Malaviya lectured at a. 'well-attended' meeting.
He advocated a. Congress Committee in every 
mohalla.
3 Feb - Meeting in Delhi to discuss Rowlatt Bills and 
Excess Profits Tax Bill. Poor attendance. 
l4 Feb - Meeting of the Moslem League in Delhi. Protest 
against Dr Ansari's speech to the Moslem League 
in December being proscribed by the Government 
of Punjab.
7 Mar - Meeting of 6,000, Gandhi present.
14 Mar - Students of St Stephen's and Hindu colleges met 
to protest against a Calcutta schoolmaster 
throwing an image of Saraswati into a. dust bin.
A Muslim student introduced the resolution»
24 Mar - Satyagraha Sabha held meeting of 2,000.
Ansari, showed that satyagraha was used by the 
Prophet. Pandit Ram Chand (Arya, Sama j) showed 
that passive resistance was in Vedas. Shradha.na.nd 
revealed that the C.I.D. was committing dacoities 
and blaming soldiers so that the government could 
pass the Rowlatt Bills. Mohammad Shuaib, K.A. 
Desai, Dr Nair and Shankar La.l also spoke.
27 Mar - Satyagraha Sabha. held meeting of 5*000 (mostly
students and a. few Muslims) . Shra.dhana.nd, Pandit 
Ram Chand, K.A. Desai, Indra (son of Shra.dha.na.nd), 
and Subhadra. Devi (wife of Indra) spoke.
29 Mar - Satyagraha. Sabha held meeting of 5,000, same as
on March 2 7. Programme for the hartal of the 
following day proposed. Ahmad Said gave an 
emotional speech to the Muslims.
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The Satya.gra.ha. Sabha. was founded and 15 people took the
satya.gra.ha vow.'*' An appeal was made to religious
susceptibilities by pan-Islamic agitators and Arya
Samajists to the majority of the meetings. The most
passionate of these was the appeal of Ahmad Said at a
meeting on 29 March. He upbraided the Muslims for not
being prepared to die for their Holy Places and their
Khalifa and waxed eloquent on the way in which the
2Europeans had oppressed Islam. Other speeches were
members of the liberal professions and pan-Islamists.
1
For the text of Gandhi's speech see Collected Works of 
Mahatma Gandhi, XV (New Delhi, 1965), 126-127• The more 
important of these who took the vow were: Dr Ansari 
(president), Shra.dha.nand (became president after 26 March), 
Hasrat Mohani, Dr Abdul Rahman, Shankar La.l (treasurer), 
Shiv Na.rain Hak.sar, Miss Gmeiner, Mohammad Shuaib, Indra., 
Subradha. Devi, and K.A. Desai. D.I.C., I, written 
evidence of C.A. Barron. Choudhry Khaliiquzzaman says 
that Hakim Ajmal Khan joined the Satya.graha. Sabha. at 
Bombay on 24 February 1919» Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore, 
1961), p. 46. Hugh Owen states that he joined 'later', 
i.e., after 7 March 1919» 'The Leadership of the Indian 
National Movement, 1914-1920' (Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra., 
1964), p. 394. In none of the evidence does any official 
say implicitly or explicitly that Hakim Ajmal Khan joined 
the Sabha. Shradhanand stated that when he and Ajmal 
Khan moved through the city on 31 March to open the shops 
that it was the first time he had ever met the man. This 
would seem to indicate that he did not join before 31 
March. It is highly unlikely that he would join after 
the 31st since he objected to the Sabha on the grounds 
that it could only lead to violence, which it did. It is 
interesting to note that the legal fraternity held aloof 
from the Sabha and refused to condone it in any manner.
The Sabha had approximately 120 signatures on the 
Satyagraha Vow by 30 March 1919» D.I.C., I, passim.
2 D.I.C., I, written evidence of R.C. Jeffries. It is interesting to note that while the audience in Delhi was5,000 on 29 March, a. meeting of 30,000 was being held in 
Amritsar on the same date.
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heard by impromptu crowds, the subject matter of which 
was somewhat different. An observer was able to conclude: 
'...inflammatory speeches about the decisions of the 
Peace Conference with regard to Constantinople and Arabia 
continue to be delivered almost daily in Delhi and the 
agitation on the subject is increasing.'^
The activities of the volunteer organisations in the 
city added yet another facet to political agitation in 
Delhi. There were six organisations that were overtly
political and seven more that were created for social
2service. Most took an active part in organising and 
attending meetings during this period and then became 
very closely connected with the Sa.tya.graha. Sabha. during 
the Rowlatt Sa.tya.gra.ha. They were significant for 
providing a focus for student protest and they were 
responsible for achieving a large turnout of students at 
most of the meetings.
1
NAI, Home Poll 148-152 Part B, April 1919, 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence.'
2
RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918), 'List of Political, 
Qasi-Political and Religious Societies, Sabhas and 
Anjumans in the Delhi Province for the Year Ending 30 
June 1918.' The six political volunteer organisations 
were: Indraprastha Sewak Mandli, founded May 1917 (its 
parent organisation was the Vesh Young Men's Association); 
Home Rule League Volunteer Corps, founded September 1917; 
Moslem League Volunteer Corps, founded November 1918 ; 
Tibbia College Corps, founded November 1918; Congress 
Volunteer Corps, founded November 1918; Delhi Volunteer 
Corps, founded February 1919» The seven social service 
groups were: Arya. Sewak Mandli; Bharat Sewak Samiti; 
Hindu Sewa. Samiti (Hindu College) ; Hindu Young Men's 
Association; Jain Sewa Samiti; Jiv Rakshni Sabha; and St 
Stephen's Mission College Social Service League.
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It was at Delhi - the Capital of India and 
from its historical and commercial importance 
a determining factor of considerable weight in 
the attitude of the rest of Northern India - that 
disturbances first occurred on the 30th March.
Hunter Committee, Report
The agitation against the Rowlatt Act in Delhi 
lasted for 20 days from 30 March to 18 April and it can 
be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase 
extended from 30 March to 31 March and revolved around 
the organisation of the hartal on those two days and the 
initial reaction to police repression. The second phase 
extended from 1 April till 9 April. It was a phase in 
which the established leaders of Delhi lost control over 
the Satyagraha to an extent where they were unable to 
prevent a second hartal on 6 April. The third phase of 
the movement extended from 10 April to 18 April. It was 
sparked off by the news of Gandhi's arrest on the 9th 
and it lasted for a full nine days.
The men who led the Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi can 
be divided into primary leaders and secondary leaders.
The primary leaders had established positions in Delhi - 
as the heads of traditional families, as wealthy men, and 
as highly respected professionals. These leaders had 
close ties with Gandhi and combined a keen appreciation 
of national politics with a thorough knowledge of local 
issues. They divided, however, over the establishment of 
the Satyagraha Sabha. There were three men of this type 
who did join the Sabha. The most eminent of these three
XI
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was Dr M.A. Ansari, who was encountered earlier as the 
leader of the Red Crescent Medical Mission to Turkey in 
1912. Upon his return in July 1913 he had joined the 
Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, become a trustee of the M.A.O. 
College at Aligarh, and a member of the Municipal 
Committee of Delhi. He resigned from the Municipal 
Committee and became active in all of the local political 
organisations. His interest in national politics led 
him to the presidency of the annual session of the Moslem 
League at Nagpur in 1920 and the annual session of the 
Indian National Congress at Madras in 1927» Dr Abdul 
Rahman, who was less active than Dr Ansari, was also a 
prominent figure in Delhi. He had accompanied Dr Ansari 
on the Red Crescent Medical Mission and he was also a 
general secretary of the Central Bureau for the Relief 
of Muslim Internees. Muhammad Abdur Rahman, who was a. 
pleader and another leader of the Muslim community in 
Delhi, was a member of the Reception Committee of the 
Second All-India Social Service Conference (which met 
in Delhi in December 1918) and the treasurer of the 
Central Bureau for the Relief of Muslim Internees. These 
men were active in the organisation of the Satyagraha 
Sabha, but they quickly changed their views after the 
riots of 30 March. Because of the violence on the 30th 
they concluded that the masses had not understood the 
principles of satyagraha. Thereafter they acted in 
unison with leaders who did not join the Sabha. and tried 
to stop the hartals that occurred on 6 April and between 
10 and 18 April.
There were several influential men in Delhi who 
identified themselves with the national movement but who 
did not join the Satyagraha. Sabha. A short list of the
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more important of these would include Rai Sahib Pearey 
Lai who was a Sarogi Bania. by caste and a. pleader by 
profession. He was the senior vice-president of the 
Municipal Committee and the president of the Delhi Bar 
Association. He was active in all the local political 
organisations and he became the representative from 
Delhi Province to the Imperial Legislative Assembly in 
1923» La la Shiv Narain was a Kayasth by caste and a. 
pleader by profession. He was also a member of the 
Municipal Committee and active in all the local political 
organisations. Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh was an Aggarwal 
Jain and a banker, industrialist, and landlord by 
profession. He was a. divisional da.rba.ri and a member 
of the Municipal Committee and because of his deep 
interest in education became a member of the Provisional 
Executive Council of Delhi University when it was 
established in 1922. He, too, was active in all the 
local political organisations. The last in this list 
of men who had high social and economic status, and who 
also exercised considerable political influence, was 
Hakim Hafiz Muhammad Ajma.1 Khan, Hazik-ul-Mulk, who was 
encountered earlier as a traditional leader of the city. 
He was involved in the Home Rule League agitation and 
he became the president of the annual session of the 
Moslem League at Amritsar in 1919 and the president of 
the annual session of the Indian National Congress at 
Ahma.da.bad in 1921. All the men listed above were 
officials of the Reception Committee of the Congress in 
December 1918» They abhorred the violence of the 
Rowlatt Satyagraha and were tireless in their efforts 
to maintain peace and order, and to stop the hartal of 
6 April and the hartal which lasted from 10 to 18 April.
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The primary leaders of Delhi failed to control the 
Rowlatt Satya.gra.ha. because of the activities of the 
secondary leaders of the city. The secondary leaders 
were members of the petty bourgeoisie who had no 
recognised position in the city and who played an 
insignificant role in national politics. They sought 
to acquire the role of leadership during Satyagraha by 
identifying themselves with the grievances of the under­
privileged sections of the city and by articulating their 
protest. They succeeded in doing so through their 
continual agitation in the press and on the public 
platform. Their activities and police repression 
combined to shape the course of the Rowlatt Satyagraha. 
in Delhi.
K.A. Desai was one of the more important secondary 
leaders among the Hindus. He was a. Gujarati of recent 
arrival in Delhi and had formerly been an important 
lieutenant of B.G. Tilak in Bombay. He was the manager 
of the Birla cotton mills in Delhi and the secretary of 
the local Satyagraha. Sabha. Shiv Na.ra.in Haksar was a 
Kashmiri Brahman and the editor of the Hindi Samachar. 
Indra was the son of Shradha.na.nd, of whom more later, 
and the editor of the Vijaya. Shankar Lai was the 
manager of the Swadeshi Co-operative Store; the treasurer 
of the local Home Rule League; and the treasurer of the 
Satyagraha Sabha. And finally Neki Ram Sharma, who had 
been tried for a seditious speech to the local Home Rule 
League in 1918, was another in the group of important 
Hindu secondary leaders. Asaf Ali, who was a pleader 
and who had been tried for a seditious speech to the 
local Home Rule League in 1918, was one of the more
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important Muslim secondary leaders. Arif Hussain Ha/swi 
was the editor of the Congress and the Inqilab. Qazi 
Abbas Hussain was the editor of the Qaum, which was 
considered to be the most rabid of the vernacular 
journals. Abdul Majid was a. young firebrand of some 
note in Delhi. Ahmad Said was a. maulvi, and a teacher 
at the Madrassah Aminia. And finally Tajuddin, who had 
been a temporary secretary of the Reception Committee 
for the Moslem League and the temporary superintendent 
of the Central Bureau for the Relief of Muslim Internees, 
was another of a group of important Muslim secondary 
leaders. These secondary leaders were convinced that the 
primary leaders supported their actions, but lacked the 
necessary courage to act in a similar fashion themselves.'*'
One of the leaders of Delhi occupied a unique position
in the capital; a position which entitled him to the
2sobriquet of the 'uncrowned king' of the city. Mahatma 
Munshi Ram, or Swami Shradhanand as he became in 1918, 
was a religious figure of outstanding distinction in : 
northern India. He was still the leader of the conserva­
tive wing of the Arya Samaj, even though he had resigned
3as principal of the Gurukula. Maha.vidaya.lya.. He had been
1
Interview with K.A. Desai, 7 April 19 6 7*
 ^ N A i, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919» 'Proposal to 
Intern Munshi Ram alias Swami Shradhanand and Dr. Ansari. ’
3 Shradhanand’s eldest son, Harish Chandar, had been the 
first graduate from the gurukul at Kangri in 1912 and had 
become the A chary a. of a new gurukul at Thane sar in the 
Ka.rna.1 District in the same year. The second son, Indra, 
had graduated with his brother, and had appeared in Delhi 
to become well established by the time his father arrived 
in Delhi in November 1918. From the time Shradhanand resigned as the A charya of the gurukul at Kangri in 1917 until he was assassinated by a Muslim in 1926, the Swami 
was very active in politics.
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a. violently passionate and highly sensual person before 
the call to religion brought about a. dramatic change in 
his life. But even after he had become a 'mahatma' and 
then a 'sa.nya.si' , Shra.dha.na.nd's passionate nature was 
tamed rather than quenched. Over the citizens of Delhi, 
more particularly, over the Hindu petty bourgeoisie and 
the Jats who had migrated to the capital, the Swami 
exercised an influence which could not have been 
exercised by a 'secular' leader. Gandhi's success in 
persuading Shradhanand to join the Satyagraha Sabha of 
Delhi on 7 March was a triumph of the first magnitude, 
for the Swami was able to draw considerable sections of 
the Hindu community of Delhi into the Rowlatt Satyagraha.. 
Indeed, Shradhanand's role during the heroic days of 
April 1919 was of crucial importance in ensuring popular 
support in the capital of India for Gandhi's movement 
of protest.
All the secondary leaders of Delhi met at the 
office of the Home Rule League on the morning of 30 
March. They despatched members of the different 
volunteer corps to maintain peace and to ensure that no 
one was forced to close his shop against his will. These 
leaders then set out to make a final request to all the 
merchants, except those dealing in drugs and foodstuffs, 
to close their shops.'*" They succeeded by midmorning in 
effecting a complete hartal in the city. Dr Ansari was
I
They had made the rounds of the city on 28 and 29 
March requesting all the merchants to close their 
shops.
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absent from Delhi as was the Deputy Commissioner, H.C. 
Beadon, and Shradha.na.nd preached the morning service at 
the mandir of the Arya Sama j.
The Hindu merchants'*’ of Delhi led the city in the
observation of the hartal. They accepted the call for
a hartal for a. number of reasons, prominent among which
were economic grievances. Indeed, it is probable that
2the cloth merchants engineered the hartal because of a 
disastrous slump in their business immediately after 
the War. The fact that the major opposition to the hartal 
came from the cloth merchants lent credence to this view. 
Choudhri Ram La.l, a cloth merchant who had successfully 
organised the hartal of Hindu merchants in 1917» was
1
The Hindu merchant community in Delhi was composed of 
the following castes in 1921- The figures for the 
Ka.ya.sth community were not available. These were probably
not dissimilar to the Khatri community.
Total Number of
Caste workers Total Number workers
& dep. workers litera te in trade
Aggarwal 25,637 9,891 8 , 528 7,636Brahman 37,1^1 16,932 8 ,720 3,265
Jat 46,064 15,551 1,5^4 223Khatri 7,254 22,236 2,763 1,302Rajput 20,655 9,850 2,315 1 ,222Ahir 1 1 , 1 1 7 4,387 280 258
Chamar 45,046 21,944 182 383
Jhiwar 10,855 5,922 288 867Julaha. 8,907 4,327 62 119Kumbar 8,991 3,561 65 117
Mali 7,456 3,379 203 471
Census of India, 1 9 2 1, XV (Punjab and Delhi) , Part II
( Tables).
D.I.C., I, written evidence of C.A. Barron
2
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mainly responsible for the cloth merchants joining the 
hartal that occurred on 30 March.’*'
The merchants of Delhi were also unhappy over the
Excess Profits Tax Bill. They were told that the Bill
would enable the government to tax away all profits and
to seize goods in payment.  ^ The merchants felt especially
unhappy over this Bill because it was the third
extraordinary tax in three years. A super tax had come
into effect on 1 April 1917 with the intention of putting
an extra tax burden on large incomes. A new income tax
had come into effect on 1 April 1918 with many new
regulations, a new system of returns, and less chance of
3evasion with an apparent inequable assessment. The taxes 
were looked upon as a sign of bad faith on the part of 
the government in view of the substantial subscriptions 
that the merchant community had donated to the War effort. 
In addition to these taxes, the merchant community was
1
RDDA, Confidential File 262 (1919)» ’The Disorders 
Inquiry Committee', Intelligence Summary for the Week 
Ending 21 June 1919*
2
NAI, Home Poll 16 Deposit, March 1919» 'Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for 
the First Half of February 1919»' The Bill was passed 
on 19 March 1919 and came into effect on 1 April 1919»
The purpose of the act was to obtain half of the excess 
profits which accrued during 1918 in excess of profits 
of a more normal period.
3
NAI, Home Poll 373 Part B, February 1920. Home Poll 
133-135 Part A, December 1920, 'Question of the Recovery 
of the Cost of Additional Police and of the Amounts Awarded 
as Compensation under Sections 15 and 15-A of the Police 
Act in Connection with the Disturbances in April 1919 at 
Delhi.'
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very unhappy at the amounts of compensation paid for 
land acquired for the new capital and for improvement 
schemes in the old city.'*'
The decline in the number of traders in certain
important commodities, too, reflected some disquiet in
commercial circles. Those who were involved in banking,
insurance, money lending and brokerage declined by
1,478 (or 6l per cent) between 1911 and 1921. Those
involved in grain and pulses declined by 24 per cent,
leaving only 803 workers in 1921. Those involved in
hay, grass, and fodder declined by 61 per cent; and
those involved in precious stones, jewellery, clocks,
and optical equipment declined by 71 per cent, although
these commodities were dominated by Jains and Hindus
equally. General storekeepers and shopkeepers declined
by 58 per cent and the farmers of pounds, tolls, and
2markets declined by 87 per cent. The fact that there 
was a decline in the number of people who dealt with 
the above commodities is a fairly good indication that 
those who remained in such businesses were facing 
economic difficulties as well. These difficulties 
arose as a result of the banking crash in the Punjab in 
1913-1914 and from the effect of shortages during the 
War.
1
D.I.C., I, written evidence of Raj Narayan, Government 
Pleader.
2
Census of India., 1911 > XIV (Punjab), Part II (Tables); 
Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II. The farmers of pounds, 
tolls, and markets dropped in number because of a change 
from the octroi tax system to the terminal tax system 
in 1916.
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The absence of opportunities for investment was a 
less well-defined economic grievance. Delhi had not 
escaped the banking crash of 1913-1.914 in the Punjab 
when sixteen companies had failed in the city.“*' The 
crash also adversely affected the swadeshi industries 
in Delhi and completely ruined the confidence of 
prospective investors in such endeavours. This meant 
that the only safe commodity in Delhi was urban 
property which was extremely expensive and difficult 
to obtain.^
The economic grievances of the Hindu merchants 
provided one of the main motives for their participation 
in politics. There were other, more amorphous, 
discontents that supplied equally fertile soil for the 
political demagogue. There was a considerable amount 
of resentment over the Patel Marriage Bill which the
1
RDDA, Commerce File k Part A 1916, 'Note on the 
Effect of the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1917 and 
the Companies Act of 1913 on Indian Industries.'
2
There were 31 swadeshi factories in Delhi in 1911» 
employing about 2,625» Only three of these 31 were 
still in existence in 1 9 2 1, the rest having liquidated. 
In 1921 there were 17 new swadeshi firms employing 
2,000. See p. 50» note 2 above.
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sanata.nl s looked upon as inimical to their faith.'*' This was 
especially true of the Brahman, Bania., Khatri, Kayasth, 
and Rajput castes which were highly committed to 
conservative social and religious values. Hindu sentiment 
was also aroused over the prosecution of Hindus in the 
Karturpur riots of 1918 and over the Ram Lila affair in 
Delhi in 1917- 2
1
D.I.C.,I, written evidence of C.A. Barron; RDDA , Home 
File 162 Part B 1921, ’Bill to Further Amend the Special 
Marriage Act, I8 7 2.’ An Indian correspondent was quoted 
in the following manner on the subject: 'The Hindu 
Marriage Bill which Mr. Patel of Bombay was permitted to 
introduce during the last Simla Session of the Supreme 
Legislative Council has excited very considerable oppos­
ition amongst Hindus of all classes in the country. The 
Social Reform party and here and there Hindu individuals 
of advanced views in matters social, support the measure, 
but the general feeling of the community is against it.
It is interesting to note that the bitterest opponents 
of the measure are among the Home Rulers and other 
political extremists in the Deccan and in the Madras 
Presidency. They maintain that their opposition will go 
a long way to strengthen their claim that they are the 
guardians of the religious, political and the general 
interests of the Hindus.’ NAI, Home Poll 160-163 Part B, 
January 1919» ’Weekly Reports of the Director of Central 
Intelligence,’ for the week ending 4 January 1919»
2
’The Karturpur riot case is also receiving a good deal 
of attention, the accounts of it published in one Hindu 
paper being so obviously false that action may have to 
be taken in the matter.’ NAI, Home Poll 4l Deposit, 
January 1919» ’Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of December 1918,’
C.A. Barron to J. DuBoulay, 16 December 1918. And 
similarly in the Punjab, ’The Karturpur riot continues to exercise the minds of Hindus and there is little doubt that their attitude towards the case tends to widen the 
breach between themselves and the Muhammadans. Mr Roshan Lai, a Lahore Barrister, has been deputed to assist in 
the defence of the accused, and the Hindus have been busy 
collecting subscriptions for the same purpose.' Home Poll 
42 Deposit, January 1919» 'Fortnightly Reports on the 
Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of 
December 1918,' [report for the Punjab], 31 December 1918.
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Despite all these grievances, however, the Hindu 
merchants of Delhi would not have observed a hartal on 
30 March without a strong feeling of resentment against 
the Rowlatt Act and without the charisma of Mahatma 
Gandhi. Gandhi's unique insight into the political 
realities of India led him to concentrate on a very 
dramatic issue, namely the Rowlatt Bills. He knew that 
the discontent engendered over these Bills would act as 
a touchstone for a variety of grievances that would 
otherwise have remained quiescent. But Gandhi's 
ingenuity was not confined to the location of a dramatic 
issue, it was also expressed in his choice of the manner 
in which the protest against the Rowlatt Act was to be 
articulated. The means of protest against the Rowlatt 
Act that Gandhi proposed was a hartal by the business 
community. Other sections of the society were required 
to support the merchants and observe a day of mourning 
against the immorality of the government which had 
imposed the Rowlatt Act upon India. Constitutional 
means had failed since the Imperial Legislative Council 
had passed the Act over the unanimous opposition of the 
Indian members of the Council, but it was not proposed 
to coerce the government to change its mind. It was 
proposed that the government should witness an act of 
love, which was the basic attitude of the satya.gra.hi, 
and the government's feeling of shame would cause it to 
repeal the Act. The combination of politics and religion 
in Gandhi's speeches; the asceticism of his style of 
life and his regard for the values and institutions of 
Hindu society endeared Gandhi to the Hindu merchants.
But above all, his emphasis on the superiority of moral
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over material power struck the most respondent chord in 
the hearts of the business community.
The Muslim merchants, too, joined the hartal, but 
they probably did so with some reluctance.'*' The Muslim 
merchants were unhappy at the prospect of a. mass agitation; 
they had a minimum of economic grievances and nationalism 
had little appeal for them; their primary motive was to 
obey the state as long as it was not proven dar-ul-harab; 
and they felt that the only hope for the Muslim community 
in India was to negotiate for a fair share of power with 
the British. It is more than likely that they joined 
the hartal because it was easier to do so than to oppose 
the appeal. They had opposed the call for a hartal in 
1917 when the Hindu traders had observed their hartal.
But in March 1919 there was more of a sentiment of 
protest in the Muslim community as a whole and the 
merchants could only acquiesce and hope that the main 
current of political agitation would pass by them.
The tonga drivers, rickshawwallahs, porters 
(excluding railway porters), and palki bearers and 
others involved in local transport also joined the 
hartal. But they participated in the Sa.tyagra.ha through 
moral coercion rather than voluntarily. Anyone riding 
in a vehicle for hire was asked to step down and walk..
This meant that the vehicles stopped plying as much for 
want of business as from a half-hearted support of the 
hartal.
I
D.I.C., I, Written evidence of C.A. Barron. Barron 
stated that there was no certainty on 29 March that the 
Muslim merchants would join the hartal.
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hartal that occurred on Sunday 30 March 1919 in Delhi.
Huge crowds surged up and down the bazaars to ensure
that all shops were closed. A local police officer
described them in the following words:
As Additional Superintendent of Police my duty 
was to visit all kotwa.1 s [police stations] and 
also to assess the feeling of the city. I left 
at 9:45 for Kashmir Gate Station, then proceeded 
to the main kotwal, planning to go hence to Sadr 
Bazaar, Faiz Bazaar and Haus Qazi,
The first crowd I met was about 100 yards west 
of the Clock Tower. At the kotwa.1 i station I 
met a. European on foot who informed me that he 
had been told to get out of his tonga by a crowd 
that was collected at the western end of Chandni 
Chauk. He said that the crowd though peaceful 
had been so insistent that he had no hesitation 
in complying.
About a. hundred yards west of the Clock Tower I 
saw this crowd of 500 or 600 persons loosely 
filling up the whole of the roadway of the Chauk.
As we Lthe City Inspector and himself] approached, 
a. number of individuals ran towards us holding up 
their hands and shouting at us to stop. They did 
not actually interfere with us and we drove on 
amid repeated cries of ’shame* and 'Gandhi ki ,ja1’ 
[victory to Gandhi].
The majority ran away and the City Inspector called 
out loudly that quiet and order should be maintain­
ed. The crowd immediately reassembled and loudly 
called out after us. The crowd was composed for 
the greater part of quite young boys of the lower 
classes. I saw no well-dressed men.-*-
The crowds of demonstrators, such as the group of 500 or 
600 'young boys of the lower classes’ described above 
were somewhat rowdy but not inclined to violence. These
Such, then, was the pattern of support for the
D.I.C., I, written evidence of R.C. Jeffries.
1
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crowds had stopped the trams and tongas quite early and 
had then meandered harmlessly in loose groups up and 
down the main bazaars, now growing, now diminishing in 
numbers as followers joined or departed. The whole city 
throbbed with the spirit of a ta.ma.sha rather than with 
the purposefulness of a political agitation. Huge 
throngs continually converged on Chandni Cha.uk, always 
the centre of interest and activity within the walled 
city. The lack of organised activity there did not 
dampen the gaiety of the crowds, however, as they moved 
off again in search of some action or mischief to enliven 
what had every promise to be an uneventful day.
The organisational activities of the Satyagraha 
Sabha had achieved a good deal, but the spontaneous 
response from many different quarters added to their 
success in drawing the citizens of Delhi into the Rowlatt 
Satyagraha. The manner in which crowds collected, as 
observed by an officer in the Army, illustrates the 
extent to which much of the response to the Satyagraha 
was independent of the efforts of the leaders. The 
officer reported his observations in the following 
manner: ’They went around to all the poorest of the 
bazaars saying, "Come with us, the rais log will give 
you all the nourishment and clothing you require." I 
saw food being given away.’ These ba.za.aris then 
collected together and marched in 'military fashion' 
armed with sticks. They struck at tramcars and telegraph 
posts because they were government property. They even 
turned people out of tramcars and took away their 
cigarettes saying, '"Now it is our day, away with 
everything that reminds us of British rule." They said
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that they were fed up with the Bill and that, in the 
event of any trouble, the Army would assist them and 
refuse to obey their officers.' ^
One itinerant group of satyagrahis discovered 
around noon that the sweetmeat sellers at the Railway 
Station had not observed the call for a. hartal. It 
immediately sought to redress this sorry state of 
affairs. The sweetmeat sellers took umbrage at such 
interference and complained to the railway authorities. 
Several members of the Railway Police appeared and took 
two members of the group into custody. News of the 
incident spread in the walled city and the crowd at 
the Station grew apace. Within two hours the whole 
paraphernalia, of government appeared at the Railway 
Station in the form of railway officials, police, a 
magistrate, and regular English troops. The self-styled 
leaders of the crowd demanded the release of those who 
had been arrested. The officials were equally adamant 
that no one had been arrested. The mood of the crowd 
changed from one of interest and curiosity to one of 
concern and outrage. The feeling grew that the iniquity 
of the Rowlatt Bills confronted them physically. The 
leaders fanned the flames of this feeling so successfully 
that a section of the 'crowd', which was by now 
transformed into a 'mob', threw brickbats at the troops 
and officials. Their accuracy and the general hysteria 
of the moment impelled one of the officials to order the 
troops and police to open fire. Seven persons collapsed
1
D.I.C., I, written evidence of Subedar Major Hamid 
Khan, 2-55th Coke's Rifles.
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from the four gunshot and buckshot vollies. Chaos and 
confusion reigned supreme as the terrified mob fled in 
every direction. The more obstinate and indignant fled 
in the direction of the Clock Tower and joined a second 
crowd that had formed in front of the Town Hall. The 
news of the firing transformed this crowd, too, into a 
mob and once again brickbats flew. Hysteria and 
indecision wrought their influence and again the troops 
and police who were stationed there fired. The 
fortuitous congestion of Chandni Chauk at that point 
raised the number of those who were injured by twelve.
The crowd that gathered at the Railway Station 
consisted predominantly of Hindus. Since there was an 
interval of two hours between the time it began to 
congregate and the firing, there was time for people to 
come from some distance to the Railway Station. Such 
was the case for a small group of very minor leaders 
who were having tea on Chandni Chauk. They were all 
educated men from high castes and they were all active 
in the Congress, the Home Rule League, the Indian 
Association and the Hindu Association. They were Debi 
Pershad, Chhote Lai, Bishan Sarup, Jugal Kishore, Sewa 
Ram, Kali Charan, and Chhidami Lai. These men argued 
vociferously with the officials at the Railway Station 
and were arrested afterwards for inciting a riot. They 
were all acquitted, however (except Debi Pershad), as 
there was no evidence that they had actually encouraged 
the crowd to throw brickbats. Four of these seven men 
had been wounded (chhidami Lai, Chhote Lai, Debi Pershad 
and Sewa Ram) because they were at the front of the 
crowd when the firing took place. There were five other
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casualties from the firing, one of whom was a Muslim 
baker, another a Kahar and yet another a. Brahman. The 
last two of those arrested were Muslims, one of whom 
was a barber.
The crowd at the Railway Station was drawn mostly 
by curiosity and was composed largely of members of the 
higher castes. The members of the crowd were dressed 
in clean white clothes which meant that they were all 
respectable members of the community."*" The crowd at 
the Clock Tower was almost a mob from its inception 
since it received the volatile elements from the Railway 
Station and larger numbers of lower class elements 
loitering in Chandni Chauk. They also had a focus of 
excitement since they knew of the shooting at the 
Station. There were 12 casualties from the riot at
the Clock Tower, eight of whom were Hindu and four of
2whom were Muslim. No apparent leaders emerge.
The mob at the Clock Tower dispersed at 4.30 and 
almost immediately an audience began to gather at Pipal 
Park at the other end of Chandni Chauk. A meeting had 
been advertised for 5*00 p.m. with Shradhanand,
Muhammad Shuaib, and Dr Abdul Rahman as the principal 
speakers. The authorities grew uneasy at this 
collection of 25,000 to 40,000 people and C.A. Barron,
1
D.I.C., I, written evidence of H.H. Yule, District 
Traffic Superintendent of the East Indian Railway; 
Judgement in the Railway Station Riot Case contained in 
the written evidence of C.A. Barron.
2
D.I.C., I, Inquest by H.C. Beadon; written evidence 
of Lt.-Col. C.H. James, Chief Medical Officer, Delhi.
383
the Chief Commissioner, arrived at the head of a large 
force to disperse it. Shradhanand assured Barron that 
the crowd would disperse peacefully at 6.30 p.m.
Barron accepted this and took the troops away. The 
speakers then lectured to the audience on the non-violent 
principles of sa.tya.graha. and the evils of the Rowlatt
It is possible to show that certain groups in the 
city predominated in the audience at Pipal Park and in 
audiences that collected on succeeding days. These 
groups were the Hindu merchants and their employees, 
those involved in local transport, students, artisans, 
and karkha.nda.rs. Hindu merchants and their employees 
participated in this audience for the same reasons that 
they had joined the hartal. Those involved in local 
transport participated to a lesser extent because of 
their half-hearted support of the hartal. Those that 
did attend the meeting were probably drawn by the Arya 
Samajist and pan-Islamic speakers at the meeting.
There is little doubt that students attended the 
meeting at Pipal Park in large numbers. They formed a
Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
N.B. Figures are for male workers. Students are males 
over 15 years of age.
Act.
1
Hindu merchants and employees
Those involved in local transport
Students
Artisans
Karkhandars
16,500 
5,000 
3,500 
2 3,750  
6,700
55,450
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significant portion of the audiences at Home Rule 
League meetings from 1917 onwards. They also provided 
the majority of the members in the various volunteer 
corps. Their western education, their ideological 
proclivities, and their desire to involve themselves 
in the social and political problems of the nation 
found an outlet in the Rowlatt Satyagraha. They were 
present in audiences, and active in the volunteer corps 
whose purpose it was to keep order on 30 March, 6 and
l6 April.'*’ The Muslim students of the madrassahs also
participated in volunteer corps and attended the meeting
2in large numbers. They responded to the Satyagraha 
because of the activities and pan-Islamic speeches of 
Dr Ansari and Ahmad Said. Their main grievance was over 
the Kh.ila.fat and the Holy Places.
The Hindu and Muslim artisans of Delhi also 
participated in the Rowlatt Satyagraha. They contributed 
large numbers of people to the crowds which gathered in
1
S.K. Rudra, Principal of St Stephen's Mission College 
testified that student behaviour during the Satyagraha 
was 'generally satisfactory'. They listened to their 
teachers who counselled moderation and college work 
continued 'almost uninterrupted'. There was no evidence, 
he concluded, that students had participated in any of 
the disorderly proceedings. D.I.C., I, written evidence 
of S.K. Rudra.
2
There is no reliable estimate of their numbers. There 
were 168 students from the North-West Frontier Province, 
Afghanistan, and Baluchistan in May 1919* There were an 
additional 182 students and teachers from Bengal. NAI, 
Home Poll 48 Deposit, July 1919» 'Fortnightly Reports on 
the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of 
May 1 9 1 9»’ C.A. Barron to J. DuBoulay, 16 May 1919*
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the streets on 30 March and on succeeding days. They 
also contributed large numbers of people to the audience 
which gathered at Pipal Park and to the audiences which 
gathered at subsequent meetings. The main impetus to 
their participation was the declining state of their 
occupation and the growing anxiety which they felt for 
the traditional organisation of their community. A 
large number of artisan crafts declined between 1911 and 
1921 in the number of individuals who depended upon them 
for their livelihood.'*' Those who left the declining 
crafts either became labourers, an occupation for which 
there was an expanding need in the city, or joined other 
crafts. Those who joined other crafts too contributed 
to the disorientation that affected the handicraft 
industry in Delhi. The departure of ever-increasing 
numbers of men from their traditional craft, usually 
the younger sons who did not adopt the skills of their 
fathers, led to a gradual disintegration of the social 
organisation of the artisan communities. A feeling of 
helplessness and frustration arose in those who remained 
because of their inability to halt the process.
The Hindu and Muslim artisans also harboured more 
immediate grievances. They had suffered more than 
anyone else from the influenza epidemic of September,
1
The most notable of these were the textile workers of 
lace, crepe and embroidery which declined from 18,000 
to 4,000; brass and copper smiths from 5,000 to 2,000; 
rice and flour grinders from 2,000 to 900; cabinet 
makers from 1,300 to 800; and workers in precious metals 
and stones from 12,000 to 7,000. These figures are for 
workers and dependents. Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt,
II.
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October, and November 1918. Those who survived suffered 
even more so from the skyrocketting prices of necessities 
and high rents since the end of the War. The political 
leadership, in the persons of the pan-Islamic agitators 
and the Arya Samajist preachers, cleverly exploited 
these frustrations. The Muslim artisan community, which 
constituted 52 per cent of all artisans in the city 
(while the Muslim community constituted only 36 per cent 
of the total population) responded very readily to the 
religious appeal of the Khilafat and the Holy Places.
The Hindu artisans joined their Muslim brothers in 
sympathy for the Delhi martyrs and in response to the 
inspiration provided by the bravery and oratory of 
Shra dhanand.
The ka.rkha.ndars responded to the Rowlatt Sa.tya.gra.ha. 
almost entirely on religious grounds. They joined the 
crowds that roamed the streets and attended the meeting 
at Pipal Park in considerable numbers, Their first 
impulse was not to miss any of the fun. And on this 
occasion when religious sentiment and the issue of 
police repression were raised, they became sincerely 
outraged for a short period of time.
These were the classes and communities that flocked 
to the meeting which took place at 5*00 p.m. on Sunday 
30 March. The gathering dispersed on schedule at 6.30 
p.m. Shradhanand led a large group from Pipal Park up 
Chandni Chauk towards the Clock Tower, and encountered 
a troop of Gurkhas on their way to the main kotwal from
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the opposite direction.'*" The Gurkhas stepped onto the 
footpath and made ready to load their rifles in case 
of trouble. In the process a shot was fired into the 
air. Shradhanand immediately confronted his 'attackers' 
and asked them why they had fired at the satya.gra.his.
The Gurkhas replied by levelling their bayonets at the 
Swami, whereupon Shradhanand bared his breast and 
invited them to charge. What could have been a serious 
situation was obviated by the timely arrival of P.L.
Orde, the senior superintendent of police, who ordered 
the Gurkhas to lower their bayonets and to disengage 
themselves from the demonstrators. News of this 
incident, which the Chief Commissioner considered too 
trivial to report to the Government of India, spread 
throughout the city and established Shradhanand as a 
popular hero who had dared to face the brutal might of 
the oppressor armed only with his moral and spiritual 
superiority. The rest of India, too, learned of 
Shradhanand's confrontation with the Raj through the 
columns of the Ma.hratta. (Bombay) on 6 April, and this 
news established the sanyasi's position as the 
outstanding leader of Delhi through the rest of the 
Rowlatt Satyagraha.
1
NAI, Home Poll 20 Deposit, May 1919, 'Enquiry from 
the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, in Regard to an Article 
in the Mahratta. of 6 April 1919, Reporting - in 
Connection with the Delhi Riots - an Incident of Munshi 
Ram's Encounter with the Gurkhas.' The Gurkhas had been 
detrained at the Railway Station just prior to the riot 
there. They were pressed into emergency service even 
though they did not understand any Hindustani and little 
English. Most of the tension that arose during the 
confrontation with Shradhanand resulted from their 
failure to communicate.
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Public reaction to the events of 30 March varied 
as between different classes and communities, but most 
people agreed on the issue of police repression. An 
officer of the Central Intelligence Department summed 
up popular sentiment in his report of an interview with 
his cousin and nephew, who were residents of Delhi, in 
the following manner:
Notwithstanding the knowledge of my position and 
responsibility, and my connection with the Police 
Department, these boys did not conceal their 
feelings of resentment against the police and the 
horror of people being killed recklessly. They 
told me, people in the town and the student 
community were equally angry and horror stricken, 
and that the man in the street was told by the 
agitators that the Emergency Act made the police 
supreme in all matters and that the latter could 
search the house of, and arrest the people at, 
their pleasure. They did not, however, believe 
it, but that this was the general conception of 
what the new legislation had in store for the 
people. It would have been better said they that 
shooting should have been avoided and that if at 
all this was necessary should have been done below 
the knees.-*-
The complete hartal continued on the following day, 
Monday 31 March. The men who had died the previous day 
were buried. The funerals for the two Muslims attracted
15,000 people and the funerals for the three Hindus drew 
around 30,000. The primary leaders attended and 
counselled calm and an end to the hartal.
1
NAI, Home Poll ikl-lkl Part B, May 1919, 'Reports on 
the Recent Riots in Delhi and of the Extent to Which 
'Satyagraha Day of Humiliation' Was Kept Throughout the 
Provinces. '
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The five men who died and the 1h who were injured 
during the riots of the 30th became known throughout 
India as the martyrs of Delhi- Gandhi proposed that 
the hartal of 6 April should be as much in honour of - 
and in mourning for - those fallen heroes, as in protest 
against the Rowlatt Act. The events of the following 
19 days in Delhi added ik more martyrs to the cause of 
a political agitation the like of which had never been 
seen in the imperial capital of India.
Overt political activity remained at a minimum 
from 1 April until the 9th. A non-official commission 
of inquiry of six members began hearing witnesses at 
the Congress office on the 2nd.^ The Sa.tya.gr aha. Sabha 
met on the same day and decided against a hartal for 6 
April because Gandhi had requested the citizens of 
Delhi not to participate in the demonstration against 
the Rowlatt Act in view of what had happened on the 
30th.
Shradha.na.nd became the focus of attention once 
again on 3 April. One of the persons who had been 
wounded on 30 March, Ram Sarup, died and Shra.dha.nand 
led the funeral procession down Chandni Chauk. He 
stopped the procession in front of the Sis gun j Gur dwa r a 
and harangued the crowd of mourners and spectators for
1
The six men were: Hakim Ajmal Khan, R.S. Pearey Lai,
L. Shiv Narain, R.B. Sultan Singh, Dr S.P. Shroff, and 
Muhammad Abdur Rahman. NAI, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, 
May 1919; Home Poll l4l-l47 Part B, May 1919; D.I.C.,
I, written evidence of Muhammad Abdur Rahman.
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15 minutes. He compared the innocent victim with the
Sikh martyr Guru Tej Bahadur and reiterated the nobility
of Sa.tya.graha. ^  The procession continued to the burning
ghat where Shradhanand urged the crowd to boycott trams
and all foreign goods. He was followed by Ahmad Said
who gave an emotive speech which ended on the note that
just as a gardener watered a weak tree with the blood of
a goat, so did the tree of independence require the blood
2of many more than the martyrs of 30 March.
The newspapers of Delhi printed lurid accounts of
the events of the 30th. The Vijaya and Congress devoted
almost their entire issues to the riots and police
firings. The Vijaya, in issues of the 1st, 2nd, and
3rd, revelled in the bloody scene of Delhi and the
'murders' that had been committed there. It accused
British soldiers of fighting Indians with greater
enthusiasm than they had fought against the Germans, and
3called British rule ' Nadirshahi ' . It also gave a.
'heart rending' account of the funeral of the 3rd, and 
stated that the majority of the dead and wounded had 
been children under 12; and that a woman, too, had been 
a victim of the machine gun that was alleged to have 
been used. The Congress instituted a Martyrdom Series 
and proclaimed that:
1
NAI, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919-
2
D.I.C., I, Note by R.C. Jeffries.
3 The rule of terror established by the Persian 
conqueror, Nadir Shah, when he captured Delhi in
1739-
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Though the Indians stand in no way better than 
brutes in the eyes of the government, yet India 
can never forget the sacrifices of her sons.
The heartless cruelty and the merciless butchery 
shown to the Indians on 30 March will be 
remembered in India, forever.-*-
The Vijaya had toned down by 4 April and retracted
its charge that a machine gun had been used on the 30th.
But Indra. countered this admission by stating that the
police were to be severely punished for not treating the
crowds more harshly. The Congress, which continued its
Martyrdom Series, editorialised at length on 4 April on
the meanness of the Indians and the greatness and
superiority of the British. It queried why when a bomb
had been thrown in Delhi very few had suffered, yet when
only stones were thrown many had to die. Arif Hussain,
the editor, recalled the Cawnpore mosque affair in 1913
when 600 cartridges had been fired, and the Mutiny of
1857 and the severity it had visited upon Delhi. He
concluded that Indians, who were brutes and uncivilised
2slaves, were destined to be killed by their rulers.
Friday 4 April began with a meeting at the Town 
Hall. The Deputy Commissioner had convened this meeting 
of the rais, the title holders, the honorary magistrates, 
and the municipal commissioners of the city in an effort 
to reassert his control over the city through the time- 
honoured device of consulting the traditional leadership.
1
N A I , Home Poll 3^ Deposit, October 1919, ’Detailed 
Reports on the Recent Riots in Delhi.'
2
NAI, Home Poll 3^ Deposit, October 1919*
392
At the end of the meeting he issued a statement that the 
hartal of the 30th was foolish and that those who had 
caused the riot at the Railway Station were 1badmashes' 
(bad characters).^
The events of the 30th, the funeral oratory of the 
3rd, and the propaganda campaign conducted by the press 
combined to produce one of the most dramatic episodes 
of the Rowlatt Sa.tya.graha. in Delhi on the 4th. The 
Muslims of Delhi threw an open invitation to the Hindus 
to attend the Friday khutba at the Jama Masjid. The 
sentiment of Hindu-Muslim unity was at a. peak as a 
result of the fact that both Hindus and Muslims had 
been 'martyred' on the 30th. Shradhanand was hurriedly 
summoned by a deputation of Muslims and upon entering 
the Jama Masjid, which was packed with a Hindu and Muslim 
congregation, the sanyasi mounted the pulpit and 
delivered a moving sermon. He inveighed against the 
tyranny perpetrated toward innocent women and children
1 •
The text of his announcement was, in part, as follows: 
'Those who had determined to close their shops took the 
law into their own hands and prevented other shopkeepers 
by threats from opening their shops. The result was 
that the bazaar was closed and many people were idle and 
a crowd of ba.drnash.es created a disturbance at the railway 
station. The so-called Passive Resistance turned at 
once into active rioting, which the Sirkar cannot allow. 
Those who created the strike are entirely to blame for 
creating the situation which they could not control. 
...The shopkeeper who closes his shop injures himself; 
probably he will often injure innocent persons also, but 
the government does not suffer....I therefore propose 
asking the raises of Delhi to raise a, subscription for 
the dependants and the wounded.' D.I.C., I, included 
in the written evidence of Muhammad Abdur Rahman.
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and stated that even if half of the population of Delhi
had been killed instead of kO or 50 people, the
sa.tya.gra.his should still have no fear. He then
applauded the congregation at the Mosque as a
demonstration of Hindu-Muslim unity that would be
remembered for many generations.1 When he emerged from
the mosque Hindus and Muslims alike flocked around him
and kissed his hands and feet as though he were a saint
2dear to both the religious communities.
There was a complete hartal in Delhi on the 6th 
despite the appeals to the contrary by the Satyagraha 
Sabha and the primary leaders. Shradha.nand was asked 
to speak at the 8.00 a.m. prayers at the Fatehpuri 
Mosque. He stood before the crowd of Hindus and Muslims 
and prayed:
...Grant us power that we may not be afraid of 
worldly strength; that we may regard military 
force as worthless and may recognise the piety- 
of the martyrs. May we be prepared to sacrifice 
ourselves for the freedom and progress of our 
country. Grant power unto us Asiatics. Give 
thirty-two crores of Asiatics the strength of 
sixty-four crores that we may oppose the power 
of all materialists and bring forth the reign 
of peace and tranquility.3
The Satyagraha, leaders had met earlier in the morning 
at Dr Ansari's consulting rooms at Fatehpuri and 
scheduled lectures to keep people from collecting on
1
NAI, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919.
2
Interview with Sri Ram Sharma., recorded by the Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, on 22 April 1967* 
3
NAI, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919-
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Chandni Chauk, and the volunteer corps had again 
dispersed to maintain order. Shradha.na.nd and the other 
leaders lectured on swadeshi and satya.gra.ha to an 
audience of 15,000 to 20,000 at King Edward Park at 
noon. There was a series of eight similar meetings at 
Darygunj (at Dr Ansari's compound) in the early evening 
at which an estimated one lakh of people gathered. The 
satyagrahis looked upon the absence of violence on the 
6th as conclusive proof of the fact that the firing on 
30 March was unnecessary and the fault of the government.
Those who flocked to the meetings on the evening of 
6 April represented the overwhelming majority of the 
citizens of Delhi. 1 A complete cross-section of the 
population - social, religious, economic and educational - 
attended. It is not possible to assess their motives 
except to say that those groups which were only mildly 
enthusiastic about the Rowlatt Satyagraha could have 
attended out of curiosity or as a gesture of protest 
against police repression.
Business resumed as normal on the morning of 7 
April. Another victim of the riots that had occurred
1
Total population of the Delhi urban 
area in 1921
Minus the following:
304,400
females
males (under l4) 
males (over 60)
Army and Police 
Europeans (males) 
Government of India.
122,300
51,000
7,000
5,500
3,450
n. a. 189,250
(at Simla) 115,150
Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.
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on the 30th died and there was yet another funeral 
procession led by Shradhanand. In a passionate voice 
he described how Ram Kishan, aged 22, had enlisted not 
once, but twice in the Army. He asked what greater 
tragedy could occur than that a true patriot should die 
at the hands of his former colleagues?
The Chief Commissioner of Delhi, C.A. Barron, was 
unhappy that the influence Shradhanand had with the 
populace was directed more towards the evocation of 
passion rather than the persuasion towards prudence.
He admitted that Shradhanand professed a genuine desire 
to calm matters, but it was evident that the Swami lost 
all control over himself the moment he mounted a public 
platform. Barron decided on 8 April to extern 
Shradhanand and his son Indra. But he was unsuccessful 
because neither the United Provinces nor the Punjab 
would accept the responsibility for him. Both the 
governments considered him more popular than Gandhi with 
the masses of north India, and each thought the 
consequences of externment would be disastrous. No one 
knew what would happen if the 'King of Delhi* was 
silenced.1
Shradhanand and 30 or 40 others waited for the 
train upon which Gandhi was riding to arrive in Delhi 
on the evening of 9 April. It came in late, and without 
Gandhi, who had been detained on Barron's order 
prohibiting his entry into the province of Delhi. This
NAI, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919-
1
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was Gandhi’s first act of civil disobedience in India.
The news of the arrest circulated throughout the city 
with remarkable rapidity and a complete hartal followed 
on 10 April. The hartal continued until 18 April during 
which time there were two riots and the police withdrew 
from the city for one night. During this period a 
conscious effort was made by the more radical satya.gra.his 
to enlist all those who had not already joined the hartal.
At 9»00 a.m. on the morning of the 10th, 20,000 
people flocked to the banks of the River Jumna to hear 
Shradha.na.nd read the message which Gandhi had written 
to the people of India, prior to his arrest. Shradhanand 
addressed the audience and urged everyone to be ready 
to follow Gandhi’s example and go to jail. He announced 
a meeting that evening at Dr Ansari's residence at which 
forms for vows of swadeshism and Hindu-Muslim unity 
would be distributed. An estimated one lakh of people 
attended the meeting that evening at which Muhammad 
Abdur Rahman presided. Shradhanand introduced one 
resolution asking for the release of Gandhi and another 
asking every Indian to follow Gandhi’s example until 
the Rowlatt Act was repealed. He requested the people 
to follow Gandhi’s injunction against violence, and 
asked them to open their shops the following day. Dr 
Ansari concluded the meeting by alluding to the fact 
that the Viceroy had smiled when Gandhi had asserted that 
the spiritual force of India would influence the 
government.1
1
NAI, Home Poll l4l-l47 Part B, May 1919; Home Poll
268-273 Part B, May 1919*
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The shops remained closed on Friday the 11th, A
huge congregation of Muslims gathered at the Jama. Masjid
to hear the khutba., in which Ahmad Said, Abdul Majid and
others forced the Imam to include the name of the Sultan
of Turkey as Khalifa, a. practice that had been
discontinued since 1915» Abdul Majid then took up an
incident which he had first broached on 4 April when he
had accused the Imam of eating bacon at the Deputy
Commissioner's house. The Imam was a notorious supporter
of the Raj and the popular leaders sought to humilate
him by making him swear on a Koran that the story was
untrue. Hakim Ajma.1 Khan intervened and saved the Imam
by having the issue referred to a committee of the alim . 1
That evening, at a meeting at Pataudi House, Shradhanand
urged the audience not to give evidence to the official
enquiry into the riots that had occurred on 30 March
which the Deputy Commissioner was to begin the following
day. Shradhanand attacked the C.I.D. for spreading false
rumours which kept the shops closed. He advised them
to boycott the law courts and urged them to end the
2hartal the following day.
The Inqilab of 12 April carried the suggestion of 
Asaf Ali that the place in front of the Town Hall should 
be called the Khuni Cha.ura.ha (Bloody Crossing of Four 
Roads). This would perpetuate the memory of the riots 
of 30 March just as the Khuni Da.rwa.za (Bloody Gate)
. ...  ~.. 3perpetuated the memory of the Mutiny of 1857» No
1 NAI, Home Poll 5 Deposit, May 1919, 'Detailed Reports
on the Situation in Delhi in Connection with the Satyagraha 
Movement.'
2 NAI, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919»
NAI, Home Poll 34 Deposit, October 1919»
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meetings were held that day and the hartal continued 
despite the pleas of the primary leaders and despite 
the news that Gandhi had been released. The boycott 
of the hearing at the Town Hall was complete.
The hartal continued on Sunday the 13th even 
though the ostensible reason for it had vanished. This 
was largely due to the secondary leaders who exercised 
a. precarious control over the movement by riding through 
the city each morning in a tonga, with a vertical whip, 
which was a. sign to all and sundry that the hartal was 
to continue. 1 The success of the secondary leaders 
with the shopkeepers led them to approach other 
occupational groups that had not stopped work. One 
such group was the railway employees.
More than a week before the 1 3th several secondary 
leaders (namely, Indra, Shankar Lai and Abdul Majid) 
contacted active members of the Arya Samaj who were on 
the staff of the North Western Railway. This secret 
meeting was designed to encourage the traffic and 
signals branches of this railway to strike in support 
of the hartal; a local strike which could in turn have 
led to a general strike involving the North Western 
Railway and the five other railway systems that 
converged on Delhi. The railway agitators attempted to
1
Interview with K.A. Desai, 7 April 1967; RDDA, 
Confidential File 262, in a report on enquiries into 
the Delhi disturbances for the week ending l6 May 1919 
the following statement is made: ’With regard to the 
continuance of the hartal during the days when the 
leaders were apparently making every endeavour to end 
it, I am told that those responsible included Rauf Ali, 
Bar-at-Law, Abdul Majid, Shankar Lai and Bishan Sarup.
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persuade their colleagues to strike. They accused their 
fellow-workmen of being unpatriotic, to which many of 
them replied that due to inflationary conditions they 
had no savings to support themselves during a period 
of unemployment. The organisers then took those who 
seemed interested in striking a blow at their British 
masters to Seth Raghu Mai Lohia, a wealthy iron merchant 
and Arya Samajist of Delhi, The Seth promised to 
finance them during the strike and he further promised 
to help those who might be dismissed. 1 The success that 
followed these negotiations heartened the railway 
organisers and encouraged them to call a meeting of all 
railway workers in Delhi for the 1 3th.
The employees of the six railways met at Delhi on
the morning of 13 April to discuss the possibility of a
general strike. The Arya. Samajists from the North
Western Railway were the most vociferous and the most
inclined to favour the proposal. The employees of the
other lines were reluctant, mainly because they had all
2been promised a rise in wages. Those who attended the 
meeting failed to reach a decision and it appeared that 
all had been in vain. That evening, however, several 
agitators at the Shakurpur Goods Station on the North 
Western Railway in Delhi Province decided to act. They
1
NAI, Home Poll 398-420 Part B, October 1919, 'Judgement 
in the Shakurpur Wire-Cutting and Railway Strike Case.'
2
Another of the reasons for the hesitation was that 
Yule, the district traffic superintendent for the East 
Indian Railway, distributed food at cost during the 
hartal of 10-18 April and he distributed vegetables free.
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cut the telegraph wires and forced the Lahore Mail Train 
to return to Delhi. They also commandeered a. freight 
train and backed it into Delhi where the strikers 
attempted to get the Delhi workers to join them. But 
at the crucial moment the ra.ilwa.ymen of Delhi refused 
to join their fellows from Shakurpur. The whole movement 
ended in a fiasco and within seven hours everything was 
back to normal.
Monday morning, l4 April, saw the continuation of 
the hartal. The near success that the secondary leaders 
had had with the railway employees spurred them on to 
encourage other groups to join the hartal. They 
approached the lawyers, domestic servants of Europeans, 
government servants, and bank clerks. The lawyers, 
domestic servants, and government servants were 
ridiculed and maligned for refusing to join the hartal. 
The Vijaya suggested that the inhabitants of Delhi 
should refuse to call them Indians for their unpatriotic 
attitude. Stronger means were also applied to these 
groups, such as social pressure and the refusal to 
supply them with food, but to no avail.1 The agitators, 
however, did succeed with the bank clerks. One English 
bank reported that its clerks refused to work. The 
Chief Commissioner then declared a. bank holiday which 
lasted for four days until 17 April.
The Vi j ay a., in its issue of l4 April, contributed 
to the unsettled mood in the city with an article on the
I
D.I.C. , I, written evidence of C.A. Barron; written 
evidence of H.H. Yule. There was also a serious attempt 
to persuade the dhobis to join the hartal. RDDA, 
Confidential File 262.
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official enquiry into the riots of 30 March which the 
Deputy Commissioner had held on 12 April- Indra 
registered a strong protest over the enquiry and 
applauded the residents of the city in their refusal 
to give evidence. He thought that an enquiry by 
British officers was meaningless because it was they 
who had committed the murders and it was their clothes 
that were stained with the blood of the martyrs. He 
concluded the article with an especially emotional 
paragraph which was translated as follows:
The enquiry is to be held in the Town Hall 
near which the blood of innocent children 
was shed, and into which their corpses were 
dragged like the carcasses of dogs. The 
floor of this building is still stained with 
the blood of martyrs. Those under whose 
orders guns were fired and bayonets used will 
act as judge of this outrage.1
The acquiescence of the bank clerks in the hartal, 
the vituperative language of the vernacular press, and 
the railway strike at Shakurpur made the authorities 
apprehensive that the situation was getting out of hand. 
Gandhi, after all, had been released and there was no 
apparent reason for the hartal to continue. The Chief 
Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Officer 
Commanding the Delhi Brigade, and the Superintendent of 
Police met the primary leaders of the city, among whom 
were Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari, Sultan Singh, and 
Pearey Lai. The primary leaders expressed the view that 
the hartal would remain peaceful; they also stated that
1 D.I.C., I, contained in the written evidence of C.A. 
Barron.
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if they were given time, and if the police did not 
interfere, they could bring it to an> end. The Chief 
Commissioner agreed and the meeting closed.
The primary leaders of Delhi were, no doubt, 
sincere in their desire for peace. But the extent to 
which they misjudged the popular mood became apparent 
as they emerged from the Town Hall. Gathered in front 
of the building was a huge crowd of 15,000 men, many of 
whom were Jats from the neighboairing villages and men 
from the lower classes in the city. They all carried 
lathis and their mood became increasingly pugnacious 
as the meeting inside progressed. They were quite 
literally prepared to invade the Town Hall and liberate 
the leaders by force if necessary. They had ample 
grounds to suspect the authorities since they knew that 
the leaders of Amritsar, Satyapal and Kitchlew, had 
been arrested under similar circumstances on the 10th.
The absence of Shra.dhana.nd among those who emerged from 
the meeting enraged the demonstrators, and they refused 
to allow anyone to depart until some of them had checked 
at Shradhanand's house (which was nearby) and returned 
to assure the rest that he had not in fact been arrested.
The appearance of lathis on the l4th was indicative 
of the changed mood of the city. This was the first 
time that a large crowd had gathered with weapons of 
this sort, and it indicated an aggressive mood in which 
the crowd was willing to defy the authorities. It also 
indicated the involvement in the demonstration of a 
large number of Jats who were particularly adept at 
wielding the lathi. These Jats with their lathis were 
seen coming into the city from the countryside on the
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trains in the morning. They returned to their villages 
each night and then journeyed into the city again on 
the 15th and the succeeding days to the 19th. 1
A meeting, which had been advertised by means of
crude posters, took place around 5*00 p.m. at King
Edward Park on the l4th. A sadhu boy read a poem with
2Gandhi as the main theme. He was followed by a speaker 
whom no one seemed to know and who spoke such nonsense 
that he was hooted down. Abdul Majid then mounted the 
plinth. He made a vituperative speech against the 
Rowlatt Bills comparing them to a cup of poison; he also 
compared the Press Act of 1910 to a sword. He then 
pointed to a person taking notes and launched into an 
invective against the C.I.D. The people around the 
note-taker attacked him until someone said that he was 
a student. Then the real C.I.D. reporter was pointed
1
NAI, Home Poll 144-162 Part A, June 1919» 'Extension 
of the Seditious Meetings Act of 1911 to the Province 
of Delhi. Decision that Martial Law Should Not be 
Proclaimed in Delhi for the Present.'
2
The Sadhus' name was Saraswati Dev. He is another 
example of the initiative which individuals took during 
the Rowlatt Satyagraha quite independently of the 
organisation of the leaders. Saraswati Dev was at the 
Railway Station during the riot of the 30th. He was 
also present at the Clock Tower. Although his motives 
were unclear, it was evident that he was spreading 
rumours and encouraging the crowd to act. He rode in 
a motor car with Hakim Ajma.1 Khan and Shradhanand and 
evidently took Shradhanand as his mentor. He took a 
prominent part in the riot at Edward Park on the l4th 
for which he was later sentenced to flogging. He then 
went to Rohtak District and attempted to whip up support 
there for a hartal. NAI, Home Poll 16 Deposit, July 1919» 
'Result of the Enquiries Made Regarding the Sadhu Boy 
Saraswati Dev, Who Was Connected with the Delhi 
Disturbances and Was Arrested at Rewari.'
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out and the mob ripped the notes from him and hounded 
him out of the park. He made good his escape in a tonga 
to the Alliance Bank. The mob then spotted a head 
constable and attacked him for being a member of the 
C«I.D., which he was not. They took his revolver, 
ammunition and pants and belaboured him severely with 
la this. They then held the articles up for the mob to 
see, burnt the notes and marched off triumphantly to 
Dr Ansari's house with their trophies. These were 
immediately turned over to the police.
The participants in the riot at King Edward Park 
were mostly Muslim, as would be expected of an event 
that took place in a predominantly Muslim locale. There 
were 19 men arrested for taking part in the riot, 12 of 
whom were Muslim. The meeting had attracted a. large 
number of members of the lower classes. They were 
mainly artisans and karkhandars. Some of their 
occupations were tinsmith, chauffeur, panwallah and 
there were two brothers who made penny whistles in 
Kishanganj as piece work . 1
On the morning of the 15th Hakim Ajmal Khan and 
Shradhanand attempted to persuade the shopkeepers to 
resume business. They first visited the but chers and 
then gradually worked through the rest of the city. By
10.00 a.m., some shops had opened. Barron called a 
meeting of the primary leaders once again. They 
expressed their helplessness, and suggested a meeting 
of the leading traders with the officials. Ajmal Khan
1
D.I.C., I, Judgement of the King Edward Park Riot Case, 
contained in written evidence of C.A. Barron.
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and others continued their attempts to get the shops 
open, and succeeded with the butchers, who agreed to 
slaughter a. Tew animals in order to end the hartal.
The leading traders and primary leaders (including 
' Shradha.na.nd) met the officials in the Town Hall on the 
afternoon of the 15th, The traders stated that they 
were reluctant to open their shops in response to the 
pleas of the primary leaders, because that would imply 
that they had closed their shops at the insistence of 
the leaders of Delhi rather than in protest against the 
Rowlatt Act, police repression, and the arrest of Gandhi, 
The traders thought that these leaders would be liable 
to arrest if it could be proven that the leaders were 
responsible for the continuance of the hartal. The 
merchants wanted it clearly understood that they had 
continued with the hartal on their own responsibility, 
and that they would end it only on the condition that 
no action would be taken against the leaders. The Chief 
Commissioner immediately agreed to issue a. notification 
not to arrest any of the leaders; he also promised to 
convey the dissatisfaction of the merchants over the 
Rowlatt Act to the Viceroy. The traders then agreed to 
break, the hartal on the l6th over the strong opposition 
of Choudhri Ram Lai, the leader of the cloth merchants.
During the meeting of the 15th a huge crowd of
20,000 gathered outside the Town Hall. The heat of the 
day and the excitement of the Satya.gra.ha. fostered a. 
mounting tension that focussed once again upon the 
question whether the leaders inside had been arrested.
The close-packed crowd of lathiwallahs, which was similar 
to the crowd at the Town Hall on the l4th, murmured and
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grumbled about the rumour of a massacre at Amritsar on 
the 1 3th and the use of aeroplanes to quell disturbances 
in the Punjab. They felt themselves more than a match 
for the authorities; and their anger practically 
touched a danger point with the appearance of an aero­
plane overhead. The unemployed coolies and the rural 
Jats in the crowd found common cause in their 
determination to liberate the leaders, especially the 
intrepid Shradhanand. Barron* s quick action in meeting 
the objections of the traders, however, ended the 
meeting inside and eased the situation outside as the 
leaders emerged triumphant from the building to a 
voluminous, swelling roar of greeting. Shradhanand 
then led the crowd to Dr Ansari's compound.
The shops opened on the morning of the l6th, but 
a. spirit of truculence reasserted itself when Beadon 
and Hare-Scott, the Superintendent of Police, paraded 
through the city at the head of a strong guard in a 
flamboyant bid to reassure the ’law-abiding elements* 
of the city. This ostentatious display of authority 
merely provoked the merchants of Delhi into closing 
their shops, because they would not allow the man who 
had called them ba.dma.shes to say that he had ended the 
hartal. The leaders could only give up in the face of 
such a misplaced faith in the efficacy of force. Later 
that afternoon the leaders and the merchants held a 
meeting at the Delhi Mercantile Association at which 
it was again agreed to break the hartal. While the 
meeting was in progress the participants received the 
news that the entire police and military force had 
withdrawn from the city. The authorities feared an
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attack, on the Civil Lines during the night and had 
regrouped their forces to deal with it. The leaders 
did not know the reason for the withdrawal, but they 
proceeded to station volunteers from the various corps 
at the positions of the night guard.
The butchers of Delhi resumed slaughtering on the 
17th. The banks and most of the shops also resumed 
business on the same day. The withdrawn guard was very 
much in evidence on its return in the morning. Towards 
noon the police arrested Gauri Shankar, a young man of 
no significance in the city, who attempted to persuade 
shopkeepers to close their shops. Three men in a tonga 
then rode down Chandni Chauk, shouting that three men 
had been arrested, bayonetted, and thrown into the 
Queen's Gardens. A crowd collected on Chandni Chauk 
and moved down to the Town Hall. Hakim Ajmal Khan was 
there and asked Beadon to allow him to take the boy out 
to show that he was unharmed. Beadon thought that the 
prestige of the Sirkar would suffer if he complied, and 
he refused. The crowd, now turned mob, then returned 
in the direction of Ballimaran Street. They attacked a 
solitary constable and then accosted a police picket of 
14 men. They wrenched the rifle from one man before the 
police were order to fire at will. The police killed 
two and wounded 18. The shops closed immediately and 
mast of them remained closed the following day.
The participants of the riot of Ballimaran Street 
mirrored the type of people who happened to be in 
Chandni Chauk at the time. Three leaders emerged. They 
were Mohammad Din, Chhote Lai and Ganga Saran. These 
three men had been at the Railway Station on the 30th,
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but had not assumed an active role there. They all had 
some education and were active in the various political 
organisations in the city. There were 12 people killed 
or wounded who were examined by the Chief Medical 
Officer. Two of these were Muslims and ten were Hindus. 
There were ten other people arrested, among whom there 
were six Muslims and four Hindus. Some of the 
occupations represented were a chakkiworker, a 
confectioner, a cook, a Kahar, two labourers, and four 
petty shopkeepers.1
The authorities decided that severe measures were
necessary. They proclaimed Delhi under the Seditious
Meetings Act and Beadon appointed l4 citizens as special
2police officers. This angered the populace once agaxn. 
They could not accept that there was an insufficiency of 
policemen with so many military around. The fact that 
they were not compelled to wear uniforms did not 
alleviate their indignation, more particularly because 
most of these men had already tried to end the hartal. 
The complete loss of control, the violence, and the 
actions of the government combined to convince the 
members of the Satyagraha Sabha that their goals were 
unobtainable. The Sabha, consequently, burned its 
membership list on 17 April and disbanded.
1
D.I.C., I, written evidence of Lt.-Col. C.H. James.
2
The 14 men were: R.S. Pearey Lai, R.B. Sultan Singh, 
L. Pearey Lai (motorwalla), L. Shiv Narain, Muhammad 
Abdur Rahman, Dr Abdul Rahman, Choudhri Ram Lai, L.
Madan Mohan, Asaf All, Hafiz Abdul Aziz (pleader),
L. Har Bogind Pershad, Mian Fakhr-ud-din (butcher), L. 
Jagdish Rai (jeweller), Mohammad Siddiq.
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There was a general feeling in the city that things 
had gone too far when mobs attacked police pickets with 
no provocation. The subject received a thorough airing 
among small groups of the more substantial citizens who 
met informally to discuss the matter. They began to 
doubt the validity of supporting mass agitation because 
such agitations invariably led to violence. They 
attributed the riot to the ignorance and wild passions 
of the masses, who resorted to violence at the least 
provocation. The informal alliance between the middle 
classes and the lower classes began to dissolve as 
unobtrusively as it had formed.
The hartal of the 18th was supported by the Muslim 
merchants because it was Friday, a. day on which they 
usually closed for half a day anyway. The Hindu 
merchants too kept their shops closed; some in mourning 
for the two who had died the previous day; others in 
response to the orders of the secondary leaders; and 
yet others in response to their own leaders who were most 
concerned with the maintenance of an outward display of 
unity. The shops in Sardar Bazaar and Sa.bzima.ndi were 
generally open; as much to signify their owners' 
independence from the merchants inside the walled city 
as for any other reason. The funeral for one of those 
who had died in the riot of the 1 7th attracted 50,000 
at the burning ghat. There were very few Hindu merchants 
in attendance and no Muslim merchants. The sentiment of 
communal harmony that had prevailed at previous meetings 
was conspicuous by its absence. There were no violent 
speeches and no issues were raised. The audience was a 
collection of curious and interested bystanders who had
4io
no personal concern in the matter. There was in fact a 
certain amount of disillusionment on the part of the 
majority of the audience. They felt that the merchants 
and leaders had led them on, and had then disengaged 
themselves when the situation got out of hand. They saw 
it as another example of the traditional cowardice of 
the Bania. The old divisions and antagonisms among the 
residents of Delhi reasserted themselves as the city 
reverted to its normal state on the 1 9th.
The Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi stemmed from 
Gandhi's call for a hartal in protest against the 
Rowlatt Act. But the Rowlatt Act only provided the 
catalyst and Gandhi the spark for the ventilation of 
the long standing grievances of the different classes 
and communities of Delhi. Some of the events that 
occurred between 1911 and 1919 revealed these 
grievances in either latent or active form. The pan- 
Islamic propaganda of Mohamed Ali and the hartal in 
response to his internment; the agitation of the Home 
Rule League and the hartal in response to the Ram Lila 
affair; the annual sessions of the National Congress 
and the Moslem League; the public meetings that were 
held between January and March 1919 and the rapid 
expansion of the vernacular press illustrate such 
events. The frustrations that these events expressed 
were religious, economic, and political, and the 
leadership of the movement sought to draw upon them 
for their own purposes. They had to raise different 
issues before different groups because of the variety 
of loyalties operative in the community. The leaders
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were confronted by sanatani, Arya Sa.ma.ji.st, and reformist 
Hindus; by liberal and orthodox Muslims; by the educated 
and the illiterate; and finally by the affluent and the 
deprived. They succeeded in the first instance when they 
obtained a complete hartal; and over and above a 
complete hartal a public responsive to the spirit of 
the Rowlatt Satyagraha. But from the 30th onwards the 
focus of popular attention switched from the Rowlatt Act 
to police repression which became the catalyst for the 
events of the following 1.9 days.
The classes and communities which supported the 
Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi changed somewhat after the 
first day. While none of the communities which 
supported the Satyagraha on the first day dropped out, 
the infusion of the rural Jats with their lathis into 
the situation from the l4th onward coincided with a 
remarkable change of mood in the city. The mood in the 
city had been fairly peaceful on the 30th and very 
constrained on the 6th. But the people of Delhi showed 
signs of becoming more aggressive from Gandhi's arrest 
onwards, and the appearance of the Jats at the Town 
Hall on the l4th and 15th tipped the scale of the 
balance. Although the Jats did not participate in the 
riots of the l4th and the 1 7th, their truculent attitude 
communicated itself to the more violent elements in the 
city, who, once they had received their cue, restrained 
themselves no longer in the manner of true satyagrahis.
At that point, the alliance between the petty 
bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the lower classes, on 
the other, broke down as the former realised that things 
had gone too far, and the latter realised that they had
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been encouraged to participate and had then been blamed 
for the results.
Gandhi had not foreseen that the people would join 
in such numbers in his protest against the Rowlatt Act. 
He confessed his confusion and chagrin over the results 
when he stated: 'Who knows how it all came about?*
It all came about, so far as Delhi was concerned, as 
the result of a combination of nationalist appeals, 
local grievances, and police repression. It all came 
about because the inhabitants of Delhi found a common 
grievance where previously their interests had been 
diffuse, dissimilar, and even contradictory. The 
primary significance of the Rowlatt Satyagraha in 
Delhi was, that given an appropriate issue, it was 
possible to transform a heterogeneous political 
community into a homogeneous political society. This 
more than anything must explain the unique alliance 
between the Hindu Banias and the Muslim artisans of 
Delhi, just as it must also explain the fact that a 
Hindu sanyasi spoke to a Hindu and Muslim congregation 
from the pulpit of the Jama Masjid.
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In the cities and among the urban population the 
people abuse their educated fellow-countrymen in 
filthy terms and accuse them of having led them 
astray. Nowhere is there any sympathy for the 
political agitator, and the general opinion is 
that he is responsible for all that has occurred 
and for all the sufferings and loss that the 
people have suffered and are suffering.
Indian Correspondent 
Central Intelligence Department
5 May 1919
The reaction to the Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi 
became apparent at a meeting on 13 May to display support 
for the government against the Amir of Afghanistan who 
had attacked India on 8 May . 1 The meeting was convened 
by 23 prominent Hindus and Muslims and was attended by
1
The war with Afghanistan had almost no effect on 
Delhi and is therefore not dealt with in the text. The 
Muslims of Delhi felt that the attempt of the Amir was 
suicidal if he stood alone and some Marwaris and Banias 
buried their jewellery in fear of an invasion. The 
number of foreign students in the madrassahs in Delhi 
were reported and any suspicious behaviour noted. An 
increased number of Pathans and Afghans passing through 
Delhi on the way north were also noted. NAI, Home Poll 
9 3 - H 3  Part A, June 1919, 'Intimation by the Local 
Governments of the Manner in Which the News of the 
Outbreak of Hostilities with the Amir of Afghanistan 
Has Been Received by Hindu and Muhammadan Opinion in 
India'; Home Poll 48 Deposit, July 1919*
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five or six hundred persons. Khan Bahadur Nawab Ahmad 
Said-ud-din Khan, the local leader of the Loharu family, 
took the chair. The proceedings began with Rai Sahib
Pearey La.1 reading a letter from Dr Ansari who was
2unable to attend. The Rai Sahib then criticised the
1
The following men were some of the more prominent 
citizens who attended: Say id Ahmad, Imam of the Jama 
Masjid, Khan Sahib Bashiruddin Hassan, Rai Bahadur Sultan 
Singh, Rai Sahib Pearey Lai, Khan Bahadur Nawab Ahmad 
Said-ud-din Khan, Hafiz Abdul Aziz, Pandit Banke Rai,
Pandit Har Narain Shastri, Muhammad Abdur Rahman (pleader), 
Islamullah Khan, Haji Abdul Ghani, Pearey Lai (motorwalla), 
Muhammad Abdul Ahmad. NAI, Home Poll 144-162 Part A,
June 1919-
2
Dr Ansari was called to Rampur. Hakim Ajmal Khan was 
also absent from the city. The text of Dr Ansari's 
letter was as follows: 'My dear Babu Piarey Lai, I came 
back last night to Delhi. This evening I learnt that 
there is going to be a public meeting tomorrow afternoon 
regarding the present situation. I would have liked to 
express my ideas personally but an urgent professional 
engagement prevents me from remaining in town tomorrow.
I have given the subject my earnest thought and 
have discussed the matter with friends. What I am 
writing is, therefore my considered opinion. At a time 
when there is danger of a foreign invasion on our 
motherland, it is the imperative duty of all true and 
patriotic Indians whether Hindus or Musalmans to sink 
all their differences with Government and give it their 
whole-hearted support. Even if we put aside all the 
higher patriotic and ethical considerations, our self- 
interest demands that we should make common cause with 
our rulers at this juncture. For, we must bear in mind 
that "Home Rule", "Responsible Government" and all our 
highly cherished ideals of constitutional rights and 
personal liberties could be gained only when there is 
perfect tranquility inside the country and no apprehension 
of an attack from outside.
I appeal to all my countrymen to heartily support 
the government at this critical period.
I hope you would be good enough to read this letter 
at the public meeting.' NAI, Home Poll 144-162 Part A,
June 1919-
people who had exceeded the law during the agitation and 
the government which had suppressed it with unnecessary 
vigour. Khan Sahib Bashir-ud-din followed with a strong 
condemnation of the promoters of the agitation and 
stated that it was a duty to be loyal to government at 
all times and not just at times of danger. The 
sentiments in the speech of the Khan Sahib found support 
from Pandits Banke Rai and Har Narain Shastri, and from 
Raj Narain (pleader). Haji Abdul Ghani and Khan Bahadur 
Abdul Ahad. This was followed by a 'most loyal speech' 
from Muhammad Abdur Rahman (pleader). The chairman 
concluded with a strong speech which emphasised that 
loyalty was not a favour, but a duty incumbent upon all, 
at all times.
The speeches at the meeting of 13 May voiced the 
apprehension of many in the city that the arousal of the 
masses could only result in violence. They hoped that 
the events that occurred during the Rowlatt Satyagraha 
were sufficient warning against similar action in the 
future. Shradha.na.nd' s withdrawal of his support for 
Gandhi on 2 May1 and Dr Ansari1 s letter which had been 
read at the meeting, appeared to all to be a general 
statement of dissatisfaction with mass politics. In 
addition the presence of Rai Sahib Pearey Lai, Pearey 
Lai (motorwalla), Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh and Muhammad 
Abdur Rahman (pleader) at the meeting to express loyalty
1 NAI, Home Poll 49 Deposit, July 1919, 'Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second 
Half of May 1919,' C.A. Barron to W.S. Marris, 4 June 
1919* The letter from Shradhanand to Gandhi was published 
in the Independent (Allahabad) on 28 May 1919* It stated 
that Shradhanand was convinced that passive resistence 
and non-co-operation under conditions then existing could 
only produce upheaval among the masses.
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to the government, even though they had counselled the 
government to change its attitude to win the hearts of 
the people, gave support to the traditional leaders who 
argued against nationalist politics.1 Dr Ansari 
reiterated this point of view three days after the 
meeting of supporters of the government on 13 May when 
he interviewed the Chief Commissioner:
In a long conversation I had with Ansari...he told 
me that though he had been the first person in 
Delhi to sign Gandhi's vow, his views regarding 
the practicability of the passive resistance 
movement, as he had understood it had changed 
when he saw the excesses to which it led.2
1
An Indian correspondent summarised this state of 
affairs as follows: ’The unfortunate turn which 
political agitation in some parts of India took by the 
misdirection of politicians in April last has set men1 s 
minds thinking as to the future of political agitation 
in this country. There are many men who have begun to 
deprecate political agitation altogether and say that 
it can only do harm. These people are of the opinion 
that all political agitation and particularly all anti­
government political agitation should be avoided in the 
future. They add that such agitation whilst it does no 
good to the country it does incalculable harm by 
embittering the relations between Europeans and Indians 
. . . .Recent events in India, have made even the most 
incorrigible Congress politicians pause and say that a. 
great blunder was committed when efforts were made to 
induce the masses, particularly the illiterate classes, 
to take part in political agitation. The politicians 
all over India are coming to the conclusion that 
political agitation should in future be confined to the 
educated classes and among those people who can trust 
each other.' NAI, Home Poll 315-319 Part B, August 1919, 
'Report of the Director of Central Intelligence, 1 for 
the week ending 7 July 1919*
2
NAI, Home Poll 49 Deposit, July 1919*
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This attitude continued to receive support and 
especially so when Gandhi indefinitely postponed the 
introduction of non-co-operation which he had planned 
to initiate on 1 July 1919»
An even greater effect of the 'excesses’ of the 
Rowlatt Satyagraha was the gradual breakdown of Hindu- 
Muslim unity which had reached an apogee during the 
agitation. One of the causes of this dissolution was 
the upswell of feeling among orthodox Hindus and Muslims 
against the use of temples and mosques for political 
purposes . 1 This was aggravated by the general 
disenchantment that Arya Samajists felt with Shradhanand, 
who had represented the epitome of Hindu-Muslim unity
1
NAI, Home Poll 47 Deposit, July 1919, 'Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 
Second Half of April 1919,' C.A* Barron to W.S. Marris,
3 May 1919* The reports from every province comment on 
the reaction of orthodox Hindus and Muslims against the 
use of temples and mosques for political speeches.
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when he spoke from the pulpit of the Jama Masjid.1
Such feelings were further exacerbated by a renewal
of an agitation against kine-killing in the United
2Provinces, and a general reaction by both orthodox 
Hindus and Muslims against the public negotiation 
between Gandhi and Abdul Bari to limit the number of 
cow sacrifices. The disenchantment took a political 
turn by July when Gandhi replied to the Commissioner 
of Police in Bombay that the Muslims had instigated 
the Hindus during the disturbances. If it had not 
been for the distress of the Muslims over the position 
of the Khilafat the Hindus would have been able to 
enforce calm and no violence would have
1 NAI, Home Poll 701-704 Part B, June 1919, ’Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,’ for 
week ending 23 June 1919» One correspondent commented 
on Shradhanand as follows: ’Swami Shradhanand, well 
known in the Punjab as Mahatma Munshl Ram, has lost 
much in the estimation of his co-religionists. The 
latter say that he did the Arya, Samaj much harm by 
throwing himself headlong into extremist or anti- 
Govemment politics without consulting the leading 
men in the Arya Samaj. The general opinion is that he 
is a most unsafe and unreliable person as a leader.
In the estimation of politicians he has also fallen 
because he wrote in his recent letter to Mr# Gandhi 
that politics were a matter which concerned only 
Government. The politicians say that the Swami is 
insincere and has changed his opinions in order to save 
his skin. The Leader of Allahabad took the Swami to 
task only the other day and advised him not to meddle 
with politics any more. It is quite clear that on the whole Swami Shradhanand had lost more than he has gained by his recent excursion into anti-Government politics. 
Those in the Arya Samaj who are anxious that the Samaj should keep aloof from politics - and their number is considerable - are of opinion that the Swami cannot be trusted as a leader of the Samaj and that he should either withdraw from the Samaj or give up politics altogether.*
2 NAI, Home Poll 47 Deposit, July 1919*
^ NAI, Home Poll 48 Deposit, July 1919»
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resulted.1 Muslims then began to feel that they had 
been made a 1catspaw1 and, after having been drawn into 
supporting the Rowlatt Satyagraha, were left holding 
the blame.
The concern and caution of the Indian population 
was equally matched by their European rulers. They saw 
two problems: the place of Delhi as a centre for 
political agitation and the place of political agitation 
in the good government of the country. The question 
arose primarily because both the Punjab and the United 
Provinces made repeated allegations that emissaries were 
emanating from Delhi and encouraging the people in the 
surrounding districts to join the hartals during the
3Rowlatt Satyagraha. Both provinces further alleged 
that the merchants of Delhi used their commercial
1
NAI, Home Poll 261-272 Part A, August 1919» ’Reports 
Regarding Mr M.K. Gandhi’s Further Activities and His 
Proposal to Renew Civil Disobedience.’
2
NAI, Home Poll 54 Deposit, August 1919» 1 Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st 
Half of July 1919»’ [report on the Punjab] for the 
fortnight ending 15 July 1919*
3
A report from the Punjab charged that: '...there is 
the strongest evidence to prove that Delhi had been 
from the beginning, and is still, endeavouring to seduce 
the loyalty of the Southern Punjab. Emissaries and 
Lecturers have been constantly coming and going and 
without the pressure exerted by Delhi merchants the 
hartal and its accompanying disturbances would have been 
a complete failure.' NAI, Home Poll 47 Deposit, July 
1919» [report for the Punjab], 30 April 1.919*
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control of the area to enforce hartals . 1 The complaints
were compounded by a bureaucratic control that channelled
information about incidents in contiguous districts to
the respective provincial government and thence through
2the Government of India, to the Delhi Administration.
The Government of Punjab and the Government of United 
Provinces both looked upon Delhi as the centre of an 
evil influence which if done away with, would allow 
their provinces to prosper in peace and tranquility.
The Delhi Administration replied by painting a picture 
of idyllic serenity which prevailed before the arrival 
of the Government of India which completely upset the 
local equilibrium. The Secretary to the Government of 
India, Home Department, made the following comment on 
the situation:
1
The Government of United Provinces complained in the 
following vein, ’Meetings connected with the present 
situation have been held sporadically during the last 
fortnight at various towns in the province; in many 
cases they were addressed by emissaries from Delhi- At 
a. few places which did not observe hartal on the 6th 
and 13th April, shops were closed on other dates during 
the fortnight under report. In many instances this was 
done under pressure from the wholesale dealers of Delhi 
who refused to do business with the smaller trades 
people in the towns of this province, especially in the 
western districts, if they did not join the movement.’ 
NAI, Home Poll 47 Deposit, July 1919, A.C. Chatterjee 
to W. Marris, 2 May 1919»
2
The C.I.D. in Delhi investigated 35 reports of 
emissaries from Delhi who were alleged to have fomented 
discontent in the Punjab and United Provinces. None 
could be proven satisfactorily, even by the local 
officials. The C.I.D. also investigated 37 reports of 
merchants who were alleged to have used commercial 
pressure to enforce a hartal. Again, none could be 
proven. RDDA, Confidential File 262 (1919)*
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The District Magistrate and Chief Commissioner 
have drawn an idyllic picture of Delhi as it was 
before the serpent in the shape of the Government 
of India entered into it, which may be a reply to 
the Punjab picture of modern Delhi as the source 
of all political poison. But even if its ancient 
innocence is overdrawn it is clearly true that 
Delhi as the winter seat of the Government and 
Legislature of India will always lure the agitator 
and the reptile journalist. They naturally come 
there in the hope of creating agitation and so 
impressing Government; they will come more than 
ever under the new regime of larger councils and 
longer sessions; intrigue and caballing will 
abound: there is a hostile element always to be 
found in the city, if not indeed in Delhi City 
more than most places; and it is probably quite 
true that the District Magistrate and the Chief 
Commissioner will have a very difficult task in 
handling the situations which will arise, and that 
the Government of India will be embarrassed by 
appeals to them to interfere. They escaped a 
similar embarrassment about Bengal affairs when 
they left Calcutta, but they are even more likely 
to be involved in Delhi because of the difference 
between a Chief Commissioner and a Lieutenant- 
Governor in Council.1
The conditions which the Home Secretary noted were of 
such concern that it was decided that Colonel Beadon was 
not the ideal district magistrate for Delhi 'under modern 
conditions' and that he was to be replaced by 'an officer 
of different type . * 2
It seems, however, that two points had been 
recognised. The first was that there was a certain
1
NAI, Home Poll 452-453 Part A, August 1919> 'Report 
from the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, On the Recent 
Disturbances in Delhi City,' note by W.S. Marris, 13 
June 1919*2
Ibid.
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amount of propensity for political agitation that was 
indigenous to the city of Delhi and the second point 
was that the transfer of the capital to Delhi had 
exacerbated this propensity because the capital 
attracted agitators and the presence of the Government 
of India provided an additional avenue of protest to the 
agitators, both indigenous and alien to the city.
What had not been recognised was the fact that the 
enhanced importance of Delhi as a centre for political 
agitation gave the indigenous agitator a new status# As 
we shall see men such as Asaf Ali, Neki Ram Sharma, and 
Shankar Lai soon assumed an increasing importance in 
national radical politics which they had not heretofore 
held.
The matters above concerned Delhi as a centre for 
nationalist politics. Another reaction to the Rowlatt 
Satyagraha went beyond Delhi and questioned the basic 
principles of government in India. The Home Secretary 
again summed up the problem in the following manner:
Is agitation conducted in the name of constitutional 
liberty which is likely to lead to disorder to be 
permitted up to the point at which disorder 
actually occurs; and if not, can we do anything to 
stop it beyond what we do now? We have the Press 
Act, the Seditious Meetings Act, and so forth; but 
the trouble is that they are all rather a denial of 
our own principles; we use them intermittently and 
reluctantly, and they are weapons too big and 
clumsy to deal with ninetenths of the actual 
mischief. It [the problem] strikes right at the 
continuance of our administration. Since we cannot 
rule by machine guns, can we acquiesce in a campaign 
which must from time to time bring the machine guns 
on the scene? Last year the Secretary of State 
assented in conversation to the proposition that if
423
after reforms dangerous agitation continued 
means must be found for stopping it. But 
inasmuch as reforms are themselves a half-way 
measure, such agitation there is bound to be; 
and yet under reforms repression will be 
harder than ever.-*-
The future held a great deal in store for the Government 
of India and the Delhi Administration, But nothing in 
that future offered any solution to the dilemma posed 
by the Home Secretary.
1
Ibid.
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The Rowlatt Satya.graha was the most remarkable 
event in the political life of Delhi after the Mutiny 
of 1857« It reflected the degree to which the 
inhabitants of the city had been politicised by the 
preceding ten years of agitation. It also reflected 
the extent to which their political horizons had 
expanded from provincial issues to nationalist ideals. 
And finally it reflected the extent to which both the 
élite and the lower classes of Delhi became involved in 
political agitations and demonstrations.
The events which occurred during the Rowlatt 
Satyagraha, had a. remarkable effect upon the citizens 
of Delhi. The Satyagraha effectively contributed to 
the politicisation of a. significantly larger number of 
individuals and groups than had been involved previously. 
The events of April 1919 also led to a. gradual 
recrudescence of parochial attitudes among the classes 
and communities that were drawn into the agitation.
The Hindu merchants and professionals who had 
participated in the Home Rule League from 1917 onwards 
and who organised the Rowlatt Satyagraha reacted to the 
violence of those tumultuous 21 days by withdrawing from 
overt political activity. The riotous behaviour of the 
lower classes taught them the lesson that mass 
involvement in political movements entailed more 
violence than they were willing to condone or support.
The events which occurred during the Rowlatt Satyagraha 
also made the Hindus suspicious of the religious motives 
of the Muslim politicians, especially when these 
politicians encouraged the support of the most ardent 
fanatics and the ulema..
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The recrudescence of parochialism, which resulted 
from the Rowlatt Satyagraha, affected the quality of 
the non-co-operation movement. Instead of 
consolidating and building upon the gains of the 
Satyagraha, this movement became an anti-climax with 
limited participation. The participants were drawn 
mainly from the Muslim community, which responded in a 
most aggressive manner to the prevailing economic 
distress and the uncertainty surrounding the fate of 
the Khilafat.
The continuous appeal to religious sentiment by 
Muslim agitators affected the nature of Muslim 
participation in the first non-co-operation movement.
The sharif withdrew from political activity since such 
appeals violated their cosmopolitan values and loyal 
attitudes. The appeal to religious sentiment had a 
remarkable effect upon the merchants, the lower 
classes, and those sharif who were political Extremists. 
These groups gave their wholehearted support to the 
non-co-operation movement because it was so inextricably 
linked with the issue of the Khilafat. The most radical 
of this group continually sought to increase the pace 
of politicisation in an effort to demonstrate mass 
support for their political and religious grievances. 
These two groups, organised into the Khilafat Committee 
and the Khilafat Workers’ Association respectively, 
continually manoeuvred for control of the movement.
But the control and influence which the sharif in the 
Khilafat Committee exercised, invariably drew the 
merchants to their side and effectively restrained the 
political excesses of the predominantly non-sharif 
Khilafat Workers.
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Sensible Hindus and Muhammadans are of opinion 
that political agitators may be successful for 
a time with the help of misrepresentation in 
raising a. Hindu-Muhammadan combination against 
Government and in influencing Indian racial 
passions against European, but they cannot 
succeed in making the mutual relations of 
Hindus and Muhammadans cordial.
Indian Correspondent to 
Central Intelligence Department 
8 September 1919
The citizens of Delhi observed a. hartal on Sunday
17 October 1919* The hartal which was called Khilafat 
Day, was universal in Delhi except for those who dealt 
_in foodstuffs, sweetmeats, drugs, and public transport 
and who had been exempted in order to prevent any 
possibility of a disturbance resulting from coercion.
The hartal was organised by the Muslim nationalists as 
a protest against the delay in the publication of the 
peace terms with Turkey and against the supposed terms 
which would be imposed upon Turkey when they were 
published. It was also a protest against the activities 
of the Greeks in Turkey. The success of the hartal 
depended mainly upon the state of public opinion in the 
Muslim community.
The sentiments of radical Muslims in India on the 
Khilafat question were articulated by Dr Ansari in his 
speech to the Moslem League in December 1918. This was 
followed by an attempt on the part of Abdul Bari of 
Firangi Mahal, Lucknow, to circulate an istifta
I
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[interrogatory] to the ulema of north India. His object 
was to obtain an authoritative pronouncement from Muslim 
theologians in support of the views expressed by Dr 
Ansari. 1 His hope to circulate a fatwa with the answers 
to the istifta never reached fruition as none of the 
ulema, except those of Firangi Mahal, would sign the 
fatwa. Abdul Bari then began circulating extracts from 
the Chehal Hadis to the ulema.. They contained such lines 
as:
...one who approaches an oppressive ruler and 
advises (literally, commands) him to do good and 
prevents him from doing evil (deeds), and is 
killed for it (is the best of martyrs).
The Prophet also said: 'The best jihad is 
truth which is spoken before a tyrant king. '2
Abdul Bari's attempts to persuade the ulema failed.
They were not ready at this point to become involved 
in politics which were based on religious issues.
Abdul Bari failed in his appeal to religious 
sentiment on the Khilafat issue because the dominant 
feeling among leading Muslims was one of caution. This 
attitude, wrought mainly as a reaction to the violence
1
NAI, Home Poll 181-184 Part B, February 1919» 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for 
the week ending 15 February 1919» Home Poll 13 Deposit, 
March 1919» 'Religious Interrogation issued by the 
Ulemas of Ferringhi Mahal, Lucknow, On the Question of 
the Caliphate, The Holy Places, And the Position of the 
King of Hadjaz'; Home Poll 16 Deposit, March 1919» 
'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation 
in India for the First Half of February 1919>1 S.P. 
O'Donnell to J. DuBoulay, 19 February 1919*
2
NAI, Home Poll 494-497 Part B, June 191.9» 'Weekly
Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for
the week ending 19 May 1919»
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of the Rowlatt Satya.graha, wa s capitalised upon by the 
Government of India. On 3 May the Home Secretary 
circulated a letter to all local governments advising 
them of the likely terms which would be offered to 
Turkey. The letter requested that local governments 
advise local Muslim leaders in order to anticipate what 
was expected to be a. sharp blow when the terms were 
officially announced.1 The Chief Commissioner of Delhi
1
NAI, Home Poll 363-368 Part A, May 1919, ’Issue of 
Instructions to Local Governments and Administrations on 
the Question of the Effect upon Muhammadan Opinion in 
this Country of the Forthcoming Announcement of the Terms 
of Peace in Relation to Turkey. 1 The Home Secretary,
W.S. Marris, made the following notes on the state of 
Muslim opinion in India on 1 May 1919: ’The internal 
danger proceeds from the pan-Islamists, who are largely 
identified with the young Muhammadans. If they start a 
great agitation the maulvis may follow, and the masses 
be drawn in. The young Muhammadans are also largely the 
pro-Hindus (though logically they ought to be nothing of 
the kind) and in the present temper of the country we 
may easily have a rising of both communities. But 
fortunately the pan-Islamists are for the most part 
known and localised. They are to be found in cities - 
Lucknow, Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, Patna, Aligarh. If 
we can deal with them or isolate them, or take the wind 
out of their sails, they may be unable to do much harm.
The conservative Muhammadans dislike them and the idea 
of temporal loyalty is still striving and the divisions 
of sect and school will also help to check a united 
movement.
We have had crises with the Muhammadan before: 
Cawnpore 1913, which was probably the effect of the Balkan 
War; November 1914 and June 1916. But the present 
situation far surpasses all its predecessors in gravity.
The next question seems to be whether we should 
instruct local governments, on the old lines, to send for the sober leaders and let them know as gently as may be 
what the terms will be and also to let anticipations of 
the terms appear gradually in the press. I have not much 
faith in these methods. The work is done evenly, the 
process gets known and creates suspicion, and the loyal­
ists are timid and likely to fail us as soon as an outcry begins.•
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called the local Muslim leaders for a conference on 8 May
and impressed the point of view of government upon them.1
The Chief Commissioner also elicited a promise from
Hakim Ajmal Khan to counsel the maulvis to refrain from
2agitation over the peace terms.
While the Muslims were being subjected to pressure 
from government, they also faced other propaganda efforts, 
the main aim of which was to inflame public opinion. The 
fatwa of the Amir of Afghanistan was circulated freely 
in the city despite the fact that it had been prohibited.
1
NAI, Home Poll 5^4-532 Part A, May 1919, 'Question of 
the Effect upon Muhammadan Opinion in This Country of 
the Forthcoming Announcement of the Terms of Peace in 
Relation to Turkey.' In the letter from C.A. Barron to 
the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 
dated 10 May 1919, the Chief Commissioner commented on 
the meeting as follows: '...the meeting...was very 
fairly representative of the sober minded and substantial 
residents of the community in Delhi.
The announcement was I thought received surprisingly
we 11.My announcement of Thursday has, I am told, been 
widely discussed, but no excitement has so far been 
reported among the lower classes. The usual Friday 
prayers at the Jama Masjid passed off yesterday entirely 
without incident, and no reference is reported to have 
been made to either the Turkish peace terms or the 
Frontier trouble.
One very remarkable feature of our meeting on 
Thursday afternoon was that, after a very few questions, 
both the Turkish peace terms and the Frontier trouble 
were dismissed from further discussion, which then turned 
to the much more burning questions of the discount being 
charged by bannias on currency notes and the recent rise 
in the prices of wheat and clothi'
2
NAI, Home Poll 50 Deposit, August 1919, 'Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First 
Half of June 1919,’ C.A. Barron to W.S. Marris, 16 June 
1919-
430
Other pieces of propaganda were also circulated, such as 
a jihad leaflet by an anonymous author which contained 
statements such as the following:
And the Prophet is said to have said that the 
man who commits murder in the name of God 
becomes entitled to go to heaven during the 
short time of milking a female camel. The man 
who has received a wound in a crusade, for the 
sake, of God, or has been distressed, will be 
lifted up on the day of judgement....
Muhammadans! a religious war is a duty... 
when the Muhammadan, religion and the Muhammadans 
are weak and they are prevented from performing 
their duties, their religious customs being 
insulted. We are in such a state at present.
The English have caused our mosques to be 
demolished in our presence. They are abusing 
our Prophet... and when we venture to say 
something we are shot down. The English had 
promised us that our Caliph would not be 
dethroned during the time of war, the territories 
under him would not be snatched away from him, 
and the sacred places would remain under his 
guardianship. But has any one of these promises 
been fulfilled? You yourself can answer the 
question. How long, 0 Muhammadans, will you 
continue to lead a shameless life? How long are 
you going to tolerate these accursed sights 
detrimental to your faith?
Leaflets, such as the one described above, and a letter 
from the All brothers (who were interned at Chhindwara) 
to the Viceroy, the contents of which became known very
1
NAI, Home Poll 494-497 Part B, June 1919» for the
week ending 19 May 1919«
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widely and very quickly, inflamed the pan-Islamic 
attitudes of the Muslim body politic.1
Pan-Islamic opinion became inflamed with such
occurrences as the events in Egypt and the suggestion
2that St Sophia should be converted into a church. But 
despite the government, the issue of the Kh.ila.fat 
gradually changed from one of pan-Islamic outrage to 
one of general discontent among all Muslims. The major 
factor in this change was the inordinate delay in the
1
NAI, Home Poll 363-368 Part A, May 1919, Mohamed and 
Shaukat Ali to His Excellency the Viceroy, 24 April 
1919» There were 5,000 copies of the letter printed in 
Bombay by l6 May 1919• Home Poll 48 Deposit, July 1919, 
'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation 
for the First Half of May 1919,' J* Crerar to W.S. 
Marris, 19 May 1919» The support which the Ali brothers 
won for making such a courageous announcement of their 
views soon changed to consternation when the brothers 
came out in support for the Amir of Afghanistan. They 
regained much of this support, however, when they were 
interned in the jail at Betul in June 1919»
2 NAI, Home Poll 48 Deposit, July 1919, C.A. Barron to
W.S. Marris, l6 May 1919*
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publication of the terms of peace.1 The concern that 
arose from this delay acted as a touchstone for other 
grievances and discontents. The more important of 
these were the excruciating heat, the delay in the
2monsoons, the high prices of essential food stuffs, 
the trials of those who were connected with the riots 
in Delhi during the Rowlatt Satyagraha, the imposition 
of sentences on those who had been tried in the 
Karturpur riot case, the admission of appeals to the
1
NAI, Home Poll 27 Deposit, September 1919, 'Extract 
Sent by the Director, Central Intelligence, from the 
Leader Regarding the Delay in Publishing the Turkish 
Peace Terms Resulting in Anxiety and Agitation among 
Muhammadans.' Tassaduq Hussain of the C.I.D. made the 
following observations on 8 September 1919: 'The 
diverse news cabled by Reuters is causing great pain 
to the Muslim public. It is believed by a majority of 
the thinking Musalman public that the fate of Turkey 
was decided by the Peace Conference but merely to cool 
down the excitement of the Musalman feelings the British 
Government has kept back the decision from being made 
public, and Reuters telegrams are only to prepare them 
for the worst, so that the decision may not come to them 
with a. shock. The semi-literate and illiterate 
Musalmans still believe that Turkey will not cease to 
exist as a ruling nation, but the different telegrams 
which are filtering down now every day are sure to 
create painful feelings among them as well. Another 
rumour that only the American Missionary Society is 
preparing 2,000 missionaries to overrun the conquered 
Muslim countries is giving cause to the public to 
believe that the missionaries in Europe and America 
know the fate of these countries and are taking steps 
accordingly.
2 NAI, Home Poll 49 Deposit, July 1919, 'Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the
Second Half of May 1919,' C.A. Barron to W.S. Marris,
4 June 1919; Home Poll 15 Deposit, November 1919,
'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 
Second Half of September 1919,’ C.A. Barron to W.S. 
Marris, 30 September 1919*
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Privy Council of cases that resulted from the disturb­
ances in the Punjab during the Rowlatt Satyagraha, and 
finally, the propaganda of the agitators. 1
The agitators in Delhi had lost the means with 
which to raise issues before the inhabitants of the 
city with the cessation of public meetings under the
1
The political agitators of Delhi were very quiet 
during May and June, but they began to reassert 
themselves in July. Their major effort was a meeting 
of 25 July 1919* Hakim Ajmal Khan, Sultan Singh, Dr 
Ansari, K.A. Desai and Shradhanand convened a meeting 
of 1,000 to 2,000 to express their thanks to C.A. Barron 
for the manner in which he handled the Rowlatt Satyagraha. 
The following resolution was introduced: 'That we 
citizens of Delhi, assembled in a public meeting, held 
under the auspices of the Indian Association, Delhi, 
desire to place on record our thankful appreciation of 
the wise and sympathetic policy of the Hon'ble the Chief 
Commissioner of Delhi in handling a most embarrassing 
situation created in Delhi after the unfortunate and 
exceedingly painful occurrence of 30 March last.' Arif. 
Hussain Haswi then introduced an amendment on behalf of 
Asaf All who could not address a public assembly due to 
a restriction on him under the Defence of India Act. The 
amendment, which was ruled out of order by Hakim Ajmal 
Khan, was carried overwhelmingly against the objections 
of the chairman. It added the words 'the real nature of 
which events we shall take some other opportunity to 
review.' As the meeting dispersed, Shankar Lai arrived.
He had just been acquitted in the Edward Park Riot case; 
he was garlanded and cheered. NAI, Home Poll 55 Deposit, 
August 1919» ’Fortnightly Reports on the Internal 
Political Situation for the Second Half of July 1919> 1
C.A. Barron to W.S. Marrks, 1 August 1919; Home Poll 300- 
305 Part B, November 1919» 'Resolutions in Council by 
the Hon'ble Mr. Kamini Kumar Chanda Regarding the 
Appointment of Mixed Committees to Investigate the 
Causes of the Recent Disorders in Delhi and the 
Circumstances of the Firing upon the Crowds in Calcutta 
in April Last,' extract from the Independent (Allahabad),
27 July 1919-
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Seditious Meetings Act and the demise of the new
vernacular press under strict precensorship. The
situation did not improve until the end of the summer
when the Congress began republishing in September and
the Vijaya in October. The pa.n-Isla.mic Muslims and
Extremist Hindus continued to find a common cause by
combining the issues of Punjab and Turkey . 1 A
manifestation of this combination was an effort on
the part of the politicians to reduce the number of
cows to be sacrificed at Bakr-Id. Hakim Ajmal Khan
and Dr Ansari, both protagonists of Hindu-Muslim unity,
gave their support to the move. The movement failed
in Delhi, however, due to the high prices of sheep and
goats, as people who might have used the latter animals
2had to sacrifice cows.
Such, then, was the climate of opinion in Delhi 
and in North India when the Leader (Allahabad) made a 
call on 17 September 1919 for a meeting to discuss the
1
NAI, Home Poll 59 Deposit, October 1919* 'Reports on 
the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of 
September 1919»' C.A. Barron to W.S. Marris, 15 
September 1919* The impetus for the move to combine 
the issues came from Bombay and Lucknow according to 
the Government of Punjab.
2
NAI, Home Poll 44 Deposit, October 1919, 'Reports on 
the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of 
August 1919,1 C*A. Barron to W.S. Marris, 1 September 
1919; Home Poll 59 Deposit, October 1919» The Marwaris 
in Calcutta served refreshments at local mosques and 
Abdul Bari kept his promise not to sacrifice cows in 
Firangi Mahal. Home Poll 454-457 Part B, September 1919, 
'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' 
for the week ending 29 September 1919*
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Khilafat . 1 The meeting of the All-India Muslim
Conference duly took place at Lucknow on 21 September
1919* It was attended by between 300 and 400 delegates
including most of the politically important Muslims in
India and a large number of representatives of Muslim
organisations. A 'fair number' of prominent Muslims
of Delhi attended but did not take a 'very conspicuous
2part in the proceedings. 1 A noticeable split occurred 
between those who supported Abdul Bari and those who 
supported the more moderate Raja of Mahmudabad. The 
major resolution which passed stated that the spiritual 
dignity of the Sultan as Khalifa was indissolvably 
bound up with his temporal power and that the balkan- 
isation of the Turkish Empire, with non-Muslim powers 
as mandatories, was an intolerable affront to the 
Khilafat. In general, feeling ran high at the meeting 
and one observer noted:
But the greatest insult felt by the Muhammadans 
is about Smyrna being given to the Greeks. This 
heart burning among the Moslems is daily on the 
increase and is gaining in volume, spreading 
among the lower classes also.^
The article was signed by 36 well-known Muslim leaders, 
among whom were Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr Ansari. Abdul 
Majid of the Central Intelligence Department was of the 
opinion that the renewal of agitation was a direct 
result of a suggestion from the Muslims in London (the 
Agha Khan, Syed Ameer Ali, and Marmaduke Pickthall) who 
thought it was still not too late to influence a decision 
and that public sentiment in India should be aroused.
NAI, Home Poll 27 Deposit, September 1919»
2 NAI, Home Poll 15 Deposit, November 1919»
^ NAI, Home Poll 36O-363 Part B, October 1919» 'Weekly
Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for
the week ending 13 October 1919»
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The most important decision taken at the meeting was one 
that recommended a day of fasting and prayer and a 
hartal for Friday 17 October 1919»
The Central Khilafat Committee in Bombay took the 
lead in the organisation of the hartal. There were many 
attempts, mainly from the Bombay, Delhi , 1 and the 
Calcutta. Extremists, to push the moderate members of the 
Committee into a. radical position. Others took an even 
more active step; thus, Hasrat Mohani, Tajuddin of Delhi 
(who was editing the Taj of Jubbalpore), and Arif 
Hussain Haswi (who was editor of the Congress in Delhi) 
all went to Bombay with posters and news bulletins which 
had been drafted by Abdul Bari. The wording of the 
posters was considered too radical by the president of 
the Committee, Sir Fazulbhky Currimbhoy, and they were 
published without his signature. Tajuddin and Arif 
Hussain then sent telegrams to the principal Muslim 
journals and organisations in India advising them that 
Muslims should suspend all business on Khilafat Day.
They concluded the message with the statement,
1
NAI, Home Poll 14 Deposit, November 1919» ’Reports on 
the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of 
October 1919»* J» Crerar to W.S. Marris, 16 October 
1919* Shankar Lai of Delhi sent a telegram to the 
Central Committee urging them to threaten the Government 
with a graduated boycott of British goods and 
institutions if they signed a treaty of peace that 
dismembered the Turkish Empire.
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Mahatma Gandhi advises that it is absolutely 
incumbent upon Hindus to signify their 
sympathy with their Muhammadan brethren by 
joining with them in observing the 1 7th of 
October as a Day of Prayer and Protest by 
closing their shops and suspending their 
business.
The hartal that took place on Khilafat Day, 17 
October 1919> was confined to the cities of India.
These were Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Delhi and 15 other
2  3urban centres none of which was in the Punjab. The
1
NAI, Home Poll l4 Deposit, November 1919*
2
NAI, Home Poll 16 Deposit, November 1919, 'Report on 
the Internal Situation in India during the Second Half 
of October 1919»1 The other cities that were specific­
ally mentioned as holding hartals were:
Ahmedabad Cawnpore Gaya
Godhra Allahabad Bhagalpur
Ahmednagar Agra. Monghyr
Hyderabad (Sind) Darbhanga Secunderabad 
Lucknow Patna Bangalore
3
NAI, Home Poll 360-363 Part B, October 1919- ’The 
agitation about the Khaliphate Day observances fell flat 
so far as the Punjab was concerned. In no place in the 
Province was the day observed either as a holiday or as 
a day of humiliation and prayer. Nobody fasted and 
there was no hartal or even cessation of business. 
Ordinary congregation prayers for Friday were held and 
except in one or two places there were no crowds in the 
mosques. In Lahore and Amritsar those Muhammadans who 
ordinarily close their shops or places of business for 
holiday on Fridays kept open the whole day on the 1 7th 
for fear of being misunderstood. The students too who 
are made to do much mischief in matters of this kind 
were absolutely quiet. They did not literally stir 
their little finger and did not go out even to see if 
the Badshai Mosque contained a crowd of Muhammadans. Pan 
Islamic influences are largely restricted to urban areas 
but in this instance the agitation was a failure even in 
cities and towns. In rural areas it was altogether 
unknown. ’
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hartal in Delhi was completely effective, with the
exceptions noted above, a most extraordinary achievement
in view of the reaction to the Rowla tt Satya.graha,.1 The
crowds which demonstrated in the bazaars of Delhi were
considerably smaller than those of 30 March 1919; they
were also more subdued. Barron gave Dr Ansari
permission to hold a meeting in Queen’s Gardens in the
evening which was attended by 10,000 to 12,000 persons
of which 3,000 were Hindus. The Hindus left the
meeting after the speeches and before the Muslims began 
2their prayers.
There were several significant differences between 
the hartal of 30 March 1919 and that of 17 October 1920. 
The sense of involvement and the enthusiasm evident on 
30 March were completely lacking on 17 October. The 
attempt to achieve a mass following by means of 
propaganda, through the vernacular press and public 
meetings was lacking even though the Congress and Vijaya 
did raise similar issues on both occasions. Above all, 
the campaign for the hartal on 17 October was aimed at 
completely different sections of the community than
T
It was quite evident to the Chief Commissioner of 
Delhi on 16 October that the hartal would take place 
the following day. He asked for permission to extend 
the Seditious Meetings Act for another six months, a 
request which was granted. NAI, Home Poll 394-397 Part 
A, October 1919, 'Grant of Authority to the Chief 
Commissioner, Delhi, To Issue a Notification under 
Section 2 (l) of the Seditious Meetings Act, 1911, 
Declaring the Delhi Province to Be a Proclaimed Area 
for a Further Period of Three Months.'
2
NAI, Home Poll 16 Deposit, November 1917«
those of 30 March. The politicians were much more 
interested in obtaining the support of the merchant 
and the professional classes and they sought, with few 
exceptions, to restrain all attempts to appeal to draw 
the lower classes into the movement.
Another significant difference between the hartals 
of 30 March and 17 October was the regional orientation 
of politics in Delhi. The Hindus of the city had been 
inclined to follow the general pattern of politics that 
held for the Punjab, and for Lahore and Amritsar in 
particular. After the Rowlatt Satyagraha, however, the 
Muslims of Delhi who took control of nationalist 
politics in the city, looked to Abdul Bari in Lucknow 
for inspiration. More importantly, the politicians 
in Delhi conceived of their role as one of active 
leadership in nationalist politics for the rest of 
India, an aspiration which found fulfilment in 1920.
Yet another difference between 30 March and 17 
October was the reversed role of the Hindu and Muslim 
merchants. On Khilafat Day the Muslim merchants took 
the lead in organising the hartal and convinced the 
Hindu merchants that it was in their interests to 
participate. The Hindu merchants had been in the 
forefront of nationalist politics in Delhi since 1917 
and the foundation of the Home Rule League. They looked 
upon the Rowlatt Satyagraha as the culmination of their 
efforts and were exceedingly reluctant to 'burn their 
fingers' a second time. The Muslims had to hold out 
the promise of a reduction in the number of cows to be 
sacrificed at Bakr-Id and the promise that if the Hindus 
supported the Muslims over the Khilafat, the Muslims
k 39
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would support the Hindus with non-co-operation and the 
issue which arose from the atrocities in the Punjab. 
During the two succeeding years, the reluctance of the 
Hindu merchants, due mainly to the increased passion 
with which the Khilafat issue was handled, became more 
and more manifest to the point where hartals were more 
a matter of ridicule than of serious protest.
Mahatma Gandhi cpaitalised upon the resolutions 
passed on Khilafat Day at Bombay and Belgaum, 
resolutions which stated that because of the uncertainty 
over the position of the Khilafat Muslims would be 
unable to participate in the peace celebrations, to call 
for an all-India boycott of government-sponsored 
festivities. Gandhi pointed out that in any case the 
sufferings of the Punjab debarred the citizens of India 
from participating in the celebrations. A conference 
of the All-India Khilafat Committee was called for at 
Delhi for 23 November 1919, to be followed the next day 
by a Hindu-Muhammadan Conference to lay the ground work 
for the boycott . 1
The tremendous enthusiasm in Delhi for a boycott 
of the peace celebrations became evident during the 
first week of November. This enthusiasm stemmed in a
T
NAI, Home Poll 5 Deposit, December 1919, 'Reports on 
the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of 
November 1919,' C.A. Barron to W. Marris, 17 November 
1919* The motive behind the meeting was as much to 
transfer the control of the Central Khilafat Committee 
from Bombay to Lucknow or Delhi, as it was to decide on 
the boycott of the peace celebrations.
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large measure from a reaction to the testimony given 
before the Disorders Inquiry Committee which began 
hearings in Delhi on .31 October and stretched to 10 
November.1 The greatest response resulted from the 
testimony of General Drake-Brockman (Officer Commanding 
the Delhi Brigade), who stated that the amount of 
physical force used during the Rowlatt Satyagraha was 
insufficient and added: 'If more firing had been
2resorted to it would have had a more salutory effect.1
1
D.I.C., I. The Committee heard 35 witnesses give oral 
testimony and received written evidence from 33 of them. 
Deputy Commissioner Beadon was absent from the city and 
did not give any testimony. The case for the Congress, 
which was organised by Shradhanand, was conducted by 
C.R. Das, Pandit M.M. Malaviya, and Asaf Ali. The 
hearings were well-attended, with the Home Rulers and 
the students the most noticeable. NAT, Home Poll 5 
Deposit, December 1919*
2
N A I , Home Poll 24 Deposit, December 1919» 'Question of 
the Action to Be Taken to Stop Unfair Journalistic 
Comments on Evidence before the Hunter Committee.' Asaf 
Ali commented in the Bombay Chronicle of 7 November 1919 
that: 'It is this hideous doctrine of "frightfulness", 
which has to be condemned and buried for the safety of 
freedom and civilisation in India. We thought that 
Englishmen were above indulging in the Teutonic fancy 
that civilised subjects of the King should be treated 
with extra firing for "salutary effects".' A good deal 
of resentment was engendered by the statement of Hare- 
Scott, the superintendant of police, who stated that the 
enrolment of the 14 special constables did not entail 
any special onus since they were not required to wear 
uniforms, to which Lord Hunter replied that he was a 
special constable himself and had to wear a uniform.
Both of these statements completely overlooked the 
enormous enmity with which the police were regarded by 
all segments of the population. The Amrita Bazar 
Patrika (Calcutta) of 9 November carried a leader on 
this issue.
This statement had a startling effect upon the agitators 
who were able to communicate their natural revulsion to 
a wide section of the community. The statement did not, 
however, have as noticeable an effect upon the 
wealthier inhabitants of the city, who may have disliked 
the racial overtones of Drake-Brockman's comments, but 
who agreed with his conclusion that the restrained 
handling of the Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi had in effect 
encouraged the more violent elements of the city.
The excitement aroused by the statements of Drake- 
Brockman was carried to a new pitch by the meeting of 
the All-India Khilafat Committee at Delhi, on 2 3 November.
A large number of Muslim and Hindu leaders converged on 
the city, as did a significant number of maulvis who 
were becoming more active in the Khilafat agitation.
The meetings of 23 and 2k November resolved to boycott 
the peace celebrations and to boycott British goods.1
The secondary leaders carried on a vigorous campaign
through leaflets, posters, letters, telegrams and public
2meetings in support of the boycott. They toured in the 
neighbouring districts of the United Provinces, Punjab, 
and Rajasthan, and they subjected the Municipal Committee
1
NAI, Home Poll 5 Deposit, January 1920, 'Reports on the 
Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of 
November 1919, 1 C.A. Barron to W. Marris, 2 December 1919» 
The All-India Khilafat Committee failed in its attempt 
to transfer the control of the Central Khilafat Committee 
from the moderate control of the Bombay Muslims to the 
more radical leaders of Lucknow or Delhi.
2
Dr Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan dissociated themselves 
from the campaign and were generally absent from the 
city.
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to pressure to cancel its appropriation for the 
festivities, an attempt which succeeded mainly through 
the good offices of Dr S.P. Shroff, a European on the 
Municipal Committee.
The secondary leaders scored a success in their 
attempt to encourage the citizens of Delhi to boycott 
the peace celebrations. There was no tamasha in Delhi 
Municipality and no decorations, either civic or 
private. Indeed, few people attended the 'Thanksgiving 
Service' which was held in the Civil Lines and New 
Cantonment on l4 December, or the 'Grand Military 
Sports Tournament' which was held on the l6th. The 
agitators held meetings on the 1 5th and l6th which 
attracted a large number of the lower class Muslims of 
the city. These leaders were less successful with the 
merchants, however. They issued a general call for a. 
hartal to last from 5*00 p.m. onward each day. Only a 
few Muslim shops on Chandni Chauk: observed even this.1
The boycott was thus a mixed success. The 
agitators had cowed the Municipal Committee, but they 
had failed to carry the merchants. However, their 
consternation at this lukewarm support from the more 
established citizens for their radical programme soon 
changed to elation with the triumphal entry of the All 
brothers into the city on 4 January 1920.
1
NAI, Home Poll 44 Deposit, January 1920, 'Reports on 
the Internal Political Situation for the 1st Fortnight 
in December 1919,’ C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 17 
December 1919*
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Delhi threatens to become the centre of a 
very virulent form of politics.
Correspondent to 
Central Intelligence Department
12 January 1920
The organisers of the successful boycott of the 
peace celebrations in December 1919 saw another 
opportunity for political agitation in the expected 
arrival in Delhi of the Ali brothers.1 The brothers 
were brought by motor car from Ghaziabad on 4 January 
to a Delhi which was covered with extravagant 
decorations and jammed with people eagerly awaiting 
their arrival. The volunteer corps, which used this 
triumphal entry as their first opportunity for ’mass
1
The Ali brothers were released from jail under the 
Royal Amnesty of 23 December 1919* They passed through 
Delhi on 29 December 1919 on their way to Amritsar 
where the annual sessions of the Congress and League 
were in progress. When the annual sessions ended, the 
brothers began a general tour of north India, with Delhi 
one of the first stops.
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operations', paraded along in front of the guests of 
honour.1
These large crowds also attended the meeting which 
the brothers held in the evening at which they thanked 
the Hindus for their co-operation and emphasised that 
the Muslims were 'well-wishers' of the government. The 
crowds, the organisers and the brothers were all 
suitably impressed with the 'considerable sum' of money 
that had been collected for the decorations and for a 
purse fund for the brothers. A measure of the enthusiasm 
and size of the crowds was that all Europeans were warned 
not to enter the city during the two days of processions.
1
The Kh.ila.fat Volunteer Corps and the Askar-i-Islamia 
were founded at the beginning of January 1920. They 
added to the number of volunteers already organised in 
the Home Rule League Volunteer Corps, the Delhi 
Volunteer Corps, and the Moslem League Volunteer Corps. 
They all consisted almost entirely of students. The 
group of volunteers who escorted the Ali brothers 
consisted of 250 persons, of which 40 were on horses. 
They took charge of Chandni Chauk and attempted to 
control the assembled crowds. The enthusiasm of the 
crowds, however, was so great that they pushed through 
the volunteers and also through the police who were 
stationed there, with impunity. NAI, Home Poll 118-120 
Part A, December 1920, 'Application of Part II of the 
Indian Criminal Amendment Act of 1908 to the Province 
of Delhi1; Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921, 'Activities 
of the Volunteer Associations in Delhi,' a note on 
political agitation in Delhi with special reference to 
the activities of volunteer corps.
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Those who did go had to be guided through the crowds 
by the volunteers.1
Hindu-Muslim unity received something of a blow
in the weeks that followed the triumphal entry of the
Ali brothers. Shankar Lai attempted to hold a meeting
on 18 January on behalf of the Martyrs' Memorial and
received no co-operation from the Muslim community
and very little co-operation from the Hindu community.
The Hindu community responded more readily to a meeting
on 22 January which Shankar La.1 and Shradhanand
organised on behalf of the four Hindus who were to be
executed on 21 February for their part in the Karturpur
Riot. The Hindu leaders suffered an even greater
disillusionment on 23 February. Shankar Lai worked
extremely hard to make the festivities connected with
the entry of Lajpat Rai into the city a. success. He
obtained permission for a procession and canvassed for
subscriptions for decorations. The subscriptions were
so niggardly that no decorations were put up and when
only 1,000 Hindus met the train the procession had to 
2be abandoned. The unwillingness of Muslims to support
1
NAI, Home Poll 78 Deposit, January 1920, 'Reports on 
the Internal Political Situation in India for the First 
Half of January 1920,* C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 15 
January 1920; Home Poll 37-38 Part B, April 1920, 
'Question and Answer in Parliament Regarding the 
Outraging of European Women and Other Matters in 
Connection with the Disturbances at Lyallpur and Delhi.'
2 NAI, Home Poll 89 Deposit, March 1920, 'Weekly Reports 
of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for the week 
ending 1 March 1920. The only bright spot in what had 
every appearance of a political fiasco was a meeting of 
5,000 Hindus on 24 February which Lajpat Rai addressed 
on the theme of self-help which was contrasted to the 
beggarly acceptance of gifts.
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Hindu political activities had the effect of converting 
the reluctance of the Hindus for political activity into 
a general passivity.
It became quite obvious to the agitators that 
public enthusiasm for the Khilafat agitation was on the 
wane. The Muslim agitators desperately needed an issue 
to enliven their campaign. It came in the form of a 
campaign in England against the presence of the Turkish 
Government in Constantinople.1 The intention of holding 
another Khilafat Day on 19 March was immediately 
proposed and an agitation begun to make it a success.
The agitation received some impetus from the meeting 
of Khilafat leaders in Delhi on 16 January and the 
subsequent deputation to the Viceroy; from the All-India 
Khilafat Committee Meeting in Bombay on 15 February;
1 NAI, Home Poll 89 Deposit, March 1920, for the week 
ending 8 March 1920.2 At the meeting in Delhi on 16 January Mohamed Ali 
urged Muslims to sacrifice their health, wealth, and 
life in the name of God and that the Muslims should 
decide their own course of action as they pleased 
(sentiments which were much more consistent with his 
earlier attitude, than the statements in Delhi on 4 
January made during his triumphal entry) . Abdul Ka.la.rn 
Azad said that the deputation to the Viceroy had no 
requests; it would simply inform him of the nature of 
Islamic obligation to the Khalif. Said-ud-din Kitchlew 
observed that the loyalty of Muslims to a non-Muslim 
authority was only conditional. NAI, Home Poll, 67 
Deposit, April 1921. Even though this meeting was 
closed to the public, reports of the proceedings spread 
throughout the city.
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The agitation for Khilafat Day moved along at a
2muted pitch. Hakim Ajmal Khan surrendered his title 
and decoration of Hazik-ul-Mulk and Kaiser-i-Hind, 
while a meeting of 5>000 Muslims on l4 March approved 
the resolutions adopted at Calcutta. The lack of 
Hindus at the meeting was indicative of a general mood 
to the Chief Commissioner who commented:
There were no Hindu leaders present at 
yesterday's meeting [i.e., the l4th] and 
very few Hindus in the audience....In fact 
the Hindus generally seem rather disturbed 
at the length to which the Calcutta, 
proceedings went. This and quarrels among 
the staff of certain vernacular papers are 
wearing Hindu-Muslim unity thin.3
and from the Calcutta Resolutions of 28 February. 1
NAI, Home Poll 30 Deposit, March 1920, 'Note by Mr 
Manley on the Khilafat Conference Held in Bombay.1 The 
Calcutta resolktions arose from a meeting at Calcutta of 
the Bengal Khilafat Committee which wanted to force the 
pace of agitation at a greater rate than the Central 
Khilafat Committee in Bombay was willing to accept.
2 The Delhi Provincial Khilafat Committee held a meeting 
on 22 February. Sadar Patel presided over a large 
meeting which heard Hakim Amjal Khan, Dr Ansari, Asaf 
Ali, Shankar Lai and G.S. Khaparde speak. The speeches 
were moderate in tone, with the only spark supplied by 
the suggestion that the leaders of Delhi should demand 
two seats in the Imperial Legislative Assembly and refuse 
to pay taxes if the request was refused. NAI, Home Poll 
67 Deposit, April 1921. The meeting broke up and 
recovened at the Town Hall to protest against the general 
rise in rents in the city. RDDA, Home File 238 Part B 
1921, ’Petitions in Respect of the High Rents Demanded 
by Landlords in Delhi.’
^ NAI, Home Poll 90 Deposit, July 1920, 'Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st 
Half of March 1920,' C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 15 
March 1920.
This was certainly a far cry from the support the 
agitators received in 1919*
The Khilafat Committee of Delhi organised the 
hartal for Khilafat Day. They wrote to Gandhi and 
instructed him to recommend that Hindus should co-operate. 
They also bargained with the local Hindu leaders to 
participate in the Khilafat Day hartal in return for 
Muslim participation in the hartal planned for 30 March 
in memory of the Rowlatt Satyagraha..1 The Muslim 
volunteer corps also called on leading Muslims of the 
city and asked them to sign a declaration which stated 
that the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople 
would cause them 'acute personal sorrow.! The price 
of refusal was an aggressive social boycott.
A complete hartal was held on Friday 19 March.
Muslims of the volunteer corps and other Muslims were 
posted in every bazaar to prevent violence. They were 
most aggressive in ensuring that not even the smallest 
crowd gathered. A special prayer composed by 
Kifayatullah was read at all the mosques. It called
on Allah to annihilate the infidels and the enemies
2of Islam. A similar prayer that was printed in Lucknow 
for the occasion and circulated throughout north India 
contained lines such as the following:
1
NAI, Home Poll 9 Deposit, April 1920, ’Confidential 
Reports from the U.P.C.I.D. Regarding the Hartal Held 
on March 19, 1920.' Indra, Pandit Shiv Narayan,
Qutbuddin, and Ahmad Said also made speeches in the 
neighbouring districts of the United Provinces in 
support of the hartal.
2
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NAI, Home Poll 9 Deposit, April 1920.
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0 Thou, kind and merciful we have allowed 
ourselves to be overawed by worldly power and 
material strength and have been guilty of 
many acts of obedience. We have beheld your 
prayer houses being demolished but have remained 
inactive. Non-Muslims have insulted Thy Prophet 
but our lips have remained sealed. Thy Quran 
has been defiled but we remained silent. Thy 
respected servants were killed but we did not 
open our mouths. 0 God we are immersed in the 
ocean of sin, accept our penitence. 0 Thou 
great concealer of shortcomings and forgiver of 
sins, very many gardens of Thy faith have been 
trampled upon but we did not yet realise our 
duty. Andulusia was laid wastes Hungary was 
yet devastated, Bulkania was burned, India was 
plundered, Africa was destroyed, Egypt was 
trampled upon, Aden was seized, Persia was 
ruined, but we always ignored Thy commands.
0 God of the Worlds, Thy faith is beset by 
enemies, save it. Thy holy prayer houses are 
enveloped in the darkness of heathenism, purify 
them, non-Muslims are encroaching upon Thy 
Khilafat, protect it. The Ottoman Empire, the 
standard bearer of Thy religion, is being 
sundered to pieces, keep it whole and safe.
Grant us strength that we may in obedience to 
Thy commands come into the field against the 
enemies of the faith with our lives and property.
0 God, help those who are helping the faith 
of the Prophet and make us followers of His 
Teachings and shame those who are fighting against 
His faith and let us not be one of them.-*-
The effect of such appeals on those who attended the 
mosques on that Friday became apparent at a large meeting 
in the evening at which resolutions advocating 
conditional loyalty and other decisions taken at the 
Calcutta Conference were endorsed by public acclaim.
1
RDDA, Home File 9 Part B 1920, 'Declaration of 
Pamphlets to Be Forfeited to His Majesty under the 
Indian Press Act, 1910.'
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The city was pervaded with, an aura of success. The 
hartal had been complete and there had been no violence. 
The following day Tilak arrived to the accompaniment of 
a small demonstration at the Railway Station. The rest 
of the nationalist leaders of India arrived the following 
day and began a joint meeting of Hindu* and Muslim leaders 
on the 22nd.1
The most extraordinary event in this week, however, 
was the foundation of an organisation called the 
Khilafat Workers' Association. It was formed by the 
secondary leaders of Delhi as a direct protest at being 
excluded from the meeting of the leaders on the 22nd.
It was also a reaction to the repeated refusals of Hakim 
Ajmal Khan and Dr Ansari to attend political meetings, 
and a vague protest against the loss of the preeminence 
which the secondary leaders had acquired during the 
boycott of the peace celebrations. They looked upon 
the Association as a means of elevating their position 
in the Khilafat agitation. To further these objectives 
they announced a meeting of an A11-India Khilafat 
Workers'Conference at Delhi on 18 April. They began 
organising for that immediately, but turned their 
attention first to the hartal planned for 30 March.
There seems little doubt that the success of the 
hartal on 30 March was largely due to the efforts
1 —
NAI, Home Poll 4 Deposit, April 1920, 'Report on a 
Meeting of the Hindu and Muhammadan Leaders of India,
Held at Delhi on 22 March 1920.' There were no Hindu 
representatives from Delhi, while four out of the 15 
Muslims who attended were leaders in the city. The four 
Muslims were Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari, Asaf Ali, and 
Tofazzud Hussain.
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of the Khilafat Workers. They circulated posters and 
leaflets and engendered sufficient enthusiasm in the 
city for the businessmen to hold a second hartal in
11 days. They also succeeded in redeeming the promise 
of the Muslim merchants to participate in the hartal 
of 30 March as the price for participation by the Hindu 
merchants in the hartal on Khilafat Day. Thus, while 
the members of the Khilafat Committee and the Provincial 
Congress Committee were in Ajmere, the Khilafat Workers 
organised the hartal. As in previous hartals, those 
who dealt in transport, drugs and foodstuffs were exempt. 
Ahmad Said delivered an 'objectionable' speech to 
Muslims in the morning and a 'virulent' speech to Hindus 
at the burning ghats in the evening.1
A clash between the Khilafat Committee and the 
Khilafat Workers became imminent during 'National Week 
(6 April to 13 April) which was called by Gandhi to 
commemorate the martyrs of 1919« The local businessmen 
in Delhi completely rejected the idea of another hartal 
and the organisers had to settle for meetings on the 6th, 
9th and 1 3th. A meeting on the 6th was very poorly
attended, and the speeches were dull. It was an altogether
2miserable beginning for the week. The Khilafat
1
NAI, Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921.
2
NAI, Home Poll 28 Deposit, December 1920, 'Supply to 
the India Office of a Set of Communications Issued by 
the Govt, of India Indicating Their Policy in Regard 
to the Suppression of Seditious Propaganda among Troops,
The Khilafat Movement, Tempering with the Police in the 
Execution of Their Duties, And the National Volunteer 
Movement.'
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Committee in the persons of Dr Ansari and Asaf Ali 
responded to the taunts of the Khilafat Workers and 
spoke at the meeting on the 9th. Dr Ansari emphasised 
the need for the practical work of observing a. 
commercial boycott and non-co-operation with the 
government. Asaf Ali spoke on the danger of infuriating 
Indian Muslims and Shankar La.1 promised Hindu support. 
Enthusiasm had waned to such an extent, however, that 
only bazaar riff raff attended the meeting on the 1 3th. 
The agitators saved face only by attracting a large 
audience of businessmen, professionals and students, 
mostly Muslim, to a. meeting on the l4th. The main 
speaker, Abdul Majid of Badaun, was introduced by Hakim 
Ajma.1 Khan and launched into a. wild speech on the 
following lines:
The sword of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, and the weapon 
of Enver Pasha will brighten the Muslim glory.
Are you waiting to see the Union Jack flying over 
Mecca and the keys of the Holy Places in 
Christian hands? A Muslim who is loyal to the 
government curses God. Liquor is freely sold 
in Mecca under British rule which makes pilgrimage 
of no avail.
This speech, which preceded the Khilafat Workers' 
Conference by four days, sparked interest in the 
Conference and gave a boost to public opinion which 
even though it did not express itself in political 
activity, was a latent source upon which the agitators 
could draw.
1
NAI, Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921.
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The organisation of the Khilafat Workers on 24 March 
and the convocation of the Khilafat Workers’ Conference 
on 18 April reflected a significant trend in the Khilafat 
agitation. These events represented the first major 
break away from the control which the sharif in the 
persons of Hakim Ajma.1 Khan and Dr Ansari exercised over 
the Khilafat movement. The group that engineered this 
break consisted of the non-sharif and of members of the 
ulema who found the moderate influence exercised by the 
sharif on the Khilafat Committee intolerable. The 
Khilafat Workers were united in their desire to adopt 
more radical solutions to the problems that surrounded 
the Khalif and the holy places. The events of 24 March 
and 18 April also reflected the degree to which 
parochial sentiment had activated broad sections of the 
non-sharif and the ulema.. All of the Khilafat Workers 
were literate in the vernacular and the majority had 
been educated in traditional schools rather than in 
western-oriented institutions. They were, in effect, a. 
sub-elite which had limited resources of wealth, status 
and power, and which sought to utilise political 
agitation as a means to obtain recognition. They were 
also a group of highly motivated religious enthusiasts 
who sincerely wished to alleviate the difficulties which 
impeded the settlement of the Khilafat question. And 
finally, the success of the Khilafat Workers between 24 
March and 18 April reflected and reinforced the degree 
to which parochial issues had affected the Muslim 
merchants and orthodox Muslims in general. Those who 
formed the Khilafat Workers1 Association had attempted 
to invoke a hartal as a protest against the peace
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celebrations in December 1919» but the complete 
disassociation of the sharif in the Delhi Khilafat 
Committee foredoomed their efforts to failure. The 
absence of these same men from Delhi on 30 March 1920 
to attend the Delhi-Ajmere-Marwara Political Conference 
at Ajmere, however, did not in the slightest deter the 
Muslim merchants from responding to the issues raised 
by the Workers. The failure of ’National Week1 also 
reflected this attitude since there was almost no 
parochial sentiment in the issues upon which that week 
was supposed to focus.
The Khilafat Workers' Conference, therefore, 
represented a climax in the growth of parochial 
sentiment among a. highly politicised sub-elite, namely, 
the Muslim merchants, and the more traditional Muslims 
of Delhi and of north India. The Conference, which 
began on 18 April, attracted 525 delegates, of which 
87 were from the Punjab and 220 from the United 
Provinces.1 The Khilafat Workers from Delhi who were 
prominent in the conference were Abdulla Churiwala (who 
was to figure prominently in events later in the year),
1
This account of the Khilafat Workers' Conference comes 
from the following documents: NAI, Home Poll 103 
Deposit, April 1920, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of 
Central Intelligence’; Home Poll 12 Deposit, May 1920, 
'Account of the Public Meetings of the "Khilafat Workers" 
Conference Held at Delhi on 19 April 1920*; Home Poll 78 
Deposit, June 1920, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of 
Central Intelligence1; Home Poll 94 Deposit, July 1920, 
'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation 
for the 1st Half of May 1920,' H.P. Tollinton to H. 
McPherson, 15 May 1920; Home Poll 104 Deposit, July 1920, 
'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence'; 
Home Poll 106 Deposit, July 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports 
on the Internal Political Situation for the 2nd Half of 
July 1920.»
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Qazi Abbas Hussain, Kifayatullah, Ta.judd.in, Ahmad Said, 
Arif Hussain Haswi, and Qutbuddi.n. The most notable 
workers from outside Delhi were Maulvi. Muhammad Daud 
Gh.azna.vi and Maulvi Ataullah, both eminent Ah.l-i-Ha.dis 
leaders from Amritsar who took a prominent part in the 
Rowlatt Sa.tya.graha. in that city.
The Conference itself consisted of private meetings 
on the 18th and of three public meetings on the 19th.
The public meetings were the most important from the 
point of view of the issues raised and the size of the 
audiences. Ahmad Sa.:id? s speech was the first on the 19th 
and the most noteworthy. He favoured a boycott of 
English goods and recommended the use of swadeshi goods 
both of which decisions the Punjabian merchants of Delhi 
had already agreed to endorse. (They did not do so, 
however, at the meeting.) He continued with a condemn­
ation of the Central Khilafat Committee which had not 
declared either jihad or hijrat. He was prepared to 
spread the doctrine among the troops and government 
servants even if he had to go to jail. He informed the 
assemblage that those who gave up government employment 
would go to heaven. Other means of gaining a heavenly 
reward, so Ahmad Said pointed out, were to follow jihad 
and hijrat when told to do so; to refuse to pay taxes; 
to give up titles; to take an oath to further the 
swadeshi movement; and to boycott English goods. His 
emphasis on government titles led the audience to cry 
out against the Imam of the Jama Masjid, the direct 
result of which was that the Imam came under attack the 
following day (the 20th). Muhammad Daud Ghaznani and 
Attalluh of Amritsar also made violent speeches but had
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little to add to what had already been said by Ahmad 
Said.1 Shankar Lai spoke and was followed by Shanti 
Sarup, an Arya Samajist of Fa.ru.khabad. The latter 
stated that:
he considered that Turkey though she had lost 
her possessions was the real victor in the 
War in as much as she had endeared all Hindus 
and Muhammadans to her through the Khalifa, 
who had therefore become the Khalifa, of kings.
He was quite prepared to go to jail rather than give
up working in the cause of justice. When Kifayatullah
rose to speak he was greeted with shouts of Allah ho
Akbar, which was a sign of the high regard in which he
was held by the congregation. The agitators managed
to outdo any previous meeting in their radical approach
to the Khilafat issue. The Home Secretary for the
Government of India admitted that, * the violence of the
language used in the Delhi proceedings of the 19th
instant, exceeds anything that has been previously
2reported....’
The aftermath of the Khilafat Workers' Conference 
in Delhi was most remarkable. The day after the
1
Muhammad Daud Ghaznavi stated that the Czar of Russia 
had learned his lesson and the British Government would 
soon meet the same fate. Ataullah said that domestic 
servants to Europeans should practice a boycott of their 
masters. He concluded the sessions with the statement 
that unless a few Europeans were murdered they would not 
get any satisfaction from government. He was personally 
against murder, however, and the only avenue of protest 
open to him was hijrat.
2
NAI, Home Poll 12 Deposit, May 1920, H. McPherson to
C.A. Barron, Simla, 2 3 April 1920.
conference had ended, 20 April, Ghulam Muhammad Aziz of 
Amritsar opened a hijrat office in Delhi. He maintained 
this office at Delhi throughout the rest of the year and 
lectured and toured extensively in support of it. He 
reportedly obtained 50 names, most of which were later 
discovered to be pseudonymous.1
The most extraordinary event that occurred in the
wake of the conference, however, was the attack upon the
Imam of the Jama Masjid. There were continual demands
during the conference that the Imam should surrender his
title (like Hakim Ajmal Khan), and that it was
irreligious to participate in a prayer led by a title
holder. The Khilafat Workers interfered with the Imam's
prayers on the 20th and 21st. The Imam then sent his
son rather than court this public nuisance. But even
2this led to outright violence on the 23rd. A meeting 
was held the following Wednesday, 2 8 April, with the 
object of electing a new Imam. At this point the 
Khilafat Committee attempted to regain the control of 
the movement. Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari and Asaf Ali 
succeeded in their attempt to give the Imam another
1
NAI, Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1920.
2
The Imam's son was prevented from leading the prayer, 
as was the Imam's brother when huge crowds of the Workers 
gathered around the mukkaba and refused to allow their 
ascension. Another maulvi then led the prayers while the 
son and brother of the Imam were hidden away in an ante­
chamber. When the prayers ended and the two relatives of 
the Imam emerged, a shoe was thrown, striking the 
brother of the Imam on the cheek. They were then 
violently jostled by the crowd until the police picket 
which had been stationed there specifically to prevent 
just such violence, cordoned off the two men and led 
them home.
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chance if he would resign his titles. Ansari led
the deputation the following day and secured the Imam1s 
resignation, after a meeting of three hours, from the 
titles of shams-ul-ulema, provincial durbari and khan 
sahib.
The violence of the Khilafat Workers' Conference 
and the attack on the Imam of the Jama Masjid resulted 
in two significant events. The Chief Commissioner 
reinvoked the Seditious Meetings Act on 29 April.1 This 
had the indirect effect of discrediting the Khilafat 
Workers because they had boasted that they would begin 
non-co-operation if the Act were enforced and hold 
illegal meetings. They did not fulfil this pledge 
which made it impossible for them to expact anyone to 
attend a meeting for which permission had been obtained 
or for a meeting outside the province. The government 
had decided upon a strict policy of non-interference in 
the hope that if it did not arrest any of the agitators, 
the violence of the movement would bring discredit upon
2the leaders. The policy had justified itself in Delhi.
Another result flowed from the violence of the 
Khilafat Workers. The Provincial Khilafat Committee
1
NAI, Home Poll 26k Part A, July 1920, 'Delegation of 
Powers to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, To Issue a 
Notification under the Prevention of Seditious Meetings 
Act, 1911, Declaring the Province of Delhi to Be a 
Proclaimed Area for a Period of Three Months with Effect 
from 27 July 1920. In Order to Cope with the Situation 
Created by the Khilafat Agitation.’
2 See especially the article by D.A. Low, 'The Government 
of India and the First Non-Co-opera.ti.on Movement, 1.920- 
1922 , 1 Journal of Asian Studies, XXV (February 1965)*
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reasserted its more moderate control over the movement 
on 28 April and resumed absolute control on 8 May. On 
the latter date Shaukat Ali made a quick visit to the 
city and held a. series of private meetings with the 
Khilafat Committee and the Khilafat Workers. He 
upbraided the latter severely for being responsible for 
the invocation of the Seditious Meetings Act. He made 
it very plain to the Khilafat Workers that they were to 
do nothing else to antagonise the government before the 
All-India Ulemas Conference scheduled for Delhi on 21 
August 1920.
The Khilafat Workers heeded the warning of the
Shaukat Ali and toned down the language of their
propaganda. They continued their activities, however,
through the press1 and through the use of religious
2meetings. Ghulam Muhammad Aziz continued to agitate 
on behalf of his hijrat office and the Khilafat Workers
3attended a meeting of domestic servants at Raisina.
1
The Khilafat and the Hurryat (the latter of which began 
just two weeks before the Workers’ Conference as a 
spokesman for the Workers), took up the campaign for non- 
co-operation. The Khilafat appealed to government 
servants and the Hurryat distributed allegiance forms 
for swadeshism, boycott, and non-co-operation. NAI, Home 
Poll 78 Deposit, June 1920; Home Poll 112 Deposit, June
1920, ’Extract from the Weekly Letter of the Commissioner 
of Police, Bombay, Dated 17-18 May 1920, Regarding the 
Khilafat Situation.’
2 The Workers organised a female melad sharif [religious 
reading] on 13 May at which they passed out the allegiance 
forms distributed by the Hurryat. Neki Ram Sharma organ­
ised a similar readings on l6, 17 and 18 May for male Hindus.
3 The Workers informed the servants that they would be 
restricted to their quarters after 9*00 p.m. during the 
time which Martial Law would be imposed which was to occur 
at any moment according to a host of rumours in the city.
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Some measure of their reticence is revealed, however, 
by the fact that they did not protest against either 
the Turkish Peace Terms which were published on 18 
May or the publication of the Report of the Hunter 
Committee on 28 May. Far more surprisingly when the 
protest meeting against the Report of the Hunter 
Committee was held on 22 June, it was organised under 
the aegis of the Provincial Khilafat Committee with 
Dr Ansari and Asaf Ali responsible for obtaining 
permission from the Chief Commissioner for holding 
the meeting under the Seditious Meetings Act.1
The Khilafat Workers suffered an ignominious 
demise after a short-lived ascendancy in April 1920.
The continual friction that resulted from the conflict 
between their more radical approach to the Khilafat 
agitation and the more restrained tactics ordained by 
the Provincial Khilafat Committee found some resolution. 
The friction was resolved when the moderate leaders 
reasserted their control over the movement in Delhi, 
and even more so when the Central Khilafat Committee in 
Bombay accepted non-co-operation on 28 May and the Joint 
and Central Khilafat Committees Conference at Allahabad 
on 1 June ratified that decision for all Muslim 
organisations in India. The conflict between the 
moderate and radical Extremists submerged rather than 
disappeared during the following months.
1
NAI, Home Poll 97 Deposit, July 1920, ’Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 2nd 
Half of June 1920,’ H.P. Tollinton to H. McPherson, 30 
June 1920.
In G-od’s name put utmost effort to save Islam
from dishonour. Make 1st August success.
Avoid friction.
Telegram from Shaukat Ali and 
Saiduddin Kitchlew
30 July 1920
The month of August 1920 saw the inauguration of 
non-co-operation in Delhi with a hartal on Sunday the 
1st of August. The month witnessed two more hartals, 
the boycott of the Festival of Flowers at Mahrauli and 
the reduction in the numbers of cattle sacrificed on 
Bakr-Id.
The Khilafat Workers fought valiantly to get the 
non-co-operation movement off the ground during June 
and July. They found the task most difficult, as 
testified to by Shankar Lai, in a letter opened by the 
censor, in which he complained bitterly to the Central 
Khilafat Committee about the apathy and indifference of 
the general public in Delhi. He found it especially 
difficult to raise funds in the face of a general 
suspicion that the funds already collected were used for 
the personal gain of the individuals concerned.1
Non-co-operation did not find the responsive public 
for which the Khilafat Workers would have wished. Their
1
NAI, Home Poll 105 Deposit, July 1920, 'Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st 
Half of July 1920,' H.P. Tollinton to H. McPherson, 15 
July 1920.
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usual response in such situations was to heighten the 
frenzy of their campaign. The opportunity cajme with the 
announcement that the Seditious Meetings Act was to be 
extended for another three months from 28 July.1 The 
Khilafat Workers immediately proposed that the Act should 
be defied as another part of non-co-operation. The 
Provincial Khilafat Committee refused thereby forcing the 
Khilafat Workers to appeal to Gandhi for permission.
Gandhi specifically forbade them to perform any act of
2defiance. The feud between the Khilafat Workers and the
Committee, which had remained submerged from June, re-
emerged with increased bitterness on the part of the
Khilafat Workers who resented the moderate stand of the
Committee. The feud became so heated that Shaukat Ali
paid a flying visit to Delhi in a bid to heal the breach
between the two factions. As on 8 May he was successful
enough to gain an assurance that there would be no
3violence on 1 August.
Public sentiment had not reached the point it had 
earlier on the eve of previous hartals. The organisation 
for the hartal on Sunday 1 August did not encompass any 
mass meetings. It followed, rather, from the efforts of 
the volunteer corps which canvassed the city quietly in
1
NAI, Home Poll 264 Part A, July 1920.
2
N .R . Phatak, Source Material for a History of the 
Freedom Movement in India, III, Part I (Bombay, 1965),
292. Gandhi wired the following to the Workers in Delhi 
from Karachi on 27 July: 'You should not break law 
breach harmful.'
3
NAI, Home Poll 106 Deposit, July 1920.
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an attempt to obtain a hartal with no violence. The 
corps circulated a poster with the programme for the 
inauguration of non-co-operation which was also called 
the Third Khilafat Day.1
2Sunday, 1 August 1920 dawned in Delhi with a. hartal. 
Members of the volunteer corps spread throughout the 
city and kept crowds from collecting and protected 
anyone who did not wish to close his shop. Their 
vigilance in this regard created a subdued mood of the 
city. Manual labourers, domestic servants, and 
transport workers did not observe the hartal and were 
not interfered with. The merchants in the main bazaars, 
both Hindu and Muslim, did observe the hartal. The 
hartal on the smaller bazaars was slight, and it was 
non-existent in the galis.
By August 1920 the merchants of Delhi had held 
hartals on six occasions. Hartals no longer represented 
an equivocal response to vague feelings of discontent 
which had characterised their earlier introduction. From
1 August onward, it is possible to say that the hartal 
had become a finely tuned political instrument. The 
Hindus who participated in it were highly politicised
1
RDDA, Home File 9 Part B 1920. A translation of the 
poster appears in the Appendix to this Chapter.
2
The account of the hartal on 1 August 1920 is drawn 
from the following documents: NAX, Home Poll 106 
Deposit, July 1920; Home Poll 111 Deposit, August 1920, 
'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation 
in India During the First Half of August 1920,* H.P. 
Tollinton to H. McPherson, 15 August 1920; Home Poll 
338-367 Part B, August 1920, ’Policy of Non-Interference 
Advocated by the Lieutenant-Governor, United Provinces, 
In Connection with the Non-co-operation Movement*; Home 
Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920.
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and were quite conscious of* the ideals which underlay 
the nationalist movement, a conclusion which is 
confirmed by the lack of response on 2 August to 
Tilak* s death. The participation of Hindu merchants 
in hartal, therefore, depended only marginally upon 
economic, religious, or social discontents and 
grievances. The Muslim merchants on the other hand, 
responded primarily from a religious grievance centred 
upon the Khilafat question. The parochial overtones 
of this issue affected more Muslim merchants, than the 
nationalist overtones of the Punjab atrocities affected 
Hindus, but even so, the Muslims recognised that they 
participated in a political process of protest.
The political leaders held a meeting at Hajipur in 
the Meerut District of the United Provinces in the 
afternoon of 1 August. Hajipur had been chosen to 
escape the application of the Seditious Meetings Act.
The 4,000 people who attended the meeting, mostly 
students and Hindu and Muslim traders, heard speeches 
from Dr Ansari (who presided), Kifayatullah, Ahmad Said, 
Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, Shankar Lai, Taffazzal Hussain, 
Qutbuddin, and Asaf Ali.1 The meeting passed resolutions 
which adopted non-co-operation; condemned the Seditious 
Meetings Act and the special tax for the Rowlatt 
Satyagraha; deplored the division in the House of Lords 
in the Dyer debate; and subtly called for the withdrawal 
of Indian troops from Egypt, Turkey and Mesopotamia.
Asaf Ali then announced that he was withdrawing from co­
operation with the government as a barrister. As the
Hakim Ajmal Khan was unavoidably absent from the city.
1
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crowd returned to Delhi the Khilafat Workers reopened 
the feud with the Khilafat Committee and held an illegal 
meeting of protest inside Delhi Province at Abdullapur. 
That evening news of Tilak’s death arrived and a hartal 
similar to the one on the 1st followed on the 2nd.
The hartal in Delhi on Monday the 2nd was supported 
by the Hindu and Muslim merchants in the main bazaars. 
The Muslims observed the hartal in response to an appeal 
from the Hindus who regarded Muslim support as the price 
for Hindu support on the previous day. The small 
shopkeepers, both Hindu and Muslim, on the side streets 
regarded the hartal very lightly and those in the galis 
not at all. It would have been natural for the Hindus, 
at least, to respond to the charisma of the political 
leader of orthodox Hindus in India. They did not 
respond, however, and they adhered to the policy of non­
participation. There was an ironical twist in the 
occasion, in that those who would have liked to show 
some sign of regret for Tilak's death were constrained 
by Tilak's opposition to non-co-operation, and thus they 
did not participate in the hartal which was a political 
weapon of the non-co-operators. But the overwhelming 
majority of the Hindu petty bourgeoisie had withdrawn 
from politics and neither local grievances nor the 
charisma of B.G. Tilak could arouse a parochial or 
political response.
The parochial overtones of the hartal on the 2nd 
led to an extraordinary event. The moderate Hindus of 
Delhi applied for permission to hold a meeting in 
Queen's Gardens on the evening of the 2nd. The Chief 
Commissioner gave his permission for the meeting whose
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object was to eulogise the deceased Colossus of Indian 
politics. The Khilafat Workers saw this meeting as a 
direct affront to their principles of non-co-operation, 
principles which forbade any political meetings in 
Delhi while the Seditious Meetings Act was in force. 
Abdulla Churiwalla, Aziz Hussain Naqashbandi, and members 
of the Khilafat Volunteer Corps raided the meeting and 
dispersed it. This was a blow to the Hindu-Muslim unity 
exhibited on the previous day and further aggravated the 
feud between the Khilafat Workers and the Khilafat 
Committee. In an effort to reaffirm Hindu-Muslim unity, 
the next raid on a meeting of trade union of clerks on 
Sunday the 8th was led by Shankar Lai and the Home Rule 
League Volunteer Corps. (The clerks met at the Lachmi 
Narain Dharmasala to commiserate the death of Tilak who 
had lectured to them on 23 March 1920, and to protest 
the rise in house rents in the city.) This time, however, 
the raiders were ejected and suffered a defeat. The 
demise of the agitators was nearly complete when on the 
following day, i.e. the 9th, they organised a procession 
and a meeting to coincide with the hartal (again in 
memory of B.G-. Tilak). The hartal was again confined 
to only the main bazaars and the illegal procession 
which finished at the Jumna Ghat only drew 400.
The lack of support for the hartals and the meetings 
held in connection with them reflected the general 
feeling in the city against non-co-operation. The 
meeting at Hajipur of 4,000 people was the first and 
the largest. The non-co-operators were unable to 
attract as many again in the following week when they 
held meetings at Ghaziabad on the 2nd and the 10th and
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at Delhi on the 9th. The difference in the sizes of 
the audience at Hajipur on the 1st and Delhi on the 9th 
also shows that proximity was not the determining 
factor in the response. The populace seemed inclined 
to leave politics to the activists and adopted a stance 
of passivity. From this point onward in the non-co- 
operation movement, politics became the purview of the 
volunteers, the nationalists, and the Khilafatists.
The Kh.ila.fat Workers openly broke with the Khilafat 
Committee when they resorted to force on 2 and 8 August 
and when they held an illegal meeting on the 9th. Their 
failures on 8 and 9 August spurred them on to reassert 
their leadership over the non-co-operation movement.
The opportunity arose on 19 August during the Phool 
Walon ki Sair at Mahrauli. The Festival of Flowers was 
an annual event at Jehaz Mahal in Mehrauli, a large 
village ten miles south of Delhi near the Qutb Minar.
All the members of the volunteer corps picketted the 
roads which led out of Delhi and stopped the carriages 
which were on the way to Mahrauli. The volunteers, who 
were in uniform, informed the occupants that they were 
boycotting the fair as a measure of non-co-operation. 
Those who insisted on attending were subjected to 'gross 
insults’ with threats of social boycott at a later date. 
The volunteers also bluntly informed those who planned 
to set up booths along the road that they would loot 
any stalls set up in defiance of non-co-operation. At 
Jehaz Mahal, a. large group of volunteers and ’a, hooting 
crowd of loafers» obstructed the procession which 
carried the punkhas and were »with difficulty persuaded
469
to stand aside.’1 The result of the ’boycott' of the 
Mahrauli Festival of Flowers was a victory for the 
non-co-operators as few people attended the festivities 
there. It was a success, however, only because the 
inhabitants of the city, who looked upon a tamasha as 
one of the major forms of recreation, were intimidated 
by the spector of unpleasantness that faced them if 
they disregarded the volunteers. It is not known what 
the volunteers told the illiterate masses that usually 
flocked to the fair every year but they also probably 
responded in a negative sense.
The use of force and propaganda combined to produce 
a most startling occurrence at the Bakr-Id at the end 
of August. The Khilafat Workers and the volunteers 
combined a propaganda campaign and a boycott backed by 
physical force and succeeded in their attempt to reduce 
the number of cattle that were sacrificed. They had 
more active support in this campaign because Hakim 
Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari and the rest of the Provincial 
Khilafat Committee were most enthusiastic over the 
success of such a project. The leading Hindu politicians 
also hoped for its success which would act as an impetus 
to Hindu-Muslim unity expressed at the popular level.
In pursuance of the campaign to reduce the number 
of cattle sacrificed at Bakr-Id the Muslim members of 
the volunteer corps persuaded the butchers not to 
sacrifice cattle, and led by Tajuddin, Qutbuddin, Aziz
I
NAI, Home Poll 112 Deposit, August 1920, 'Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India, 
for the Second Half of August 1920,' H.P. Tollinton to
H. McPherson, 1 September 1920.
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Hussain and Abdulla Ch.uriwa.la, they picket ted all the 
approaches to the slaughter house. Other parties 
picketted roads leading into Delhi to discourage 
cowherds from driving their cattle into the city to 
sell, since as they said, the sacrifice of cattle 
had been forbidden. The Kh.ila.fat Workers issued 
posters and leaflets which declared that those who 
sacrificed cattle were enemies of the Khilafat and 
traitors to their faith. The Muslim public responded 
to the appeal and brought few cattle for sacrifice.
Those who did bring cattle faced the prospect of having 
cattle forcibly turned loose, or ’bought1 by Abdulla 
Churiwalla who then demanded the return of the money 
as a subscription to the Khilafat Committee. Those few 
who did manage to sacrifice cows were subjected to a 
strong social boycott which lasted until the Ahl-i- 
Hadis and other orthodox Muslims instituted a stronger 
counter-boycott. The volunteers successfully picketted 
the slaughter house until the arrival of the police who 
stopped the activities of the volunteers and who refused 
to be intimidated by Abdulla. This so infuriated the 
latter that he vowed to establish a volunteer corps 
that would ’deal once and for all with such rascals.1 
He founded the Khuddam-i-Watan volunteer corps early in 
September out of a group of ’selected hooligans' who 
had a. strong predilection for violence.
The volunteers were immensely successful in their 
attempt to reduce the number of cattle sacrificed on 
Bakr-Id. The Muslims of Delhi had sacrificed 130 
cattle at Bakr-Id in 1918 and 250 in 1919» The jump in 
the latter figure was due to the stringent economic 
conditions at the time. At Bakr-Id in 1920 there were
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only 29 cattle sacrificed. The reduction was quite 
remarkable and became another milestone in Hindu-Muslim 
unity.
The success of the Provincial Khilafat Committee, 
the Khilafat Workers, and the volunteer corps at the 
Bakr-Id festival reflected a general upsurge of 
enthusiasm for the Khilafat agitation. A correspondent 
wrote to the government that 'the movement is spreading 
to the masses and that the Maulvis are coming in,1^ in 
western United Provinces, and south-eastern Punjab of 
which Delhi was the centre. But if the Khilafat campaign 
brought success, it also brought sorrow. A Muslim 
fanatic, fired by the propaganda of the Khilafatists, 
murdered the Deputy Commissioner of Kheri District in 
the United Provinces, an Englishman by the name of Mr 
Willoughby.
The Khilafat Workers looked upon the activities of 
August 1920 as a vindication of their efforts to increase 
the pace of political agitation in Delhi. They drew 
attention to the fact that only one meeting had been held 
legally under the Seditious Meetings Act; that they had 
enforced a successful boycott of the Festival of 
Flowers at Mahrauli; and that the number of cattle 
sacrificed at Bakr-Id had been reduced. This claim 
overlooked the fact, however, that the hartals of the 
1st, 2nd and 9th were only partially successful; that 
their meetings drew smaller audiences than the Home Rule 
movement at its height; and that there was little
1
NAI, Home Poll 112 Deposit, August 1920, M. Keane to
H. McPherson, 1 September 1920.
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support for their activities from the inhabitants of the 
city who succumbed to the pressure of the volunteers in 
order to avoid their wrath. Nothing of note occurred 
during September and October to alter public opinion 
towards the non-co-operation movement.
The only significant change which occurred in the 
second and third months of the non-co-operation movement 
involved the volunteer corps. Asaf Ali sought to use 
the corps to submerge the parochial attitudes inherent 
in the groups which were organised on a. communal basis. 
At a meeting of the Delhi Provincial Congress Committee 
convened to consider the details of non-co-operation on 
7 October, he announced a. scheme for national courts 
and a national administration.1 The volunteers were to 
conduct the national administration and enforce it by 
means of an intensive social, economic, and religious 
boycott of any opponent. The Khilafat Volunteer Corps 
and the Askar-i-Islamia were to serve summonses for the 
national court which he had set up at the Khilafat 
office. The Provincial Congress Committee agreed and 
ordered the volunteers to agitate for a boycott of the
2census and the Imperial Legislative Assembly elections.
1 Asaf Ali had first announced this plan in a letter to 
the Special Congress at Calcutta, on 4 September. NAI, 
Home Poll 70 Deposit, September 1920, ’Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for 
the First Half of September 1920,' H.P. Tollinton to H. 
McPherson, 15 September 1920.
2 NAI, Home Poll 59 Deposit, December 1920, ’Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for 
the 1st Half of October 1920,' H.P. Tollinton to H, 
McPherson, 16 October 1920; Home Poll 84 Deposit, 
December 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal 
Political Situation for the 2nd Half of September 1920,' 
C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 1 October 1920.
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More importantly, Asaf Ali attempted to unite all of the 
volunteers under his own A skar-i-Islamia in an effort to 
appropriate to himself police functions over Delhi. But 
the foundation of the Muslim based Khuddam-i-Wa.tan 
(under Abdulla Churiwala) and of a Hindu volunteer corps, 
the Pahari Dhiraj Seva. Samiti, marked the failure of his 
aspirations.
The foundation of the two new corps marked a 
significant trend in the volunteer movement in Delhi.
All of the corps expanded their membership during August, 
September, and October. The increase in the number of 
corps and in the number of volunteers reflected the fact 
that new social groups had been drawn into the movement. 
Initially the corps had depended almost entirely upon 
students, both Hindu and Muslim, who had received both 
vernacular and English education. Their motives were 
primarily ideological, but the prestige which accrued 
to the movement also made the corps attractive. The 
expansion of the corps drew upon the semi-educated, the 
illiterate, and those with very little social status. 
Among the Muslims in particular the sons of artisans and 
petty shopkeepers joined the movement in increasing 
numbers, as much from parochial sentiment as from an 
attempt to acquire a. heightened social stature. The 
Hindu corps, on the other hand, still drew most of their 
support from the literate or semi-literate petty 
bourgeoisie. The new social element in the volunteer 
corps introduced a note of boisterousness and intolerance
into the movement. 1 The leaders sought to control 
these tendencies by issuing uniforms, parading the 
corps in formations and teaching them infantry drill.
The leaders could not maintain complete control of 
their followers for long since they were willing to 
submit to discipline only for limited periods at a 
time and only under the promise of some purposeful 
activity in the not too distant future. This probably 
explains the increasing use of force by the volunteers 
and their greater proclivity to resort to physical 
violence.
The volunteer corps seized two opportunities to
supplant the police after the inauguration of non-co-
operation. The first opportunity occurred at Moha.rra.rn
when the police followed the wise policy of making the
fullest possible use of the volunteer corps in
2controlling the processions. This policy worked to 
the satisfaction of all concerned and was acclaimed as 
a victory for non-co-operation and the volunteers. The 
second opportunity arose at Ram Lila which began on l4 
October and lasted until 23 October 1920.
During the Ram Lila festival of 1920, a strong 
parochial spirit manifested itself, just as a parochial 
spirit had manifested itself in October 1917» The
1
The 'lawlessness* of the volunteer corps in Delhi came 
to the notice of the G-overnment of India, in September 
1920 when they were informed that the corps were arming 
themselves with swords. The Government of India then 
decided to demand licences for the possession of such 
weapons in Delhi. NAI, Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1920.
2
474
NAI, Home Poll 84 Deposit, December 1920.
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major problem arose when the leaders of the Hindu 
community objected to the presence of Muslim volunteers 
inside the mandal. The Muslim volunteers remained 
outside the mandal on the l4th and only 20 entered on 
the 15th as a sign of Hindu-Muslim unity. 1 By the 18th, 
however, the more radical Khilafat Workers were 
unwilling to accept their exclusion. Ahmad Said gave 
a wais at the Ka.tra. Hindu Mosque in which he justified 
the presence of the Khilafat Volunteer Corps at the 
Ram Lila celebrations. Abdulla. Ch.uriwa.la also announced 
that if the Ram Lila Committee did not invite his 
Khuddam-i - W a tan into the enclosure, they would make 
their way in by brute force. He made good his promise 
the next day when 119 Muslim volunteers invaded the 
enclosure and prevented the Committee from garlanding
1
NAI, Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921. The following 
chart shows the numbers of volunteers from each corps 
over the ten days. October
14 15 16 17 18 12 20 21 22 23(Sa.
Indraprastha Sewak Mandli 70 50 90 65 58 64 80 51 55 35Hanuman Sewak Mandli 20 20 15 20 20 25 20 20 20 20Bharat Sewak Mandli • • 20 • * 25 25 25 30 30 35 25
Arya Sain Sewak Mandli 10 10 l6 • • • •
Moslem League V.C . • • 20 15 # # • • .  . 10 • • • • 25A skar-i-Islamia. • • • • 26 45 4o 55 79 50 • • 57
Khilafat V.C. • 0 • • 18 38 30 33 • • 20 • • 25Muslim Raza.ka.rs 11 • • 13 20 • •Khuddam-i-Wa t an 20 18 • * 20 15
Home Rule League V.C. 7 20 35 9 50 • •Unidentified men on horse 29
90 110 164 193 180 263 282 209 200 231
476
the officials of the city who were present. The 
sanatani Hindus reacted strongly to this invasion and 
on the 20th l40 Hindu volunteers kept the 100 Muslim 
volunteers at bay outside the enclosure. The Muslims 
invaded the enclosure again on the 21st and each 
succeeding day as opposition to their activities grew 
apace. By the 24th, they had become so unruly, and 
so unpopular, that a large mob broke through their 
ranks at the Clock Tower on the last day of the 
festival, the 24th, and completely dispersed the 150 
volunteers in uniform. The Khilafat Workers' claim 
that they had successfully supplanted the police during 
the Ram Lila only exacerbated the rising tide of Hindu- 
Muslim enmity which had reached a nadir when the Muslim 
had restricted the number of cattle which were 
sacrificed at Bakr-Id. But the events of the Ram Lila 
of 1920, because of Bakr-Id, did not give rise to the 
extreme feelings of parochialism so evident in 1917»
IV
There is no doubt that Delhi is one of the 
centers of sedition, and that it is more 
prevalent here than anywhere else.
Viceroy to Secretary of State 
22 December 1920
The non-co-operation movement assumed a new 
significance in Delhi after 28 October 1920. On that 
day the Seditious Meetings Act lapsed in the city and 
the agitators took advantage of a prerogative which had 
been denied to them during the preceding six months.
The radical Khilafat Workers obtained the support of
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the Kh.ila.fat Committee and successfully raised the issue 
of non-co-operation before a wide segment of the non- 
sharif sections of Muslim society. -As these radical 
agitators assumed ever more responsibility for the 
movement, their language became more vehement and their 
activities became more violent, both of which culminated 
in the excesses of the first week of December.
The tempo of political agitation immediately
accelerated. Asaf Ali, Abdulla Churiwala., Nur Muhammad,
an ex-drawing master at the Anglo-Arabic High School,
and six uniformed volunteers made an 'attack’ on the
Anglo-Arabic High School on Saturday, the 30th. The
’attack’ itself was inconclusive since the 'attackers’
were refused permission to enter, and the two leaders
could only entice a small number of boys to come out on
strike.1 The long term effect of the 'attack', however,
was much more serious. The school closed for seven days
during which time the agitators sought to coerce the
students and parents into a boycott of the school. In
this the agitators were much more successful, for when
the school reopened on Saturday 6 November, only two-
2thirds of the students returned.
On the afternoon of 30 October the agitators held 
a meeting at the Lachmi Narain Dharmsala. A.T. Gidwani,
1
NAI, Home Poll 66 Deposit, December 1920, 'Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for 
the 2nd Half of October 1920,' C.A. Barron to H. 
McPherson, 2 November 1920.
2
NAI, Home Poll 74 Deposit, December 1920, 'Fortnightly 
Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st 
Half of November 1920,' C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 15 
November 1920.
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the principal of Ramjas College, who had resigned as a
non-co-operator on the 29th, stated that he had declared
war on the government and that he wanted to enlist
schoolboys as sepoys. Asaf Ali appeared in uniform as
the Colonel of the A skar-i-Islamia and dramatised his
success at the Anglo-Arabic High School. Dr Ansari then
urged all schoolboys to imitate the students at Aligarh
who had struck in response to Gandhi and Mohamed Ali.1
Shankar Lai closed the meeting with a call for the city
of Delhi to recapture the lead in nationalist politics
that it had held when it had contributed the first
2martyrs in 1919»
Sunday 31 October witnessed a high point in the 
propaganda campaign for non-co-operation. Asaf Ali and 
Nur Muhammad convened a meeting at Fatehpuri mosque in 
the morning after the 8.00 a.m. prayers. Asaf Ali 
recommended the use of mosque schools to replace schools 
which received grants-in-aid. Nur Muhammad read a fatwa. 
of Kifayatullah which justified the boycott of schools. 
He read another fatwa, one which Ahmad Said had issued, 
which justified non-co-operation and even resistance 
to the extent of jihad. Gidwani and Asaf Ali convened 
a meeting at the Lachmi Na.ra.in Dharma.sa.la. in the 
afternoon. They both urged a large group of Hindu 
students to ’worry* title-holders and lawyers into non- 
co-operation, in which appeal they were unsuccessful.
1
NAI, Home Poll 81 Deposit, October 1920, 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of the Intelligence Bureau, ’ 
for the week ending 25 October 1920.
2
NAI, Home Poll 66 Deposit, December 1920; Home Poll
118-120 Part A, December 1920.
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In the evening a large audience met at Pa.ta.udi House. 
Asaf Ali and Pandit Shiv Dutt. Sharma. voiced their 
sympathy with the methods and aims of the Sinn Fein; 
Shankar Lai followed with a review of agitational 
activities that succeeded despite the Seditious Meetings 
Act, namely, the submission of the Municipal Committee; 
the prevention of the Ram Lila Committee from garlanding 
the officials of the city; and the persuasion of all 
nationalist candidates to boycott the Assembly elections. 
He looked upon the successful attack on the schools as 
a fitting triumph to their efforts and asked the 
inhabitants of the city to boycott the celebrations in 
connection with the visit of the Duke of Connaught.
Hakim Ajmal Khan then rose and condemned the treachery 
of the Trustees of Aligarh in which he was supported by 
Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, and Qutbuddin and Gidwani spoke on 
the courage of the students who refused to go back to 
the college. Dr Ansari asked students to abandon their 
books as had been done in England during the war. Rai 
Sahib Pearey Lai climaxed the meeting and protested 
against the arrest of such Khilafat supporters as Zafar 
Ali Khan. He promised to bring about a strike at Ramjas 
College and also to resign his title (which he did the 
next day). Another highlight of the day was the 
announcement that the All-India Ulemas' Conference, 
which had been postponed indefinitely from August due 
to the Seditious Meetings Act, would convene on 19 
November.1
1
NAI, Home Poll 66 Deposit, December 1920; Home Poll 7k 
Deposit, December 1920; Home Poll 118-120 Part A, 
December 1920; Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921.
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It is legitimate to draw attention to two features 
of the meetings of the 31 October. The first was that 
the meeting in the evening was probably not much bigger 
than the one that occurred on 1 August. The 4,000 
people were also composed for the most part of students, 
a sprinkling of professionals, some merchants (both 
Hindu and Muslim), pan-Islamists, and supporters of 
Gandhi. The most important thing about the meeting in 
the evening, however, was the presence of moderate 
Extremists, and the radicals on the same platform and 
the support the former gave to the programme of the 
latter. The second feature of note that occurred on
31 October was the nature of the appeals voiced by the 
speakers. The agitators began to go outside the narrow 
limits of their supporters, i.e., the volunteer corps, 
the merchants and professionals and the pan-Islamists. 
Asaf Ali and Nur Muhammad appealed to a general 
congregation at the Fatehpuri Mosque. This speech, 
along with the weekly wais of Ahmad Said, represented a 
definite attempt to bring the issue of non-co-operation 
before the Muslim masses. The activation of the masses 
was something which the agitators had assiduously 
avoided since the Rowlatt Satyagraha in April 1919 
because of the violence that erupted during that 
agitation. The agitators also sought to expand their 
influence among the students, when Asaf Ali and Abdulla 
Churiwalla made their direct appeal to the students at 
the Anglo-Arabic High School on 30 October, and Asaf Ali 
and Gidwani addressed the Hindu students at the Lachmi 
Narain Dharmasala. This appeared as a direct attempt to 
circumvent the volunteer corps which had previously 
concerned itself with the recruitment of students.
\481
The month of November witnessed a sharp rise in the
temper of politics in Delhi. There were 13 public
1 2 meetings, the foundation of a national school, the3organisation of two volunteer corps, two conferences, 
one industrial strike, and one hartal. The issues which 
were raised by the two conferences, the industrial 
strike, and the hartal, and the response to each, were 
the most important events of the month. The second All- 
India Ulemas' Conference met at the Bara Hindu Rao in
1
The 13 meetings occurred on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 9th, 
1 7 th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 2 1st (three), and the 25th of 
November. No meetings occurred between the 5th and 8th 
and the 10th and l6th because the leaders did not want 
to give the Administration any cause for reimposing the 
Seditious Meetings Act which would prevent the ulema 
from holding their conference in Delhi on the 19th.
2
Mohamed Ali had begun a new national college at Aligarh 
during the first week of November. Asaf Ali probably 
emulated his lead when he established his national school 
at Delhi.
3 One of the volunteer corps founded in November was the 
Bhojla Pahari Volunteer Corps. It was a Muslim counter­
part to the Pahari Dhira.i Seva Samiti which was an Arya 
Samaj volunteer corps founded in September. It is more 
than probable that the members of the Bhojla Pahari 
were butchers as this was the area, in which most of 
them resided and they had been a highly volatile and 
active group since 1 9 1 0.
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Sardar Bazaar on 19 and 20 November. 1 The sessions on 
these two days were closed to the public, while the 
final session, which was held on Sunday the 21st at the 
Lachmi Na.ra.in Dharma.sa.la, was open to the public, 4,000 
of whom attended. Conservative estimates put the 
number of delegates at 250, while more otpimistic 
accounts went as high as 3 7 5» which was considerably 
smaller than the Khilafat Workers’ Conference of April. 
Maul ana. Mahmud-ul-Hasan presided over the Conference 
which was attended by a. stellar constellation of leading 
Muslim divines.
The meetings of the 19th and 20th were milestones 
in the non-co-operation movement for two reasons. In 
the first instance, the conference witnessed the 
cementing of a coalition between those leaders who had 
opposed the Khilafat Workers’ Conference in April, and 
those who had attended the Conference: Mohamed and 
Shaukat Ali, Said-ud-din Kitchlew, Abdul Kalam Azad,
Abdul Majid Badauni, Hakim Ajmal Khan, and Abdul Bari 
mixed freely with Azad Subhani (Cawnpore), Hasrat Mohani 
(Aligarh) , Muhammad Daud Gha.zna.vi (Amritsar) , Aqilul 
Rahman (Saha.ra.npur) , and Agha Safdar (sialkot) to name 
a few.
I
This account of the Ulemas’ Conference is drawn from the 
following documents: NAI, Home Poll 62 Deposit, December
1920, ’Summary of the Results of the Ulemas Conference 
Held at Delhi’; Home Poll 86 Deposit, December 1920, 
’Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,’ 
for the week ending 29 November 1920; Home Poll 118-120 
Part A, December 1920; Home Poll 33 Deposit, January
1921, ’Fortnightly Reports on the Provincial Political 
Situation for the 2nd-Half of November 1920,’ C.A.Barron 
to H. McPherson, 1 December 1920; Home Poll 67 Deposit, 
April 1921; N.R. Phatak, Source Material, III, Pt. I, 359»
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The meetings on the 19th and 20th were important in 
the second instance for the resolution that was passed 
in endorsement of the following fa twa.:
1. It is not permissible to -
ia") become a member of government councils, b) plead as a vakil before the British courts,
(c) read in government or semi-government
schools,
(d) keep honorary magistracies, other
honorary posts, and titles conferred 
by government; and
2. all government services by which government 
is helped are haram (forbidden), especially 
serving in the Police and the Army is a great 
sin because they have to fire on their 
brethren. God says (in a quotation from the 
Koran), "One who kills a Musalman deliberately 
will be subjected to the eternal hell fire."
The Prophet said, "Who ever takes up arms  ^
against Muslims, he ceases to be a Muslim."
This fa.twa. was regarded as a. notable success by the more 
radical of the ulema in view of the divisions that 
emerged at the Conference. The lack of unanimity on 
such points as Hindu-Muslim unity and the sacrifices to 
be made to secure it; the propriety of manipulating the 
words of the Koran to furnish quotations for political 
purposes; and the general desirability of non-co- 
operation stung Azad Subhani to remark that the 
Conference was not asked to concern itself with details. 
It was the duty of the Conference, he concluded, only to 
draw a broad line which would enable Muslims to 
distinguish between the faithful and the infidel. In an 
attempt to overcome the reluctance of the moderates, 
Maulvi Shabbir Ahmad read a detailed review on the non- 
co-operation movement (Tark-i-muvalat par Mofassal 
Tab sera.) . He first appealed to religious passions and
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stated that the countries which had massacred thousands 
of Muslims and which had taken possession of the holiest 
mosques in the world, had established a. rebel government 
over Mecca and Medina with the result that the sacred 
temple of God was desecrated and its worshippers 
arrested. He went on to state that a nation could be 
powerful only in one of two ways. It must possess 
material strength or it must cultivate spiritual power.
He looked upon non-co-operation as the most effective 
means to cultivate spiritual power, if the whole nation 
worked at it unitedly. To accomplish this he advised 
the ulema, to remove cowardice, disunion, and pride from 
their followers and to settle their differences among 
themselves. He concluded with the point that if Hindus 
obtained swaraj the Muslims would also profit. They 
would profit because a free India would make it difficult 
for the British to enslave other Islamic countries and 
it would also mean that future Indian armies would not 
have to fight against Muslims. With the expression of 
such sentiments, the ulema ended the closed sessions.
The third day of the Conference was marked by 
speeches of a more passionate nature. Gandhi started 
the meeting at the Lachmi Narain Dharmasala by advocating 
swadeshi and the boycott of foreign cloth. The audience 
of 4,000 then heard Maulvi Sultan Hassan of Ajmere 
wistfully speak of jihad while Asaf Ali stated that the 
English had come as guests and had remained as vampires. 
Shaukat Ali stated that the government was the worst 
enemy of the people and Agha Safdar declared that the 
presence of the Union Jack in India, was intolerable. 
Aqilul Rahman brought the meeting to a close when he
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attempted to incite the audience to attack the C.I.D. 
reporter.
The Second All-India Ulemas’ Conference was a 
considerable success. Those with radical political 
attitudes pointed with pride to the fatwa. on non-co- 
operation. The Moderates and Extremists thought that 
the Conference was a success because the tone of the 
speeches was not as violent as it had been at the 
Workers' Conference in April. Those pan-Islamists 
with conservative religious attitudes were less satisfied 
with the Conference, but they could at least rest assured 
that Muslim orthodoxy had not been endangered. But the 
most significant 'success' of the Conference was the 
effect it had upon the inhabitants of Delhi and the rest 
of India. The effect of the Conference on the Muslims 
of Delhi, an effect which was more latent than active, 
was that the Conference implanted the idea that a large 
number of the ulema supported non-co-operation and 
participation in political activity. It was only left 
to the political agitators to transform this latent 
feeling into active participation.
The Second All-India Ulemas' Conference ended on 21 
November and was followed immediately by the Delhi™ 
Ajmere-Marwara. Political Conference at Delhi on the 2 3rd 
and 24th. The two Conferences were split, however, by 
an industrial dispute at the Delhi Biscuit Company which 
became a strike on 20 November.1 The strikers, 65 men,
1
NAI, Home Poll 264 Part B, November 1920, ’Summary of 
Reports on Strikes Prepared by the Board of Industries 
and Munitions’; Home Poll 291 Part B, December 1920, 
’Report on Strikes in the Various Provinces.’
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followed the same pattern as previous strikers.1 They 
were unhappy with their living conditions and wanted 
higher wages. But they had no formulated demands, nor 
could they agree on what course of action to take once 
they had struck. And once again they accepted the 
offer of Asaf Ali to mediate the dispute. Asaf Ali 
made extravagant demands, while the company, which was 
owned by Sultan Singh, offered much less which the 
strikers accepted and went back to work on 3 December.
This incident revealed that the agitators were unable 
to utilise economic distress as an issue upon which to 
focus political activity. The strike caught the 
politicians unawares, and more importantly, the strikers 
went back to work before the agitation reached its peak 
on 6 December. There were three more strikes in mid- 
December; for which the same can be said. It seemed 
that those who were affected by economic distress were 
more willing to look to industrial strikes rather than 
political action for the resolution of their problems.
The Delhi-Ajmere-Marwara Political Conference 
lasted for two days, 23 and 24 November. Mohamed Ali 
presided over the meetings of both days and set the tone 
for the Conference when he quipped 'with apparent glee1 
over the innuendo in the Sinn Fein recruiting poster 
that transformed the phrase * join the Army and see the 
world' into 'join the R.I.C. and see the next world.'
1
Strikes occurred in Delhi on 17 July (Government Press), 
19 July (Birla Mills), and 15 October (imperial works).2 This account is taken from NAI, Home Poll 7k Deposit, 
December 1920; Home Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920; 
Home Poll 33 Deposit, January 1921; Home Poll 67 Deposit, 
April 1921.
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Asaf Ali expressed his admiration for the methods and 
goals of the Sinn Fein and Dr Ansari tried ’without 
much success' to justify Mahatma Gandhi's extensive use 
of the railways and the Post Office in relation to 
perfect non-co-operation. The Mahatma spoke on the 24th 
when he offered a mild rebuke to the citizens of Delhi 
for the paucity of their subscriptions. Shaukat Ali 
followed Gandhi and 1 lost his temper' when he spoke on 
the subject of subscriptions. The conclusion that the 
authorities drew from the Conference was that it »was 
an admitted failure and aroused no interest or 
enthusiasm.' It was not an 'admitted' failure, but it 
did fail to draw the amount of public support which the 
public session which the same Conference had drawn the 
previous year at Ajmere where it coincided with a 
religious Urs.
Mahatma Gandhi was quite active in Delhi during 
his one day stay on 24 November. He attended the second 
session of the Delhi-Ajmere-Ma.rwa.ra Political Conference 
He officially opened the National School which Asaf Ali 
had founded at the beginning of the month and he paid a 
visit to St Stephen's College where he lectured to a 
joint meeting of the students of St Stephen's, Hindu, 
and Ramjas colleges. At this lecture Gandhi presented 
all the students with the choice of following his lead 
or turning their backs upon their country in its hour of 
need. S.K. Rudra, the principal of St Stephen's, N.V. 
Thadani, the principal of Hindu College, and Kidar Nath, 
the Chairman of the Ramjas College Committee, all 
counselled calm and moderation. They advised their 
students not to make any decision until they had 
consulted their parents. But Gandhi was adamant that
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the students should walk out of the schools and colleges. 
Thadani countered with the statement that the Mahatma 
set a high standard of conduct that was difficult for 
others to follow. One of the students asked if Gandhi 
believed in diplomacy. Gandhi replied 'Yes, X believe 
it to be a sin.'1 The marginal results of Gandhi's 
lecture were evident the following day. The three 
colleges resumed their work as usual. The only response 
came from 15 students at the Hindu College who foresook 
their education to work for the cause of nationalism.
The predominantly Hindu students of Delhi had failed to 
respond to Gandhi's appeal where several hundred Muslim 
students had responded to the sentiment aroused by the 
Khilafat issue.
The last week of the month passed at a fairly low 
pitch. The agitators held daily meetings to ensure the 
boycott of the elections scheduled for 6 December. On 
Tuesday, 30 November, Mahmud-ul-Hassan died at Dr 2Ansari's house and the entire city observed a hartal.
All the Muslim volunteers marched solemnly at the head 
of a huge procession which escorted the body of the ex- 
Shaikh-ul-Islam to the Railway Station. There was an 
exceptionally noticeable difference between the hartal 
of the 30th and those on 2 and 9 August for B.G. Tilak.
1
NAI, Home Poll 33 Deposit, January 1921; interview 
with Shri Ram Sharma, 22 April 19^7» by the Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.
2
NAI, Home Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920; Home
Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921.
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The first week of December 1920 highlighted several 
of the trends noted earlier in the non-co-operation 
movement. There was an increase in public support for 
the issues which the agitators raised, and a. notable 
propensity towards violence.
On Thursday 2 December, Khan Bahadur Abdul Ahad, 
who has been described earlier as a conservative leader 
of Delhi, died. The family of the deceased planned to 
take the body to the Jama Masjid for the usual obsequies 
on Friday and thence to the cemetery. The family was 
warned by the Khilafat Workers not to take the body to 
the mosque, with which warning they complied. When the 
procession started from the house on the 3rd, a band of 
obstreperous volunteers in uniform led by Abdulla 
Churiwalla of the Khuddam-i-Watan, Muhammad Isaq of the 
A s kar - i -1 s 1 am i a., Arif Hussain Haswi and Aziz Hussain 
Naqshbandi, obstructed its progress. A large crowd of 
Muslims quickly gathered and the family retired into 
the house in despair. The volunteers were supported by 
the Muslims of Delhi because Abdul Ahad, who as a 
trustee of the M.A.O. College at Aligarh, had voted 
against non-co-operation. He was also on the Managing 
Committee of the Anglo-Arabic School which refused to 
adopt non-co-operation, and finally he was a title 
holder. The Deputy Commissioner and the Senior 
Superintendent of Police arrived at the head of 50 armed 
policemen, determined to make short shrift of the 
demonstration. The family hesitated to bury the Khan 
Bahadur by force for fear that the volunteers would make 
good their threat to desecrate the grave at some future
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date. Eventually the family announced that the Maulvi 
had renounced his titles on his deathbed and that he 
had become a full supporter of non-co-operation. The 
volunteers and the crowd jubilantly led the funeral 
procession to the cemetery.1
The volunteers were jubilant over their success 
over the family of Abdul Ahad. On 4 December a small 
party visited Rai Sahib Amba Pershad and asked him to 
return his title. He was very reasonable, but refused 
to act until other prominent Hindu leaders complied 
with the request. On 5 December the rumour spread that 
Rai Bahadur Lala. Sheo Pershad, C.I.E., who had been ill 
for some months, had died. Shankar La.l led a group of 
volunteers to the house on Chandni Cha.uk and created a. 
massive disturbance. A huge crowd collected and 
refused to disperse when told that the Lalji was still 
alive, and even persisted in the face of three attempts 
of the police to clear the street. The volunteers also 
threatened Khan Bahadur Haji Bakhsh Ilahi, C.I.E., who 
had suffered from paralysis for some time.
The campaign against the election for the Imperial 
Legislative Assembly in Delhi was the high point of the
1
NAI, Home Poll 87 Deposit, December 1920, 'Weekly 
Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for 
the week ending 13 December 1920; Home Poll 118-120 Part 
A, December 1920, C.A. Barron to Secretary, Government 
of India, Home Department, 6 December 1920; Home Poll 35 
Deposit, February 1921, 'Fortnightly Reports on the 
Internal Political Situation for the First Half of 
December 1920,' C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 16 December 
1920; Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921.
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non-co-operation movement in the city.1 The Provincial 
Khilafat Committee, the Provincial Congress Committee, 
the local Home Rule League, the Khilafat Workers' 
Association and the volunteer corps all co-operated to 
a remarkable extent to foil the election. They put up 
two nonentities for candidates. Abdul Hamid, alias 
Sheikh Abdul Majid, was an illiterate halwai and was 
nominated as the person who was to receive the votes 
of the non-co-operators. Mirza Agha Jan, who was a. 
petty contractor, was nominated as the »second string* 
of the non-co-operators. There were five polling booths 
each of which was picketted by volunteer groups.
Muhammad Ishaq and l4 volunteers from the Home Rule
League Volunteer Corps picketted the Town Hall booth
2carrying two flags. Shiv Narain Haksar, Aziz Hassain
1
The following account of the campaign against the 
elections for the Imperial Legislative Assembly is based 
on NAI, Home Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920; Home 
Poll 61-69 Part A, January 1921, ’Election of Unsuitable 
Candidates to the New Councils'; Home Poll 67 Deposit, 
April 1921; Home Poll 408-410 Part A, April 1921, 
'Conduct of the Elections at Delhi; RDDA, Home File 130 
Part B 1920, 'Orders Effecting the Delhi Province in 
Connection with the Reforms Scheme* ; Home File 53 Pant 
B 1921, 'Delhi Elections'; Legislative File 5 Part B
1922, 'Delhi Elections.'
2
The volunteers of Delhi first used flags as banners 
for propaganda purposes at Bhiwani in October 1920 
during the Ambala Division Political Conference. At 
that Conference the Khilafat Volunteer Corps of Delhi 
had a green flag marked with a crescent that bore a 
verse written by Muhammad Iqbal. It read: ’We have 
grown under the shade of swords; it is not easy to 
efface our names.’ NAI, Home Poll I83-I86 Part A, 
December 1920, ’Request to the Government of the Punjab 
for a Full Report of the Speeches Delivered by Leaders 
of the Non-co-operation Movement During Their Tour in 
the Province in October.’
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Naqsh.ba.ndi, Sahak Beg and 23 volunteers picketted 
Polling Station No. 2 at Edward Park. Raruq Abdul 
Ghani, Maulvi Ahmad Said and 20 volunteers, two of whom 
rode horses and carried flags, picketted Polling Station 
No. 3 at the Tis Ha.za.ri Maidan. Arif Hussain Haswi led
13 volunteers from the Khuddam-i - W a. tan which had one flag 
at the Polling Station at the Lahori Gate. And Gurbakhsh 
Singh, a Sikh non-co-operator, led a dozen volunteers at 
the Sardar Bazaar Polling Station. Both of the non-co­
operating candidates also had an agent or a. sub-agent at 
each polling station. There was complete co-ordination 
between the agents inside the polling stations and the 
volunteers outside. The agent was able to tell who a. 
person voted for by his name when a voter presented 
himself at a. polling station. This information was noted 
for the social boycott that was to follow. What was more 
important was that the non-co-operators wished to ensure 
two votes for their dandidate for every one vote for the 
other candidates. At regular intervals Abdulla Churiwalla, 
Dr Abdul Rahman, and Shankar Lai would motor to each 
station to ascertain how many people had voted. Within 
a short period of time twice that number of people would 
appear to vote for Abdul Majid. There was some 
difficulty in communication with the rural areas which 
led the non-co-operators to ensure enough votes to 
compensate for any unexpected events there and ensure 
the win for Abdul Majid. The final results were 288 
votes for Abdul Majid, seven votes for Mirza Agha Jan, 
and 40 votes for the other three ’respectable' candidates. 
The 335 votes were divided between 181 votes from Muslim 
electors and 1^4 votes from non-Muslim electors, 25 of 
which were European votes. There were 863 Muslim
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electors and 2,441 non-Muslim electors in Delhi city.
This meant that 20.9 per cent of the eligible Muslims 
and 6 .3 per cent of the eligible non-Muslims voted. It 
is not possible to discover from which group the 40 votes 
for the ’respectable* candidates came, but it seems valid 
to conclude that the non-co-operators relied heavily upon 
the active support of the Muslim community in Delhi.
This would also seem to indicate that there was more 
popular support for non-co-operation among the Muslim 
community than among the Hindu community. These tentative 
conclusions receive a distinct verification in the 
elections for the Municipal Committee in 1922 which 
appears in the following chapter.
The day following the boycott of the elections the 
police arrested the four volunteers who had led the crowd 
against the burial of Abdul Ahad. Large audiences packed 
the courtroom to attend the trial which lasted through 
the rest of December. All the events leading up to 6 
December decided the authorities that the Seditious 
Meetings Act should be reimposed on Delhi. The Act was 
reimposed on 9 December and the same day the Chief 
Commissioner declared four of the volunteer corps as 
unlawful under the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 
1908, The A skar-i-Islamia, the Kh.ila.fat Volunteers, the 
Muslim League Volunteer Corps and the Khudda.m-i-Wa.tan 
had to disband. The following day, 10 December, the 
volunteer corps reasserted themselves and attacked the 
Imam of the Jama Masjid in a. demonstration at the Mosque. 
They also prevented the marriage of the daughter of Nur 
Ahmad until the barrister had publicly apologised to 
Hakim Ajmal Khan.
The Home Rule League Volunteer Corps continued the 
agitation. On 13 December Shankar Lai and 30 volunteers 
invaded a railway octroi post to resolve a dispute 
between an official and a clerk from the Swadeshi Store. 
The following day the same Corps, swelled in number by 
members from the disbanded corps, took complete control 
of the Sikh procession, the Guru Granth Sahib.
The political agitation quietened somewhat during 
the middle of the month while economic matters assumed 
importance. A strike of 500 men against the Delhi 
Electric and Tramway Company began on the l4th and 
lasted until the 20th. An additional 250 men working 
on a new concrete factory went on strike on the 1 5th as 
did most of the operatives at the Delhi Cloth and 
General Mills. The cloth merchants also exhibited signs 
of extreme anxiety over the fall in exchange rates. They 
contemplated a mass refusal of orders on British firms 
until the exchange rate rose to the comfortable level 
it had achieved in the summer when many merchants 
indulged in ’excessive speculation. ’ 1
The force of the agitation slackened as public 
interest slowly began to wane. The agitators failed 
miserably to gather any sizeable audience at Ghaziabad 
to protest against the death of an Indian girl at the
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NAI, Home Poll 35 Deposit, February 1921; Home Poll 
77 Deposit, February 1921, ’Fortnightly Reports on the 
Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of 
December 1920,’ C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 3 January 
1921; RDDA, Commerce File 26 (a) Part B 1921, 'Reports 
on Labour Strikes Etc. in the Delhi Province.’
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hands of an I.C.S. officer who was hunting.1 The 
family had already accepted compensation for the 
accident and there was little over which to agitate.
The leaders of the Provincial Khilafat Committee 
thought that the agitation had become too violent 
which was a sign that they were losing control of the 
movement. Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari and Asaf Ali 
forced the volunteers who were reponsible for the 
demonstration against the Imam of the Jama Masjid on
10 December, to publicly apologise on the 17th for 
their behaviour. The leaders then departed for 
Nagpur where Dr Ansari assumed the presidency of the 
annual session of the Moslem League. The agitators 
took advantage of the absence of the leaders to recover 
their wounded pride. The volunteers of the Home Rule 
League Volunteer Corps forced the leaders of the Jain 
Community to agree to turn over the direction of the 
Mahavir procession to the Corps. The procession on 28 
December followed in the wake of the momentarily 
triumphant volunteers.
1
RDDA, Home File 24 Part B 1920, 'Report in the Case 
of the Accidental Shooting of an Indian Girl by Mr. 
A.N.L. Cater, I.C.S.'
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APPENDIX*
A Hartal Programme Leaflet for 1 August 1920 
entitled: "Respond to the Call of Duty."
I. On this date Musa.lma.ns will assemble in the 
morning in their mosques and will say their morning 
prayer. After the prayer they will recite the Koran 
and then beseech G-od the Saviour to free Islam and the 
Calipha, from danger. The Hindus will offer prayer in 
their temples or in any other convenient places.
II. Rest at Mid-day.
III. After the Mid-day prayer, that is after 1 pm, 
Hindus, Musa.lma.ns, Jains and Buddhists will all assemble 
in some suitable place and will hold a. meeting. In this 
meeting a discussion will take place as to the unjust 
and oppressive treatment which the Allied Powers - the 
English and the French - have meted out to the Sultan of 
Turkey, the revered Calipha. of the Moslem world. The 
disrespect which the Allies have shown towards Islam and 
the disappearance of religious freedom of the Indian 
will also be discussed.
IV. The subject of non-co-operation especially 
should be explained to the general public. Non-co- 
operation will begin from that auspicious day, the 1st 
August (l6th Sraban). Khan Bahadurs, Khan Sahebs, Rai 
Sahebs etc. will renounce their titles. At this meeting 
honorary magistrates, members of Councils and others 
will also proclaim the renunciation of their honorary 
offices.
V. The Public will be enlightened as to the 
necessity for boycotting the new Councils which are 
coming into being as a result of the Reforms Scheme. 
Selected voters will not vote for any one in the New 
Councils and nobody should stand as a. member for the 
same.
*
RDDA, Home File 9 Part B 1920.
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VI. Nobody will give loans to the Government and 
nobody will enlist as a soldier of the Government.
Nobody should go to Basra, Mesopotamia and other places 
to work as a soldier or a sailor.
VII. Those who assemble at the meeting must take a 
vow that they will neither buy nor sell British goods.
As far as possible they will use and purchase only 
swadeshi goods. (British goods which have already been 
bought by them should not be destroyed).
VIII. Able-bodied Musalmans will fast on 1 August and 
able-bodied Hindus should do likewise.
IX. On this day all should close their shops and 
places of business.
X. The proceedings of the meeting with the 
signature of the Press should be sent to the local 
newspapers.
N.B. The speeches should not be violent in tone. 
Collision with the Police should be avoided for this 
will but destroy our aims. Everything should be done 
in a peaceful and regular fashion.
Chapter Eight
THE ASCENDANCE OF PAROCHIALISM: II 
The Non-co-operation Movement, 1921-1922
The Expansion of Hindu Support for Non-co-operation
January-August 1921
II
The Appeal to Muslim Religious Sentiment 
August-November 1921
III
The Final Act of the First Non-co-operation Movement 
November 1921-March 1922
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The agitation of 1919 in Delhi over the 
territorial integrity of the Khalif and over the 
Rowlatt Bills relied heavily upon those classes and 
communities which had experienced a political 
awakening in the previous decade. This movement, 
which climaxed in the Rowlatt Satyagraha, relied even 
more heavily upon the new social groups which it drew 
into political agitation immediately before and during 
the Satyagraha. In the subsequent Kh.ila.fat agitation, 
which emerged into the non-co-operation movement in 
August 1920, the agitators of Delhi attempted to retain 
a broad social base of support, hoping that the newly 
politicised citizens of Delhi would continue to follow 
the highly politicised elites in Delhi in attending 
political meetings, observing hartals, and joining the 
various volunteer corps. By concentrating upon a single 
religious issue, however, they failed to retain the 
support of the highly politicised sharif, although they 
did succeed in acquiring the loyalties and support of 
most of the non-sharif. More significantly in 
politicising the non-sharif, they awakened and 
heightened the religious consciousness of the community 
and thereby deepened the gulf between the Hindus and 
Muslims of Delhi.
The agitators in Delhi were not successful in their 
attempt to achieve a broad social base for political 
activity within the Hindu community. The paucity of 
significant and unifying issues caused them to lose the 
allegiance of the newly politicised groups which had
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supported them during the Rowlatt Satyagraha. The 
results of their attempt to gain the loyalties of a 
heterogeneous political society had frightened the 
Hindu bourgeoisie, namely, the high caste Hindus who 
were the most highly politicised members of the 
community. The continued reliance upon the Muslim 
community for support during the non-co-operation 
movement, the appeal to Muslim religious sentiment, 
and the increasing heterogeneity of Muslim political 
society, did little to reassure them. Their response 
to the movement, therefore, was reluctant and equivocal.
The suspicion which the Hindu bourgeoisie displayed 
towards a heterogeneous political society was shared by 
the Muslim sharif. Both groups watched with trepidation 
the efforts of the newly politicised groups to gain 
status and recognition through participation in the 
movement. They were aghast when members of these groups 
combined religious fanaticism with a political desire 
to increase the pace of agitation. They were relieved 
when the sharif who controlled the Khilafat Committee 
reasserted their control in May 1920, but the sporadic 
eruptions in July, August, October, and December of 
that year confirmed their fears that once aroused, these 
new groups were no longer amenable to control. The 
continual attempts of the Hindu bourgeoisie and the 
Muslim sharif to restrain the radicalism of the agitators 
and the activities of their supporters, resulted in the 
uncontrollable outbursts which they sought to avoid, and 
more importantly, led to a gradual disenchantment with 
the movement by everyone.
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The pattern of the non-co-operation movement in 
Delhi did not change significantly in 1921. The Muslim 
community still provided the bulk of the non-co- 
operators who left the schools and who were arrested as 
volunteers. The gradual decline of the movement 
continued with only temporary interruptions. These 
interruptions were important, however, for they revealed 
varying responses to the movement; but more significant­
ly, they increased the general disenchantment of all the 
groups in the city, a disenchantment which heightened 
the parochial attitudes and communal tension in the city,
I
...Delhi is a place which contains many violent 
professional agitators and where the more extreme 
forms of non-co-operation have found a favourable 
soil.
Secretary, Home Department 
2 June 1921
The non-co-operation movement suffered somewhat of a 
setback at the hands of the more violent advocates of 
political agitation in 1920. Both the Sikh and Jain 
communities resented the fact that they had to submit to 
the highhandedness of the volunteers in December. More 
significantly, the industrial workers who stopped work 
during December, and who received no practical aid from 
the agitators, were also suspicious of the benefits which 
non-co-operators claimed they could confer. The Hindu 
bourgeoisie was reluctant to oppose the agitators, but 
their distaste for such acts as the boycott of the 
festival at Mahrauli in August and the burial of Abdul
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Ahad in December dampened what little enthusiasm they 
had for the movement. They were frightened that the 
lower classes would become violent again as in April 
1919» And they only had the charisma of Gandhi and 
the Punjab atrocities upon which to focus their 
political consciousness. They were attracted by the 
issues of swaraj, swadeshi, and boycott, but something 
more intelligible was needed to inject new life into 
the movement. The Muslim sharif opposed the movement 
since they saw little hope of bringing sufficient 
pressure to bear upon the British Government to make 
it change its attitude over the Khilafat, an issue 
which did not directly impinge upon the more 
cosmopolitan attitudes anyway. The Muslim merchants, 
students, and artisans were the only groups which were 
intimately concerned with the question of the Khilafat 
and the holy places, and it was these groups which 
gave the most vocal support to the non-co-operation 
movement,
The lack of Hindu support for the non-co-operation
movement was most noticeable on 1 January 1921, when
huge throngs of Hindus, Jains, Sikhs and Christians
lined the route of the Proclamation Parade. The
volunteers attempted to persuade these people to go home,1but with little success.
The parochial attitudes which inspired the Muslims 
to support the non-co-operation movement in 1920 began
1
NAI, Home Poll 4l Deposit, April 1921, 'Fortnightly
Reports for the First Half of January 1921,' C.A. Barron
to S.P. O'Donnell, 18 January 1921.
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to find a counterpart in the Hindu community in 1921.
The Hindus in the Provincial Congress Committee returned 
from Nagpur imbued with enthusiasm for non-co-operation. 
They accused the Muslims of misappropriating the Khilafat 
Fund and the Provincial Congress Committee passed a 
resolution which demanded that the control of the 
National Court should be vested in the P.C.C. When the 
Khilafat Committee relinquished control of the Court, 
the P.C.C. appointed a Hindu judge.1
The Hindus of the Provincial Congress Committee
were able to arouse a good deal of support for the non-
co-operation movement in the first half of 1921. They
laid plans for a hartal and boycott during the visit of
the Duke of Connaught in February to inaugurate the
opening of the new Imperial Legislative Assembly and
Council. They also encouraged the merchants of the
Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association to adopt the
Congress resolution advocating the repudiation of
foreign contracts due to the depreciation of the rupee.
The Association adopted the resolution and not only
joined in the plans for a hartal on 9 February, but
agreed to bring pressure on the dealers in the Delhi
2Piece Goods Association.
The boycott and hartals against the Duke of 
Connaught were a complete success. The Municipal 
Committee had been coerced into refusing an address to 
Duke and also refusing to sanction any expenditure on
1
Ibid.
2
NAI, Home Poll 4-2 Deposit, April 1921, ’Fortnightly 
Reports for the 2nd Half of January 1921,' C.A. Barron 
to S.P. O'Donnell, 31 January 1921.
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the occasion. And there was a hartal on Wednesday 9
February when the Duke opened the Assembly. Again the
people who were concerned with food, drugs, and
transport were exempt, and again none of the industrial
labourers, construction workers, domestic servants,
students, or government servants observed the hartal.1
And just as in all the hartals in Delhi after April 1919»
the volunteers were out in strength in the streets to
ensure that no crowds gathered and that no shop was
forcibly closed. Their second goal was to discourage
anyone from lining the procession routes that the Duke
would take, a goal in which they succeeded with equal
2measures of force and persuasion. The Seditious 
Meetings Act was in force and no public meeting was held. 
This was even more remarkable since the public meeting 
was a device upon which the leaders relied to focus 
public excitement and prevent unruly behaviour. The fact 
that no meeting was held revealed the supreme confidence 
of the leaders that they could control the disruptive
1
This was not because there was a lack of economic 
distress in the city. The Tramway workers who had 
struck in December, struck again on 1 March for 17 days 
in a bid to raise the wage increase given to them in 
January by another 25 per cent. NAI, Home Poll 63 
Deposit, June 1921, 'Report on the Political Situation 
in India during the Fortnight Ending 15 May 1921,* C.A. 
Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 16 May 1921.
2
Huge crowds lined the route which Mahatma Gandhi took 
when he arrived in the city on 12 February and again on 
the 13th when he officially opened Hakim Ajmal Khan* s 
Tibbia College as a counter demonstration to the official 
functions of the Duke of Connaught. NAI, Home Poll 12 
Deposit, June 1921, 'Report on the Political Situation 
in India During the Fortnight Ending l4 February 1921,' 
C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 17 February 1921.
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elements of the city. It was also significant that 
both Hindus and Muslims observed the hartal and boycott. 
The Muslims observed the hartal in the first instance 
as a sign of protest against the attitude of the British 
Government toward the Khilafat and in the second instance 
because the Hindu merchants had observed the hartal with 
the Muslim community on 30 November 1920 to mourn the 
death of Mahmud-ul-Hasan.1
The arousal of parochial attitudes to win support 
for the non-co-operation movement ensured the success of 
the hartal and boycott of early February. It began to 
pay a different kind of dividend, however, toward the 
end of February. The Sikh Extremists, of whom there
were very few, attempted to initiate a hartal when news
2of the tragedy at Nankana Sahib reached the city. The 
Muslims adamantly refused, a refusal which embittered 
relations between the two groups of agitators. The 
refusal also exacerbated an already tense relationship 
between the Hindu and Muslim agitators, a tension which 
followed from the advice of the Muslim agitators to the 
non-co-operating member from Delhi to the Imperial3Legislative Assembly to take his seat. The situation 
was further complicated on 1 March when, in response to
1
NAI, Home Poll 12 Deposit, June 1921.
2
NAI, Home Poll 282-315 Part A, May 1921, 'Fight at 
Nankana Sahib in Sheikhpura District between Mahant's 
Party and Sikh Reformers Resulting in Loss of Life.'
3
NAI, Home Poll 43 Deposit, April 1921, 'Fortnightly
Reports for the 2nd Half of February 1921,' C.A. Barron
to S.P. O'Donnell, 2 March 1921.
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the verdict in the trial against the Tour Muslim 
volunteer leaders, the Muslim community attempted to 
initiate a hartal as a sign of support for Abdulla 
Ch.uriwa.lla., a. hartal which the Hindus would not join. 
This refusal reinforced Muslim public opinion that 
their community was bearing more than its share of the 
burden of non-co-operation since only 28 college 
students (mostly Muslim) and 317 high school students 
(242 of whom had left the Anglo-Arabic High School) 
had responded to the call to quit government 
institutions.1 The gradual estrangement of the two 
communities, which became even more obvious through 
the rest of the non-co-operation movement, was 
primarily responsible for the disregard by the Muslim 
petty merchants of the call for a. hartal on Wednesday 
30 March to commemorate the martyrs of 1919• It was 
also evident on Wednesday 13 April when the Hindu 
community observed a. hartal to commemorate the
1
NAI, Home Poll 65 Deposit, June 1921, 'Report on the 
Political Situation in India, during the First Half of 
March 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 16 March 
1921; RDDA, Education File 14 Part B 1921, 'Withdrawal 
of Recognition from the Da.yana.nd Residential High 
School'; Educational File 70 Part B 1921, 'Recognition 
Accorded to the Indraprastha. Girls' School'; Education 
File 78 Part B 1921, 'Recognition Accorded to the V.S. 
Jat Anglo-Vernacular Middle School, Kaera Garhi, Delhi'; 
Education File 174 Part B 1921, 'Non-co-operation 
Movement in Educational Institutions'; Education File
3 (66) Part B 1922, 'Quinquennial Report on Education 
in Delhi Province for 1917-22.' The only Hindu students 
who joined the national school which was established 
were the 90 orphans in the Arya. Samaj orphanage under 
the care of Master Lakshman.
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Jallianwallabagh massacre which the Hindus fully- 
supported since it coincided with the Ba.isakh.ai 
festival.1
The Hindu non-co-operators were able to gain the
support of the Hindu bourgeoisie for hartals, but the
fact that Hindu students would not observe the hartal,
nor leave the schools, provided ample evidence that
the leaders could no longer rely upon a homogeneous
political community. The fact that not one Extremist
candidate won a seat on the Municipal Committee in
the elections of April reinforced the conclusion that
they did not enjoy the support of the Hindu bourgeoisie
2of Delhi. The Hindu agitators led by Shankar Lai,
Shiv Narain Haksar and supported by those who had 
formed the Hindu Association in 1917 ami the Executive 
Committee of the Reception Committee of the Congress, 
then made a. successful bid to induce illiterate 
outcastes to join the non-co-operation movement. At 
successive meetings of the Dhobis, Jhiwars, and Chuhras 
during April, each caste passed resolutions which 
prohibited members of the brotherhood from drinking3alcoholic beverages.
1
NAI, Home Poll 51 Deposit, June 1921, 'Report on the 
Political Situation in India during the Fortnight Ending 
15th April 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 16 April 
1921 .2 NAI, Home Poll 44-45 Part A, June 1921, 'Rejection of 
the Proposed Extension of the Seditious Meetings Act in 
the Province of Delhi for a Further Period of Six Months 
from 8th June 1921.'3 NAI, Home Poll 13 Deposit, June 1921, 'Report on the 
Political Situation in India, during the Fortnight Ending 
the 30th April 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 30 
April 1921.
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The passage of the resolutions by the outcaste 
brotherhoods in April 1921 was the most significant 
incident of the non-co-operation movement in Delhi in
1921, and reflected several significant trends within 
the nationalist movement in the city. The first 
tendency already noted above was that the Hindu 
political agitator for the first time turned from a 
homogeneous political society which was literate, high- 
caste in status, and non-manual in occupation, to a. 
heterogeneous political society which was both literate 
and illiterate, high and low caste, manual and non- 
manual in occupation, and sectarian in religious outlook. 
The leaders also realised that those social groups which 
displayed a high degree of consistency of caste, sect, 
and occupation were much more cohesive and thus much 
easier to convert to a new idea once the more important 
leaders were convinced. There is no evidence to show 
that the political leaders did, in fact, persuade the 
choudhris of these three brotherhoods, but no other 
hypothesis sufficiently explains the overwhelming 
support from their members. The agitators, then, 
decided to politicise those traditional social groups 
whose cohesion had not been undermined by modernisation.1
There were four likely reasons for the success of 
Congress in their attempt to broaden the social base of 
nationalism. The first was the charisma of Gandhi and 
the religious idiom which he had injected into politics.
1
That is, those members of a caste who remained in their 
traditional occupation; who remained within the 
brotherhood; and who still supported the panchayat and 
the choudhri.
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It was this charisma which had first attracted the 
bourgeoisie and other social groups in Hindu society 
and which continued to act as a touchstone for political 
support. The second was the simplicity with which the 
issue was raised. These groups were told that a boycott 
of alcoholic beverages (itself a highly sanskritised 
value) would reform their living habits and this would 
in turn bring swaraj for the individual and for the 
country. The third reason was that the Indian community 
had consistently confronted the government for five 
years, a fact of which these outcaste groups could not 
but be aware. And finally, these outcaste groups 
probably supported the Congress as a result of stringent 
economic conditions which approximated those of 1919*^
If the outcaste groups did follow the lead of Congress 
as a result of economic discontent, then the political 
agitation of 1921 effectively focussed discontent onto 
less violent and more organised activity, and 
represented a higher degree of politicisation - than 
similar attempts in April 1919»
The second general tendency that the effort to 
politicise the outcastes of Delhi represented was, in 
effect, a direct assault upon those groups (the merchants) 
who had previously supported the political activity of 
the nationalists. The boycott of alcoholic beverages 
developed into the picketting of spirit shops, just as 
the boycott of foreign cloth later on in August developed 
into the picketting of cloth merchants. The activities
See Table 4-C, Chapter One.
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of the nationalists stated boldly that those who did 
not support the non-co-operation movement did not 
belong to the new heterogeneous political community 
and were thus the object of the same opprobrium as the 
government. This attitude attracted many since it 
enabled them to display their feelings against title 
holders and other government supporters and also against 
the wealthiest members of the community, most of whom 
looked askance at the movement. For many their political 
activity served the same function as modernisation since 
both tended to erode the rigid practices of deference 
within traditional society.
The membership of the Congress Committee grew by 
leaps and bounds. The new attitude toward heterogeneous 
groups and the new subscription fee of one anna raised 
the number of formal members over 10,000 by June 1921.
The elections for a. 'National Parliament' increased the 
enthusiasm in the city for the movement also. The 
Committee divided the city into elective wards, which 
were the same as those already in existence, and 
enfranchised individuals and groups who had never voted 
before. A campaign was conducted over eight days in the 
last week of June during which 15 meetings were held.1 
Every Congress member had a. vote in addition to a vote 
for special representatives for women, Sikhs, Christians, 
Chuhras, Jh.iwa.rs, Nais, Darzis, transport workers, and 
so forth. Most of the special interest groups became 
so enthusiastic over the process that they rejected the
The Seditious Meetings Act expired on 8 June 1921.1
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candidate nominated by the caucus of the Congress and 
elected a candidate of their own.1
The movement halted abruptly at the end of June.
The volunteers who were picketting the liquor stores 
encountered outright physical opposition and immediately 
dropped the boycott. And on top of a hot Indian summer, 
a cholera, epidemic hit the city and panic soon spread.
The incidence was light due to effective precautions 
and only 114 cases (of which 43 were deaths) were 
reported in the city.2
The Congress remained quiescent during July, but
renewed their campaign on 1 August, the first anniversary
of non-co-operation. The leaders initiated a boycott
campaign against the purchase of foreign cloth. A 'fair
proportion' of the inhabitants of the city wore some3article of swadeshi cloth on that day. They also*
initiated local committees in each ward of the city;
asked the Darzis, Julahas, and Dhobis to charge an
increased rate for foreign cloth; and persuaded officers
of the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association into
asking its members not to order any foreign cloth until 
I ,vthe end of 1 9 2 1, a request with which they were all too
1
NAI, Home Poll 1 Deposit, July 1921, 'Report on the 
Political Situation in India during the Fortnight 
Ending 30th June 1921,' C.A. Barron to H.D. Craik, 1 
July 1921.
2
Ibid. There were 266 more cases in the rural areas 
with 144 of those resulting in death.
3
NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, 'Report on the Political 
Situation in India,' for the month of August 1921, C.A. 
Barron to H.D. Craik, l6 August 1921.
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happy to comply in view of the economic distress in 
the city.
There were two factors which effectively restricted 
the success of the Congress in August. The first factor 
was a second outbreak of cholera which only affected 29 
people (of whom 13 died) but which created another mild 
panic. The second factor caught everyone by surprise, 
especially the Congress leaders. On 19 August the 
Chamar brotherhood held a meeting and passed a unanimous 
resolution which denounced the tyranny of higher castes; 
which stated that swaraj would increase this tyranny and 
that, therefore, the goals of the Congress were not in 
the best interests of the Chamars; and which finally 
announced the unqualified support of the brotherhood for 
the government. This was the first open and unofficial 
opposition which the Congress encountered, an opposition 
to which there was no reply since the organisation was 
faced with a fait accompli. The opposition also caused 
other outcaste groups to become hesitant to join the 
non-co-operators.1
The opposition of the Chamar brotherhood to the 
goals of the National Congress was a step of deep 
significance. The Chamars had borne the brunt of bitter 
sectarian strife between the sanatanis, Muslims, 
Christians and the Arya. Samajists. Each group had 
suggested a course which the Chamars should follow in 
their own interests. The sanatanis wished them to 
retain their traditional place in Hindu society. The 
Muslims too wished them to perform their traditional
1 NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of August 1921,
C.A. Barron to H.D. Craik, 1 September 1921.
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tasks either as Muslims or as Hindus (preferably the 
former) since the Muslim leather merchants relied upon 
them entirely for their economic well-being. The 
Christians wished to ameliorate their conditions and 
add to the number of converts. And the Arya Samajists 
wished to ameliorate their conditions and keep them 
from being converted to either Islam or Christianity.
This conflict assumed political and parochial overtones, 
since it was an integral part of the political upheaval 
that occurred after 1905 and since each group sought to 
prejudice the Chamars against the other groups. The 
result was that by 1921 the Chamars had become the most 
highly politicised group in the illiterate portion of 
Hindu society. Their decision of 19 August 1921 
represented the epitome of a. process of politicisation 
which depended upon a religious idiom. The decision 
obviously stemmed from the fact that it was quite evident 
to the Chamars that their caste fellows who took to new 
occupations benefited more than those who had been 
converted to other religions. Their decision, then, 
rested upon a keen appreciation of the process of 
modernisation brought about by the Raj. It followed 
that their material advancement did not rest upon the 
upper caste Hindus who dominated the nationalist 
movement, but upon the continued maintenance of the 
British Government.
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...even moderate Mahomedans are fanatics... 
they are being swept aside by the tide of 
fanaticism. They can do nothing to stem it.
Wali Mahomed Hassan Ali 
Member, Legislative Assembly 
25 October 1921
The Muslim community had remained fairly quiescent
during the first eight months of 1921. But by Bakr-Id
on 15 August, the leading Muslim agitators began to
revive their campaign for non-co-operation in protest
over the Khilafat issue. As a contribution to the
campaign for unity between the Hindus and Muslims, the
Muslim leaders achieved a signal victory when they
persuaded the entire Muslim community to sacrifice only
25 cattle, which was a reduction of four over the
previous year. The limitation on the qarbani was made
even more significant by the fact that economic distress
had resulted in the sacrifice of 250 cattle in 1919, and
yet in August 1921, when the price of wheat was four
seers per rupee, the lowest it had ever been in modern
times, the Muslim community only sacrificed a token
number of cattle. Undoubtedly a large portion of the
community simply abstained from one of their permissive
religious obligations, an abstention which reflected
the depth of feeling in the community over the Khilafat
11 s sue.
1
NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of August.
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The display of support at Bakr-Id for non-co- 
operation was further buttressed by a. factor which 
successfully aroused the entire non-sharif section of 
the community and the leaders and students from the 
sharif. This was a. raid by the Delhi C.I.D. on the 
office of the Jamait-ul-Ulema-i-Hind in the second week 
of August, a raid during which over 800 copies of the 
fatwa. passed by the All-India Ulemas' Conference in 
November 1920 were confiscated. The agitation now had 
an issue upon which to focus discontent, an issue 
which electrified the community as few issues had 
before. The agitators immediately sent a message to 
Gandhi, asking for permission to initiate civil 
disobedience to meet 1 this direct attack on the 
Muhammadan religion.' To their disappointment, however 
G-andhi equivocated and replied that they should do 
nothing in a hurry. For a short time thereafter Delhi 
became the focus of Muslim politics in India. Large 
numbers of maulvis, who displayed a high degree of 
religious enthusiasm, descended upon the city to 
deliver inflammatory speeches and to suggest possible 
courses of action by the Muslim community. They 
finally decided to call a meeting at Delhi on l4 
September of all the members of the Jamait. They also 
planned to print thousands of copies of the fatwa and 
distribute them on a given day in the hope that the 
Administration would arrest their possessors. The 
religious implications of such an act were overwhelming 
Not even the Cawnpore mosque affair had presented such 
a clear-cut issue, since the prohibition and 
confiscation of the fatwa was an unequivocal 
contravention of the principle of religious neutrality
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which the government monotonously avowed. Mass meetings 
were held in the city on the 23rd and 26th during which 
the fanatic maulvis castigated the government, their 
main contention being that a fatwa. was the next most 
sacred object after the Koran.1
The public furore died down temporarily while 
everyone awaited the outcome of the meeting of l4 
September. Meanwhile the estrangement between Hindus 
and Muslims increased. On 6 September the Hindu members 
of the Municipal Committee voted with the official 
members to present a loyal address to His Royal Highness 
the Prince of Wales on his visit to Delhi. They also 
appropriated Rs. 20,000 for a casket and decorations.
The Congress boycotts began to bear fruit as the Hindu 
bourgeoisie showed its disenchantment with the non-co- 
operators. A large meeting was called on 9 September, 
to protest against the decision of the Municipal 
Committee. The meeting was attended primarily by 
Muslims of the 'lower classes'. The small number of 
Hindus at the meeting and at the meetings of the 23rd 
and 26th of August caused the Muslims to wonder what 
had happened to their vaunted enthusiasm for the Congress 
and non-co-operation. This attitude was exacerbated by 
public taunts from Shankar’ Lai and Pandit Balwant Singh 
that the Muslims were enduring the attack on their 
religion in a most shameful manner. The Moplah rebellion 
gave the Hindus, in turn, a concrete reason to resent 
the Muslims. The high cost of wheat at seers per 
rupee, a situation which caused grain riots in Meerut,
1 Ibid.
2 There was no public disturbance in Delhi in response 
to the Moplah outbreak.
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added economic distress to the parochial feelings already 
so evident. The Moharram festival passed peacefully, 
however, in the face of another cholera, epidemic which 
affected 291 people of whom 133 died in the first 
fortnight with a further 102 cases (and 46 deaths) in 
the second fortnight.1
The Jamait-ul-Ulema-i-Hind and the A 11 -India,
Khilafat Committee met in Delhi on the 21st through the 
24th, instead of on the l4th of September, as originally 
planned. The Khilafat Committee met first to decide on 
a course of action vis-a-vis the confiscation of the
2fatwa. and on the arrest of the Ali brothers at Karachi.
The agitators, who were led by Abdul Kalam Azad and who 
advocated the immediate ina.ugara.tion of civil disobedience, 
encountered stiff opposition. A large number of lawyers 
and maulvis, who were Extremists, but who did not support 
the radical programmes of the more fanatical agitators, 
were reluctant to initiate a movement based upon a 
parochial issue which had within it the seeds of a 
violent agitation. After a long and bitter struggle the 
Khilafat Committee refused to come to any decision and 
left it to the Jama.it to recommend an appropriate course 
of action. The Jamait, which met subsequently, soft- 
pedalled the whole issue and resolved to change the 
wording of the fatwa so that it was no longer qattai
1
NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of August, C.A. 
Barron to H.D. Craik, 16 September 1921.
2
The Ali brothers gave a speech to the Khilafat Confer­
ence in Karachi on 28 July 1921. They were arrested for 
that speech on l4 September, tried on 26 September, and 
sentenced on 1 November 1921.
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haram [a heresy and a sin] for a Muslim to join the 
police or army, but only haram [unlawful] . 1
The disenchantment of the Muslim public in Delhi
with the sharif leaders of the Khilafat movement and
the moderate maulvis in the Jama.it was evident at public
meetings which were held nightly in the city. It was
especially evident at the meetings on the 2 7th, 29th,
and 30th of September. Visiting maulvis and agitators
were very eloquent on the subject, but their vehemence
could not match that of Ahmad Said, who was proceeded
against by the Administration for inciting religious
passions. Also at these meetings thousands of copies
of the fatwa were distx'ibuted to the audiences of
'lower class Muslims' who accepted them as a protest,
rather than because they could read them. The police
wisely abstained from interfex-ing and instead
prosecuted the printer of what eventually became 11
2separate publications of the fatwa.
The tension between the sharif members of the 
Khilafat Committee and the non-sharif behind the Khilafat 
Workers reappeared at the end of September 1921. The 
leaders of the Khilafat Workers held a 'monster rally 
and procession' on the 3 0tl1> when they marched through 
the city at the head of a huge and enthusiastic crowd of 
swadeshites, who eventually wound up on the Champ de 
Mars in front of the Jama Masjid and constructed a
1
NAI, Home Poll 192l/l8, for the month of September,
C.A. Barron to H.D. Craik, 1 October, 1921.
2
Ibid.
r
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massive bonfire of foreign cloth. The enthusiasm of 
the crowd, the size of the crowd, and the amount of 
cloth were in sharp contrast to the meek affair of 
the Congress on 1 August. Before the Khilafat Workers 
could seize complete control of the movement, however, 
Dr Ansari, who had returned from a deputation to 
England, announced that there would be no further 
meetings in October; the month was to be devoted to 
real swa.deshi work. The Khilafat Workers did not 
oppose Dr Ansari, but the enthusiasm which they 
engendered was so strong that those who regularly 
attended the Akab Kalam Mosque, a typical mosque in 
the city, issued thousands of copies of a proclamation 
which contained a. summary of the fatwa..1
The non-co-operation movement thereafter became 
the purview of the volunteers once again. About 60 
Hindu and Muslim volunteers picketted cloth shops on 
Chandni Cha.uk while the Hindu volunteers completely 
took over the Ram Lila festival, with the permission of 
the organisers. The police were followed about 
remorselessly and taunted relentlessly by groups of 
volunteers. The spirit of October 1920 was again 
evident in 1921. There was little enthusiasm in the 
Hindu community for non-co-operation. There was more 
enthusiasm among lower class Muslims, but there was no 
focus provided for this and it began to languish. The
1
This same proclamation was widely distributed in 
Bombay in late October. NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for
the month of October, J. Crerar to S.P. O'Donnell,
4 November 1921.
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volunteers of both communities sought to keep the movement 
alive with decreasing success.1
The agitators became increasingly distressed with
the low pitch of the campaign and were most pleased
with Gandhi’s arrival at the beginning of November.
Gandhi, who was in Delhi on 4 November to attend an All-
2India Congress Committee meeting, spoke to an audience
of hundreds of cloth merchants of the city, only ten of
whom agreed to boycott foreign cloth. The resolutions
on civil disobedience passed at the A.I.C.C. and the
plans to hold a hartal on 17 November 1921, the day on
which the Prince of Wales was due to arrive in India,
imparted somewhat more enthusiasm for the movement. The
merchants were again persuaded to hold a hartal,
although they apparently agreed more in a spirit of3resignation than one of whole-hearted support.
Thursday 17 N o v e m b e r  dawned with a fairly complete 
hartal. Those who dealt in food, drugs, and transport, 
the industrial and construction labourers, and the 
students, domestic servants, and government servants 
continued their normal activities unmolested. The shops 
in the Kashmeri Gate area also remained open. Otherwise 
the shops in the city were closed and the volunteers
I
NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of October, C.A. 
Barron to S.P. O ’Donnell, 17 October 1921.
2
See the Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, XXI, 396-7» 
411-4.
3
NAI, Home Poll 1921/18 for the month of October, C.A. 
Barron to S. P. O ’Donnell, 1 November 1921; for the month 
of November, C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 1 December 
1921.
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patrolled as vigorously as on previous occasions. The 
Muslims displayed their enthusiasm for the hartal by 
flocking in great numbers to the 15 meetings which were 
held in every ward and then to a. mass meeting at Pataudi 
House in the evening. They also used the occasion to 
protest the sentence of two years imprisonment on the 
Ali brothers, a sentence which had been delivered on 1 
November 1921. There were no incidents and the sharif 
leaders maintained absolute control.1
Ill
For the benefit of the City generally I have 
arranged with the General Officer Commanding,
Delhi Brigade, for a route march of a 
considerable body of troops through the main 
bazaars to take place at an early date. With 
a little heartening of this nature it is hoped 
that private citizens will pluck up courage to 
refuse to submit to intimidation and abuse....
Chief Commissioner, Delhi
1 December 1921
The first non-co-operation movement entered its2final stage on 18 November 1921. On that day the Delhi 
Provincial Congress Committee held a second election 
for the ’National Parliament’. The Committee carried
1
NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of November.
2
For a very good account of the government’s reaction 
to the civil disobedience campaign see D.A. Low, ’The 
Government of India and the First Non-co-operation 
Movement, 1920-1922,’ Journal of Asian Studies, XXV 
(February 1966).
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out a strenuous propaganda campaign in which it drew 
upon the resolutions of the All-India Congress Committee 
of 4 November and what élan had been engendered by the 
hartal of the previous day. It looked upon the 
elections as a reaffirmation of the support it had 
received from February to June, but which it thereafter 
seemed to lose. The Committee also wished to show the 
Muslims that it had been responsible for the hartal on 
the 1 7th; that it commanded the loyalty of a significant 
portion of the Hindu community; and that the Hindus were 
pulling their weight in the campaign. The elections 
were a, disaster in view of these objectives. Where they 
had encountered enthusiasm in June among the lower 
classes who could vote for special interests, they now 
found little recognition, a meagre vote, and limited 
attendance at meetings in the wards. They found an 
equal lack of interest among the bourgeoisie who refused 
to vote for the radical candidates put forward by the 
caucus of the Committee or to nominate their own. The 
Committee found it doubly difficult to explain the 
results in view of its loud claims for such a large 
membership.1
On the evidence available, there is some reason to 
believe that the Congress should have reaped the 
benefits it expected. Everyone knew that the non-co- 
operation movement had entered a crucial stage which 
was to fulfil the promise of swaraj by the end of the year. 
It had a goal which supplied a focus for popular support. 
The fact that wheat was selling for five seers per rupee
1
NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of November.
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also supplied a measure of discontent which could have 
found an outlet in political agitation. But the lower 
classes did not respond.
Prominent among the lower class Hindus who had 
given the most loyal support to the Congress were the 
members of those low castes who had remained in their 
traditional occupations. It must be explained, then, 
why their enthusiasm languished. The single most 
important reason must be the open opposition to swaraj 
by the Chamars. There was very little support shown 
for non-co-operation after the resolutions passed by 
the Chamar brotherhood on 19 August 1921. In fact the 
Congress ward committees established in August failed 
miserably and were effectively disbanded in October.
The high degree of politicisation which the members 
of the brotherhood had achieved worked effectively 
against the Congress when the Chamars mounted their own 
campaign against swaraj from November through January.1 
The radicals in the Congress Committee had opted for a 
heterogeneous political society and had lost. The 
Hindu bourgeoisie (most of which was Moderate) was not 
unaware of the fact that the radicals had hoped to 
increase the pace of agitation by appealing to the 
illiterate and impressionable section of the community. 
And with the lesson of 1919 firmly in mind, they refused 
to support such a move.
1
NAI, Home Poll 1922/18, ’Reports on the Internal 
Political Situation in India,’ for the month of January, 
C.A. Barron to S.P. O’Donnell, 17 January, 1922.
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The Kh.ila.fat Committee went ahead with Gandhi's 
programme to intensify the non-co-operation movement.
They began picketting cloth shops on the 21st. The 
Administration held back imt.il the 23rd when it acted 
in response to a. general directive from the Government 
of India to crack down on the Extremists. Chief 
Commissioner Barron, who had been the chief commissioner 
since 6 November 1918, prepared for the non-co­
operators in a. heavy-handed fashion, a manner quite 
different from the restraint he had shown in April 1919» 
He applied for - and received sanction for 200 
additional police reserves; he applied for - and received 
permission to reimpose the Seditious Meetings Act at his 
own discretion; he had orders prepared under section l44 
of the Criminal Procedure Code to restrain the eight 
leaders of the volunteer corps; and he had orders 
prepared under the Indian Criminal Amendment Act which 
declared volunteer corps as unlawful associations. All 
of these were brought into force on the 23rd. In order 
to enforce them he had the military move a squadron of 
cavalry into the Queen's Gardens, and position reserve 
forces of regular European infantry in the Red Fort, 
with a subsidiary force of Indian infantry in the Police 
Lines. The 50 or so volunteers who had been active up 
to that point decided not to confront the troops and 
police directly, but to whip up popular enthusiasm 
against the show of force which had turned Delhi into 
an armed camp. The eight leaders issued a manifesto 
stating that they maintained the right of Indians to 
form associations and to carry on political activities 
in a non-violent manner. At this crucial stage,
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Dr Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan were in Bombay.1 Shankar
2Lai and Hanwant Sahai then issued a recruiting poster 
which called the inhabitants of the city to join the 
Swarajya, Saina.. The two were arrested on 9 December 
and sentenced to three years and to four months rigorous 
imprisonment respectively. These were the first two 
men to be arrested and imprisoned in the civil 
disobedience campaign in Delhi.
The volunteers decided that they must push the 
civil disobedience campaign or completely lose what 
status and recognition they had achieved through the 
previous three years. Asaf Ali then sent a letter to 
the Deputy Commissioner on 11 December informing him 
that 'in the cause of men's rights' he and 50 volunteers 
in uniform would parade through the streets on Monday 
the 12th. On the 12th, a large police force awaited 
the volunteers to exit from the Jama Masjid in which 
the volunteers marched ceremoniously prior to issuing 
forth onto the streets. The 50 Muslim volunteers 
marched out and were all arrested. Asaf Ali was 
imprisoned for 18 months and the rest for terms up to 
six months. The police then arrested the remainder 
of the signatories of the manifesto. Muhammad Taqi, 
vakil, Dr Abdul Rahman, Abdulla Churiwalla, Deshbandhu, 
Shiv Narain Haksar, and Nanak Singh were all sentenced 
to a year of simple imprisonment. The tempo of the
1
NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of November, 1921.
2
He had been sentenced to seven years transportation in 
1915 for his part in the Delh.i-La.hore Conspiracy Case.
He was released in 1920 under the Royal Amnesty of 23 
December 1919«
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campaign immediately accelerated. On the 1 3th, 30 
volunteers appeared in Queen* s Gardens and then Tied 
from the police into the Fatehpuri Mosque where they 
doffed their uniforms and mingled into the crowd 
which was leaving the midday prayers. This effort was 
not quite in keeping with the civil disobedience 
campaign, but it caught the enthusiasm of the young 
Muslims who had consistently supported the non-co- 
operation movement. Later in the afternoon a. larger 
group of volunteers succeeded in the same manoeuvre, 
and still later, a large band of 3°° youths rushed 
the length of Chandni Chauk with the police in hot 
pursuit, successfully disappearing into the galis 
around Fatehpuri Mosque. The troops were brought back 
on the l4th to the positions they had occupied on 2k 
November, but the police were able to ensnare 21 
volunteers (of whom 19 were imprisoned) without any 
assistance. The following day, Sundar Singh, a tailor 
who lived in the Police Lines, led a force of 29 Muslim, 
five Hindu and three Sikh volunteers to demonstrate 
before the Kashmiri Gate kotwal. They were all 
arrested.
The climax of the civil disobedience campaign came 
on Friday 16 December. The congregation at the 
Fatehpuri Mosque remained after the midday prayers and 
prepared to accompany a group of 30 volunteers in 
procession through the city while the congregation from 
the Jama. Masjid proceeded to the main kotwa.1 on Chandni 
Chauk. Over 5,000 Muslims jammed Chandni Chauk to 
watch the expected encounter between the police and the 
procession from the other end of the Chauk. The police,
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supported by three Hindu honorary magistrates, ordered 
the crowd in front of the kotwal to disperse only to 
be met by hoots of derision and violent abuse. The 
police reserve of 200 men then mounted a lathi charge 
and sent the mob fleeing in all directions. The police 
arrested Mahomed Ishaq (a topiwala) who had been active 
in the burial incident in December 1920. The members of 
the congregation at the Fatehpuri Mosque, upon hearing 
of the violence at the kotwa.1, disbanded and quietly 
went their way.1
The burst of popular support for the non-co-operators 
waned quickly in the face of the show of force by Barron. 
The following days saw small bands of volunteers, number­
ing 25 to 30, selling khaddar and spinning wheels. They 
were all taken into custody but only four minor leaders 
were arrested. The campaign, up to the end of December, 
contributed 215 volunteers who were taken into custody, 
of which 128 were arrested and imprisoned. A further 
105 volunteers were taken into custody on 2 January when 
they were discovered successfully campaigning for a 
boycott of the Proclamation Parade; 59 were imprisoned.
There were no further arrests of volunteers in the civil
2disobedience campaign in Delhi.
1
NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of December, C.A. 
Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 17 December 1921. C.A. Barron 
to S.P. O'Donnell, k January 1922.
2
NAI, Home Poll 1922/18, 'Reports on the Internal 
Political Situation in India,' for the month of January, 
C.A. Barron to S. P. O'Donnell, 17 January 1922.
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The support for the civil disobedience campaign in 
Delhi came primarily from the Muslim community. Of the 
I89 volunteers who were imprisoned, over 90 per cent 
were Muslims who came from low class and illiterate 
families. Members from these same families gathered 
outside the kotwal on 16 December and also gathered in 
the Fatehpuri Mosque and prepared to go in procession 
through the city behind the volunteers. Barron's use 
of force ended their support temporarily, but his use 
of force did result in a general boycott of the 
Proclamation Parade on 2 January by most of the lower 
classes of Delhi.
The civil disobedience campaign in Delhi in 
December 1921 reflected a heightened political 
consciousness on the part of the non-sharif in the 
Muslim community. But the process of politicisation, 
like the process of modernisation, also reinforced 
the parochial attitudes of this group. The non-co- 
operation campaign languished as the non-sharif waited 
for the Hindus to participate. They waited in vain and 
at a. rising cost of bitterness and enmity. This 
bitterness was in no way alleviated when the Hindu 
bourgeoisie, who were reassured that Muslim support 
for the campaign had been withdrawn and that a 
heterogeneous political society was impossible within 
the Hindu community, supported a hartal on l4 February
1922, on the occasion of the arrival of the Prince of 
Wales. The Muslims were disenchanted with the movement, 
but their bitterness reached new depths when Gandhi 
called off the campaign after the violent events which 
occurred at Chauri Chaura on 4 February. A significant 
proportion of the ulema had enjoined the community to
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support non-co-operation as a moral obligation. How, 
they asked, could Gandhi call off the campaign on the 
grounds of political expediency?1
The first non-co-operation movement effectively 
ended with the Bardoli resolution and its corollary, 
the Delhi amendment of 25 February. The non-co- 
operators who had been arrested began a massive 
defection on 7 March by signing agreements that if 
released they would abstain from political activity 
for one year. By the 9th, all those who were serving 
terms of rigorous imprisonment had signed. Gandhi’s 
arrest on the 18th caused no public reaction whatever, 
a remarkable change from 9 April 1919*
The final verdict of the community on non-co- 
operation was a. mixed one. The Municipal elections, 
which were held on 2k March, offered the limited 
electorate an opportunity to express its opinion. The 
elections were an especially good opportunity for the 
public to express its opinion because the Municipal 
Committee had been completely reorganised. Acting upon 
the recommendations of a Special Sub-committee which 
had begun in 1918, the Administration changed the 
Committee so that it comprised 36 members, 2k elected, 
six appointed and six official. The 2k elected members 
were divided equally between 12 Hindu and 12 Muslim 
members. The number of electoral wards was expanded 
from 11 to 12 and each ward was to elect one Hindu and 
one Muslim with each elector having only one vote
1
NAI, Home Poll 1922/18, for the month of February,
C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 18 February 1922, C.A. 
Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 1 March 1922.
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(which effectively ensured that Hindu electors would 
vote for Hindu candidates). The Provincial Congress 
Committee submitted a full slate of 12 Hindu candidates 
to contest against self-nominated Moderates ox* 
conservatives. Dr Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan hand- 
picked 12 Muslim candidates. The results of the 
election revealed that all of the Muslim candidates 
selected by the Hakim Sahib, who had just served as 
president of the annual session of the National Congress 
at Ahmedabad, won. The issue of the Khilafat still 
weighed heavily upon the Muslim bourgeois non-sharif.
Only six of the Congress candidates won seats in 
the Municipal Committee, however, as six wards rejected 
their Congress candidates. Each of the three wards 
outside the walled city returned a non-Congress candidate. 
This was easily understandable since the Congress had 
never enjoyed any support from the bourgeois groups in 
the suburbs. Within the walls, they lost the wards in 
which the Banias predominated. Non-Congress candidates 
were elected from Ward II, Chandni Cha.uk, which included 
all of the area between Queen's Road and Chandni Cha.uk 
and Khairi Baoli; Ward IV, Malewara, which was the area 
bounded by Egerton Road, Chaori Bazaar, Golden Mosque 
and Chandni Chauk; and Ward V, Gali Qasim Jan, which 
was bounded by Ballimaran, Chaori Bazaar and Egerton 
Road. The other six wards contained other high-caste 
Hindus, most of whom were not as affluent as the Banias,
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and a number of whom were Arya Samajists.1 This 
municipal election epitomised the degree to which the 
Hindu bourgeoisie was disenchanted with non-co- 
operation and its sequel, the civil disobedience 
campaign.
The corollary to the campaign should not be lost 
sight of, however. For the first time, Extremists 
were elected as members of the Municipal Committee.
This success, more than any other event, reflected the 
degree to which nationalism had incorporated the desires 
and discontents of the Hindu petty bourgeoisie. It 
also reflected the fact that the Hindu petty bourgeoisie 
had accepted the process of politicisation as a means 
to reap some of the benefits of modernisation.
The Muslim bourgeoisie, even though it was 
disenchanted with the non-co-operation movement, 
revealed that it was still deeply disturbed over the 
Khilafat issue. The fact that the candidates whom they 
elected were substantial businessmen made the process
1
RDDA, Education File 10 Part A 1921, 'Reconstitution 
of the Delhi Municipal Committee' ; Education File 4 
Part A 1922, 'Reconstitution of the Delhi Municipal 
Committee.' The six Congress candidates who were 
elected were Lala Pearey La.1 (pleader) who was elected 
to the seat for the Imperial Legislative Assembly from 
Delhi in 1923 aged 6 5; Lala Manohar Lai Bhargava who 
was a merchant aged 34; Sri Ram, Bar-at-Law aged 40; 
Lala Madan Mohan La.1, who was a Vaish banker and 
landlord aged 57 5 Lala Bulaqi Das who was an Aggarwal 
merchant and an Arya Sa.ma.jist aged 54; and Lala Pearey 
Lai (motorwa.Ha.) aged 50.
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palatable to them, however.1 The process of 
politicisation which the Muslim bourgeoisie underwent 
during the non-co-operation, movement also reinforced 
the strong parochial attitudes of this group. They 
expressed these attitudes during Bakr-Id when they 
sacrificed 14-9 cattle, an increase of 124 over the 
previous year.
1
The Muslim candidates who won were Mir Mohammed 
Hussain, merchant, aged 3 6; Mimshi Abdul Khaliq, 
merchant, aged 48; Mir Laiq Ali, merchant; Muhammad 
Abdur Rahman, pleader, aged 3^; Hafiz Abdur Razaq, 
landlord, aged 50; Rauf Ali, Bar-at-Law, aged 3^; 
Munshi Mumtaz Hassan Khan, Pathan landlord and 
zamindar, aged 28; Munshi Tamizuddin Khan, Pathan 
merchant; aged 48; Shaikh Rashid Ahmad, merchant, 
aged 3 6; Hafiz Abdul Aziz, pleader, aged 43; Hakim 
Mohammad Zafar Khan, teacher at Tibb.ia College, aged 
34. RDDA, Education File 4 Part A 1922. The twelfth 
candidate immediately resigned and was replaced by a 
non-Congress Muslim, Shaikh Muhammad Abdulla, import 
agent, aged 32, who won a bye-election in Ward VI, 
Farashknana, against Dr Ataullah Khan (another nominee 
of Hakim Ajmal Khan) by seven votes.
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The growth of nationalism in the city of Delhi 
between I.9II and .1922 poses several interesting 
questions for the social historian« What was the tone 
and temper of society in Delhi and how did it 
influence the political attitudes of the inhabitants 
of the city? Who were the leaders of the nationalist 
movement and what were their motives? What issues did 
the leaders raise before the citizens of Delhi in their 
attempt to mobilise them in support of political 
demonstrations of one sort or another? Which classes 
and communities responded to the issues raised by the 
leaders and why did they do so? And finally,, what 
were the consequences of the growth of a nationalist 
movement in the new imperial capital of India?
I
The urban scene in the city of Delhi in 1911 and 
1922 reflected and reinforced many of the divisive 
and cohesive tendencies of society in the city. The 
new residents who migrated to the city tended to reside 
without the walled city while the inhabitants within 
the walled city tended to be residents of established 
tenure. This lent a certain amount of stability to 
society within the walls, a stability which was 
reinforced by strong institutional ties» The society 
without the walls was unstable because of the 
transitory nature of residence, a transience which
CONCLUSION
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militated against institutional ties of any sort. It 
was also unstable because of the squalor and deprivation 
to which many of the inhabitants were prey. One 
manifestation of this distinction was the high crime 
rate in the suburbs. Another was the predominance of 
kaccha houses in the suburbs.
The distinction between the suburbs and the walled 
city was also reflected in bourgeois society. Those 
inhabitants of Delhi who had the largest resources of 
wealth, status, and power lived within the walls while 
the inhabitants of the suburbs tended to belong to the 
petty bourgeoisie. (The Muslim Panjabian community 
which lived in Sardar Bazaar was the major exception 
to this trend,) A further distinction existed between 
the petty bourgeoisie who lived in the suburbs and 
those petty bourgeoisie who lived within the walls.
Those who lived within the walled city were particular­
ly well equipped to derive economic and social benefits 
from the process of modernisation, and indeed, they 
displayed great drive and energy in this direction, 
while their less fortunate fellows without the walls 
had neither the resources nor the initiative to perform 
a comparable feat. The fact that the Arya Samaj was 
numerically stronger and relatively more important 
within the walls was one manifestation of this 
distinction. Another manifestation was the enormous 
increase in the number and type of petty industrial 
establishments between 1911 and 1922 within the walls. 
And yet a third manifestation was the increase in the 
number of educational institutions within the walls.
The distinction between the suburbs and the walled 
city had a significant effect upon the growth of
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nationalism in the two areas. The lack of any 
institutional ties among inhabitants of the suburbs 
provided few means by which the political agitator 
could contact or mobilise the inhabitants of these 
areas. The plethora of social, religious, educational 
and occupational institutions within the walled city, 
however, provided a variety of means for the agitator 
to raise political issues before the citizens of the 
city. The more traditional and conservative nature of 
those who resided in the suburbs also acted as a brake 
upon participation in political activities, while the 
process of politicisation within the walls assumed an 
important role for those who were intimately involved 
in the process of modernisation, of which more later. 
The growth of the imperial area, the New Cantonment, 
and the Civil Lines between 1911 and 1922 heightened 
these distinctions rather than diminished them.
The urban scene within the old walled city of 
Delhi reflected and reinforced many of the divisive 
and cohesive tendencies of that society in 1911. Those 
inhabitants with the largest resources of wealth, 
status, and power lived on the main bazaars with 
successive graduations down to the residents of the 
galis. The wards which bordered on Chandni Chauk 
(plus Kashmiri Gate) tended to be literate, bourgeois, 
commercial, and Hindu, while the wards south of 
Fatehpuri Mosque, Chaori Bazaar and the Jama Masjid 
tended to be illiterate, lower class, handicraft arid 
petty industrial, with a slight Muslim predominance.
In most instances the differences in education, income, 
occupation, religion, and residence divided the society 
into constituent parts, while these same factors, on
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the other hand, bound the members of these constituent 
parts into cohesive units. These cahesive units were 
organised by traditional society into a heirarchy of 
role and function»
This then was the traditional environment of the 
city of Delhi in 1911, an environment which had seen 
few compromises for the sake of urbanisation. The 
higher castes, the sharif, and wealthy Muslim merchants 
controlled the largest resources of wealth, status, and 
power; they predominated in the educational institutions; 
they monopolised non-manual occupations; and they resided 
in the larger houses and on the healthier streets in the 
city. They maintained the traditions of marriage, 
religious observances, and commensality inviolate. And 
they retained the strongest practices of deference which 
lower groups in the heirarchy showed toward higher 
groups.
This traditional urban environment conditioned the 
political attitudes of the inhabitants of Delhi to a 
large extent. Those groups which controlled the 
largest resources of wealth, status, and power provided 
individuals for membership on the Municipal Committee 
and the Punjab Legislative Council (before 1912).
These individuals, and the groups they represented, 
looked upon politics as an effective means of 
reinforcing their dominance over the commercial and 
professional life of the city and as a way of 
inaugurating their first steps up the ladder of 
government preferment. Their only political interest 
outside the city was limited to the provincial capital 
at Lahore and then only when the action of some
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governmental agency impinged upon their prerogatives 
and practices.
The traditional urban environment also conditioned 
the political attitudes of those who participated in 
nationalist politics in the city. These participants 
also came from the same classes and communities which 
controlled the largest resources of wealth, status, and 
power. They were however, the less eminent members of 
the elite and the majority had some training in Western- 
oriented education. With the exception of a small 
number in the professions they found it difficult to 
gain status or recognition from the traditional society 
to which they were irrevocably bound by ties of kinship 
and residence. Where the traditional elite used 
politics to reinforce their dominance, the Western- 
educated sub-elite used nationalist politics to 
circumvent that dominance. But like the traditional 
elite, the sub-e'lite rarely looked beyond Lahore for 
inspiration and guidance. Politics in Delhi before 1911» 
therefore, were provincial in two respects; the 
participants were members of a small e'lite and they 
focussed their attention on the provincial capital of 
Lahore.
The urban scene in Delhi reflected and reinforced 
the divisive tendencies in the city and to that extent 
the traditional urban environment crystallised the 
parochial attitudes of the inhabitants» These parochial 
attitudes stemmed primarily from religious sentiment.
But the parochial attitudes of the Banias, the sharif 
and other groups such as the Muslim Panjabian community 
depended equally upon social values» These parochial
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attitudes, in effect, delineated one group from every 
other group and emphasised the qualities and 
characteristics that made one group different from 
another» It was this parochialism which provided 
security to the members of the group and it was this 
parochialism which inspired a vigorous defense against 
any attack upon the security of the group»
II
The leaders of the nationalist movement in the 
city of Delhi came from the traditionally dominant 
elite,, They were Moderates and Extremists and 
participated in the movement almost entirely from 
ideological motives. Men such as Hakim Ajmal Khan,
Dr Ansari, Dr Abdul Rahman, Muhammad Abdur Rahman 
and Hafiz Abdul Aziz (the latter two of whom were 
pleaders) were all sharif. They came from the most 
eminent families in the city and their influence over 
the Muslim inhabitants of the city was considerable. 
Men such as Rai Sahib Pearey Lai one of the most 
outstanding lawyers in the city, Rai Bahadur Sultan 
Singh, one of the wealthiest men in the city, Lala 
Shiv Narain (pleader), and Seth Ram Lai, the choudhri 
of the cloth merchants, were equally as eminent in 
the city and exercised considerable influence over 
the Hindu inhabitants. These leaders maintained 
close personal ties with Mahatma Gandhi after his 
rise to predominance from 1917 onwards. These men 
firmly believed that India should progress toward some 
form of government in which Indians would exercise a
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predominate influence. These leaders divided as 
Moderates and Extremists over whether the goal should 
be some form of responsible government which accepted 
the continued presence of the British in India, or 
some form of self-government which rejected any British 
presence. Dr Ansari and Seth Ram Lai were the only two 
leaders who consistently supported the Extremist 
position while the rest of the leaders vascillated 
between the Moderate and Extremist stance in response 
to the particular political agitation then in progress. 
These leaders institutionalised their leadership through 
control of the Provincial Congress Committee, the Moslem 
League, the Home Rule League, and the Provincial Khilafat 
Committee.
By and large the Moderates supported some form of 
responsible government because of a firm belief in the 
value of a homogeneous political society which effective­
ly excluded the illiterate portions of society. The 
Extremists recognised the obstacle to participation in 
politics presented by a high rate of illiteracy, but 
they believed that self-government should precede 
social reform, otherwise it might be delayed indefinitely.
The defection of all the Hindu leaders into the 
Hindu Association in October 1917 was a severe blow to 
the nationalist movement in the city. In some ways it 
revealed that the cosmopolitan values and liberal 
religious attitudes of the Muslim leaders had overcome 
the tendency toward parochialism that was obvious in 
the actions of the Hindu leaders. It was primarily 
through the tireless efforts of the Muslim leaders who 
wholeheartedly believed in Hindu-Muslim unity that
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harmony was restored to the movement0 And it was the 
concessions that these leaders made to Hindu sentiment 
in the reduction of garbani in 1920 and 1921 that made 
the Hindu-Muslim alliance a viable one. The refusal 
of the Hindu leaders to campaign for a cessation in the 
playing of music before mosques did little to foster an 
alliance that existed despite the actions of the Hindu 
leaders, rather than because of them. The election of 
Hakim Ajmal Khan as chairman of the Reception Committee 
of the National Congress was the major exception.
There were two major leaders in Delhi who did not 
come from eminent families but who nevertheless 
exercised a considerable influence over the inhabitants 
of the city. These were Mohamed Ali who resided in the 
city between 1912 and 1915» and Mahatma Munshi Ram or 
Swami Shradhanand who resided in the city for short 
periods during 1918 and 1919» Both men came from 
families which experienced little material deprivation; 
both were passionate orators who could move their 
listeners; both relied upon religious sentiment to 
arouse their audiences; both sought support from the 
illiterate lower classes; and finally, both were anti- 
British, Mohamed Ali because of his pan-Islamic 
beliefs and Shradhanand because of his belief in the 
superiority of the Vedic culture of India.
The secondary leaders of the nationalist movement 
in Delhi were legion in number. They ranged from the 
important lieutenants of the primary leaders down to 
the insignificant self-styled agitator who had no 
following whatever. The more important Hindu 
lieutenants were K.A. Desai, a Gujrati who was the
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manager of a cotton mill; Pearey Lai (motorwalla);
Shankar Lai, who was connected with the Benares 
Conspiracy Case in 1915 and who became the manager of 
the Swadeshi Co-operative Store; Shiv Narain Haksar, a 
Kashmiri Brahman and a journalist; Indra, the son of 
Shradhanand and a journalist; and Neki Ram Sharma, a 
Gaur Grahman from Rohtak« K.A. Desai, Indra, and Neki 
Ram Sharma left the city by 1920 and did not 
participate in the non-co-operation movement« The 
more important Muslim lieutenants were Asaf Ali who 
returned from England in 1915 and became a barrister; 
Ahmad Said, a maulvi and a teacher at the Madrassah 
Aminia; Kifayatullah, a maulvi and a teacher at Madrassah 
Aminia (later to become the Mufti of Delhi); and Arif 
Hussain Haswi, a journalist.
All of these lieutenants came from high-caste or 
sharif families (except Kifayatullah). They all 
supported the Extremist position and in fact tended to 
be quite radical in their political views. They 
constantly sought to increase the pace of political 
agitation and invariably clashed with the primary 
leaders. Such collisions occurred during the Rowlatt 
Satyagraha of April 1919 and consistently from March
1920 onwards after the foundation by these lieutenants 
of the Khilafat Workers' Association in opposition to 
the leaders who controlled the Provincial Congress 
Committee and the Provincial Khilafat Committee,
The lieutenants who emerged as a result of the 
growth of nationalism in Delhi had three motives. They 
were similar to the nationalists who led the movement 
before 1911 in that they had a sincere ideological
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commitment to the movement • They were also similar to 
the earlier leaders in that they had all received a 
Western-oriented education (except Ahmad Said and 
Kifayatullah) and used political activity as a means 
to gain status and recognition from the traditional 
elements in the society and from their own leaders«
And finally these lieutenants adopted a radical 
position on the issue of political change in order to 
retain the support of the minor leaders and followers 
of the movement, the only group which accorded them 
the status and recognition which they felt their due.
The minor leaders and agitators in Delhi were 
legion in number. S\a.ch men as Shambhu Nath Chopra,
A.C, Acharaya, Qazi Abbas Hussain and Tajuddin, who 
were all journalists, or Bishan Sarup and Abdulla 
Churiwalla had very little following in the city, and 
only created a position among the agitators by 
progressively advocating ever more radical programmes 
and delivering more violent speeches. They joined the 
Khilafat Workers' Association, but more importantly, 
they acted as the leaders of the volunteer associations 
in the city along with Qutbuddin, Muhammad Ishaq, Aziz 
Hussain Naqshbandi, Sahak Beg, Rarup Abdul Ghani, 
Gurbakhsh Singh, a Sikh agitator, and Pandit Balwant 
Singh, The foundation of the volunteer associations 
suited these minor leaders perfectly because as their 
leaders, they received an amount of status and 
recognition which they desired. In fact, their- 
participation in active political agitation gave them 
increased status in their own eyes since they were the 
people who confronted the police in the streets and 
not the leaders who remained aloof in their houses.
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These very minor leaders came from the petty 
bourgeois sections of society. The majority had 
received a traditional education and spoke very little 
(if any) English. As the nationalist movement 
gathered momentum, ever increasing numbers became 
involved. These minor leaders represented the thin 
end of a wedge in the society that responded to the 
issues raised by the more important leaders. These 
minor leaders in effect, represented the epitome of 
the process of politicisation in the city, a process 
which the majority of the petty bourgeoisie supported 
for reasons to be discussed below.
Ill
The leaders of the nationalist movement in Delhi 
made definite attempts to mobilise the inhabitants of 
the city in support of their campaign to wrest 
concessions from the British. The revolutionary 
nationalists were the first to attempt this. The 
number of actual revolutionaries was confined to a 
small coterie, but they hoped by showing that the 
government was vulnerable and by spreading innumerable 
pamphlets that they could create the will to resist. 
The use of assassination as a political weapon found 
little support among the general populace, however, 
while the overtones of Bengali Hindu nationalism which 
sustained the movement erected an effective barrier to 
Muslim participation.
The attempt of Mohamed Ali to mobilise support 
for his campaign to alleviate the distress of the
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Ottoman Empire during the Balkan crises was considerably 
more successful. Mohamed Ali encountered stiff 
opposition from the sharif to his campaign and he was 
forced instead to turn to the non-sharif elements in 
the city. He gained the support of the shoe, leather, 
and hide merchants, the butchers, the artisans who 
worked with leather, and the students in the schools, 
colleges, and madrassahs. He utilised his extraordinary 
ability as an orator and a journalist, institutions such 
as the mosque, organisations such as the An.juman-i- 
Khuddam-i-Kaaba. and incidents such as the Cawnpore 
mosque affair to convince a wider audience that the 
British, who were also Christians, were hostile to Islam 
and that the government, therefore, did not deserve the 
support of the Muslim community in India. He forged a 
temporary alliance with a substantial number of the 
Muslim bourgeoisie but was able to gain the support of 
only a few members of the sharif, all of whom were 
Extremists«, The Cawnpore mosque affair cemented the 
alliance with the bourgeoisie, but the entry of Turkey 
into the War on the side of Germany exposed the 
reluctance of the wealthier merchants to support 
Mohamed Ali‘s brand of pan-Islamism and it finally 
collapsed. Mohamed Ali's success in mobilising support 
for his campaign among the low classes was revealed 
when his newspaper was confiscated on 2 November 1914 
and when he was interned on 21 May I9I5 . On both 
occasions the low class groups to which he pinned his 
hopes responded with an overwhelming display of support. 
In the first instance he collected Rs. 10,000 to reopen 
his newspaper and in the second an audience of 7,000 
congregated at the Jama Masjid after the Juma prayers
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and then the entire Muslim community observed a half­
day hartal«
The Muslim lower-classes, and especially those 
connected with leather, responded to the campaign of 
Mohamed Ali basically for three reasons. The Muslim 
artisans of Delhi were faced with chronic economic 
distress. The distress was partially the result of 
foreign competition and partially the result of a 
change in the pattern of consumption. Another reason 
for the response of the Muslim lower classes to Mohamed 
Ali was the fact that the lower classes of Muslim 
society had a strong bias in favour of the traditional 
values of Islam. Mohamed Ali played on this bias when 
he raised the issue which postulated that the pan- 
Islamic world had to unite in view of the Christian 
conspiracy against the Muslims, It was a romantic 
appeal, but it was made to groups which were exception­
ally responsive to such sentiments. And yet another 
reason for the response of the Muslim lower classes to 
Mohamed Ali arose out of Hindu-Muslim enmity prevalent 
at the time. The conflict between the Muslim community 
and the Arya Samaj had resulted in a meeting of 10,000 
Muslims at the Id^ah on 3 July 1910. This was followed 
by an attempt on the part of orthodox Hindu, Arya 
Samajist, and Christian missionaries to influence the 
Chamars (the Hindu caste which traditionally dealt 
with leather). This campaign resulted in the Chamars 
becoming anti-Muslim, a state of affairs which 
endangered the economic well-being of the Muslim shoe 
merchants, hide merchants, butchers, and those Muslim 
artisans who made leather articles, a group which 
totalled approximately 9»000 in 1921. The estrangement
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had social overtones as well because a large number of 
these Muslims had been converted from the Chamar 
caste originally and the new Muslims reacted to being 
looked down upon by a group to which they considered 
themselves superior.
The student community and the petty bourgeois 
sections of Muslim society responded to Mohamed Ali 
for two reasons. Both these groups were amenable to 
the romantic sentiment embodied in the issue of pan- 
Islamism. But more importantly, these two groups 
reflected the greatest amount of social mobility in 
Muslim society. Both groups had the most to gain from 
the social and economic opportunities offered by 
modernisât ion and both groups looked upon political 
activity as a means to consolidate the advantages 
gained therefrom. They also looked upon political 
activity as another means to circumvent the traditional 
patterns of deference and patronage so evident among 
the most established members of Muslim society. And 
finally, participation in political activities provided 
a means to gain status and recognition#
A third attempt to mobilise the inhabitants of 
Delhi in support of a political agitation occurred 
during the Home Rule League campaign which began in 
1917* A small coterie of nationalists formed a branch 
of the League in Delhi in February 1917, but were 
unable to inspire any public enthusiasms for the 
movement until they organised a public meeting on 26 
September 1917 and attracted an audience of 4,000,
Those who attended this meeting were overwhelmingly 
Hindu and overwhelmingly bourgeois, with students,
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petty merchants and clerks forming the bulk of the 
audience while members of the liberal professions and 
representatives of the more substantial merchants 
attended in smaller numbers. An even greater response 
from the public of Delhi came during the Ram Lila 
festival when the Home Rulers invaded the Ram Lila 
Committee and refused to compromise with the 
Administration over a change in route of a procession 
that coincided with the Moharram festival of the Shias, 
The Hindu merchants of Delhi then responded to a call 
for a hartal which lasted six days from 17 October 1917» 
The public support displayed for the hartal and the 
arrival of Edwin S * Montagu, Secretary for State for 
India, who arrived in Delhi to begin consultations on 
a reforms scheme resulted in a political meeting with 
an audience of over 8,000 on 26 November 1917« This 
meeting, like the meeting of 7 »000 Muslims on 21 May 
1 9 15» reflected the degree to which many of the 
inhabitants of the city had been politicised. The 
crucial difference between the two meetings, however, 
was the fact that the Muslim lower classes predominated 
at the latter meeting while the Hindu bourgeoisie 
predominated at the former meeting.
The Hindu bourgeoisie participated in the hartal 
of 17 October and public meeting of 26 November for 
several reasons. They participated in the hartal 
because that form of protest was peculiar to the Indian 
merchant community and reflected and reinforced the 
solidarity of those involved in this traditional 
calling. The fact that the merchants were amenable to 
this form of protest does not explain, however, why
they used it» The religious idiom, which the Home 
Rulers used in their conflict with the Administration 
and with the Shias, struck deep roots of religious 
sentiment in a community which was particularly 
concerned with the manifestations of religion. The 
sanatani and the Arya Samajist saw the hartal as a 
reaffirmation of the moral strength of Hinduism against 
the Administat ion and against the Muslim community, 
both of whom had trampled upon their religious 
susceptibilities. The most enthusiastic response, 
however, came from the petty bourgeois merchantsu The 
members of the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association, 
the Kirana Committee, the Indian Bankers Association 
and the panchayats of the grain, sugar, and ghee 
merchants looked upon the hartal as a chance to assert 
their will over the merchants in the Punjab Chamber 
of Commerce and the Delhi Piece Goods Association, the 
members of which controlled the largest resources of 
wealth, status and power in the city. The hartal, in 
fact, reflected the attempt of the non-Bania castes 
(those castes which contributed the majority of the 
petty bourgeois merchants and the majority of the Arya 
Samajists in the city) to consolidate and reinforce 
the advantages they had seized from the social and 
economic opportunities thrown open by the currents of 
modernisation and industrialisation. It was also an 
opportunity to attack the rigid lines of deference that 
were an integral part of traditional Hindu society,
And finally, the petty bourgeois merchants supported 
the hartal because they were beginning to feel the 
economic strain of three years of war.
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The fourth attempt to mobilise public support for 
political agitation in Delhi was the most successful»
The leaders who supported Gandhi's campaign against 
the Rowlatt Bills and who formed the Satyagraha Sabha 
engendered enough enthusiasm in the city for all the 
merchants to observe a hartal on 30 March 1919« Two 
riots also occurred on that day which saw five people 
killed and 14 wounded at the hands of the police and 
troops who were called in to quell the disturbance»
The inhabitants of the city then united against police 
repression and the following 19 days witnessed two 
hartals (a one-day hartal on 6 April and a nine-day 
hartal from the 10th to the 18th); two riots which 
added two more deaths and 12 more casualties to the 
martyrs of the 30th; 12 public meetings with audiences 
which ranged from 25,000 to 5 0,000; two public meetings 
which attracted 100,000 persons which included almost 
the entire available population of the city; and two 
occasions when Swami Shradhanand was invited to speak 
to the congregations at the two main mosques in the 
city» The extent of public consensus was reflected in 
the fact that on one of the occasions the Swami spoke 
to a huge audience of Hindus and Muslims in the Jama 
Masjid; and more importantly, he spoke from the pulpit, 
an act which, though forbidden by Islamic law, was 
supported by public acclaim.
The issues which were responsible for the 
overwhelming support shown during the Rowlatt Satyagraha 
were varied. The ostensible and immediate cause was 
the enactment of the Emergency Powers Bill on 19 March 
1919o But this Bill only acted as a focus for other
5^9
grievances and discontents shared by the inhabitants 
of the city of Delhi. Foremost among these was the 
acute economic distress suffered by all sections of 
society in the city» The distress was compounded by 
the fact that an influenza epidemic had carried off 
7,000 inhabitants in the city between September and 
November 1918; by the fact that prices were higher in 
the first three months of 1919 than they had been in
1918 (a fact which most of the lower classes found 
incomprehensible once the War had ended); and because 
the Administration had opened cheap grain shops and 
kerosene and salt depots during the War to alleviate 
distress but refused to do so once the War was over.
The Muslim student community and the lower classes 
were aroused over the stigma placed upon the ex-Shaikh- 
ul-Islam, Mahmud-ul-Hasan, by the Rowlatt Committee; 
over the continued incarceration of the Muslim 
internees; over the uncertainty that hung over the 
future integrity of the Khilafat and the holy places; 
and over the proscription of Dr Ansari's speech to 
the annual session of the All-India Moslem League of 
December I9I8 by the governments of the Punjab and the 
United Provinces. The Hindu bourgeoisie was aroused 
over the three extraordinary taxes imposed by the 
government on 1 April 1917, 1918, and 1919; over the 
catastrophic depression which hit the piece goods 
market after the unbounded speculation late in 1918; 
over the introduction of an intercaste marriage bill 
into the Imperial Legislative Council; and over the 
arrest and trial of a large number of Hindus for their 
part in the death of 30 Muslims during the riot at 
Karturpur in the United Provinces in September I9I8.
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The Hindu petty bourgeoisie .led the campaign for 
a hartal on 30 March 1919 just as they had on 17 October 
.19 17» In many ways they felt that their entry into 
politics in I9I7 had been successful and in March 1919 
they had the additional charisma of Mahatma Gandhi to 
lead them on. The riots and the repression by the 
police on the 30th gave the inhabitants of the city a 
sense of involvement which had been lacking in all the 
political demonstrations which preceded this one. The 
result was that the movement for which the leaders and 
their lieutenants had worked and canvassed, took on a 
life of its own. From the 31 March onward the leaders 
worked hard to restrain the movement while the 
lieutenants and minor leaders seized the opportunity to 
ride the crest of the wave of popular enthusiasm. The 
merchants observed a hartal on 6 April in opposition 
to the Satyagraha Sabha, that body which had been 
responsible for organising the hartal on 30 March. Just 
as the Hindu petty bourgeois merchants used this 
opportunity to assert themselves at the expense of their 
more eminent colleagues, the secondary leaders likewise 
became the spokesmen for the popular movement at the 
expense of the primary leaders of the city. The smaller 
fry, who also wanted to gain recognition and status 
urged the populace to more daring expressions of their 
discontent which led to the riots on 14 and 17 April.
The events which occurred between April .1919 and 
March 1922 resulted from two influences» The reaction 
of the Hindu petty bourgeoisie to the Rowlatt Satyagraha 
was one of horror. They had been enthusiastic over 
participation in the hartal which began on 10 April but
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they had not counted on the excesses which followed 
upon mass participation. This violence deprived them 
of a feeling of victory because it gave the axithorities 
the opportunity to show that Indians were not prepared 
to participate responsibly in political processes.
From April 1919 onward the Hindu petty bourgeoisie 
strictly eschewed participation in any political 
demonstrations which depended upon the support of the 
illiterate sections of the community. They supported 
many hartals during the non-co-operation movement but 
they would not support the boycott and swadeshi 
campaign» They did not allow their children to leave 
the schools; they did not support the national court; 
they limited the amount of funds they were willing to 
donate; and they withdrew their support from the 
volunteer associations.
This was even more true between February and June
1921 when the Hindu leaders attempted to achieve a 
mass following by raising the issues of boycott, 
swadeshi and swaraj before the traditional outcaste 
groups of the city. The bourgeoisie heaved a sigh of 
relief when the Chamars unanimously rejected swaraj, 
a decision which effectively ended any participation 
by lower class Hindus.
Yet another influence on the events between April
1919 and March 1922 was the issue raised over the 
integrity of the Khilafat and the holy places. The 
religious sentiment engendered by this issue drew the 
Muslim bourgeoisie into an alliance with the Muslim 
lower classes and from the first Khilafat Day on 17 
October 1919 until the end of the abortive civil
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disobedience campaign in 1922, these two groups provided 
the leadership and the support for the non-co-operation 
movement« The Muslim merchants, led by the Panjabian 
and Ah.l-i-Hadis communities (the wealthiest Muslim 
merchants and the most orthodox Muslims respectively) 
were in the vanguard during hartals, political and 
religious meetings, and the boycott campaign which 
reduced the number of Muslim students in the Anglo- 
Arabic High School by one-third, and turned the 
elections for the new Imperial Legislative Assembly 
into a victory for the non-co-operators. They also 
agreed to a compromise in the practice of garbani which 
saw the reduction of cattle sacrificed at Bakr-Id from 
250 in 1919 to 25 in 1921, an extraordinary performance 
by any measure. The Muslim lower classes supported the 
non-co-operation movement by attending political and 
religious meetings, but more importantly, by swelling 
the ranks of the volunteer associations.
The non-co-operation movement, in fact became a 
religious movement and therein lay the seeds of its 
demise. The supporters of the movement were gradually 
led by primary leaders to believe that support of the 
non-co-operation movement was a moral and political 
obligation. The lieutenants and minor leaders whipped 
up a good deal more support by convincing the same 
supporters that non-co-operation was a religious duty.
The primary leaders were constantly forced to restrain 
the enthusiasm of their followers who were impelled by 
their own propaganda and supporters to take ever more 
intransigent positions. The climax came when the 
government confiscated the fatwa which prohibited Muslims
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from joining the police or the army* The lack of any 
lead from the leaders and their success in restraining 
the secondary leaders from any response revealed that 
in the final analysis the secondary leaders could not 
oppose the dictates of the sharif leaders, The Muslim 
community became disenchanted with non-co-operation 
and its corollary, civil disobedience, because of the 
restraint of the sharif leaders, and also because of 
the total lack of support from the Hindu community.
The Muslim bourgeoisie supported its leaders, however, 
during the Municipal elections on 2k March 1922, and 
elected their candidates because they were still 
aroused over the Khilafat and because they saw local 
elections, as a means to consolidate and reinforce 
their entry into politics» The Banias, on the other 
hand, did not support the nationalists in this election, 
nor did the Hindu petty bourgeoisie outside the walls. 
Both these groups elected their own candidate, men. who 
would serve as staunch supporters of established 
economic interests and indirectly staunch supporters 
of the government. The petty bourgeoisie within the 
walls, however, once again used this opportunity to 
assert their support for a process which particularly 
manifested their rise to prominence in the city.
IV
There were several consequences of the development 
of a nationalist movement in the new imperial capital 
of India. The inhabitants of the city became aware of 
the fact that national issues affected local events. It
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is almost; impossible to conclude that Delhi's selection 
as the capital was most responsible for a change in the 
provincial attitude which took small notice of anything 
beyond local interest. The constant comings and 
goings of the nationalist leaders of India, of the 
members of the Imperial Legislative Council (and then 
Assembly), and of the members of the Government of 
India must have had some effect«, The reiteration from 
1917 onwards of the theme that imperial Delhi had a 
special responsibility to provide a lead for the rest 
of the country also must have had some effect. But 
without a contemporary study for comparison, it is 
impossible to say that the issues raised by the 
nationalist leaders in the city were not equally 
important. Regardless of the cause, the inhabitants 
of Delhi were interested in, and affected by, national 
issues.
The development of a nationalist movement in the 
new imperial capital of India also resulted in the 
politicisation of social groups which, because of the 
disadvantages of their economic and social position, 
had previously been excluded from participation in 
local politics. Nationalist politics created a new 
arena in which these groups could operate. Nationalist 
politics provided status and recognition for the 
participants, and it afforded immense opportunities 
for those groups in society who wished to become 
mobile. In this sense, nationalist politics benefited 
the petty bourgeoisie most because they enabled them 
to utilise politics to consolidate and reinforce the 
social and economic advantages they derived from
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participating in the process of modernisation. But the 
nationalist movement, by raising issues which were 
germane to all segments of the society, became a focus 
of interest for the lower classes in the society. And 
to the extent that they participated in meetings and 
volunteer associations in Delhi, they acquired a new 
political consciousness. This new consciousness had to 
await the franchise before politics could become a 
constructive focus of grievances and discontent.
The most significant consequence of the 
nationalist movement in Delhi was the effect it had 
upon parochial attitudes. The nationalist movement in 
Delhi was responsible for awakening a political 
consciousness among all classes and communities in the 
city. It was also responsible for heightening parochial 
attitudes among the inhabitants. By making people 
politically conscious of nationalist issues, the leaders 
raised the question - Why do Indians want swaraj? The 
answer, that swaraj was necessary for Indians to rule 
themselves, raised the more basic question - How will 
Indians rule themselves? This was the crucial question 
because once the neutral umpire had been removed from 
the scene, who would protect the interests of different 
sections of society, particularly the minorities. This 
was one reason why parochial attitudes were reinforced. 
Another reason was because the leaders had resorted to 
a religious idiom in order to gain mass support for 
their movement. In this sense political consciousness 
and religious consciousness proceeded apace.
Yet another reason for the rigid parochial attitudes 
which resulted from the first non-co-operation movement
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was the disenchantment of the Muslims for the Hindus 
after their first attempt to bury their differences 
and act in harmony for a political goal. The Muslims 
had joined the non-co-operation movement on the promise 
from Gandhi and others that the united support of 
Hindus and Muslims would bring enough pressure to bear 
upon the government to redress the grievances of both 
communities. And yet the Muslims had supported the 
movement far out of proportion to their numbers. More 
significantly, the Muslims had supported non-co- 
operation as a religious duty, and then Gandhi had 
suspended the movement on grounds of political 
expediency. A leader who could violate a religious 
duty for political expediency in one instance could do 
the same in others and was not to be trusted. The 
sacrifice of 1^9 cattle on Bakr-Id 1922 was the Muslim 
answer to their 'betrayal* at the hands of Gandhi and 
the Hindus who followed his lead in the first non-co- 
operation movement. In the future the Muslims of Delhi, 
indeed, the Muslims of India as a whole, were to exact 
an even more fearful price for their 'betrayal' at the 
hands of the Hindus of India.
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